THE CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT CIA HEAD
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00552R000404490014-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
July 22, 2010
Sequence Number:
14
Case Number:
Publication Date:
February 10, 1982
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000404490014-7
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE
10 February 1982
Robert P. Newman
The case for an independent CIA head
Were there no other salutary
outcome, the new evidence show-
ing that Gen. William Westmore-
land and Gen. Daniel Graham
falsified reports on Viet_Cong
strength has mightily reinforced
the first law of communication.
When he sent the 12 spies into Readers are invited to submit
Canaan, the nervous wellies who essays on any topic to Point of
reported back that the land was 'View, Box 957, Pittsburgh Post-
well defended and should not be 'Gazette, Pittsburgh, Pa., 15230..
attacked met untimely ends. '.-;All articles are subject to edit-
Only Joshua and Caleb, who told ing and none can be returned.:
Moses what he wanted to hear,
As applied to intelligence sys- flourished. entirely free of presidential con-
tems, this reads: The greater the Things are no different now.trol. The model here is the audi
salience of the issue, the l 'An administration that did not ',tor general of the Untied States, .
subordinates are likely to report - want to hear bad things about the whose term of office is 15 years
negative information to their Shah of Iran did not hear them. ahd who cannot be dismissed or
There was abundant negative in- punished if his General Account
President Lyndon Johnson had telligence in the system,. but it I ing Office reports that some Sa-
to believe we could at least hold could not work its way to the top. cred cow is actually a mangy
our own in Vietnam. When work- president Reagan may be dif cur.
ing-level intelligence officers ferent; he may be a moderate' As we.saw in Vietnam, the
produced. statistics showing that posing as an, idealogue, a man' CIA, whose director now serves
the enemy- was gaining' in without rigid commitments and at the pleasure of the president,
strength, some gatekeeper in the
system was bound to distort the
information flow. Gen. Graham
filled this sycophantish role and
Gen. Westmoreland backstopped
.him. -
This law is really too well
established to need additional
ways had to struggle to reach. a issues. The 'director of the C n- from an ntirely unlikely ever
sovereign. Go back to Moses. tral Intelligence Agency must bie that the president or secretary of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000404490014-7
preconceptions. He appears- to knew that Pentagon reports were
have accepted intelligence which inaccurate, tried for a while to
ran counter to his established rebut them, but gave up the
beliefs, as for instance about the struggle under pressure. This
consequences of providing happened in that crucial period
Taiwan with advanced fighter. just before the.Tet offensive.
planes. ` A really independent CIA di-
But some of the policies to rector could not be thus intimi-
which Reagan is committed may. dated. Consider how a scenario in
be vital to his worldview and El Salvador might benefit from
candid subordinates may not be n insulated. intelligence oper-
able to get through to him. If one ation. Suppose that the belief that
of his unchallengeable beliefs the Salvadoran rebels are weak
creates danger of nuclear \war and without popular support is a
and the intelligence gatekeepers central element in Reagan', poll
state chose to believe some bi-
ased, sensation-seeking, left-
leaning reporter. - ,
Intelligence aficionados to
whom I have suggested this dras-
tic remedy sputter, cough and
eventually ' object that if the
president cannot control his di-,
rector of intelligence, he cannot
be assured of getting intelligence
on subjects of vital import. Why
this would be true they are tun-
able to explain. Congress certain-
ly gets the reports it orders from
an independent auditor general.
Of course, a strong-willed
president can always refuse to
believe bad news. Even a coura-
geous intelligence chief; well in-
sulated from reprisal,. may not
be able to penetrate the defenses
of a : true believer. But our
chances for survival would be
somewhat better if the ultimate
decision makers cannot stifle in-
convenient messages before they,
are delivered. Intelligence should
be outside the normal chain of
command. This would be no
panacea, but it would increase
the chances that someone would
tell the emperor when he has no
clothes on.
Robert P. Newman is a profes-
d
' `, ..
Universit f Pi is Pro...
kind might come to an abrupt the present structure, no - con- _y Q. end. ? trary official intelligence can'
`There is really only one way to reach the top.-The only chance I
substantially avoid sanitized in= .'for a different view at the deci-.