GOODBYE TO A CHARISMATIC CONTRA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000504880006-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 23, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

CHICAGO TRIBUNE
(L nn ti -inn,
Perspective
Goodbye t
o a charisma
tic contra
Approved For Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00552R000504880006-2
By Rogers Worthington
Declaring that victory was unobtainable, Nicaraguan
contra leader Eden Pastora lay down his AR 15 last
week, walked across the San Juan River and sought
sanctuary in Costa Rica.
Not since Roberto Duran walked away from a con-
founding Sugar Ray Leonard has so intractable a
Latin fighter quit his arena of choice. What ultimately
confounded Pastora, however, was not the enemy, but
the politics of being a contra.
News of his quitting the 4-year-old guerrilla war was
certain to cause smiles in Managua. Seven years ago
as Commander Zero, he helped bring the Sandinistas
to power. No defection hurt the FSLN more symboli-
cally than Pastora's.
Smiles also were likely in the contra command
posts of. Honduras and Miami, where Pastora was
viewed more as a competitor and antagonist than a
colleague. There even may have been smiles among
some U.S. strategists who have long struggled like
Sisyphus to create a unified contra front.
But Reagan administration officials who pinned
their hopes on the unlikely long shot of a contra
victory ought to lament Pastora's decision. For along
with him goes one of the strongest strands of credibil-
ity in the contra flag's fabric of ragged purposes.
Impulsive, self-centered, hard to work with and
marginally effective as a contra military commander,
Pastora nonetheless had charisma and a vision of so-
cial revolution that paid no obeisance to Marxism or
superpower.
Despite his many failings and his growing isolation
in the last year, Pastora was the contras' only demo-
cratic revolutionary with an international reputation.
It was to him and the Southern Opposition Bloc
based in Costa Rica-and not the Honduras-based
FDN-that many disillusioned former Sandinista offi-
cials gravitated in recent years. And it was from him
that many of those same people later pulled away,
frustrated by his refusal to cooperate for what they
saw as the greater good.
Unlike U.S. policymakers, Pastora recognized early
what was to him this simple truth: A rebel group with
any chance of ousting the Sandinistas must be as
vigorously anti-Somocista and anti-imperialist as it
was anticommunist and anti-Marxist.
Eden Pastors should have been the logical choice to
lead a united contra force. Instead, U.S. policymakers
sought to make of him a legitimizing addendum to
the FDN [Nicaraguan Democratic Force], a more
controllable, already established group dominated at
key levels by former Somoza National Guardsmen
r, and Nicaraguan businessmen.
ifte tat it ma a no do rti
widely despised in Nicaragua. Some say the real
Rogers Worthington is a Tribune metropolitan re-
porter who was on assignment in Central America
when he was West Coast correspondent.
reason for his reluctance was his not being offered the
top leadership position in any such union between the
FDN and his own ARDE [Democratic Revolutionary
Alliance].
For FDN leaders, Pastora was a nettlesome
showboat, a nonteam player who refused to compro-
mise the role he had cast for himself as true defender
of the Nicaraguan revolution and Augusto Sandino's
spirit.
Some distrusted him because he had been a mem-
ber of the Sandinista government, both as deputy
minister of the interior and deputy defense minister.
Some have even considered him a divisive fifth col-
-_;..
J___Lt_ _ - _
and
Since the Reagan administration made its backing
of the contras overt, however, Pastors had been less
circumspect about where his money came from. He
even traveled to Washington in February and March
and urged Congress to pass the administration's pro-
posed $100 million contra-aid package.
For Pastors, that was as close to becoming a team
player in the contra league as he was likely to get.
The visit should have been a propitious time for him.
Secretary of State George Shultz, with whom he met,
announced he wanted to include him in the new aid
package. But shortly after his return to Central Amer-
ica, Pastora's reluctance to join a new umbrella contra
group, the United Nicaraguan Opposition [UNO],
heralded his retirement a week ago.
The new, U.S.-supported coalition is led by two
former Pastora allies, Arturo Cruz and Alfonso
Robelo, with FDN leader Adolfo Calero. When Pas-
tora would not join, approaches were made to his top
commanders. By last week, all but one had left him,
preferring what they hope will be a sure supply of
funds and ammunition with UNO than a fading fu-
ture with Pastora and ARDE.
Yet Pastors may have divined correctly that there is
no sure future for any of the contras, save oblivion. If
Nicaragua signs the Contadora agreement June 6, the
congressional debate over aid would become moot.
However events unfold, Eden Pastora will be re-
membered for blending the classic Latin caudillo role
with Che Guevara romanticism and daring. But the
blend never served him well in a conflict requiring the
kind of sanitized, selfless leadership taught by Ameri-
can military schools. Pastors had not really learned
the lesson learned so well by his former Sandinista
colleagues during their days in the hills: Insurgency is
primarily a political, not a military, venture.
But some still find news of his retirement hard to
believe. "I find it hard to accept that a person with
such a strong commitment to a democratic cause
would just give up," said a State Department
spokesman. "That's just not Latin."
Approved For Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00552R000504880006-2