THE SOVIETS' MAN IN TRIPOLI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505250037-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 37
• Publication Date: November 10, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000505250037-6
WASHINGTON POST
10 November 1985
Jack Anderson and Dale Van Atta
The Soviets' Man in Tripoli
Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi is
running scared these days. He's afraid
of his own military. The last time he
sent his troops into action-ordering
them to invade Tunisia last August-
they turned their guns on him.
Qaddafi is probably not too worried
by recent disclosures that the CIA has
put him on its enemies list with Presi-
dent Reagan's blessing. As we first re-
ported in June, the CIA supported the
disastrous coup attempt by Libyan
exiles in May 1984. The CIA contin-
ues to back the leader of that fiasco,
Mohammed Youssef Magarieff,
though his chances of success appear
no brighter now.
But if Qaddafi has little to fear from
the CIA, the same cannot be said
about the Soviets. Their hopes of con-
solidating their foothold in Libya have
improved dramatically as Qaddafi's
troubles have mounted. And their man
is in place in Tripoli: he's Qaddafi's
closest associate, Maj. Abdul Salam
Jalloud.
Qaddafi's biggest problem is money
-and it could be fatal. In the first dec-
ade of his rule, he could placate his
people with oil money and with glib
promises of continued prosperity. But
the world oil glut changed everything.
Oil makes up more than 99 percent of
Libya's exports. Qaddafi now gets less
than half the $22 billion a year that oil
brought him in 1980.
Libyans realize that they are deep in
debt to the Soviets as a result of loans
Qaddafi got to further his grandiose
plans. Shortages are everywhere, and
Qaddafi's fabled charisma can't dis-
guise the hard times-or the fact that
he's largely responsible.
We've seen a secret CIA assess-
ment that lists Libyans' "grievances"
against Qaddafi. One is that he has
been "squandering Libyan money,
promoting utopian schemes and ignor-
ing the country's best interests." Per-
haps more significantly, the report
notes that the higher-ups in Libya's
73,000-man armed forces are "angry
about Qaddafi's free-wheeling ap-
proach to foreign policy and his refusal
to share the making of major decisions
with them." The CIA points out that
there have been many more spontane-
ous coup attempts by the military in
the past five years than in the 10
years after he seized power in 1969.
Much of the army's hardware-
some $20 billion worth-was sold to
Qaddafi by the Soviets on generous
credit terms. He owes them for much
of it, but the Russians aren't that con-
cerned. They sold Qaddafi more than
he needs, in the expectation that Libya
will serve as a logistical base for
Soviet mischief.
According to intelligence reports
we've seen, the Soviets have already
installed three SA-5 surface-to-air
missile bases in Libya. These weapons
have a range of 174 miles and are de-
signed to shoot down high-altitude air
craft such as AWACS reconnaissance
planes.
Two of the three sites are on the
coast near' Tripoli and }3enghazt,
threatening the U.S. Sixth Fleet and
NATO allies in the Mediterranean.
The third, in the southeasterq desert,
threatens planes in Egypt and Sudan.
Several thousand Soviet personnel
may eventually be brought in to Khan
the missile bases.
Libya's strategic importance to the
Soviets was increased by the recent
coup in Sudan. The new Sudanese
leaders are much friendlier to Qaddati,
and are cooling their relations with
Egypt and the United States. A poten-
tial pro-Soviet bloc of Libya, Sudan
and Ethiopia would isolate Egypt and
give the Soviets a better chance to
control northern Africa than they've
had since they were kicked out of
Egypt years ago.
These Soviet dreams of glory would
shatter if Qaddafi were to be over-
thrown by the wrong people-namely,
the exile groups that are making the
first tentative steps toward unity.
They would not be content to elimi-
nate just Qaddafi, but would get rid of
the top men around him as well.
This the Soviets will try their hard-
est to prevent. They want their man,
Jalloud, to step up when Qaddafi falls.
As for the Libyan military men who
are the likeliest engine of Qaddafi's de-
struction, the CIA concludes that
some of them are already growing
concerned about "the Soviet connec-
tion." So far, though, Jalloud has been
able to prevail.
LUi5. United Neuture syndicate, Inc
Approved For Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000505250037-6