INSIDE INFORMATION FROM KREMLIN HARD TO COME BY IN U.S.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000100170003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 13, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP
f r,- =~1 r t,n^~ t~.~Q WALL STREET JOURNAL
13 February 1984
UL', V
Inside Information
From Kremlin Hard
To Come By in U.S.
Lack of Intelligence Data
Has Officials "Speculating
4 On Andropov's Successor-
By DAvm IGNATIIJS i
StaffR JT w S Jo
WASHINGTON-Last Friday morning, as
the world reacted to the death of Soviet
leader Yuri Andropov, a cable arrived on
the desks of senior U.S. officials from an
American ambassador overseas. The cable
knowingly predicted that Mr. Andropov
would give up his post as Soviet head of
state next month, but remain as Communist
Party leader.
The ill-timed cable illustrates a basic in-
telligence-gathering problem for the U.S.:
At a time when the Soviet Union is going
et t alone IpoRPT O HE ALL T EET UHNAL -
through a crucial change of leadership, the
U.S. knows almost nothing about-decision-
making within the Kremlin.
"You would be shocked at how little we
know" about the Soviet Union, says a senior
administration official who reads the daily
flow of intelligence reports. "If we confessed
our ignorance, we'd be better off."
The lack of intelligence information is so
chronic that, according to one congressional
source, the U.S. "had absolutely no idea"
where the ailing Mr. Andropov was for more
than four months. By one account, U.S. in-
telligence agencies went at least 152 days
without being able to fix Mr. Andropov's lo-
cation. Previously, since 1922, the longest
the U.S. had ever been in the dark about a
Soviet leader's whereabouts was 10 days, ac-
cording to this source.
In the effort to locate Aar. Andropov, a
U.S. Embassy officer in Moscow at one point
stationed himself on a street corner near the
Kremlin and tried to spot the Soviet leader's
limousine. A motorcade -eventually ap-
peared, but the embassy man couldn't spot
Dir. Ahdropov.
"If there is a weakness in our intelli-
ence apparatus, it's our ability to figure
out what the leaders the Soviet Union are
oin to do in any-mven situation " says
Richard Helms-former director of the Cen-
tral Intelligence A ence. He notes that to
some cases "w v not even divine for
some tim
f et of it
The U.S. is in the dark now, as the Sovi-
ets are struggling to choose a new' leader,
because of its inability to penetrate the tiny
group of Soviet officials who are privy to
major decisions. Malcolm Toon, former U.S.
ambassador to the Soviet Union, estimates
that a maximum of 100 Soviet officials actu-
ally know what's going on-and they aren't
talking.
Inevitably, this causes some serious U.S.
miscalculations. Senior administration offi-
cials say they were convinced that Mr. An-
dropov would reappear in public last De-
cember at a scheduled meeting of the Su-
preme Soviet, partly because of Soviet leaks
that seem, in retrospect, to have been disin-
formation.
To be sure, there have been some recent
intelligence successes in evaluating the Sovi-
ets. Months ago,'U S: analysts correctly di-
agnosed that Mr. Andropov was suffering
from a kidney failure, complicated by diabe-
tes. "We knew be was going to die, but we
didn't know when," says an influential U.S.
official.
U.S. information about Mr. Andropov's
health came partly from several American
doctors who visited recently with Dr. Yev-
geny Chazov, a top Soviet medical authority
who treats members of the Politburo. U.S.
officials also note reports that the American
doctors who visited Dr. Chazov may have
provided. him with medical equipment to
help treat Mr. Andropov.
A senior administration official notes one
ironic benefit of the lack of inside informa-
tion about Kremlin politics: Because the
U.S. knows so little, it isn't tempted to try to
play favorites among the Soviet leadership.
The official argues that any such attempt to
manipulate Soviet decisions would be "a
snare and a delusion."
"Even if you owned a member of the Po-
litburo, that wouldn't give you the whole
story, explains another senior U.S. official.
"You would have to own them all."
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/23: CIA-RDP90-00552 R000100170003-1