REAGAN ADVISERS HOLD SOMBER VIEW OF SOVIET INTENTIONS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505080020-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: May 25, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505080020-3
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ITW YORK TIMES
25 MAY 1980
Reagan Advisers mold Somber. View
of Soviet Intentions
Byi~NEDRICK SMITH
sped.t tJbe xew,, York Ttrnea
At the core of the working groups is a
handful of key B team members - Wil-
liam R..Van.Cleave, a defense-policy ana-
lyst at the University of Southern Califor-
nia; Richard E. Pipes, a Harvard histo-
rian who has written many books on the
Soviet Union; Lieut. Gen. Daniel O.
Graham, former director of the Defense
Georgetown Universityprofessor of gov- I Professor Pipes, who headed the if team,
ernment. argued that the American concept of nu-
IHandtul of Team Memtiers clear deterrence was becoming out-
moded because the Sovi t U
n
e
Since then the. American intelligence
agencies and even President Carter have
come to accept the B team's central con-
clusion about Moscow's strategic goals.
Moreover, members of the B team have
become key foreign policy advisers to
Ronald Reagan, the almost certain Re-
publican Presidential nominee.
The foreign policy and defense advis-
ers to the former California Governor,
now numbering over 90, have been ex-
tended beyond predominantly conserva-
tive Republicans to include such experi-
enced officials as former Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense RobertF. Ellsworth; for-
mer Deputy Secretary of the Treasury
Charls E. Walker; Adm. Thomas H.
Moorer, former Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and a sprinkling of such
Democrats, as Jeans Ji Kirkpatrick a
Bencecommunity was loltedby a forcefuFi
critique from an officially, appointed
I' of'outside experts who contended
e Soviet Union was striving not.lust
for ,strategic. parity-with- theUnited
States but for nuclear superiority.
This estimate of the Soviet Union's
long-term strategic-buildup, and its inten-
tions, a striking dissent from American
intelligence estimates over the years, be-
came sharply controversial. Members of
the outside panel, known as the "B team"
because the Government's intelligence
experts were called the "A team," were
accused of being alarmist, hard-liners
bent on increasing American military
programs or scuttling the strategic arms
limitation talks..
WASI3l?GTON, May 24-Late-in 1976;
former director of the Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs at the State Department.
,The other active figures working
closely with Richard V. Allen, Mr. Rea-
gan's principal campaign coordinator for
foreign policy, are Fred C. Ikle, former
director of the Arms Control and Disci-:
mament Agency; Laurence H. Siibe~y
man, former Deputy Attorney General
and Ambassador to Yugoslavia; Robert
W. Tucker, a' political science professor
at Johns Hopkins University, and Lieut.
Gen. Edward L. Rowny, who resigned as
the Joint Chiefs' representative at the
strategic arms talks to oppose ratifica-
tion of the second strategic arms limita-
tion treaty.
"It's a Republican group, right astride
of Republican views on foreign policy and
defense," said Mr. Allen, a 44-year-old
specialist on Soviet and international eco-
nomic affairs who was Deputy Assistant.
to President Nixon. "There are differ-
ences within the group, but if we have any
area where there's unanimity, it would be
for increased defense spending."
Beyond that, the writings of the intel-
lectual inner circle reflect a somber
world view, akin to Mr. Reagan's but pos-
sibly more pessimistic. Long before the
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan
aroused new skepticism about detente
and Soviet strategy, the Reagan advisers
were disturbed by the buildup of Soviet
power and Soviet outward thrusts and
alarmed at what they saw as the loss of
American nuclear superiority and the
general shrinkage of American power. - i
Soviet Preparing for War
e
on was
preparing to fight and win a nuclear war.
The Russians, he wrote, sought "not
deterrence but victory, not sufficiency in
weapons but superiority, not retaliation
but offensive action." He added that "the
regime is driven by ideology, internal
politics and economic exigencies steadily
.expand
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505080020-3