THE RISKS WE FACE IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000404260001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 25, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: July 28, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/25: CIA-RDP90-00552R000404260001-6
LOS ANGELES TIMES
28 ;uly 1983
The Risks We Face in Nicaragua
Consequences of Expanded War Could Spell Disaster for All
By providing - the support 'for - contra
By GEORGE MILLER and DON EDWARDS attacks, the Reagan Administration has
Toward Enemy' -and some of it-magnetic played into 'the hands of the Sandinista
Since late 1981 the Reagan Administra- flashlights filled with C-4 plastic explo- government by_ strengthening Nicaraguan
tion has been organizing, funding ..and saves-recalls the stuff of spy novels. nationalism, a force as potent as revolution-
sponsoring a covert war against the govern- : The results already have ;been costly in ary san.dinismo itself: "
ment of Nicaragua. Now the Administration lives and property. According ;to US. Em- - We are at -a -critical juncture in our
is seeking to expand that war, which may = by figures,-600 civilians have-died:in the - relations.with Nicaragua. - ..
bring the argues of Nicaragua and neigh- ! War, -Less than -a year ago the Nicaraguan week the House of Representatives
boring Honduras-into direct confrontation. government estimated the dead at '200. is debatiag .legislation -to. terminate the
The simultaneous announcement of naval Conservative estimates place the economic covert
action againstNicaragua If Cnrigress
maneuvers in the area threatens even closer costs at S5D million, an enormous 'strain on fails to hall' is illegal and-co unterprodn ss
involvement of ES. military personnel in an economy still struggling after four years five war,?it-.wslI?ha"ve given the Administra-
the Central America conflict to recuperate from a civil war. lion a
'The Administration claims that covert Now regional war is the central danger. -against, t the S df night iisttat.as. The . consequences,
aaction the Sandinista government of Unite The
against Troops of the. Honduran govenziment regu - for. the- aite;l3:States are grave and
Nicaragua is justified because it is substan- larly back the contra forces with mortar fire, far-reaching=itioldm out the probability. 'of
tially involved in aiding Salvadoran rebels' supplies and logistical support. According to years of inwTement, billions of T3ollars In
-
efforts to topple that country's government . reliable testimony that we received, US.-aid. costs -and the niter involvement -of 'US.
Ten days ago we visited Nicaragua and El to-the Honduran armed forces encourages troops. s ,. .
Salvador in an attempt to assess the legiti- their participation in -support of the contra - . Last w~& the'Sandinistas came forward
macy of those claims: activities. Indeed, many Nicaraguan officials with a negotiating.proposal that addresses
We found no evidence that arms ship- believe-that the purpose of this-campaign is some concerns at the top of the U.S. agenda:
meats to the Salvadoran rebels have been to provoke their army into crossing the an . end to the arms flow to Salvadoran
interdicted as a result of the U.S.-sponsored border into Honduras, 'thereby, providing a guerrillas; a -non-aggression pact between
covert war. In fact, we have serious doubts I pretext for, Honduras' military-dominated Nicaragua and Honduras and a prohibition
that arms interdiction was ever the Admin- government to tpoveagainst the Sandinistas, on foreign military bases in Central Ameri-
istration's purpose in launching the covert with the support or-even partidpatiomof She . Although this agenda may not-address
war. UnitedStates. all our concerns. the Nicaraguan govern-
We did find that this "secret war" is far Already the covert war'is having aserious went deserves amore sincere response from
more extensive than the Administration has negative effect in the movement of Sandie- the Reagan Administration than expanded
led the American public to believe, and -that ista policies away from pluralism- toward naval maneuvers and a multiplication of
the aim of the US.-supported insurgents is greater limitations on political parties and in military aidto-the contras. -
not to stop the arms flow but to overthrow tighter. government controls and censorship . If the Administration is sincere in its
the Nicaraguan government. of non-Sandinista media. Support or opposk- desire -to alter the Sandinistas' behavior, it
While the Reagan Administration's rhet- lion to the covert war has become a litmus must engage -the 'Nicaraguans in a dialogue
oric paints the Sandinistas as aggressors in test of citizenship, and those who fail to take for peace. Failure to do so would only
Central America, Nicaragua is the only the government's side are cast as enemies of confirm what many have concluded about
country- being invaded by an exile army the revolution. The political freedom and the Administration's real purpose: the over
backed by a great foreign power. This the civil liberties ostensibly supported by throw of a sovereign government The
became clear in conversations with Nicara- the Reagan Administration are thus being consequences of that policy would spell
guan and U.S. officials that revealed the subverted by the very policies that' it disaster for Nicaragua, for U.S.'-interests in
scope of activities staged by the counter- promotes. Central America and for the American
revolutionaries, or contras. Rebel units, The Sandinistas have- found a rallying people.
many led by officers of Anastasio Somozas point in the external attack, blaming t-h. e -
defunct National Guard, are concentrated in same "Yankee imperialists" who -occupied - George Miller and Don Edwards-are Demo-
the north along the, Honduran border, and Nicaragua fordecades and who long sup- crctic members of Californids congressional
have penetrated deep inside Nicaraguan . ported the oppressive Somoza regime. In dekgation, representing San -Jose :-and East.
territory as well as along its coastlines. `Managua we attended a political rall
y Bay area Oistrscts. =.T .
Their targets have included bridges, tobacco commemorating the return of a construction
warehouses, construction vehicles and pow- brigade that had been building telephone
er lines-in short, not military installations lines out to the remote Atlantic coast Six
relevant to stopping arms traffic but eco- workers from the state telecommunications nomic targets whose destruction is intended agency had been killed during contra rat-
to weaken the Sandinistas and increase tacks against their brigade. The impassioned
popular disaffection with the regime. speech of Interior Minister Tomas Borge
Evidence of the U.S. hand in the sabotage was met by, equally impassioned shouts from
is tangible-M-16 carbines, Claymore.mines the crowd vowing 'to keep Nicaraguan-soil
labeled with instructions in English "Face untainted by contras. ? . - ? -
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/25: CIA-RDP90-00552R000404260001-6