REAGAN SENT MARCOS SECRET MESSAGE 12 HOURS BEFORE WHITE HOUSE'S PLEA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505090013-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: February 28, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505090013-0
ON PAGE 28 February 1986
Reagan Sent Marcos Secret Message
12 Hours Before White House's Plea
By BERNARD GWERTZMAN
Special to The New York Time
WASHINGTON, Feb.. 27 - elve
hrnirs hafnra thra White H rce Vyblicly
called on President Ferdinand E. Mar-
cos to step downL.President _Reaggg
sent a message to the PtiiliPeine leader
that said that he. his family and-close
associates would_ to live in
the United States.,Administration offi-
t
w f
iI
~,
c sa
c
a
Mr. Reagan's message Sunday after-
noon, reflected a consensus that
emerged among key policy makers at a
previously undisclosed meeting Sun-
day morning at the home of Secretary
of State George P. Shultz.,AS.that time,
Std. Cenral Intelligence A enc - and
os
ad
d toobut c M d not bee in tm
a
as the Shan ocean had peen.
Mir. Reagan 's personal was
designed to assure Mr. Marcos that he
would not become an international
Habib, the special representative who
had just returned. At that meeting,
after a lengthy discussion, officials
said, Mr. Shultz won the concurrence of
the other participants to these conclu-
sions that would be presented to Mr.
Reagan later that day:
qMr. Marcos's ability to govern with
the consent of his people had ended.
9lf he uses force to try to crush the
opposition forces then led by Defense
Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and the
deputy chief of staff, Lieut. Gen. Fidel
V. Ramos, this would sharply reduce
the chances for a successful outcome.
qIt was of great importance to the
United States that force not be used.
qit would be very damaging to
United States standing in the world if
Mr. Marcos was treated like the Shah.
Gathered at Shultz's House
Those at Mr. Shultz's house besides
Mr. Habib were Defense Secretary
Caspar WWeinber er; Adm. William
J. Crowe Jr. can o the otnt
Chiefs of Staff? Robert M. Gates
deputy director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency; m. o oindeexter,
White House national security advis i ;
Michael H_Armacost, Under Secretary
ot.State for political affairs; Paul D.
Wolfowitz, Assistant Secretary of State
for East Asian and Pacific affairs, and
Richard L. Armitage, Assistant.Secre-
taa of nefgnse.for_ intgrnational.sa-
curitypolicy.
In 1979, when the Shah of Iran fled his
country, he was first offered safe haven
in the United States, but decided in-
stead to go to Morocco. But when he de-
cided that he wanted to come to theI
United States after all, President Car-
ter told him that he was not welcome.
That created a political controversy
with Henry A. Kissinger and David)
Rockefeller criticizing the Carter Ad-
ministration for treating the old Amer-I
ican ally as, in Mr. Kissinger's words, 1.
ican ally as, in Mr. Kissinger's words,
"a Flying Dutchman," a legendary
ship that was doomed to sail forever.
Eventually, after staying in the l
Bahamas and Mexico, the Shah was
permitted to enter the United States for
medical treatment, a move which led
to the seizure of the American Em-
bassy in Teheran, Iran. The Carter Ad-
ministration then virtually forced the
Shah to go to Panama, from where he
went to Egypt, before he died in 1980.
Mr. Reagan who was at Camp David
last weekend, was told at about noon on
Sunday of reports that troops loyal to
Mr. Marcos might use force. He then
dictated a personal message to Mr.
Marcos that was flashed to Ambassa-
dor Stephen Bosworth, who read it to
Mr. Marcos. In that message, Mr. Rea-
gan made a strong appeal to Mr. Mar-
cos not to use force.
Reagan Meets With Aides
From about 3 P.M. to 4:30 P.M. on
Sunday afternoon, after Mr. Reagan
had returned to the White House, he
met with Mr. Shultz and other top
Shultz's house earlier in the day. After
Mr. Shultz outlined the conclusions of
the morning meeting, there was some
V
questioning by Donald T. Regan, the
White House chief of staff, of the
recommendations, to make sure all the
alternatives had been considered, a
participant said.
Finally, Mr. Reagan agreed to the
conclusions and stressed that he
wanted Mr. Marcos to feel welcome in
this country if he chose to come here. A
personal message was drafted that
said that Mr. Reagan "looked forward
to President Marcos's working out a
scenario for a transition government."
It said that Mr. Marcos, his family and
close associates would be welcome in
the United States. It was sent to Mr.
Bosworth who read it to Mr. Marcos.
At that time, Larry Speakes, the
White House spokesman, was refusing
to say whether Mr. Reagan believed
Mr. Marcos should step down, despite
repeated questioning from reporters.
He said that because of the possibility
of violence being used by the Marcos
forces, the United States would cut off STAT
military aid if that happened.
Meanwhile, Mr. Shultz and Michael
H. Armacost, the Under Secretary of
State for political affairs, summoned
Bias F. Ople, Mr. Marcos's Minister of
Labor to the State Department at about
7 P.M. on Sunday,.
Contents of Message Disclosed
Mr. Ople said today that Mr. Shultz
"took me into his confidence" and dis-
closed the contents of the Reagan mes-
sage to Mr. Marcos.
"The message was very skillfully
phrased so as to avoid giving offense,"
Mr. Ople said in an interview. "The
gist of it was that President Marcos
should now phase himself out in favor
of a transition government and the
United States would facilitate his
safety and his medical services for
himself, his family and associates."
He said he tried to phone Mr. Marcos
immediately but could not get through.
At about 2 A.M. on Monday, he sent the
message through the Philippine Em-,
bassy telex. He said that at 5 A.M., he
was telephoned by Mr. Marcos.
The Public Statement
He said he got the message and that
it matched the message he had re-
ceived from Bosworth," Mr. Ople said.
"He started to argue against it. He felt
deeply hurt by the betrayal of his
friends in the United States."
At just about that time, the White
House issued a public statement that it
was time for a "peaceful transition" -
the first time it had publicly called on
Mr. Marcos to step down.
That touched off a series of phone
calls from Mr. Marcos and his family
to the United States and to the Amer-
ican Embassy in Manila. Mr. Marcos
telephoned Senator Paul Laxalt on
Monday afternoon to see if Mr. Reagan
was really seeking his resignation and
he was told that he was. Mrs. Marcos
telephoned Nancy Reagan to see what
she felt. Mrs. Reagan, according to her
spokesman, expressed "our concern
for the Marcoses' safety and told her
that if they wanted to come to the
United States, they certainly could."
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505090013-0