US NOT THE MASTERMIND OF CHILE'S COUP

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000201400003-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 17, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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STAT
ARTICLE AP EARED BOSTON GLOBE
ON PAGE --.15
17 September 1983
US not the 'mastermind of Chile's coup-
JEFFREY DAVIDOW
WASHINGTON - The clash of police and
protesters on the streets of Santiago has be-
come a recurring event. The turmoil. and vio-
lence stimulates a kalaidescope of nightmar-
ish memories of the coup which toppled the Al-
lende regime. With America's gaze already-fo-
cused southward, Chile's continuing problems
and the 10th anniversary of-the overthrow of
Allende this. week provoked a considerable
amount of commentary and editorializing
about-the perceived responsibility of the Unit-
ed _States for the coup of 1973.-
The complicity of the US government 1n
the coup has entered the American political
psyche as an accepted fact. It forms the basis
for .the popular film "Missing," and insinu-
ates-itself into much of the current debate
about?US policy in Central America. But the
assumption of American responsibility for the
Chilean coup is misplaced and promotes a dis
tortion of reality which benefits neither this'
country nor Chile.
The facts about American involvement in
Chile,were well documented by investigators
led by Sen. Frank Church. The record shows -
that after Allende won a slight plurality over
two other candidates in the 1970 presidential
election, the White House went bonkers. Presi-
dent Nixon, fearful of a "second Cuba,"
whipped the CIA into frenetic activity designed
to prevent the Chilean Congress from validat-
ing the election results. Nixon failed. Allende
was inaugurated, promising the Chilean peo-
plea peaceful path to socialism. In Washing-
ton, Chile was placed on a back burner, but
not.forgotten..
For the next three years the -United States
covertly financed opposition political parties
and newspapers and manifested a policy of -
generalized financial and commercial hostility
towards the Allende regime. At the same time,
the United States offered Allende the possibil-
ity of better relations. if he would drop his in-
sistence on. nationalizing American compan-
ies without compensation. US policy was de-
signed to pressure Allende and to preserve a
democratic political option for the presidential
elections scheduled for 1976. The ethics and
wisdom.of the policy can, and should, be de-
bated. But the debate should recognize that
what the US Government did or did not. do
was. peripheral to the struggle taking place.:
among the Chilean people themselves.
Domestic opposition intensified through
1972 and 1973 as large segments of Chilean
society became fed up with Allende's broken
promises to protect the country's democratic
traditions. Chile's system of governmental
checks and balances was destroyed as Allende
disregarded court orders and congressional
dictates. Illegal takeovers of farms, factories,
and businesses rampaged, instigated by the
most radical elements of the governing coali-
tion. Finally., when convinced of the futility-of
finding a political solution and alarmed by-the
growing public violence and government-
sponsored dissension within their own ranks,
the military intervened. As the Church Com-
mittee found, the military conspirators nei-
ther sought nor received American assistance
in the coup.. The events of Sept. i 1.-.11.973
buried Chilean democracy, but it had been dy
ing for several years
Suspicion of ;American complicity in the
coup was immediate. Congressional investiga-
tors had already overturned the rock under
which ITT's unaccepted offer to the CIA to f1=
nance anti-Allende activities had been hiding.
More importantly, the Chilean coup caught us.
at a painful point in our history. The stench of
political and moral corruption hung over
Washington. Vice President Agnew resigned
shortly after the coup and Nixon, of course,
followed. Unlike Chile, the American system.
proved stronger than its leaders, but the odor
of decay lingered. adding our suspected in-
-volvement in the coup as another noisome ele-
ment.
The resulting self-flagellation was consis-
tent with the post-Watergate, post-Vietnam
perversion of,the myth of American omnipo-
tence which .had once powered the Cold War.
Our self-image changed from knight in shin-
ing armor to accomplice of the Prince of Dark-
ness, but the essential conceit ? remained:
American involvement is the crucial determi-
nant In the unfolding of every political drama. '
Does It really make any difference if we as-
:sumeresponsibility for a coup that was not of
our making? Why make a fuss? Quite apart_
from reinforcing a sentimental attachment to I
the truth, an understanding -of what ` hap-
pened in Chile would serve our, interests by .
reminding us that we are neither-as malevo -
lent as we sometimes fear .nor as powerful as
we' often foolishly believe.
G~ravci~
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2.
Chile would also profit from a dispassionate
review of the events which led to Allende's de-
mise. One way or another Chile will get an-
other opportunity to construct a democratic
society. If that effort is not based upon a frank
recognition of the domestic weaknesses which
destroyed the fabric of democracy from 1970 to
1973, the stage will be set for another failure
and for the return to more dictatorial rule.
Jeffrey Davidow, a State Department of
cer, was a fellow at Harvard's Center for in-
ternational Affairs in 1982-1983. The views
expressed are his own.
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