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December 22, 2016
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December 29, 2010
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September 23, 1974
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/29: CIA-RDP90-00552R000404440168-2 r t, 2 3 S E P 1074 The' United States Government ad- hered to a policy of nonintervention in Chile's internal affairs during the Allen- de period. -Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harry Schlaudeman We bought no cotes, we funded no candidates, we promoted no coups. -Fourier Assistant Secretary of State Charles Meyer to1 try. to induce the Chilean Congress- sitting as an electoral college-to pass over Allende. After this scheme crum- bled, the CIA was given $5 million to spend over the next three years to "de- stabilize" the the the Marxist regime August t 19733, ready in deep trouble, the 40 Committee decided to throw in S1 million more. Kissinger was accurate "Technically , The CIA had nothing to do with the when he said that the CIA didn't pull the coup, remarked one expert. "But COUP ... -Secretary, of State Henry Kissinger how All can Allende e work for three years to up- set and then claim you didn't Month after month, Nixon Administra- have anything to do with the coup?" tion officials had come before Con- The fact that the Nixon Administra- gress and testified that the United States tion managed to keep its war against was free of any involvement in the Allende secret indicated anew how lit- events leading up to last September's Ad leverage Congress has over the CIA. Chilean coup. Then last week those same The agency, an arm of the executive lawmakers learned that the White House branch, reports in theory to four Con- had, in fact, authorized CIA expendi- i.gressional subcommittees. But there is tures of SS million in Chile from 1970 to a reluctance among veteran members of 1973 in a clandestine effort to undermine these panels to ask too many questions. the Marxist government of Salvador The clandestine services, give them a Allende. "I couldn't believe my eyes," peek under the rug and .their eyes pop," said Massachusetts Congressman Mi- one CIA source said. "it-doesn't take chacl Harrin long before the Congressional overseers gton after reacting a top- > secret briefing to a House subcommittee acquire that old-school feeLng." by CIA director William Colby. "Here While there seemed little inclination everyone from to to bottom in the Ad- to go after the CIA, which was only ministration had been insisting we had carrying out White House orders, feel- nothing to do with it-and the it was, ings were running stronger about the 10 pa es in black and white ... telling in testimony of Administration ofncials. And clinical detail how we were engaged up a number of lawmakers felt any effort to to our eyebrow's." get to the bottom of the Chilean story The revelations about the CIA's activi- should start with the testimony of Henry' ties in Chile broke in the press just as the Kissinger. Nz\ys-,vEES's Bruce van Voorst _. .. __ _ __..__-.__-. - -__ reported that it appeared that Kissinger fire storm over the Nixon pardon put an abrupt end to Congress's honeymoon with Gerald Ford. And in the revived mood of anguish and acrimony, Washing- ton reacted to the CIA story with deep dismay. Although there was no proof that the CIA had any direct role in the actual coup that toppled Allende, it was clear that Congress was deliberately mis- led about the scope and degree of U.S. meddling in internal Chilean affairs. Sev- eral lawmakers started an investigation to determine whether. State Department officials who testified before them on Chile could be prosecuted for perjury. And the controversy loomed as a serious political challenge to-Henn, Kissinger, who apparently was the motive force be- hind the anti-Allende campaign in his role as head of the supersecret CIA board of overseers known a the "40 Committed" (page 52) sec rtcK Bribe: At the very least, last week's revelations embarrassed the CLA more than anything since details of the Bay of Pigs fiasco became public. As the lat- est story was pieced together, the CIA first distributed Si milbo:i among Allen- de's opponents in hope of defeating him pushed the covert operations against Al- lende even though the State Depart- ment and the CIA were not too enthusi- astic about the idea. "Henry had a tick about Chile," one 40 Committee staffer told van Voorst. At a meeting of the panel that took place in June 1970, an- other source said, Kissinger declared: "'I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go Communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people." Disclosure of the U.S. campaign against Allende caused scarcely a ripple last week in Santiago, where most politicians have correctly believed for years that the CIA was deeply involved in Chilean politics. But the news created a sensa- tion in many foreign capitals, and revived all the old doubts and suspicions about CIA activities in far comers of the world. The U.S. ambassador to India, Daniel Patrick Moynilhan, cabled Kissinger that the reports had confirmed Prime Min- ister Indira Candhi?s "worst suspicions and genuine fears" about American pol- 4 . C. S U i0041410 k Kissinger, "but that we wvould be content tl to see others-like her-overthrown.' Political considerations aside, there was also the question of morality. Kissin- ger himself is known to believe that , there is a valid philosophical question whether democracies such as the U.S. should engage in such clandestine activi- ties-and if so, how Congress should be kept informed. Many congressmen-even some of those who were most critical of the Chilean revelations-would probably agree with CIA director Colby that in the harsh world of big-power politics the U.S. is left with little choice but to engage in some covert activities. As Colby said last week during a two-day Washington conference on the CIA's ac- tivities: ' I think it would be mistaken to deprive our nation of the possibility of some moderate covert-action response to a foreign problem and leave us with nothing between a diplomatic protest and sending in the marines. At the same time, however, the Administration officials who send secret agents into action cannot.?x- pect much public support in a demo- cracy if they lie to the people's repre- sentatives in Congress. Despite official denials. Washing- ton learned last week that the CL4 had secretly campaigned to` undermine. Chile's Marxist government. With files from Bruce van --ourst, --Milton Ben- jamin assesses the controversy. STAT STAT in they 19 0 Prpciclpntial election. \Vhen Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/12/29: CIA-RDP90-00552R000404440168-2