ANALYSIS AND COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT IN SALT VERIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000302890002-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
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INTERNATIONAL SECURITY REVIEW
Spring 1980
Analysis and Compliance
Enforcement in SALT Verification
Senator Gordon J. Humphrey
The deteriorating state of Soviet-American relations at-
tending Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan has tended to
obscure an exceedingly important fact. This is, the Carter Ad-
ministration's announced intention to adhere to the terms of
the SALT II Treaty, in the absence of Senate ratification.
From both a political and a legal point of view, the wisdom of
that decision is dubious at best. But given the manifest flaws
in the terms of SALT II,1 and in particular our limited ability
to monitor and enforce Soviet compliance with its terms, the
Administration's decision is irresponsible.,
The Carter Administration, like the Nixon and Ford Ad-
ministrations before it, officially claims in public that the
Soviets have complied with all aspects of both elements of
SALT .1-the ABM Treaty and the Interim Executive Agree-
ment on Offensive Weapons. This is merely because the U.S.
has never charged the Soviets with a SALT violation. But the
true record of Soviet activities related to SALT I. which is
gradually coming into the open, shows that the Soviets have
not been in compliance with its terms in several important
cases, and that the Carter Administration has tolerated and in
some instances even concealed Soviet circumvention and viola-
tion. The Carter Administration's misleading of the Congress
and the American people on Soviet compliance with SALT I is
identical to the Nixon Administration's misleading of the Con-
gress and the people regarding both the meaning of the terms
of SALT I in 1972 and Soviet compliance from October 1972
through December 1976.
The consequences of this collective deception are far-
reaching, and emphasize the importance of adequate verifica-
tion in any arms control agreement. Moreover, what that en-
tails is more complex than is generally understood. Most
recognize that verification includes intelligence collection and
monitoring. But no matter how good that may be, the most im-
portant factors in SALT verification are the analysis and en- i
forcemeat of Soviet compliance., The purpose of this article is
to examine the problems of analysis and enforcement of com-
pliance in SALT verification, based on the record of SALT I
and some concerns that have recently arisen affecting the
.potential verification difficulties with SALT II.
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a uc 171J-1J
The SS-19 story is well-known. The Soviets replaced a light
ICBM, the SS-11, with the SS-19, a missile that should be
categorized as a "heavy" ICBM. The deployment of the SS-19
was an obvious circumvention of Article II of the SALT I In-
terim Agreement. In 1972 the U.S. threatened abrogation over
this event, but instead we merely questioned this occurrence
after a long delay in 1975. The Soviets were adamant that the
SS-19 be considered a light missile, even though the Soviets
have always themselves considered the SS-19 to be a heavy
ICBM. We accepted the Soviet's position immediately without
protest, and thus they were able to totally circumvent SALT
I's Article II.
The Administration argues that "the U.S. and the USSR
delegations have agreed in the draft text of the SALT II agree-
ment on a clear demarcation, in terms of missile launch weight
and throwweight, between light and heavy ICBMs. J0 This
U.S. claim is absolutely false. There is no agreed data on the
SS-19's launch weight and throwweight. It is also interesting
to note that the SS-19 was reportedly first flight-tested in early
1973, but it took U.S. intelligence until early 1975 to develop
estimates of its increased size and throw-weight with sufficient
confidence to "question" the Soviets." This was in an era, one
must point out, before large-scale Soviet telemetry encryption
and the loss of Iranian collection sites. If it took over two years
to determine the SS-19's characteristics confidently in the pre-
encryption days, how long will it take to determine the
characteristics of the five new fifth-generation Soviet ICBMs?
Moreover, U.S. uncertainties about the volumes of existing
Soviet ICBMs are reportedly in the ten-percent range, which is
already much greater than the five-percent increase that SALT
II allows in new ICBM volume. How can we verify changes of
five percent measured from a baseline which we only know to
within ten percent?
Compliance Enforcement and SALT II
The record of verification in SALT I, particularly with
regard to the problems of analysis and compliance enforce-
ment, is distinctly checkered. What is even more disturbing
are the lessons that can be drawn from that record concerning
Soviet duplicity and American credulity in the SALT process.
Both the SALT I ABM Treaty and the SALT I Interim
Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms explicitly stated in
their preambles that their purpose included the "strengthen-
ing of trust between states." Dr. Kissinger also emphasized
several times in May and June of 1972 that SALT I was sup-
posed to strengthen U.S.-Soviet trust. The Soviets themselves
have also stated that trust was important in SALT:
The SALT II agreement presupposes mutual trust and the creation
of an atmosphere of good will which would promote the improve-
ment of relations between the USSR and the United States.32
"Trust" was therefore an important concept in SALT.
However, recently published analyses of Soviet negotiating
deception in May 1972, together with the massive Soviet
camouflage and concealment effort since 1972, and the Soviet
reeord,of questionable compliance with important provisions
of SALT I, cast certain doubt on the concept of trust and good
faith in the SALT negotiations."
ccifiTIV
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trust in SALT. In a State Department document released in
1978, the Administration contradicts itself on the issue of
"trust." On page 8 the documents states: ". . . confidence and
trust ... are important to mutual efforts to establish and main-
tain strategic arms limitations."" Five pages later the same
document states: "... The United States does not rely on trust,
on Soviet intentions ... in assessing whether verification of a
SALT agreement is adequate."'
Probably because the present Administration does not
want to come to grips with the fact that there is now substan-
tial evidence of Soviet deception and bad faith in SALT
negotiating and compliance, the preamble to the SALT II
Treaty contains absolutely no reference at all to trust. This
omission is remarkable, and should raise important questions
about the Treaty. The Administration now concedes that
although we cannot trust the Russians, we can still "adequate-
ly" monitor, verify, and enforce Soviet compliance with SALT
II. The question of Soviet negotiating and operational decep-
tion is ignored by the Administration, as are the problems of
defining a violation and enforcing compliance.
The most serious problems with SALT verification, it
should be recalled, do not really deal with the collection and
monitoring of intelligence, although these are certainly impor-
tant. The real problems are analysis and compliance enforce-
ment. It does not do any good to collect good evidence on
Soviet strategic activities, if we fail to analyze and understand
it properly or to protest illegal Soviet actions.
We should also remember that collection and analysis takes
years. It is misleading for the Administration to claim that
SALT II will be "adequately" verified and enforced
"promptly," and that all "significant" violations will be
challenged, in light of the above examples of long delay, ob-
fuscation, and U.S. tolerance of important SALT I circumven-
tions by the Soviet Union. In fact, the available evidence sug-
gests that U.S. SALT verification capabilities are inadequate,
and that the intelligence bureaucracy charged with verifying
Soviet compliance with any SALT agreement is an unreliable
guarantor of our security.
The best indication of the unreliability of our intelligence
process is the fact that the historical record of Soviet activities
in SALT can be tampered with for political reasons by the
White House. Both evidence and analysis of SALT verification
issues have on occasions been suppressed within the U.S. in-
telligence community. As the Pike Congressional Committee
reported in 1975:
The spectre of important information, suggesting Soviet violation
of strategic arms limitations, purposely withheld for extended
periods of time from analysts, decision-makers, and Members of
Congress, has caused great controversy within the Intelligence
Community.'
And, as Admiral Elmo Zumwalt clearly demonstrated in his
January 1976 Aviation Week article:
... in six cases cited by Chairman Pike, key intelligence items were
withheld. at Kissinger's direction for periods in excess of two
months-in one case for almost six months."
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It is clear from the SALT 1 recora tnaL inLeuigence of pu"iukc
Soviet violation of the Treaty [sic] was, in some cases, and for a
time, withheld from Executive branch officials who had a need for
such information. (Emphasis added.)
But the Senate Intelligence Committee has failed to require
procedural changes in the Executive branch which would pre-
intelligence from being withheld in the future from Ex-
vent
ecutive and Legislative offices with a "need to know."
Moreover, there are still no procedures to prevent information
on Soviet SALT violations from being withheld from Congress.
There have also been public reports that even Dr. Zbigniew
Brzezinski has participated in the suppression of a highly-
classified CIA study on Soviet SALT deception.' Taken with
the evidence presented above, one cannot avoid concluding
that elements within the U.S. government have suppressed in-
telligence concerning Soviet non-compliance with all of the
SALT-related accords. This suppression, in my opinion, con-
stitutes a clear and present danger to our national security.
The obstacles thus posed to SALT verification, in general,
and compliance enforcement, in particular, are compounded by
two additional factors. First, there are now severe handicaps to
intelligence collection and monitoring of SALT II which did
not exist in 1972, when SALT I was signed. We now have to
deal with Soviet encryption of missile telemetry, which began
on a large scale in 1974. Further, since 1972 two expensive and
important U.S. intelligence satellites, the "KH-11" and
"Rhyolite," have been compromised by Soviet espionage.10
KH-11 was an imagery collection system and Rhyolite was a
signal intelligence collector. Indeed, Rhyolite's compromise
may have occurred before 1974, and may have contributed to
the Soviet decision to encrypt telemetry in the first place. The
KH-11 compromise may have stimulated more and better
Soviet strategic camouflage and concealment efforts. The U.S.
has. also lost the vital Iranian listening posts, and our in-
telligence facilities in Turkey are now also in jeopardy. Finally,
the CIA Director stated in April 1979 that U.S. intelligence
collection capabilities were at a peak now. " s is consis-
tent with other reports that budgetary constraints have forced
a cutback in technical collection capabilities, just as SALT II
would take effect.
Under SALT II, we will therefore actually have less collec-
tion capability than we had under SALT I, but the future
verification challenge will in fact be much greater. SALT iI en-
tails both quantitative and qualitative constraints on offensive
strategic weapons. These more ambitious constraints on
weapons characteristics embodied in SALT II should,
however, demand even better intelligence collection capability.
SALT I's largely quantitative constraints on ICBM and
SLBM numbers were a difficult enough challenge for U.S. in-
telligence. The reduced collection capabilities, together with
the remaining quantitative and even more difficult qualitative
constraints of SALT II, combine to make our verification
capability inadequate to the task set.
Second, all realistic observers should agree, that enforce-
ment of SALT compliance depends ultimately upon the
relative balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR. The
strategic balance, which is the subject of regulation in SALT,
is itself the ultimate measure of power and therefore the means
of compliance enforcement.
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It is therefore highly relevant to uncierstanu LnaL Lue
strategic balance has shifted dramatically against the U.S.
during the course of the 1969-1979 SALT decade. In 1969,
when SALT began, there was an approximate parity between
the U.S. and the Soviets in strategic forces, as measured in
numbers of delivery vehicles. Since then, however, the Soviets
have added over 1,000 new operational missile launchers and
well over 200 Backfire bombers, while the U.S. has unilaterally
maintained a constant number of missile launchers and has ac-
tually deactivated over 250 B-52 bombers. While the U.S. has
added about 6,000 warheads since 1970, the Soviets will easily
exceed the U.S. in warheads and in accuracy by the mid-1980's.
Stated another way, according to well-known analyses by the
CIA and RAND, the Soviets have spent over $100 billion more
than the U.S. during the 1969-1979 period on strategic forces
alone, about 250 percent of U.S. expenditures on strategic
forces each year for ten years.
Thus, the present unfavorable strategic balance of 2,060
U.S. launchers to well over 2,650 Soviet launchers has already
greatly reduced U.S. enforcement leverage in SALT I com-
pliance. But of even more concern, as the Soviets surpass us in
warhead numbers, accuracy, and counterforce capability, the
balance will worsen against us further in the future. The Ad-
ministration's own testimony on SALT I I indicates that two of
the three legs of our strategic Triad will be vulnerable to a
Soviet first strike by 1985, the last year of SALT II. Our
ICBMs already have become critically vulnerable in 1980, and
our bombers will be vulnerable before 1985. Half our SLBM
force is vulnerable now-that is the half in port-and even it
will be drawn down soon. Our patrolling SLBMs could well be
vulnerable even now, without our knowledge. Carter Ad-
ministration testimony acknowledges that we will not be able
to maintain "essential equivalence" throughout SALT II, and
that we will soon move inexorably toward a "minimum deter-
rence" posture. The Carter Administration refuses to deploy
Extremely Low Frequency communications to ensure SLBM
survivability, and refuses to consider even one "strategic
quick fix" such as deploying SLCMs on Polaris submarines.
In fact, fully within the terms of the SALT II Treaty, the
Soviets may be able to achieve a form of strategic superiority.
By 1985 they will be able to have 14,500 much more lethal
strategic warheads, to our planned 11,900, plus 375 intercon-
tinental Backfire bombers and thousands of other potential in-
tercontinental delivery vehicles not counted in the SALT
totals. Collectively, this adds up to counterforce supremacy.
(These excluded delivery vehicles are composed of over 1,300
old stockpiled ICBMs, three classes of submarine-based
ballistic and cruise missiles totaling over 350 launchers, hun-
dreds of SS-20/16s, and test and training ICBM launchers.)
The Soviets will have excluded from SALT II almost as many
strategic launchers as in their first-line forces. U.S. strategic
forces will be checkmated; mutual deterrence will have ended.
But the Administration does not seem to recognize either this
shift in the strategic balance or how it handicaps U.S. enforce-
ment of Soviet SALT compliance. In fact, enforcement of
Soviet compliance will become ever more difficult as the
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strategic balance continues to shift against us in the future.
The Soviets, however, recognize very well both the shift in
the strategic balance and the advantages this shift gives them,
Their concept of global power is the "correlation of forces,"
which includes military, political, economic, social, and
psychological factors. They also know that the correlation of
forces shifted in their favor in about 1971, as their military
literature points out clearly.
The basic problem with verification is the integrity of the
intelligence analysis and dissemination process. This is in-
herently a very fragile process, and damage to its integrity,
timeliness, and accuracy is extremely dangerous. Evidence
should never be suppressed. Competing and dissenting
analysis must be brought to the attention of our policymakers.
Common sense, the "American way," and the need for duplica-'
tion of functions and debate within the intelligence community,
suggest that dissent and competitive analysis should be en-
couraged, rather than being penalized as is so often the case.
Evidence that is withheld distorts intelligence analysis, and
delays in reporting findings prevent recognition of Soviet
deceptions, as the record of SALT I verification efforts clearly
indicates.
Second, even without considering the suppression and
distortion of intelligence regarding Soviet compliance with
SALT, it is readily apparent that the record of U.S. intelligence
collection and analysis in counting the numbers of both Soviet
ICBMs and SLBMs, the main quantitative constraints of
SALT I, is not good. In fact, U.S. intelligence miscounted both
of these levels during SALT I, and the bias was to
underestimate as throughout the 1960's. These heretofore
unrevealed miscounts were the result mostly of bad analysis.
Our declining collection capabilities suggest that such errors
are all too likely to be repeated in the future.
Third, we have seen that there are long delays in the
analysis of Soviet SALT compliance. Collection, analysis, and
enforcement are in fact not prompt, despite Administration
claims. In three cases it took respectively seven, three, and two
and one-half years after detection to "resolve" a compliance
question. Of even greater importance, after these long delays
final resolution of all significant compliance problems
amounted' to U.S. acquiescence in Soviet circumvention or
violation. The Soviets themselves have also falsified basic data
in SALT negotiations and compliance, and they have officially
lied to the U.S. several times. The U.S. has only once chal-
lenged Soviet falsification, but the Soviets evidently never cor-
rected the record or rectified the situation.
Finally, U.S. enforcement leverage is also weak and de-
clining. U.S. collection and analysis of Soviet SALT violations
are meaningless if the Soviets cannot be forced to comply. En-
forcement leverage is the single most essential factor in
verification, yet this is where we are the weakest. This is a
function of U.S. strategic and political weakness vis-a-vis the
Soviets. U.S. enforcement leverage has, in fact, decreased over
time, and may continue to decline in the future as the strategic
Co13
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balance itself continues to shift in favor of the USSR. During
the 1970's the Soviets were able to violate with impunity by
deploying strategic offensive weapons in Cuba the 1962
.agreements ending the Cuban Missile Crisis and the Cien-
fuegos Agreement of 1971, largely because of this shift. For
much the same reason, the U.S. has backed away from three
significant U.S. SALT I abrogation threats made in 1972,
despite clear-cut Soviet action which the U.S. warned would
cause our abrogation. The Soviets in fact went ahead and did
all three of these things, but the U.S. did not even protest.
The Soviets have thus taken advantage of the shifting
strategic balance and of the failure of U.S. political will to cir-
cumvent or openly violate the principal strategic arms limita-
tion agreements reached to date. There is no reason to assume
that the USSR will treat the proposed SALT II accords any
differently. Indeed, the decline in U.S. intelligence collection
capabilities (which hinders detection of violations) and in U.S.
strategic capabilities (which inhibits compliance enforcement)
suggest that the Soviets will be both more inclined to violate
SALT II, and better able to do so successfully, than was the
case with SALT I. The consequences of such Soviet behavior
could be disastrous for the U.S. and must be averted at all
costs.
The present compliance situation regarding SALT II is now
quite explicit. The U.S. has publicly pledged full compliance
with the provisions of both SALT I and SALT II pending
Senate ratification of SALT II. The Soviets, on the other hand,
have twice publicly disavowed their legal obligation under in-
ternational law not to do anything to defeat the object and pur-
pose of SALT II pending its ratification. The Soviets have
thus explicitly stated their intention not to comply with SALT
II. Moreover, their strategic force operations since the inva-
sion of Afghanistan are fully consistent with this Soviet
posture of noncompliance.
First, in January 1980 according to several public
aerospace industry reports, the Soviets tested their new
"Typhoon" SLBM with over 70 percent encryption (encoding)
of its radioed telemetry signals. This should be regarded as a
direct violation of SALT II provisions requiring that the
Soviets not use "deliberate concealment" measures to impair
U.S. ability to determine whether they are testing "heavy"
SLBMs.
Second, according to an Evans and Novak column of May
18, 1980, and a New York Times news report, the Soviets have
physically concealed with a canvas tarpaulin part of a newly
launched huge submarine which may carry the Typhoon
SLBM. This concealment reportedly may hide Typhoon
missile launchers. In any case, it arguably violates the SALT
II provisions which require that the Soviets allow the U.S. to
be able to establish the relationship between new missiles and
their launchers by refraining from concealment of either.
EXCERPTED
SID
IV, _~10
GO
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1. See the articles on this subject in International Security Review, Vol.
IV, No. II, Summer 1979.
2. This was the central argument of Carnes Lord, "Verification and the
Future of Arms Control," Strategic Review, Spring 1978.
3. Senator Jake Garn, "The Suppression of Information Concerning
Soviet SALT Violations By the U.S. Government," Policy Review, Summer
1979, pp 30, 31; Congressman Jack Kemp, "Congressional Expectations of
SALT II," Strategic Review, Winter 1979, p 23; Senator Jake Garn, "The
SALT IlVerification Myth," Strategic Review, Summer 1979, pp 19. 20;
Evans and Novak, Washington Post, Dec. 14, 1979.
4. Ibid.
5. See David S. Sullivan, "The Legacy of SALT I: Soviet Deception and
U.S. Retreat," Strategic Review, Winter 1979; David S. Sullivan, "A SALT
Debate: Continued Soviet Deception," Strategic Review, Fall 1979; David
S. Sullivan, Soviet SALT Deception, Coalition for Peace Through Strength,
December 1979; Garn, Policy Review, pp 30, 31; Kemp, Strategic Review, p
23; Garn, Strategic Review, pp 19, 20. See also Jack Anderson, "Vance
Credibility On Line Over SALT," Washington Post, September 21, 1979;
Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "A Pattern of Selective Cheating,"
Washington Post, October 3, 1979; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak,
"Verifying the Verification Report," Washington Post, October 7, 1979.
6. Garn, Policy Review, pp 30, 31; Kemp, Strategic Review, pp 19, 20,
implicit in SALT II Treaty text; Jack Anderson, "How the U.S. Monitors
Soviet Arms," Washington Post, September 15, 1979; Nicholas Daniloff,
"How We Spy on the Russians and Monitor SALT," Washington Post,
December 9, 1979.
7. Sullivan, Strategic Review, Winter and Fall 1979; Sullivan, Soviet
SALT Deception; Garn, Policy Review, pp 30, 31; Kemp, Strategic Review,
p 23; Garn, Strategic Review, pp 19, 20; see also Richard Burt, "U.S. Report
Says Soviet Attempts Deception on its Nuclear Strength," The New York
Times, September 26, 1979, p 4.
8. Military Implications of the Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on the Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, Hearing before the Committee on Armed Ser-
vices, U.S. Senate, 92nd Congress, June-July 1972, p 544.
9. Bernard Weintraub, "Pentagon Aides Say Moscow Has Mobile
Missiles Able to Reach Us," The New York Times, November 2, 1977;
Sullivan, Strategic Review, Fall and Winter 1979; Sullivan, Soviet SALT
Deception; Kemp, Strategic Review.
10. Sullivan, Strategic Review, Winter and Fall 1979; Sullivan, Soviet
SALT Deception; Garn, Policy Review, pp 30, 31; Kemp, Strategic Review,
p 23; Garn, Strategic Review, pp 19, 20.
11. William T. Lee, Understanding the Soviet Military Threat: How the
CIA Estimates Went Astray (National Strategy Information Center, 1976),
p43.
12. State Department SALT Compliance "White Paper," February
1978.
13. Garn, Policy Review, implicit in SALT II Treaty.
14. Sullivan, Strategic Review, Winter and Fall 1979; Sullivan, Soviet
SALT Deception; Garn, Policy Review, pp 30, 31; Kemp, Strategic Review,
p 23.
15. Air Force Magazine, September 1979, p 24.
16. SALT If Reference Guide, The White House, Spring 1979, questions
and answers.
17. Washington Post, June 18, 1979, p A14; Air Force Magazine,
September 1979, p 22; Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, "Violations of
the Test Ban?," Washington Post, September 1979, p 5; Congressional
Record, September 5, 1979, p H7354.
18. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Hearings on SALT II, July 11,
1979, afternoon, pp 92-94; The New York Times, August 6, 1979; ABC
News, July 20, 1979; Washington Post, August 1, 1979, p A21; William
Safire, "The MiGs of April," The New York Times, April 1979; Statement
by Dr. Kissinger to Senate Armed Services Committee, July 1979; Air
Force Magazine, September 1979, p 22; "Soviet Brigade: How the U.S.
Traced It," The New York Times, September 13, 1979; ABC News, October
1 and 5, 1979.
19. Bernard and Marion Kalb, Kissinger (Boston: Little Brown, 1974), p
320.
20. Pravda, August 7, 1978, quoted by Rostislav Tumkovskiy in
"Soviet-American Talks on the Limitation of Strategic Arms," Voprosy
Istorii, March 1979.
/L
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21. Garn, Policy Review, pp 30, 31; Kemp, Strategic Review, p 23; Garn,
Strategic Review, pp 19, 20, implicit in SALT II Treaty text; Anderson,
Washington Post, September 15, 1979; Daniloff, Washington Post,
December 9, 1979; see also Raymond L. Garthoff, "SALT and the Soviet
Military," Problems of Communism, January 1975.
22. Sullivan, Strategic Review, Winter and Fall 1979; Sullivan, Soviet
SALT Deception; Garn, Policy Review, pp 30, 31; Kemp, Strategic Review,
p 23; Garn, Strategic Review, pp 19, 20; Burt, The New York Times,
September 26, 1979, p 4.
23. Department of State, Analysis of SALT II Treaty, Selected
Documents Number 12A, p 19.
24. Department of State SALT Compliance "White Paper," February
1978.
25. Ibid.
26. Sullivan, Strategic Review, Winter and Fall 1979; Sullivan, Soviet
SALT Deception; Garn, Policy Review, pp 30, 31; Kemp, Strategic Review,
p 23; Garn, Strategic Review, pp 19, 20; Anderson, Washington Post,
September 21, 1979; Evans and Novak, Washington Post, October 3, 1979;
Evans.and Novak, Washington Post, October 7, 1979.
27. Air Force Magazine, January 1979, p 18.
28. Department of State SALT Compliance "White Paper," February
1978.
29. Air Force Magazine, November 1979, p 22; see also Sullivan,
Strategic Review, Winter and Fall 1979; Sullivan, Soviet SALT Deception;
Garn, Policy Review, pp 30, 31; Kemp, Strategic Review, p 23; Garn,
Strategic Review, pp 19, 20; Anderson, Washington Post, September 21,
1979; Evans and Novak, Washington Post, October 3 and 7, 1979,
30. Department of State, Selected Documents Number 7, August 1979.
p 5.
31. Congressman Jack Kemp, "The SS-19 and the New Soviet ICBMs
Vis-a-Vis SALT," Congressional Record, August 2, 1979, p E4076.
32. Izvestiya, May 6, 1979.
33. Sullivan, Strategic Review, Winter and Fall 1979; Sullivan, Soviet
SALT Deception; Gam, Policy Review, pp 30, 31; Kemp, Strategic Review,
p 23.
34. Department of State, Selected Documents Number 7, February
1978, p 8.
35. Ibid., p 13.
36. Garn, Policy Review, pp 30, 31.
37. "Zumwalt Disputes Policy on SALT," Aviation Week and Space
Technology, January 19, 1976, p 46.
38. Kemp, Congressional Record, p E4076; see also David Kahn, "Cryp-
tology Goes Public," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1979, p 148.
39. Defense/Space Business Daily, November 5, 1979, p 70.
40. Robert Lindsay, "Soviet Spies Got Data on Satellites Intended For
Monitoring Arms Pact," The New York Times, April 29, 1979, p 1.
41. Aerospace Daily, April 16, 1979, p 226.
Senator Gordon J. Humphrey (R: N.H.) served in the U.S. Air Force for four years. He attend.
ed the University of Maryland and George Washington University before taking up a career
as a pilot. Senator Humphrey was the first state director of the Conservative Caucus in New
Hampshire, and became a U.S. Senator in 1978. He is a member of the Senate Armed Services
Committee, the Human Resources Committee, and the Veterans Affairs Committee.
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