NICARAGUA'S 'ZERO' OPTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000504880098-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 98
• Publication Date: April 18, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000504880098-1
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18 APRIL 1083
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INTERNATIONAL
Nicaragua's `Zero' Option
I n legend he is part Zorro and part Crazy
Horse-a Nicaraguan folk hero who
once brazenly stormed and captured the
National Palace on behalf of the Sandinista
revolution. But a year ago the charismatic
"Commander Zero"-Eden Pastora Go-
mez-angrily broke with the revolution,
threatening to drive his former comrades
"with bullets from their mansions and Mer-
cedes Benzes." This week marks the anni-
versary of that fiery promise. By various
accounts last week, Pastora had already
slipped back into Nicaragua's mountains or
was making final preparations in Mexico or
Panama. His ultimate intentions and his
timing were clear enough. Before he disap-
peared from his exile base in Costa Rica,
Pastora said simply: "The time for words
will be over come April 15."
Pastora may or may not be ready to start
trading bullets with the Sandinistas this
month. But if he is, the counterrevolution
stands to pick up legitimacy and to gain a
second front balancing the anti-Sandinista
foothold in the north (NEWSWEEK, April
11). If the rebellion widens, the rebels will
have to prove that they can fight together.
Pastora has always derided the northern-
based guerrillas as a collection of CIA
agents and right-wing remnants of the So-
moza dictatorship. The northerners in turn
have long distrusted Pastora as a slippery
leftist with suspected links to Cuba. To
make any progress, the feuding dissidents
must somehow match the delicate feat of
the earlier Sandinista revolution: to form a
broad marriage of convenience to oust the
latest common enemy in Managua.
Unity will not be easy for the anti-Sandi-
nista forces. Pastora heads the military
wing of the Democratic Revolutionary
Alliance, a collection of moderate opposi-
tion groups based in Costa Rica. He and
another alliance leader, Nicaraguan busi-
nessman and former junta member Alfon-
so Robelo Callejas, originally tried to start
up a peaceful dialogue with the Sandinis-
tas, appealing for a mixed economy, demo-
cratic politics and freedom of speech. The
Sandinistas ignored the appeal. The mod-
erates then lost an ally when Fernando (El
Negro) Chamorro-who had gained revo-
lutionary fame by firing a rocket at Somo-
za's bunker from a nearby hotel-took his
Armed Nicaraguan Revolutionary Forces
to join the CIA-backed shooting war out
of Honduras. "The word 'dialogue' does
not exist in our dictionary," Chamorro
declared.
Taking Sides Another sturdy opposition
movement among Nicaragua's east-coast
Indians is just as divided. Those supporting
Indian leader Brooklyn Rivera have sided
with the exiles in Costa Rica. But militants
under Rivera's rival, Steadman Fagoth
Muller, have helped carry the battle in the
north, where they "fight one day and plant
seeds the next," as Fagoth puts it. Fagoth
has mixed feelings about Pastors. "When he
spoke of bullets and called for arms last
April he made us listen," the Indian leader
said. "But some of our kids got excited,
fought prematurely and died."
The CIA's no longer secret war may have
forced Pastora to get moving or miss the
counterrevolution. If he now joins the war,
the anti-Sandinista forces at least will have
achieved a measure of agreement on strate-
gy. A way might open for some practical
cooperation as well. Many of Robelo's sup-
porters in Costa Rica are businessmen who,
with their counterparts in Honduras, for-
merle worked together in the anti-Sornoza
Higher Council of Private Enterprise. In
addition, the major rebel group in Hondu-
ras, the Nicaraguan Democratic Force
(FDN), has opened a political directorate in
Costa Rica. "We respect the FDN [Directo-
rate] very much," Robelo said, adding that
the competing groups "could establish a
relationship but I don't think it will be a
fusion or unity-more of a coordination."
So far, the anti-Sandinistas in Honduras
have fielded fewer than 5,000 guerrillas
against a 22,000-strong Nicaraguan Army
that has yet to commit its best troops. In the
south, Costa Rican officials have blocked
any similar guerrilla buildup in their terri-
tory. Pastora can probably count on only
about 400 guerrillas trained in Costa Rica-
fighters thought to have already infiltrated
southern Nicaragua. Instead of deploying
an army, his allies are banking on Pastora's
reputation and mystique to rally their coun- '
trymen against the Sandinistas. His agents
have been organizing opposition within
Nicaragua for more than six months, ac-
cording to Robelo. "We will be ready to act
at any time," he said. "This could be a
military action, strikes, sabotage, protests
or whatever is needed."
As a moderate alternative, Pastora ap-
peals to neighboring governments that are
becoming uneasy with Nicaragua's left-
ward tilt and militarization. Much like the
Sandinistas in their time, Nicaragua's latest
rebels generally call for a social-democratic
government and a nonaligned foreign poli-
cy. "We are fighting the Cubans. Russians,
Bulgarians-all the bandits of the world
who are now living as the kings of our
people," said a guerrilla based in Honduras.
"They better all go back to Cuba because if
they stay in Nicaragua they will die." With
or without Pastora's help, Nicaragua is
bound for more violence. If the guerrillas
have their way, the country will move from
revolution toward civil war.
STEVEN STRASSER with JOSEPH HARMES
in San Jose
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000504880098-1