ALOOF POINDEXTER STILL CONTENDS THAT HISTORY WILL VINDICATE HIM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505090004-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 30, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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4 1A,
_A I
WASHINGTON POST
30 November 1986
Aloof Poindexter Still Contends
That History Will Vindicate Him
By Bob Woodward
Wnshmgtnn Post Stall Writer
Last Tuesday morning at about 7:30 White House national
security adviser ohn M. P indexter was picking over his
breakfast in his West mg o ice w 1en he suddenly mentioned
to an aide, "VU be telling the president ... requesting reas-
signment in the Navy."
There were no jitters, no real emotion. The vice admiral's
face was stony as he blinked behind his glasses and returned
to his in-box, still stuffed with the endless flow of national se-
curity paper.
Poindexter has always sought to be prepared for every turn
of fate. "Of all the people in the world who might have to take
a fall," the aide later said, "the admiral was probably the most
qualified in history."
Poindexter, who at 51 was one of the most powerful career
officers in naval history, has turned inward in these days after
his fall, according to several of those who thought they were
closest to this most distant of men.
"He thinks history will vindicate him," one aide said, "that
the Iran opening was well-intended, well-thought out ....
There's two years of paper over here that will show it was not
a policy wrapped around an attempt to get hostages out."
Senior administration and Cabinet officers have spoken pri-
vately with extreme derision of Poindexter as a man who nev-
er mastered his assignment, isolated himself and never dis-
played any political understanding while holding one of the
most politically sensitive posts in government.
Said a ranking administration figure close to the president,
"John Poindexter turned in one of the most miserable per-
formances in decades."
But Poindexter is so confident of his position that two
sources said that as of Friday he had not sought an attorney.
They said the admiral thinks that it
probably was not illegal when funds
from the Iran arms sales were di-
verted to aid the counterrevolution-
aries fighting the Nicaraguan gov-
ernment. Marine Lt. Col. Oliver L.
North, the Poindexter aide fired
last week when Poindexter's res-
ignation was announced by the
president, also "did not treat the
contra spinoff as illegal," according
to (Vie informed source.
f'tt a, thousand questions remain
about Poindexter, his actions, his
timing, and who he told, what he
tolcC_when he told-if he told. Po-
ind&ter will be one of the most
sought-after witnesses, as the Jus-
tici v)epartment criminal investi-
gatc and related probes by Con-
gress.-get under way-with inves-
tigas Cs looking at potential viola-
tior if U.S. export laws and of con-
gressional prohibitions on providing
military aid to the Nicaraguan reb-
els.
One source close to Poindexter
said the admiral will cooperate with
all appropriate investigations. Re-
ferring to news accounts of possible
document-shredding in the last
week by Poindexter and North, the
source said any such shredding was
routine.
`.;'.veral of those closest to the
adt iral said that not only is Poin-
dexer a private man, but that he
ran~ul intensely private shop in the
West Wing.
"seed-to-know was second na-
ture with him," one official said.
Angther called him "the covert
Pt)indexter learned about the
contra connection to the Iranian
am sales from North, according to
sources, when North said, "Admi-
ral, you'll he happy to hear that one
spinoff ...... That reference, the
sources said, was to the $10 million
to $30 million that Attorney Gen-
eral Edwin Meese III said was de-
posited in Swiss bank accounts to
aid the Nicaraguan rebels.
Poindexter never sought a legal
opinion about this "spinoff," which
has become the core of the contro-
versy, according to one source. A
number of sources maintain that
Poindexter did not share the infor-
mation with his closest National
Security Council aides, and after
the public disclosure on Tuesday,
Poindexter did not treat it as a big
secret.
"It was not treated as that ultra-
sensitive, not like arms control mat-
ters and really sensitive intelligence
covert operations," said one source
who talked with Poindexter after
Tuesday.
Yet sources said that Poindexter
ran the NSC operation in consider-
able secrecy, keeping himself at the
center with many private spokes
radiating out. There were matters
not known by his two key assistants
who occupied the two closet-like
offices in the security adviser's war-
ren in the West Wing.
Four channels were important
and generally not known to others
on the NSC staff, the sources said.
't'hey were:
^ The paper flow of "eyes only"
messages or documents that came
to Poindexter in sealed envelopes;
also messengers occasionally deliv-
ered intelligence and other reports
to him.
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^ Face-to-face, closed-door meet-
ings with key aides or other senior
government officials in Poindexter's
office. One source said that North
had such sessions with Poindexter,
but no more frequently than some
other senior NSC aides.
^ The relationship with White
[louse chief of staff Donald T.
Regan that included periodic one-
on-one briefings, usual weekly
breakfasts between the two men
generally at the end of the work
week, and the so-called "9:30 time"
when Poindexter briefed the pres-
ident in the morning with Regan
frequently attending.
^ The direct access to the presi-
dent which included one-on-one
meetings on rare occasions and a di-
rect phone line to the Oval Office
that was used regularly. One source
said the Poindexter also frequently
sent memos, intelligence reports or
cables to the president.
Half a dozen sources and officials
who worked closely with Poindex-
ter during his 50-week tenure as
security adviser agreed that it was
pretty much a guessing game for
anyone to figure out what Poindex-
ter did or did not pass along to
Regan and to the president.
These sources said that Poindex-
ter has not given any clue to what
he may or may not have said to
Reagan and Regan.
Poindexter, according to one
source, considered Regan the per-
son who provided order to the pres-
ident's day and not someone to in-
form about every detail of national
security policy. This source with
firsthand knowledge of the work-
ings of the White house in the last
year said he was suspicious of re-
ports claiming that North informed
Regan of the contra connection.
"Ollie just wasn't with Regan
very often," this source said.
Another more senior White
house official who nevertheless was
less informed about the (laity infor-
mation flow, said Regan was keenly
attuned to the president's near-ob-
;es: i.m with the contra cause and
that the chief of staff accordingly
made sure he kept himself informed
about the matter. Regan, this
source said, was aware that North
had more information about the
contras than anyone else in the U.S.
government.
Other sources said Poindexter
realized that the president did not
want many details about policy un-
less the president was preparing for
a speech or news conference.
In his five years at the NSC, as
military assistant, deputy security
adviser and then as security advis-
er, Poindexter was the chief force
in establishing an orderly system of
national security decision-making.
Formal presidential decisions
were codified in National Security
Decision Directives.. "We even had
an NSDD on Malta," one source
said last week, and another joked
that Poindexter "probably had an
NSDD on when to use the john."
In fact, sources said that in June
1985 a draft NSDD was circulated
to the departments and agencies on
Iran, but it was impossible to devel-
op a consensus.
"State and Defense objected,"
one source said. "It was all too sen-
sitive, and it seemed logical to go
covert."
United States involvement in
arms to Iran was handled through
Israeli transfers, beginning in Sep-
tember 1985. But the covert pres-
idential authority for direct U.S.
arms sales to Iran was not obtained
until Jan. 17 of this year when the
president signed an intelligence
"finding" or order.
When the arms sales and transfers
became u Fc`t is mont Poindexter
pu is y and privately emphasized the
ro e o t e Central Intelligence Agen-
c an sources said that he has
claime e cannot reconstruct a Iftat
a n
e -f-
rem is memory an i es.
" ese thins were done mostly
up the river" ;aid one source famil-
iar with Poindexter's thinking. The
r is to t e CI w is ias
its headquarters in Langley. up the
Potomac River from Washingto
Sources said that Poindexter
thinks that CIA Director William 1.
Casey, several key CIA operations
officers and CIA lawyers have most
o t e answers on t o raman arms
sales this year.
Intelligence sources, however,
-
em
NSC..and
Poindexter as the operational arms
fora the transactions, an said
that wi ranian mod-
erates were fiandieiy tfie 1QSC
wit out intermediaries.
Poindexter managed to remain
relatively anonymous in the White
House until this fall when it was
disclosed that he had authored a
memo to the president proposing a
"disinformation program" to make
Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi
think that he was about to be at-
tacked again by the United States
or overthrown by key trusted aides.
All along Poindexter has said that
he did not intend this disinformation
for the American news media and
when it did appear there he wanted
to distance himself and the White
House from any responsibility.
Last week one of his senior as-
sistants said, "John does see the
difference between intent and con-
sequence at times .... Disinfor-
mation was meant for Gadhafi, not
[the news media], arms for Iran
were meant for good purposes, not
to cause a scandal or get money for
the contras....
"But sometimes you don't get
what you intended, and that's per-
haps the John Poindexter story."
Whatever Poindexter's aspira-
tions to be a conceptualizer or or-
ganizer of foreign policy, even those
friendly toward him say he failed:
Not only is the U.S. policy toward
Iran in shambles, but Poindexter's
critics and friends seem to agree
that some of the major policies have
come out confused, if not also iii.
shambles. They cite the Middle
East, arms control, South Africa
and U.S.-Soviet relations.
Poindexter was largely a military
planner. Any alleged administration
"successes" he is identified with in-
volve military action, such as the 1983
Grenada invasion, the 1985 intercep-
tion of the four hijackers of the Italian
cruise ship Achille Lauro and the U.S".
bombing raid on Libya last April.
Poindexter used to take Sunda,
mornings off, about the only time he
allowed himself away from his office
and in-box. But two weeks ago he
did not get that, sources said, be-
cause he was waiting for one of a
series of interviews to explain and
attempt to put out the firestorm
that had erupted over the sales.
He was asked about his 28 years
as a naval officer and his time as
commanding officer of a destroyer
in the mid-1970s. .
"Naval officers," he said, gently
extracting his pipe from his jacket
pocket, "are better equipped be'
cause of command at sea. You have
to make decisions; you learn there
is nobody else out there in a pinch.
"You learn to be cool," he added,
smiling, "whether on the bridge of a
destroyer or here. They're the
same."
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