THE CASE FOR AN INDEPENDENT CIA HEAD

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00552R000404490014-7
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 22, 2010
Sequence Number: 
14
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 10, 1982
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OPEN SOURCE
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STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000404490014-7 PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE 10 February 1982 Robert P. Newman The case for an independent CIA head Were there no other salutary outcome, the new evidence show- ing that Gen. William Westmore- land and Gen. Daniel Graham falsified reports on Viet_Cong strength has mightily reinforced the first law of communication. When he sent the 12 spies into Readers are invited to submit Canaan, the nervous wellies who essays on any topic to Point of reported back that the land was 'View, Box 957, Pittsburgh Post- well defended and should not be 'Gazette, Pittsburgh, Pa., 15230.. attacked met untimely ends. '.-;All articles are subject to edit- Only Joshua and Caleb, who told ing and none can be returned.: Moses what he wanted to hear, As applied to intelligence sys- flourished. entirely free of presidential con- tems, this reads: The greater the Things are no different now.trol. The model here is the audi salience of the issue, the l 'An administration that did not ',tor general of the Untied States, . subordinates are likely to report - want to hear bad things about the whose term of office is 15 years negative information to their Shah of Iran did not hear them. ahd who cannot be dismissed or There was abundant negative in- punished if his General Account President Lyndon Johnson had telligence in the system,. but it I ing Office reports that some Sa- to believe we could at least hold could not work its way to the top. cred cow is actually a mangy our own in Vietnam. When work- president Reagan may be dif cur. ing-level intelligence officers ferent; he may be a moderate' As we.saw in Vietnam, the produced. statistics showing that posing as an, idealogue, a man' CIA, whose director now serves the enemy- was gaining' in without rigid commitments and at the pleasure of the president, strength, some gatekeeper in the system was bound to distort the information flow. Gen. Graham filled this sycophantish role and Gen. Westmoreland backstopped .him. - This law is really too well established to need additional ways had to struggle to reach. a issues. The 'director of the C n- from an ntirely unlikely ever sovereign. Go back to Moses. tral Intelligence Agency must bie that the president or secretary of Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000404490014-7 preconceptions. He appears- to knew that Pentagon reports were have accepted intelligence which inaccurate, tried for a while to ran counter to his established rebut them, but gave up the beliefs, as for instance about the struggle under pressure. This consequences of providing happened in that crucial period Taiwan with advanced fighter. just before the.Tet offensive. planes. ` A really independent CIA di- But some of the policies to rector could not be thus intimi- which Reagan is committed may. dated. Consider how a scenario in be vital to his worldview and El Salvador might benefit from candid subordinates may not be n insulated. intelligence oper- able to get through to him. If one ation. Suppose that the belief that of his unchallengeable beliefs the Salvadoran rebels are weak creates danger of nuclear \war and without popular support is a and the intelligence gatekeepers central element in Reagan', poll state chose to believe some bi- ased, sensation-seeking, left- leaning reporter. - , Intelligence aficionados to whom I have suggested this dras- tic remedy sputter, cough and eventually ' object that if the president cannot control his di-, rector of intelligence, he cannot be assured of getting intelligence on subjects of vital import. Why this would be true they are tun- able to explain. Congress certain- ly gets the reports it orders from an independent auditor general. Of course, a strong-willed president can always refuse to believe bad news. Even a coura- geous intelligence chief; well in- sulated from reprisal,. may not be able to penetrate the defenses of a : true believer. But our chances for survival would be somewhat better if the ultimate decision makers cannot stifle in- convenient messages before they, are delivered. Intelligence should be outside the normal chain of command. This would be no panacea, but it would increase the chances that someone would tell the emperor when he has no clothes on. Robert P. Newman is a profes- d ' `, .. Universit f Pi is Pro... kind might come to an abrupt the present structure, no - con- _y Q. end. ? trary official intelligence can' `There is really only one way to reach the top.-The only chance I substantially avoid sanitized in= .'for a different view at the deci-.