... A PLOT ON THE POPE?

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00552R000505140019-8
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 9, 2010
Sequence Number: 
19
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 2, 1983
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00552R000505140019-8.pdf79.9 KB
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Approved For Release 2010/09/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505140019-8 ARTICLE APPEJ.F\:D ON PAGE oZ CHICAGO TRIBUNE 2 January 1983 A plot on the Pope? All the public relations gimmicks in the, with the gunman "and that they were mixed up world, though, will not overcome the problem in a variety of other nefarious schemes ranging for the Soviets-and for the West-if the Soviet from drug smuggling to gunrunning. It is less Union is shown to have had a hand in the. ' obvious- that Bulgarian-and Soviet-officials attempted assassination of Pope John Paul II.. were aware that they were assisting in an If Bulgaria's secret police did indeed attempt on the Pope's life. Some of those who are most familiar with the neer the attempt-and there is circumstantial case say that one plausible explanation is that evidence pointing in that direction-then there the would-be assassin was merely one of a can be little were that the Soviets also were number of potential -hit men being kept on hold. involved. And N the Soviets,were involved the for :possible future use. According to that ex man -ultimately behind the could have been planation the attack on the Pope was neither none -other than Yuri V. Andropov, former head Panned nor , and the Bulgarians were. of the Soviet KGB and now head of the country. How ,can the leaders of a predominately Chris- taken completely by surprise. bail. and heavily Catholic country deal with a But that is about as innocent as the Bul- cons conspirator to murder the . Pope? Not very garians can plausibly claim to be, and it is' the P - only explanation that would let Mr. Andro easily, if at all. off the hook. The Soviets certainl had a That is one reason the Reagan administration ? 'Motive to rid themselves of the Polish Pope, a is wise to be cautious in assessing the evidence man who was inspiring religious and nationalis- of thq Bulgarian connection. This is not a. tic fervor in eir largest and most unstable matter to try to turn into a public relations, wpm; If the deed could be done by a citizen offensive. Its implications are so of a NATO country with right-wtag connections that U.S. leaders must be certain about. the Soviets might have thought they would be before making 'public statements or takng in the clear.' action. That is not established, however, and 1 .1.1 The evidence so far is ambiguous and largely - 'it never will be. If the Italian ihv tigation circumstantial. It depends heavily on the word, unambiguously concludes that the Bulgarian of the' gunman, Mehmet All Agca, whose men- connection was real and conscious, and that tal stability and credibility are doubtful. There KGB_ support was probable, the U.S. and the ; is also evidence to - contradict some of the West : in general will have to assess -whether it allegations of conscious Bulgarian involvement is politically and morally, ible to conduct in the assassination attempt. affairs of state with Mr. An~dropov. But until Thee emphasis, however, should be on con- such a case is made, it would be unwise to scious'. involvement. It is clear that Bulgarian allow the issue to shake the uneasy framework agents were involved to one degree or another of superpower relations. Approved For Release 2010/09/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505140019-8