PENTAGON AIDE SAYS U.S. FAILED TO ANTICIPATE POLISH ARMY MOVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505010006-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: December 18, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505010006-6
V 1,-'. .., .. ..
THE WASHINGTON POST
18 December 1981
.
Femtagon Aid ,a'! T
e s
Ann,
Anticipate Polish
i ; By George C. Wilson .
ws.AlnJt S Pas$3 att Wn=.r
A Pentagon: official acknowledged yester-
day that the.,U.& -government-had suffered
"a collective failure": of intelligence gathering
and assessment by failing to anticipate that
the Polish army, rather than the ? Soviet
army, would.. crack-=down on. the. Solidarity
union movement inside Poland._-.."
"We were take by surprise," said' Richard
N. Perle, assistant secretary of defense for.;
international security .policy.. 'This has sig-'
.nificant implications for a lot of assumptions
we make about. the kind, of.*warning that is
likely to be available to 'political-military
cries. .
"We base a lot of our defense ccapability oa .
the assumption we would have a number of
days - warning" Perle continued. Failing to
read the danger signs correctly.-in .Poland !
indicates that the.U.S. government. has been-
making ' ,,"overly.. optimistic,. assumptions'"
about its abitity "especially in a protracted
crisis, to anticipate., the:'dataa acid .time of
even ts," he ;told a breakfast meeting. of re-
...-,
porters.
Perle said. the Soviet invasion of Afghan-
istan in 1979 abo was a surprise to the Unit-
ed States government > ~~
Asked. if. the -military or the Reagan ad-
ministration was at fault 'for" misreading
events In -.Poland; Perle.-; responded that,"it
was a collective failure. In :our .concern ..to
deter direct Soviet -.military bnvoiveine nt, we
didn't'giveeufheient consideratiois. to, the use
of Polish forces~ta accomplisii..the'same pur-
pose, that paspeee being torcrush.Soiidarty."
He did not pin the, blame on' any intelli-I
gence organization specifically-and acknowl-
edged that in trying to assess events unfold-
ing in Poland-"we weren't-.asking the right
questions.: We could be, less sure of our-
selves," said Perle of the future, "and should
be."
Now that the Polish army has made its
move, the U.S. government still is pretty
much in the dark about.. what really is hap-
pening :.inside Poland, Perle said. This is
handicappir the administration's efforts to
4oves\
decide on the proper responses to the crisis,
he said.
Perle said that the Polish government has..
blacked out internal communications within
Poland and that satellite photos are proving
of little value to U.S. analysts, partly because-
the weather has been poor.
Perle said the sanctions that the admin-
istration had thrashed out in advance of the
Polish crisis were tailored to the Soviet
Union sending in its own troops. This- has
not happened yet, and Perle stressed that
the administration is taking pains to avoid
setting off that action.
He said what the United States does will
depend on how violent the suppression of
Solidarity becomes and whether Soviet i
troops move in behind the Polish ones.
He said postponing the resumption of
U.S.-Soviet talks in Geneva on the mutual
reduction of nuclear weapons in Europe was
an option the administration was. consider-
ing` 'r += '
Looking at Solidarity's long term iproepects
in Poland, Perle said. "It would not sure
me if there were a reconstitution of Soli
ity in the aftermath of this action" bees
of "the broad base of support", it enjoys.. .
Turning.to Israel and its; seizing of the
Golan Heights, Perle said the Israeli govern-
ment's- "insensitivity to U.S. concerns is a
very dangerous course to pursue."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505010006-6