INTERVIEW WITH DR. CLINE AND MR. LEVCHENKO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 29, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
RADIO TV REPORTS, N~
4701 WILLARD AVENUE, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND 20815 [phone]
PROGRAM Panorama STATION W T T G- T V
DATE October 29, 1985
STAT
Washington, D.C.
STAT
MAURY POVICH: You will be seeing it in Newsweek
magazine this week and just about every other magazine. And in a
tangential way, it's on the front page of every newspaper, it led
our newscast last night. We're talking about spying. It has
finally come out from underneath the wraps. People are
defecting. Spies are getting caught, they're being tried,
they're being convicted, they're being exchanged.
What is happening all of a sudden in the spy world? It
seems as if John LeCarre all of a sudden has gone public.
We're going to get an overview of this, please, first
from Dr. George Carver, who is a senior fellow at the Georgetown
Center for Strategic and International Studies, and also has 26
years at the Central Intelligence Agency, a Fulbright Scholar, a
doctor in political theory from Oxford.
And nice to have you with us.
GEORGE CARVER: Always a pleasure to be here.
POVICH: Is this a phenomenon that is going on?
CARVER: Well, it's been going on for a long time. It's
just you had a rash of things breaking into public. But it's a
game that has existed as long as humans have been around.
POVICH: It seems, though, the pressure is on from both
sides of the spectrum, both from the Communists and from us.
CARVER: Well, the pressure is on, particularly on the
Communist side, because they are trying very hard to work in the
OFFICES IN: WASHINGTON DC, ? NEW YORK ? LOS ANGELES ? CHICAGO ? DETROIT ? AND OTHER PRINCIPAL CITIES
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
field of high-tech, they're trying very hard to get information
on how Mr. Reagan, President Reagan plans to play the summit.
There's a great deal of emphasis on production, particularly with
a new General Secretary. And that inclines people, at times, to
be careless and take risks.
POVICH: What happens, for instance, when you read a
story about a CIA employee, a fellow named Howard, all of a
sudden skipping the country. Apparently, there are reports that
he is in Moscow. And he was giving the Russians, apparently,
some high-level information about our agents.
CARVER: Well, when I read that I get very upset,
because -- hindsight's always 20/20. But if Howard was that much
of a sour apple -- he's entitled to a presumption of innocence
until he's convicted, of course. But if he is guilty, as he
appears to be, then he should have never been hired in the first
place. But it's always easy to say what should or should not
have been done. The tougher problem is to take the steps
necessary to insure that it doesn't happen again.
POVICH: Now, apparently someone like that, even though
on a low level of the -- lower levels of the CIA, apparently had
information about names of double agents, for instance, that we
were using.
CARVER: Well, not really. He obviously had some
information because he was on deck for an assignment in Moscow
and he had gone through the training that people being assigned
to Moscow are gone through, and he apparently knew the identities
of people whom he was going to assist, and may indeed have
compromised them to the Soviet Union. And if he did, and if the
United States can ever get its hands on him, I hope that he
willnot get off lightly with five years in prison followed by a
nice parole.
POVICH: Now let me ask you about that, because you just
made mention of that. Do you feel that that plea bargain
yesterday was an outrageous plea bargain on the part of the
government?
CARVER: Well, I don't think it was outrageous, Maury.
Personally -- I tend to have been born in the wrong century -- I
would have liked to have seen Walker keel-hauled and then swung
from the highest available yardarm. But you can't do that in
peacetime. And the government was faced with a very sticky
problem. It needed his cooperation to find out the details of
how the Soviets had recruited him, how he'd contacted with them.
It also...
POVICH: And the information.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
CARVER: And the information that he'd passed them, what
their requirements were.
It also would much have preferred not to try this, or
any, espionage case in open court. Because when you go into open
court, under our legal system, which we wouldn't want to change,
a defense lawyer could use the discovery process to put the
government over a barrel and say, "You be nice to my client, or
I'm going to bring out so much information in the public that
it's going to make your bad problem even worse."
So if you can finesse that, you're better off.
POVICH: What of, for instance, what has happened in
Great Britain and West Germany, the spy world? The fact that
Soviets, a Soviet defector came to Great Britain, all of a sudden
25 Soviet members of the embassy there were sent home. Then the
Soviet Union retaliates by sending British diplomats home. Is
that -- are there pieces of a puzzle? Is this a puzzle, or are
these completely separate acts going on?
CARVER: Well, the acts you've just mentioned clearly
are related. The Gordievski, the senior resident in London, the
head of all KGB activities in the United Kingdom, defects to the
British, defects publicly. It turns out he's worked for the
British for ten years. The British then send 25 of the senior
people whom he identified...
POVICH: Who he's fingered.
CARVER: Whom he's fingered. The Soviets get a little
miffed and they retaliate in kind by grabbing the first 25
Britons they can find and dispatching them from Moscow. That's
interconnected.
Whether or not what happened in Britain and what
happened in Germany are related is another and more complicated
question. I can give you and your listeners one eminently
plausible hypothesis showing that they are and another that's
equally plausible showing that they aren't.
POVICH: The fellow that you just mentioned, Gordievski.
He is considered a big fish, is he not?
CARVER: Gordievski is a very, very senior person. In
fact, Gordievski and Yurchenko, the man who defected to the
United States, are probably the two most senior defectors that we
have had in the last 25-odd years.
POVICH: Is it not true, then, that some heads would
probably roll at the KGB back home?
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
CARVER: Well, if they were rolled, both literally as
well as metaphorically, the last thing in the world I would want
to be, or to have been, is either Mr. Gordievski or Mr.
Yurchenko's direct superior or direct subordinate, because those
who worked too closely with him are going to get one-way tickets
to very cold gulags, where they will spend a very long time.
If Chebrikov had not been -- Chebrikov is the current
head of the KGB. If he had not been Andropov's handpicked
successor and had not played the role that he played in helping
make Mikhail Gorbachev the General Secretary, I wouldn't bet the
mortgage on his own tenure in that job. Were his head to roll,
it would be a political earthquake. But I don't think that will
happen. But many of his subordinates will pay with their
careers, if not their lives.
POVICH: So, on balance, you think that in this latest
surge of spy activities that have gone public, in terms of
defections, the Soviets are in far worse shape than we are, even
though we've apparently lost a CIA man to them.
CARVER: Maury, on balance, we've scored three
touchdowns and sacked two Red quarterbacks. They've broken our
pass defense once and scored a first down. I think, on balance,
we're way ahead of the game.
POVICH: Even if you add in the Walkers?
CARVER: Even if you add in the Walkers. We have to
spot them one touchdown on the Walkers, but we're still ahead on
points.
POVICH: How do you score this game?
CARVER: With great difficulty. And you have to
recognize that the game analogy is useful in a certain context,
but dangerous in others, because it's not a game that ever has a
beginning. I can't tell you I'm in the first quarter, the second
quarter, the third quarter, and at the end of the fourth we add
up the score, shake hands, and all go out and have a drink
together. This has been going on for decades and will continue
to go on for decades, and you have to sort of constantly weigh
the balance and the equities.
At the moment, we have been doing rather better than the
Soviets. But that's no grounds from complacency. And the very
fact of the Howard and the Walker cases shows how much work we
have to do internally.
POVICH: The government leads the American people to
believe that our technology, our know-how, our secrets are more
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
important than-the Russian secrets because their technoogy is in
a crude positicm, ours is sophisticated.
'that's the case, who
cares if they -- why do we want their secrets?
we have their secrets or not? Who cares whether
want to knowVhow adWvealnlc,edwethweaint not just
technoloqy technology, but we
9Y e is.
POVICH: But we've been led to believe, the
to believe their technology is not advanced at all in le
ours. - terms o of
CARVER: Well, the public has been seriousl
certain fields. I mean I find, for exam le y misled in
that the Russians are huffing and puffing about the alleged
pace, or our SDI things, when they've been
working in the filed of military space technology for over two
decades and have gone very far in it.
POVICH: So we would still like to know how advanced
they are.
CARVER: We need to know where they are. We need to
know what they know about our material.
they're planning. And we need to know manW
e need to know what y intelligence field, not just with respect to ot
the thin in th
that only human sources can get us.
herSoviets Union,
POVICH: I read an article recently in the Manchester
Guardian on what a diplomat is, says it's well known in the diplomatiicpfield thatAadlittle spying
g
is okay. I mean is that true? I mean that we expect a little
spying from all diplomats.
CARVER: Well, that's like...
POVICH: I mean is there a little bit pregnant? Can you
be a little bit pregnant?
CARVER: Well, was saying that alittle pregnancyyisgokay. I lean a girls
are sent abroad to represent their countries'/affairs Let's forget what 19th Century Britain observed: s not
gentleman sent abroad to lie for his country. A diplomat is a
POVICH: To lie for his country. Right.
CARVER: Now, in keeping his eyes and ears open, or
hers, to pick up whatever is useful, But there's a great deal of differenceobetw encthattand spyino.
and consciously breaking another country's laws to try to?get out
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
information that that country is trying very hard to protect.
And that is not a task for diplomats, that's a task for
professionals.
POVICH: What have we decided here in terms of the
numbers of Soviets and Russians who are here, the freedom that
they have in this country? I mean do you feel that there's a
sense of urgency that we should restrict diplomats' movements
here in this country?
CARVER: I feel a sense of urgency about coping with a
very serious problem. It's not soluble because we have an open
society and don't want to change it. But every third Russian, if
not every second one, works for the Soviet intelligence service,
the KGB, or is a co-optee. And when they have free run of our
country in a way that our diplomats and others don't have free
run of theirs, we have an imbalance we have to correct.
POVICH: I thank you so much, George Carver, for being
with us, from Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International
studies and a 26-year veteran of the CIA. George Carver.
We're going to continue with this. We are going to meet
another, I guess, colleague of yours, Ray Cline, at the CIA; as
well as a man who probably knows more than any other what it is
like to be a spy.
POVICH: Please welcome to Panorama -- Dr. Ray Cline is
a senior associate at the Georgetown Center for Strategic and
International Studies, formerly with the CIA for 31 years, I
guess, Deputy Director for Intelligence at the CIA. If there's
anyone who knows anything about the intelligence that the CIA is
able to gather, Dr. Cline is one. He has a Ph.D., himself, from
Harvard and he studied at Oxford as well.
And also please welcome to Panorama Stanislav
Alexandrovich Levchenko, a former KGB major, who defected to the
United States in 1979. He was stationed in Japan. He grew
disillusioned with the cynicism of Soviet Communism. And as he
saw a free society operate, his Christian moral standards were
reinforced to the point where he could no longer tolerate the KGB
and their activities, and he defected.
Nice to have you with us, Mr. Levchenko.
Your familiar with the Levchenko case, Dr. Cline.
RAY CLINE: I think it's a great tribute to the differ-
ence between our two societies that Mr. Levchenko came to give us
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
some assistance on dealing with the very tough, unscrupulous
intelligence system that the Soviet Union operates.
POVICH: Let me ask you, as I asked George Carver. Is
there anything unique, what's going on now in terms of
defections, in terms of Russian defections, and what is happening
here in this country, when all of a sudden we seem to have more
spies?
CLINE: Well, I think there are two phenomena, Maury,
quite different, because we're such different societies. The
change of an administration in an open society like ours doesn't
have any effect on the professionals in the intelligence
business, and there's no ideological problem in our country. Our
American intelligence difficulties have been with people who
wanted to make money. They were greedy.
POVICH: Is that surprising to you, that the motive for
Americans to spy is one of greed?
CLINE: It's not surprising, but it is something that
didn't happen in the first generation of intelligence activity in
our country. In fact, we have been remarkably free from any
high-level penetrations.
POVICH: You never believed the mole theories in terms
CLINE: I don't believe the mole theory, although you
always have to look for the moles. They you probably won't find
them.
I believe that our intelligence system was built on the
experience of World War II and the Korean War, and it recruited a
generation of people who created the CIA.
POVICH: The old OSS people.
CLINE: The old OSS crowd. Bill Casey was one of them.
I was one of them. And we really had tremendously high morale
and no sense of trying to achieve personal satisfaction. We felt
that something important was being done in intelligence.
So this Walker case indicates that that system can be
penetrated. But it was not the intelligence agencies that were
penetrated, it was the military services.
POVICH: On the part of the Soviets, you feel that
because there have been four leaders, let's say, in the past five
years, six years in the Soviet Union, that turmoil has...
CLINE: My feeling is that the change of leadership, and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
even a generational change in the leadership of the Soviet Union,
has caused a good bit of uncertainty and doubt as to where the
Soviet Union is going inside the Soviet Union. Now, it'll
probably keep going about the same place it always goes, but the
individuals concerned naturally are concerned about their
futures. And once one intelligence officer makes a break, then
he jeopardizes others.
The last time we saw a number of defections in the
Soviet Union of this high a caliber, or something comparable, was
way back when Beria was shot, after the death of Stalin. There
hasn't been anything quite of this scale since.
So, something we don't understand very well is going on
in Moscow.
POVICH: Well, then let's turn to Mr. Levchenko.
Let's talk about why you decided to leave your country
and, in fact, in effect, leave your loyalty, Mr. Levchenko. What
brought you to it?
STANISLAV LEVCHENKO: [Inaudible]... quite long road.
Probably the length of it was about 20 years, when I went through
all kinds of soul-searching processes. And I was exposed to many
things in the Soviet Union which even -- to which many Soviets
are not exposed, themselves. And most of these things were very
negative, so they opened my eyes on quite interesting parts of
the teaching of the Soviet Politburo, especially the way they are
influencing and manipulating the foreign Free World public
opinion.
So, finally I came to the point when I not only could
stand it -- could not stand it anymore, but I wanted to fight it.
And, you know, in my position of KGB major, you know, you can't
really fight that organization from within. You just disappear
in the first few days. So that is why I decided to ask the U.S.
Government for political asylum and to lead very productive and
active life here, which is exactly what I do now.
POVICH: Were you helped at all? In other words, did
you do this on your own? Did you just walk in and say, "I want
to defect?" Or were you helped? Did you have to throw some
signs out?
LEVCHENKO: I did it entirely on my own. And I
personally will never forget is that I got political asylum, a
decision on political asylum within six hours I asked for it.
And it was late night, Washington time. So I suppose quite a few
people were probably wakened up.
POVICH: Did you have to promise the United States
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
STAT
Whiles for instance, when we're speaking about the
Western countries' intelligence services, or counterintelligence
services, people working there, they are working in the interests
of the democracy, of the good guys.
So, those people who don't want to be bad guys anymore,
who don't want to be bad guys themselves, you know, they can't
stand it anymore and reach the point that they want to defect, as
you call it, they ask for political asylum.
CLINE: So when Mr. Levchenko wants to join the good
guys, we're delighted. And I didn't have anything to do with it.
I was already retired from government. But I'm sure the pattern
of giving him an opportunity to help the United States, because
he had made that decision, is the right pattern.
POVICH: Let me ask Mr. Levchenko here -- we were
talking about morality. If morality, in effect, in terms of your
Christian ethic, over a period of years led you to leave the
Soviet Union, now you're going to be helpful to the United
States, let's say you mention some people that are with the KGB,
or something like that, and then they get into trouble. I mean
aren't you -- morality can exist on all sides of this issue, can
it not?
LEVCHENKO: You know, you can't be ideal person
throughout every situation of your life. However, you know, if
you want to go into all, I mean, this intricate parts of the
thing, I can tell you that since probably about 20 years, you
know, if somebody in the Soviet KGB, for instance, gets exposed,
he is not fired just for this thing, he's not thrown out, and
he's not going into gulag just for that.
LEVCHENKO: No, no, no.
So, I cannot say that their career -- career-wise, you
know, people don't have setbacks. Of course they have. No doubt
about that. But at the same time, believe me, you won't find too
many good guys in KGB at all, to begin with.
POVICH: I was going to ask you that. Were you an --
you must have been an exception.
LEVCHENKO: I was part of minority. Yes.
POVICH: How many people, for instance, in the KGB do
you think have a feeling of the Christian moral ethic the way you
did?
LEVCHENKO: I think minority does have, and they keep
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
Government that you would be cooperative in answering their
questions?
LEVCHENKO: No, there were no conditions attached to
that at all.
LEVCHENKO: No conditions. None. No conditions. And
it is very important...
POVICH: Isn't that unique? I mean we don't seem to...
LEVCHENKO: I don't think U.S. Government attaches any
conditions to the Soviet officials who ask for political asylum.
I don't think so. I never heard about that. I think there are
no conditions.
CLINE: I think not. If a Soviet national, particularly
a well-informed person like an intelligence officer, wants to
defect to a free society, we make the judgment on whether he is
sincere and whether he has information that would be of use to
our national security.
POVICH: Wait a second. This seems very polite and
mannerly. Are you -- well, then, Mr. Levchenko, let me ask you
this. You have been helpful to the United States Government,
have you not?
LEVCHENKO: Yes, I was. But by all means, it was not a
part of some kind of...
POVICH: Did you feel an obligation?
LEVCHENKO: Sorry?
POVICH: Did you feel an obligation to be helpful?
LEVCHENKO: Yes. I felt moral obligation.
You know, back to your question. You mentioned the
problem of loyalty. You know, unfortunately, not too many people
understand the very big difference, you know. For instance, the
KGB, which is the elite in the Soviet Union, they are working for
the organization which is the main pillar upon which totalitarian
dictatorship, you know, rests in the Soviet Union. And they are
working actually -- it is bizarre, of course, but they're working
against the interests of their own people, for the interests of
Politburo.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
it, of course, just a secret for themselves. Because if they
will make it more or less public within the KGB, they're out
immediately.
POVICH: Let me ask you, then, Mr. Levchenko, what would
precipitate a KGB agent from becoming -- for becoming a double
agent? In other words, why would they -- I mean Dr. Cline has
talked about greed, apparently, on the part of some Americans to
become, in effect, traitors. What is the reason behind some of
those in the Soviet Union who act as spies for the United States?
What motives?
LEVCHENKO: Primarily, I would say, what is called
ideological reason. Because like, for instance, the famous
historical case with Colonel Penkovsky in 1960s, who was
[unintelligible] Soviets, who was working for Western
intelligence services. He was doing this thing primarily for
ideological reasons. He knew, undoubtedly, that his end would be
quite close, and he faced that end as a man. And quite a variety
of people, you know, are choosing this cooperation with Western
services for ideological reasons.
However, of course, you know, in intelligence business
you recruit people for a variety of reasons, you know. But
primarily, speaking about the Soviet agents, I would bet that
most of them are working for ideological reasons.
POVICH: Okay. We'll continue with this, Dr. Cline,
because I want to ask you about that. For instance, I want to
know if they're paid. Do they get some money out of the United
States the way, apparently, American spies are getting them from
the Soviet Union?
POVICH: What about your family, Mr. Levchenko? Did you
-- were you able to secure any security for them? Were you able
to get them any security, or are they still in the Soviet Union?
And what's happened to them?
LEVCHENKO: The KGB is trying to prevent defections by
two main things. One is threat to your life. They kind of plant
the rumors that anybody who will defect from the KGB, sooner or
later, you know, will be annihilated.
But the other thing is the threat against your family
members which are left behind. And it is true that they are
persecuted in a quite ruthless way.
I practically was separated with my wife. But even
regardless of this thing, KGB quite ruthlessly persecuted her for
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
two years afterwards. And they were trying to use the
correspondence with me to influence me, to make me feel
desperate, something like that.
POVICH: So that you would go back.
LEVCHENKO: Yeah. I have the whole collection of KGB
letters which came out from Moscow which can show, you know, how
skillful, actually, they -- they're trying to utilize every
possible weak point in your heart, you know, to make you feel
desperate.
POVICH: Right.
Do you have any reaction to what is going on today? Dr.
Cline was talking about many, in terms of the Russians and
Soviets, the turmoil in terms of leadership, both at the KGB over
the last few years and the central leadership in Moscow.
LEVCHENKO: Yes. There are a variety of reasons to
that. Change of leadership, of course, one of them. However, I
do not think that it's really main one, because it is not as
dramatic change of leadership as it was after Stalin, you know,
when some people literally risked their life [unintelligible]
with Beria trial and things like that.
What is going on is that since the beginning of Mr.
Brezhnev's rule in the Soviet Union, the morals in the Soviet
elite, if you want, in the higher-level government people, and of
course in KGB, started to deteriorate. Corruption started to
grow. And basically, people started to lose a sense of what will
happen in future, really, you know, whether it will be positive
or negative. And the honest minority, of course, started to go
through all these motions of trying to figure out for themselves
what is it, you know, right and wrong, you know, and what is it
they want to do throughout the rest of their lives.
And this kind of thing, I think, was probably very major
factor in bringing Mr. Gordievski, some years ago, and Mr.
Yurchenko, I would assume, and possible future defector. That's
what probably brought them to decision which they finally made,
to ask for political asylum.
On the other hand, I think that, you know, intelligence
business is very intricate thing. And when you put some
investment in something there, you know, it pays only in many
years' time, you know. And I think that probably sometime in
1960s American intelligence community did make certain
investment in...
POVICH: Were able to penetrate the KGB, in terms of
getting some agents to...
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
LEVCHENKO: I
don't mean that.
I
don't know
about
that.
What I mean, however,
that it created
that
investment
in
1960s,
you know, probably in manpower, in methods, and things like that,
probably now started to pay in the sense that Western
intelligence community understands defectors better, or probably
is able to recruit certain people who can meaningfully cooperate
with Western intelliqence services.
CLINE: Well, I think Mr. Levchenko's remarks are very
relevant about the difference between the two systems. There,
you're getting corruption and disillusionment at the top of the
system. Here, you're getting low-level people who are greedy.
Quite a different situation, reflecting our two societies.
The defectors from the Soviet Union, the KGB that I have
personally had something to do with were partly driven by
personal circumstances. And the best...
POVICH: These are like the Penkovskys.
CLINE: Yes. They have a problem of establishing their
identity in a drab and corrupt system of society.
But occasionally -- you asked me if they liked money.
Sure, some of them do. Usually they have to keep it outside the
Soviet Union in an escrow account so they can't show it. It
doesn't mean so much.
The defector whom I knew the best came out somewhat
under my supervision. He was a man named Runna (?), an illegal
who had been in West Germany for 12 years under cover. We got
him out because we brought his wife and child with him. And that
was the best enticement you could give.
So, every case is a personal case. You have to find
what will help. But basically, you come back to the fact that we
have an advantage in dealing with the KGB because it is such a
ruthless and bureaucratic model of totalitarian life.
POVICH: Well, although there's -- the story in Newsweek
this week is saying that there's lots of concern now in the White
House, for instance, about even this low-level CIA employee named
Howard.
CLINE: Little Howard? Well, Howard wasn't...
POVICH: And they want a shakeup and they want the CIA
turned upside-down, let's plug up the leaks.
CLINE: Maury, I've been in this town 40 years, and
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
anything that-happens related to intelligence ends up with a
demand for shaking up CIA. CIA's the favorite whipping boy of
this city, I'm afraid.
I don't think the Howard case was a very important one.
The man was trained. He was never dispatched on an operation.
He undoubtedly knows and will assist the Soviet Union, if he goes
there, which I expect, in detailed matters which they're already
pretty well informed about.
POVICH: Although he did close down one agent for us who
apparently had been working in the Soviet Union, and he was not
allowed to...
CLINE: I'm sure we have lost one or two agents. But
that's probably the extent of this man's knowledge. Whereas a
man like Gordievski or Yurchenko will be debriefed for three or
four years and will continue to dredge up detailed information
which will enable other leads to be pursued.
POVICH: Mr. Levchenko, Mr. Yurchenko and Mr.
Gordievski, they are considered very important people for the
United States, in terms of their defections?
LEVCHENKO: Of course I think so. Because, you know,
Mr. Gordievski was no less...
POVICH: This was the man in Britain.
LEVCHENKO: ...chief of station of the KGB in Britain.
And Britain is probably number three target for the Soviet
intelligence, after the United States and People's Republic of
China. So you can imagine what kind of importance he had for
KGB, and probably, I hope, now has importance for American
intelligence community.
Mr. Yurchenko also, it looks like...
POVICH: He was the one who defected in Italy, I think.
LEVCHENKO: Yes. He also was a very senior person,
undoubtedly exposed to very serious information within the KGB.
POVICH: What do you think is going on now in the KGB,
in terms of...
LEVCHENKO: I think that Director of the First
Directorate, which is the name of the KGB external intellgience,
General Krishkov (?), is writing now last papers in his career,
and then he will be probably fired.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
Speaking about Chebrikov, chief of the whole KGB, I
think he will be still there. He is member of Politburo. He is
above punishment.
And undoubtedly so, KGB intelligence will have to go
through all kinds of restucturing and all kinds of really
shakeups, which will take some years, probably.
POVICH: You fear, still, do you not, for your safety?
LEVCHENKO: You know...
POVICH: You're obviously not showing your face.
LEVCHENKO: Well, I am reasonably cautious, you know. I
am very active, and many people know how active I am. And let's
put it this way: I'm like soldier, because, you know, if you're
in combat situation and if you're turning your head backwards all
the time, you won't really succeed in anything.
So, you know, I'm not scared, I'm not -- I'm never in
panic and things like that. Sometimes I'm reasonably cautious,
like [unintelligible] on TV.
POVICH: I understand.
helphave
ever askedoforuanystill
Have you
ofStates?
or assistancetin termsUnited
safety?
LEVCHENKO: Let me not comment on this thing, but I am
very happy with what I'm doing and with the way of my life...
POVICH: That's what I was trying to get at. As you
envisioned it when you decided to come to this country, I mean
has it lived up to your expectations?
LEVCHENKO: Yes, yes. Undoubtedly so.
CLINE: And Maury, let us conclude by saying that is why
we get KGB people to come to this country. We have a better
country. We treat people with some respect for their humanity
and...
POVICH: Where do you think Mr. Howard, for instance,
the former CIA employee who apparently, or the reports are, is
in Moscow...
CLINE: I do not envy Mr. Howard at all. He will be
milked for publicity, for propaganda, and any minor pieces of
information he has; then he will become a nonentity.
POVICH: Is that what happens to those who defect from
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0
the West to Russia?
CLINE: They are played up as great assets, but they are
in fact forced to live a very restricted, and usually unhappy,
life. I wouldn't be surprised if Mr. Howard is trying to
redefect within two years.
POVICH: I thank you so much....
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/06: CIA-RDP90-00552R000403690001-0