MAJOR POINTS INTESTIMONY BEFORE SENATE PANEL IN HAIG CONFIRMATION HEARINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000302440056-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: January 14, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000302440056-9
NEW YORK TIMES
14 JANUARY 1981
STAT
Major n : Be fore SenatePane
al _.Conf lrmatlpn Hearings I11
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. Following are excerpts from a transcript of the hearing in Washington yester-
day by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the confirmation of Alexander.
M. Haig Jr. as Secretary of State, as recorded by The New York Times:
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SENATOR PAUL Ss''SARBANES,
Democrat of. Maryland: - How impor-
tant is it that Government decisions be
made through regularly established
channels?
A. I think very. important. And I
think we cannot permit ourselves to be
frustrated by the realities of the cur-
rent environment in Washington of the f.
kind Mr. Biden, Senator Biden, talked
about: the .. leakage problem. Some- .
times that takes a great deal of persist-
ence and requires a number of failures
and disappointments..,. - ,
Q. Well, in view of that answer, what
would your thinking be on the way the
Cambodian bombing and the Chile
Track Two operation were handled? A.
Well, with respect to the Cambodian
bombing, I think it was very much in
line with past practices in American
history.
Q. Did those practices trouble you at
the time? .--
A. Not so long as I was assured and
I was - that the appropriate leaders of
the Congress were informed. I think in
the context of past practices, normally
- no one's perfect. No administration
is impeccable in these areas, and I
don't suppose the Nixon Administra-
tion was. But I think there's not a great
deal of reason to question that aspect of
;
the problem.,,,:,
Now you can question whether or not
the program itself should've been,
launched.-In that context, you know,.
I'm on the side of being very much in
favor of it. I know what those sanctu-
aries provided the . enemy, and I
thought it was a self-defeating position
for us to take, to permit them to enjoy,
those sanctuaries on that narrow strip
of land adjacent to South Vietnam.
Q. Now what about the Chilean Track
Two be waXLhat was handled?
A-YWell again,"and yot;: know every-!
body's perception is conditioned by
their level of involvement, and I know a
great deal more about Track Two after.
the event, and, as I prepared for a re-
quired testimony in 1975, than I think I
knew at the time. And I think, in hind-
sight;. that that's something that is not,
ever going to happen again. ?
In other words, if there were estab-
lished mechanisms, a 40 Committee de-
signed to deal with covert activity, and
there was a separate track established.'
But, you know, there were tracks in
other administrations. -
So, again, I want to be sure that we
don't single out one particular phase in
our history that suggests that it was
unique and, as a consequence, some-
thing very different. There were tracks
in Kennedy's Administration, on the
Cuban problem, outside of the old 303
Committee. That's clear and history
has confirmed that.
Operation in Chile
Q. Now, it's my understanding that
the Secretary of State at the time was
not aware of the Chilean Track Two
operation. Is that your understanding?
A. Yeah, I think that's probably true,
yes. :.,
Q. What do you think of a decision-
making process that excludes from-it,,
the Secretary of State, with respect to a
decision of that - an action of that
sort? A. It better. not happen on my
watch.
Q. Did you make a value judgment
about it then?
A. I wasn't really sensitive to
whether I should or didn't - or- should-,
n't have because I was not a function-
ary, in the formal sense of Track Two.
My recollections of the situation were I
was asked to take some reports from
the Central Intelligence Agency. And I
served as a conduit for a number of re--
ports that were received, which I'
learned later were under the format of
-Track Two.
I didn't sit in on the 40 Committee
meetings, I doubt - you know, frankly,
it wasn't an issue that I focused on,
Senator. Now it's very important th
at jj
that be understood here. L,,, _u 'r
=CWT=
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000302440056-9