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December 22, 2016
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July 15, 2010
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August 1, 1982
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000302440016-3 ARTICLE AP PE 1:D 0 PLG fi-oin a post insidh' the national security council, the author watched hang mount the plVotal campaign of his life-an assault oli the soul of a tragically ntseriue president article By ROGER MORRIS IT BEGAN almost quietly. Early in Decem- ber 1968, ut his transition headquarters in New York's Hotel Pierre, on Fifth Avenue facing Central Park, President- elect Richard Nixon introduced to the press his choice as National Security Ad- visor, an unfamiliar Harvard professor named Henry Kissinger. Typically, it began, too, with a little deceit on a matter that would prove monumental. Having vouchsafed beforehand to a gratified Kissinger that they would "run foreign policy from the rr'hite House," Nixon proceeded to announce to the reporters that his new assistant would confine him- self to planning and leave diplomacy to a "strong Secretary of State" about to be named. Out of "eagerness to deflect any possible criticism," Nixon's public pretense was "substantially at variance" with their private intention, as Kissinger later delicately described it in his mem- oirs. It was also an omen of much more such variance to come. STA PLAYBOY AUGUST .1982 From the Pierre, Nixon and Kissinger fastened their absolute control over the governance of the country's international relations. They fashioned and implanted a new circuitry of decision making in which all the impulses of foreign policy fused in the White House, shorting out the bureaucracy and the Cabinet secre- taries. Yet in the hotel that December, a time Kissinger remembered as a "moment of charmed innocence," those fateful consequences were scarcely apparent. It was an unlikely dyarchy, the German- born academic strategist with a fondness for great power concerts and the Cali- fornia politician of native suspicion, bigotry and home-grown anticommu- nism. Least of all was there any foreshad- ow that their historic collaboration would produce one more figure-tea third man, who, raised in the strange inner ferment of their regime, would eventually succeed to Kissinger's place and pretend to Nixon's. Like the seizure of power at the Pierre, the extraordinary rise of Alexander Haig from 1969 to 1973 hap- pened largely out, of sight. Of the Nixon Administration policies in which his role was later questioned, none would be more charged for Haig than the covert U. S. intervention in Chile. Coming in the wakt of the wire taps and the Cambodian invasion, the Chilean episode in the autumn of 1970 possessed all the elements to excite its eventual 1975 Senatorial investigation and revelation: corporate bribery and scheming, White House intrigues, mili- tary conspirators, CIA agents passing money and guns at some predawn rendez- vous and, in the end, torture, tyranny and assassination. One of the few Latin nations with a firm tradition of nonmilitary democratic rule, Chile also had a history of ~ regular CIA intervention. The Eisenhower, Ken- nedy and Johnson Administrations all spent covert money to back pro-U. S. candidates, including $3,000,000 in propaganda and various secret subsidies in 1964 to ensure the defeat of Salvador Allende, the avowedly Marxist presiden- tial candidate of a loose Socialist/Com- munist/moderate coalition. In the 1970 election, however, Allende's Christian Democratic and rightist opposition was splintered and leaderless, and his victory seemed likely. Precisely what danger an Allende regime represented to Washing- ton was one of the tragic puzzles left when it was all over. In any case, Allende's prospective triumph at the polls rang alarm bells throughout the Administration's covert precincts early in 1970. The highly secret 40 Committee-a sub-Cabinet body chaired by Kissinger, staffed by Haig and responsible for overseeing clandestine operations-voted on 'March 25 to spend $135,000 on a "spoiling" opera- tion against Allende in the September Chilean election. That sum was sup- plemented by International Telephone and Telegraph's $350,000 payment to stave off nationalization of its lucrative holdings in Chile. Meeting again on June 27, the committee voted to in- crease the anti-Allende campaign fund to $300,000 and discussed bribing the Chilean congress in its final presidential certifying vote in October should Allen- de win the popular election. When Allende won in a free election on Sep- tember fourth, the committee allocated S250,000 to bribe members of the Chil- ean congress. It also launched still more covert actions prior to the October 24 congressional vote to prevent Allende's assumption of power "through either political or military means." Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000302440016-3