EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF THE IRAN OVERTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000303560040-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 1, 2010
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: November 16, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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BOSTON GLOBE
16 November 1986
Exploring the effects
of the Iran overture
As Reagan mission is detailed,
legal, political issues surface
President Reagan acknowl-
edged last week that for the past
18 months, members of his Na-
tional Security Council had been
meeting with Iranian officials in
an effort to open a diplomatic
channel and to free American
hostages, and that he had au-
thorized the shipment of weap-
ons to Iran. This examination by
Stephen Kurkjian. William Bee-
cher, Fred Kaplan and Adam
Pertman of the Globe's Washing-
ton bureau seeks to describe the
operation, to measure congres-
sional reaction to it and to assess
Its legal implications.
WASHINGTON - The two New
Englanders who are among those
charged with knowing the most
sensitive secrets of the US govern-
ment learned of the operation the
same way that everyone else in
America did, except for a handful
of people inside the White House -
they picked up their morning
newspapers.
But as the attention of most
readers was focused on coverage
of the elections that were to take
place that day. Nov. 4. the eyes of
Sens. William S. Cohen (R-Maine)
and Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.) were
riveted on the relatively modest
stories in the Washington and
New York papers: A pro-Syrian
news magazine in Beirut was re-
porting that the United States and
Iran had engaged In secret talks
that involved an exchange of mili-
tary supplies for American hos-
tages held in Lebanon.
"I know enough to take with a
grain of salt any news item that
comes out of that corner of the
world," said Cohen, who, like
Leahy, is a member of the Senate
Select Committee on Intelligence.
"My first reaction was. 'It couldn't
be. They'd never try anything
that hairy.' "
But less than two weeks later,
after a cascade of news coverage
had confirmed the essential out-
line of the story, President Rea-
gan, In a hastily called address to
the nation. acknowledged that for
the past 18 months members of
his National Security Council had
been meeting with two groups of
Iranian officials in an effort to
open a diplomatic channel with
Iran and free the hostages.
During that period of negotia-
tions. Reagan had publicly re-
ferred to Iran as the "new interna-
tional version of Murder Incorpo-
rated." Now, he was admitting
that he had authorized the ship-
ment of weapons, albeit "defen-
sive" in nature. to the government
of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.
Reagan and his advisers have
stressed that the mission had
been carried out for diplomatically
secure and honorably intentioned
reasons.
They hoped to bring an end to
the six years of hostile relations
between the two countries and to
bring home the hostages, who, by
most accounts, have been living
in a captive hell.
On a humanitarian level, the
mission has met with a degree of
success for Reagan. who has be-
come so concerned about the safe-
ty of the hostages that he is re-
ported to have been asking about
their status at practically every
morning meeting he has had with
his top advisers.
Three of the Americans - Rev.
Benjamin Weir. Rev. Lawrence
Martin Jenco and David P. Jacob-
sen - have been returned. Also.
there has been no indication of
any terrorist acts by Iran since
the talks began.
But as for normalizing rela-
tions with the strategically vital
country. the US mission apparent-
ly has fallen far short of its mark.
And five or six American hostages
- William Buckley has reporteaiy
been killed but no body has been
found - are still being held.
By week's end, some of the
mullahs closest to Khomeini were
mocking the president's efforts.
And congressional leaders, diplo-
matic specialists and allies were
raising serious questions about
the expertise of the foreign policy
apparatus of the Reagan adminis-
tration.
The 21-nation Arab League,
whose members generally support
Iraq, an Arab nation, in its war
with non-Arab Iran, called Rea-
gan's initiative a "new and dan-
gerous" element in relations be-
tween the Arab world and the
United States.
The league's secretary general,
Chedli Klibi, criticized the arms
deliveries as a "flagrant violation"
of the professed US neutrality in
the six-year war, and called re-
ports of Israel's role in the clan-
deetine arrangement particularly
disturbing.
While Foreign Minister Shimon
Peres has denied that Israel had
sold arms to Iran, Defense Minis-
ter Yitzhak Rabin would say only
that his country had never sold
any military items without the au-
thorization of the United States.
Israel described as key
Others, however, said that Is-
rael's role as an intermediary was
key. especially in the first ship-
ment of military supplies that ar-
rived in Iran on Sept. 14. 1985. thS
same day Weir. Presbyterian
minister, was relea
Quoting unnamed US officials.
The New York Times reported on
Thursday that the plane, a DC-8
cargo plane, delivered military
equipment to Iran as part of the
hostage negotiations.
After Weir's release, according
to The Washington Post, Reagan
called Peres to thank him for Is-
raeli's cooperation. While refusing
to confirm that Israel $iad been in-
volved in any shipments, the
Wblte House chief of staff, Donald
T. Regan. said Friday that the Is-
raelis were "trying to be helpful to
the United States in whatever way
they could."
The United States used a for-
eign intermediary in the 1985
shipment to Iran. In the early con-
tacts, Iranian officials voiced con-
ce(Pn that the middle-level officers
Continf
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of .the National Security Council
who conducted the early negotla-
tfdtns might not be speaking for
Reagan.
Knowing that only the presi-
dent could order a shipment of
weapons to Iran because of the
1979 arms embargo signed by
President Carter. the Iranian offi-
cials asked that US military sup-
plies be delivered to them.
Cabinet split
The request divided Reagan's
foreign policy advisers. Among
those who opposed the move were
Secretary of State George P.
Shultz and Defense Secretary Cas-
per W. Weinberger.
Most troublesome to specialists
in the field has been Reagan's de-
cision to shun the advice of cau-
tion from his institutional foreign
policy advisers and follow the rec-
ommendation of Adm. John M.
Poindexter, his assistant for na-
tional security affairs.
Speaking of the State and De-
fense departments, one former na-
tional security adviser said.
'.Those bureaucracies are the em:
bodiment of the wisdom of the
past and vnul (M.' lun the risk of
tarrying out a politically-motivat-
ed and amateurish operation."
But Reagan decided to go
ahead with the decision to provide
arms to the Iranians.
Four months after the first
shipment. he signed into law a se-
cret executive order that allowed
the United States to lift the embar-
go and carry out its own shipment
of military supplies to Iran.
At the same time, he ordered in
writing that the Central intelli-
genceiAgency play an "operation-
al" role In the negotiations and
that the agency deliberately with-
hold their Involvement from
House and Senate intelligence
agencies.
Although the administration is
required to inform Congress of sig-
nificant planned CIA intelligence
activities, officials said that the
president had the legal authority
to begin covert operations without
immediately informing Congress.
Several ]fey Republican and
Democrats members of Congress
disagreed.
After the first shipment went
out. and with the Iranian officials
assured that the National Security
Council officers represented Rea-
gan. further talks were held. At
least one took place in London
and another in the United States,
Regan said.
According to Regan a sense of
bartering enveloped the talks,
with the Iranians seeking more
military supplies, especially spare
parts for their aging jet aircraft,
and the Americatis asking for
more signs of good faith, such as
release of more hostages.
"In the Middle East you never
do anything in the first hour or
first day," Regan said on Friday.
"There have to be a number of
conversations and visits and this
has happened/'
Despite the prolonged negotia-
tions. Regan said, the United
States never knew what connec-
tion the Iranian officials had with
Khomeini.
And when the talks with a first
group broke down and discus-
sions began with a second, more
radical faction, the United States
still did not know if Khomeini had
approved Of the negotiations.
The most that is known. Regan
said, is that "these people are not
opposed to the ayatollah: they are
part of his government."
The talks with the second
group reached an intense phase
last spring, and in May Reagan
authorized Robert C. McFarlane,
his former national security advi-
sor, to make a secret visit to Teh-
ran. Accompanying McFarlane
were several other US officials, in-
cluding Col. Oliver North Jr. of the
National Security Council staff.
There is disagree lent on the
success of McFarlane's trip. Ac-
cording to the White House,
McFarlane's group met with Iran-
ian officials and furthered the ne-
gotiations. Hojatoleslam Hashemi
Rafsanjani. the speaker of Iran's
Parliament, has asserted that
McFarlane's group was locked in
a Tehran hotel room and was nev-
er allowed to confer with any Iran-
ians.
Adding further confusion to
McFarlane's role is a report in the
latest edition of the same Beirut-
based magazine that originally
broke the story of the negotia-
tions.
According to that magazine.
as-Shiraa. McFarlane made two
trips to Tehran, in July and Sep-
tember, and, more significantly,
took airplane spare parts to Iran
and turned them over to the Iran-
ian Air Force.
"It was only after the air force
Improved its performance as a re-
sult of the US supplies, by shoot-
ing down three Iraqi jets inside
five days, that the Iranian govern-
ment was convinced of the seri-
ousness of the American offer."
the magazine said.
The White House, however. in-
sists that since planes are consid-
ered "offensive" in nature, no
spare parts were ever delivered to
the Iranians - not In the first
shipment that was allegedly made
through Israeli intermediaries and
not in the second two, which re-
portedly took place last July and .
October.
At about the time the second
two shipments were reported to
have been made, Shiite Moslems
successively released two other
American hostages. Jenco, a Ro-
man Catholic priest, and Jacob-
sen, director of the American Uni-
versity Hospital in Beirut.
But the White House. In an ef-
fort to show that it had not be-
trayed the Western policy not to
provide ransom to terrorist
groups, has been forced to say
that such releases were only "co-
incidental" to the shipments.
Or, as Reagan told a group on
Friday, "that the Iranians have
used their influence to help free
American hostages in Lebanon
has been a bonus that has come
with the opening of these chan-
nels of communication."
The backlash
on Capitol Hill
By secretly using his National
Security Council to orchestrate a
new policy toward Iran, Reagan
has provoked a backlash in Con-
gress, and members foresee not
only committee investigations but
also legislative attempts to pre-
vent future enterprises of this
type.
Most of the complaints about
the White House operation have
centered on the effects of linking
of arms shipments to Iran with
Iran's help in getting American
hostages released from Lebanon.
Still. Congress plans to focus its
investigations less on the results
of the initiative than on Its ori-
gins.
rnntinued
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3
They maintain that the plan
was conceived and executed by
the National Security Council in
an attempt to escape congression-
al scrutiny, since the federal agen-
cies that could have run such an
operation are legally subject to
oversight by various committees
in both houses.
Some officials at those other
agencies, the State Department,
the Defense Department, also
were upset that they had been ex-
cluded from the process.
Sen. Robert Byrd (D-W.Va.),
who is expected to become the
chamber's majority leader in Jan-
uary, has directed his staff to
write legislation mandating that
all US covert operations be report-
ed to appropriate congressional
leaders. He has suggested that the
president's national security ad-
viser may have to become subject
to Senate confirmation as well.
The first of the congressional
probes, by the House Intelligence
Committee, Js scheduled to begin
as early as next Friday, and more
are anticipated when the 100th
Congress convenes in January.
The Judiciary, Foreign Affairs
and Intelligence committees in
both chambers are considering
holding hearings, and a source on
the House Armed Services Com-
mittee said the panel's chairman,
Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.), had di-
rected his staff to determine if it
should do the same.
Leahy, the ranking Democrat
on the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee, said the result of increased
congressional supervision would
be to Impair some covert oper-
ations. But he asserted that legis-
lators may impose restrictions
anyway if "the president doesn't
develop a sense of responsibility."
"I have warned them that it's a
very, very dangerous thing they're
doing." Leahy said, referring to
the administration.
"If the president doesn't make
It clear that he knows this was a
poor policy," he said, "they run
the real risk of Congress cutting
them off entirely."
? Leahy has been among the
most vocal critics of the adminis-
tration policy. He has maintained
that the White House had under-
mined the chances for a biparti-
san foreign policy, and argued
that it acted on dubious legal
grounds.
"It's not against the law to
have diplomacy operating out of
there," he said of the National Se-
curity Council, "but it is, at the
very least, a violation of the spirit
of the law if you're doing It to
avoid oversight procedures."
Leahy was referring to Section
501 of the National Security Act,
which provides guidelines for noti-
fying congressional leaders re-
garding covert operations.
The standard procedure is to
notify the heads of both parties
and pertinent committee chair-
man before an operation takes
place. If the operation is sensitive,
only four top GOP and four Demo-
cratic officials have to be notified,
and if an operation is extraordi-
narily sensitive, the act stipulates
only that notification take place
"in timely fashion."
The administration maintains
that the last criterion applied in
this case, and that proper notifica-
tion of Congress had been made
last week. Regan, told reporters
Friday that Attorney General Ed-
win Meese 3d had investigated the
luestion and had determined that
no laws had been broken.
Leahy, voicing a criticism oth-
~r members of Congress have
made, said he did not believe that
"the definition of timely is .
after there have been so many
leaks that we've already read
about it in the papers."
The Dipldmatic Security and
Anti-Terrorist Act of 1986 forbids
the transfer of more than $1 mil-
lion in munitions or military tech-
nology to any country that the
Secretary of State has identified
as aiding or conducting terrorism.
Iran has been tagged as such a
country.
The act notes that the presi-
dent may waive this prohibition.
but only If he determines the
transfer is "important" to nation-
al security and if he submits to
Congress a report "describing the
proposed export" and justifying
his decision. The act also says the
waiver expires after 90 days from
the time the report is delivered to
Capitol Hill.
Apparent violation
Congressional officials say the
words "proposed sale" and the
provision of an expiration date for
the waiver indicate that the presi-
dent is required to submit the
waiver and report before the sale
is made. President Reagan did not
do that in this case.
The act was signed Into law on
Aug. 27. The last arms delivery.
which was reportedly sent to Iran
in October, thus would have gone
to Iran well after the law went into
effect.
Reagan and his officials have
been deliberately vague on just
what was been delivered to Iran.
But they have suggested that it
may have included such "defen-
sive" weapons as antiaircraft and
antitank missiles.
There also has been no official
word on how much was transport-
ed. But using the White House's
description that ti" supplies could
fit into a cargo p,.i c, such as a C-
5 or 747, observers have speculat-
ed that the material's worth was
well above the $1 million thresh-
old of the 1986 law.
According to the Air Force, the
the C-5 can be loaded with
769,000 pounds of cargo. Accofd-
Ing to a Boeing spokesman. the
747 can carry 775,000 pounds.
Said a House aide. "Even if we
sold them hamburgers, it would
cost more than that."
Complicating court cases
From another legal angle. Jus-
tice Department officials are re-
portedly concerned that revela-
tions of the secret aims sales
could seriously complicate pros-
ecution of dozens of people on trial
on charges of smuggling weapons
to Iran.
Meese, as a member of the Na-
tional Security Council. took part
in tht decision to sell arms to Iran
- while at the same time, donning
his hat as attorney general, push-
ing hard for arrests and convec-
tions of US citizens privately do-
ing the same thing.
At a breakfast with reporters
on Friday. Regan said, when
asked about this point. "The
president has certain powers that
are given to determine foreign
policy that are not given to ordi-
nary citizens."
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