THE MEASURE OF MCFARLANE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000403960004-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 9, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000403960004-7
WASHINGTON POST
9 Decemb:r 1985
LOU CANNON
The Measure of McFarlane
Much gush has been written
about Robert Carl (Bud)
McFarlane, the president's
departing national security affairs
adviser. He has been lauded, even by
his critics, as wise, patriotic,
hard-working, fair-minded and effective.
President Reagan said of McFarlane, in
words appropriate for a eulogy, that
"few have served with more dedication,
none with more loyalty."
What is remarkable about this litany,
in an administration rarely given to
understatement, is that it is largely
true. On those few occasions when the
Reagan administration decides to rid
itself of an embarrassment, the
appointee usually is sent packing
wreathed in praise appropriate for St.
Francis of Assisi.
But McFarlane, despite the praise,
remains curiously undervalued, and not
just because the Reagan administration
has debased the currency of personal
commendation. He is undervalued
because his best work, on some of the,
administration's most difficult and
sensitive missions, was done out of the
limelight but with a quiet skill that
earned the respect of colleagues,
Congress and the media.
Almost by definition, McFarlane's job
was impossible. In an age when a single
act of terrorism can humble the
greatest superpower, the national
security affairs adviser is always on call.
When he errs, he lacks the vast
institutional bureaucracies that buffer
secretaries of state and defense and
counterattack against critics. After two
years on the job, as William P. Clark
learned before McFarlane, there are
nights on which the national security
adviser cannot sleep, even when there
are no calls.
McFarlane was no mastermind. He
miscalculated, along with others, the
cost of U.S. involvement in Lebanon.
He sometimes played his cards too
closely to the vest in his bureaucratic
dealings with powerful Cabinet
members. He worked too hard,
sometimes to the point of exhaustion.
He did not suffer fools gladly, even
when they outranked him.
But McFarlane also provided the
administration with a window on the
world that it had sorely lacked and
badly needs. He was the
administration's early-warning system,
spotting trouble before it became
uncontrollable in distant nations or on
Capitol Hill. He was also a one-man
liaison with the disparate communities
of political Washington. When the
Central Intelligence Agency wanted to
make Reagan aware of the
deteriorating situation in the
Philippines, it relied on McFarlane to
persuade the president of t e necessity
to put pressure on his longtim`lly,
Ferdinand Marcos. When moderate
Democratic members of Congress
wanted a Reagan commitment to
genuine arms-control negotiation as the
price for supporting the MX missile,
they called upon McFarlane to carry the
message. He also took the lead within
the administration in pressing for
limited economic sanctions against
South Africa, realizing that Congress
would act if the president wouldn't.
My views of McFarlane's importance
are formed more by his character and
style than his policy positions. In
dealing with reporters, as with
Congress and his colleagues, he was
inevitably an educator who expressed
his views with precision and
reflectiveness, thoughtfully listened to
opposing viewpoints and understood the
value of disagreeing in an agreeable
manner. He acknowledged mistakes. He
has, in the fine words of the Founders,
"a decent respect for the opinions of
mankind."
McFarlane was not self-inflated with
the importance of his position. He told
self-deprecating jokes, recalling that
when he first appeared on television, a
young employe of the network observed
that he had "the most boring face" she
had ever seen. He joked about his
Marine Corps background and his
sometimes meandering briefings. He
did pluperfect imitiations of his former
boss, Henry A. Kissinger.
At times, McFarlane's "no
comments" or failure to return phone
calls exasperated those of us who make
our living in journalism. But we will
miss him a great deal. Reagan and the
country will miss him even more.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000403960004-7