SOVIET ACTIVE MEASURES AND DISINFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505100002-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

iC'~TAT=~' -'
ART~LEAPPEARED vol. xv, No. 4
ON PAGE /9 _
SQVIET ACTIVE MEASURES
AND DISINFORMATION:
by
OVERVIEW AND ASSESSMENT DENNIS KUX
T ately there has been increased public "White" or overt~activities. "Gray" activ t?es
L attention regarding Soviet "disin-
formation" and. "active measures,"
attempts by Moscow to influence political
attitudes and public opinion in non-
communist countries through deceptive and
often covert means.
Yet serious analysis has been limited.
There has been a great deal of focus on
Moscow's espionage endeavors, but this
other facet of the Kremlin's intelligence
operations has received far less scrutiny,
either by the press or academics.
The terminology pertaining to the
subject is unfamiliar and loosely defined,
even among specialists. In fact, the terms
"active measures" and "disinformation" are
both imported directly from the Soviet in-
telligence lexicon. "Disinformation," the
more frequently used and better-known term,
is the English transliteration of the Russian
"dezinformatsiya" or misinforming through
the dissemination of information that is
totally or partially false. The phrase "active
measures" is the English translation of
"aktivnyye meropriyatiya," the name of the
Soviet KGB unit charged with implementing
these activities.
In Soviet intelligence doctrine, the
concept of "active measures" covers a wide
span of practices including disinformation
operations, political influence efforts, and
the activities of Soviet front groups and
foreign communist parties. All active
measures have the common goal of enhancing
Soviet influence, usually by tarnishing the
image of opponents. They generally involve
elements of deception and often employ
clandestine means to mask Moscow's hand in
the operation.
Overall, where active measures fit in the
Soviet framework may be better understood
by considering the whole spectrum of Soviet
foreign policy endeavors through the optic of
"white," "gray," and "black" operations.
Normal diplomatic, trade, aid, and in-
formational efforts can be considered
! VI! \J,
foreign communist parties, "clandestine"
radio stations, or well-known media outlets
for disinformation. While not officially
acknowledged to be Soviet sponsored, semi-
overt "gray" activities are widely known as
under Soviet direction and control. In
contrast, "black" activities involve genuinely
clandestine operations: the use of agents of
influence, spreading false rumors, duping
politicians and journalists, and disseminating
forgeries and fake documents. Active
measures fall under either the "gray" or the
"black" rubric, although the line between the
semi-overt and the clandestine is often
blurred.
Finding an appropriate English phrase to
describe active measures is difficult. Former
Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagle-
burger has written: ' `No phrase in English
conveys precisely the meaning of active
measures. Perhaps ~'orld V4'ar 11
psychological warfare operations provide the
closest parallel."'
The So~iet~ firct u.ed active measures as
a policy tool in the l9?Us a-hen 'Moscow
sought to discredit emigre groups in 11'ectern
Europe, particularly i~i France, b} spreading
disinformation and b~ luring emigre activists
back to Russia through carious subterfuges.
Even before the 191 % Revolution, the Tsarist
secret ponce emplo}ed similar deceptive
techniques, using foreign agents not only to
collect intelligence but also to sow dissent
among emigre groups and, by covert sub-
sidies to selected journals, to attempt to
create a better foreign press for Imperial
Russia=
In the 1950s the Soviet Union in-
stitutionalized these practices, establishing an
intelligence unit that specialized in disin-
formation; this ~~as Department D within the
First Chief Directorate of the Soviet in-
telligence organization, In the 1960s, the term
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/23 :CIA-RDP90-005528000505100002-0
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/23 :CIA-RDP90-005528000505100002-0