CUBAN NAMED IN PROBE SAYS HE TIPPED REAGAN TEAM ON WEAPONS

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00552R000404330001-8
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
June 21, 2010
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 26, 1984
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OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00552R000404330001-8.pdf110.54 KB
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STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/21 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000404330001-8 Cuban named in nrobeq Aft 1 I CLE. APPEARED ')N FAGE 9 -1 Raymond Molina, -a 'wealthy Miami ? real : estate. 'developer and Bay, of Pigs veteran, traveled to Key West as a volunteer in 1980 'to translate -' for and ' "orient arriving Mariel refugees.' Instead, Molina says; he 'got an unexpected, orientation : from.' the refugees, who' gave him what he calls "extremely explosive" infor- mation about Cuba's alleged pos- session' of. nuclear :weapons -and., chemical warfare equipment. - ?: Molina says he'gave the infor- mation to ' the. '. CIAj - and then turned over the'same material to Reagan campaign, officials days' later because he 'felt the' Carter administration ".was. not going to . do anything."",. The four-year-old incident` is., now stirring up controversy. In Washington, ',where it 'recently came to the attention 'of' a-H dose subcommittee `investigating the passing of inside information from:. the' Carter White' House to the tipped Reagan team'. on weapons . 26 May 1984 ments, three ? Reagan campaign aides were'aware of the informa- tion: 'Richard Allen, Roger Fon- taine and Belle.. Allen later 'became ? Reagan's national security, adviser and Fon .taine served as a Latin America analyst 'on the National Security. Council.. Neither is' now .with the administration.`: The subcommittee concluded that although it appeared. that Reagan campaign aides. "did not trust" Molina, they had not "dis- ! couraged Molina from providing sensitive. intelligence information to the campaign; ' even though he, may have had access, to govern- ment intelligence sources." The panel ' has recommended that other congressional. commit- .tees involved in intelligence mat- ters review the affair. To Molina, there's no conflict. "I was the owner of the informa- tion," he said. "I could do with the 'info whatever I wanted." Molina, a tall, ' balding, blond- haired man who spent two years in a Cuban prison for his role in the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion, said he came across the information 'when he and friends from Miami interviewed three Mariel refugees getting off the boats in Key West. One, Alarcon Roman Ramacrish na, claimed he had been an official translator for Fidel Castro during trips of the Cuban leader to the Soviet Union. During conversations that Ra- macrishna translated for Castro, Molina said, the Cuban leader discussed the presence of nuclear missiles and -chemical weapons in Cuba. . Since- 1962,`? when the Soviet Union removed nuclear missiles from Cuba after a confrontation with the Kennedy administration, U.S. officials have traditionally held that there is no evidence that Cuba still harbors nuclear weapons. A second refugee, Armando Rom- ero Rivas, claimed to have been a lieutenant in a- chemical warfare battalion stationed in Havana. -"He gave precise descriptions of Cuba's chemical warfare capabili- ties, training that the Russians gave them and the objectives they had in different U.S. scenarios," Molina said. _ ' A third refugee, Walfrido Ulises Rosel, was either a captain or a lieutenant in the Cuban army stationed in caves near Havana where chemical inventories were stored, Molina said. Rosel had. also been stationed with one of the companies guarding nuclear mis- siles. . Rosel, Molina said, identified two locations where nuclear weapons were stored, Arroyo Arena and Managua, both near Havana, and described arrangements made for security, including ground-to-air protection. - Molina said he and his friends, among them other Bay of ' Pigs veterans, interviewed the three refugees, who arrived within two days of each other, for a total of about 10 to 12 hours each. Molina then wrote a five-page report that he turned over to CIA contacts in Key West and to Reagan aides Fontaine and Belle several days later. Molina says he knew.Belle and Fontaine from the three years he spent in Washington in the 1970s acting as a registered representative of the government of then-Nicara- guan strongman Anastasio Somoza. Although Molina says. he was 'impressed by the refugees' sincerity and precise descriptions, he made no decision as to their veracity and had even, considered that they could be Castro agents planting disinfor- mation. "I didn't come to believe any- thing," he said. "I just wrote it- down. It's up to the intelligence. agencies to determine if it's true or . snot."? -According to Molina, the CIA" took the trio to debrief them and ? later returned them to the South Florida area. He -has never heard .from them again. - ,By JAY' DUCASSI',.: `.. Herald scat writer ? ` from providing `discourage. Molina:. ot.-,, .- aides did not.-,,, :.Reagan campaign' .Reagan concluded that subcommittee .f A congressional . sensitive intelligence 'information.to t h e . . campaign.' 1980 Reagan campaign. A 2,400-page report recently issued by the subcommittee in- cludes 'a section : on the incident, and contains a memo written by 'Reagan campaign aide Belden Belle partially' describing the In-, formation received. from Molina and the Mariel.refugees. According to the panel's doctl Continued Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/06/21 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000404330001-8