CIA ANTI-QADDAFI PLAN BACKED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505250056-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: November 3, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/18: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505250056-5
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WASHINGTON POST
3 November 1985
CIA Anti-Qaddafi Plan Backed
Reagan Authorizes Covert Operation to Undermine Libyan Regime
By Bob Woodward
Washington Post Staff Writer
President Reagan has authorized
a Central Intelligence Agency co-
vert operation designed to under-
mine the Libyan regime headed by
Col. Muammar Qaddafi, according
to informed government sources.
The plan, which involves CIA as-
sistance to another country or
countries in North Africa and the
Middle East that oppose Qaddafi,
has run into initial resistance from
the House and Senate Select Com-
mittees on Intelligence, which over-
see the CIA. The chairman and vice
chairman of the Senate panel re-
cently wrote Reagan to outline op-
position to the covert operation.
However, a narrow majority of
the members of both panels so far
supports the covert action, admin-
istration sources said. Secretary of
State George P. Shultz appeared
before the House committee as re-
cently as last week to support the
plan.
The operation, authorized in a
formal presidential "finding" signed
this fall, is at first designed to dis-
rupt, preempt and frustrate Qad-
dafi's subversive and terrorist
plans, the sources said. Secondly,
they said, it might lure him into
some foreign adventure or terrorist
exploit that would give a growing
number of Qaddafi opponents in the
Libyan military a chance to seize
power; or such a foreign adventure
might give one of Qaddafi's neigh-
bors, such as Algeria or Egypt, a
justification for responding to Qad-
dafi militarily.
After 41/2 years of ineffective eco-
nomic sanctions and perhaps some
minor financial support or encour-
agement to Libyan dissidents in ex-
ile, the administration has decided
that Qaddafi is such an international
menace to U.S. interests that co-
vert action should be undertaken,
officials said.
Shultz and CIA Director William
J. Casey, according to sources, have
argued that the new covert plan is
designed to stop terrorism, not to
support the assassination of Qad-
dafi.
A longstanding executive order
signed by Reagan expressly forbids
the CIA or any other U.S. govern-
ment agency from direct or indirect
involvement in any assassination
plan.
This is the issue that most con-
cerned the chairman and vice chair-
man of the Senate Select Intelli-
gence Committee, Sens. David F.
Durenberger (R-Minn.) and Patrick
J. Leahy (D-Vt.) respectively, who
conveyed their opposition to the
plan against Qaddafi in a letter to
the White House, sources said. In
the letter they asked Reagan how
the plan would avoid the prohibition
against assassination attempts or
plans.
The White House responded,
sources said, by insisting that there
was no plan to assassinate Qaddafi
and by asking the two senators to
delete the word, assassination from
their letter. The senators declined
to do so, sources said.
Administration sources said
there is no doubt that Reagan,
Shultz and Casey would like to see
Qaddafi toppled, and believe that a
support operation costing several
million dollars through a third coun-
try is the type of antiterrorist op-
eration that can safely and legally
be undertaken.
According to intelligence reports,
Qaddafi gives support to some 30
insurgent, radical or terrorist
groups worldwide, ranging from
current hot spots such as Nicaragua
and the Philippines to groups in
Lebanon, Pakistan, Europe, South
America, the Caribbean and Africa,
that, reports allege, are pursuing
goals contrary to U.S. interests.
A top secret, 29-page "Vulner-
ability Assessment" done by the
CIA and other U.S. intelligence
agencies and dated June 18, 1984,
concluded that "no course of action
short of stimulating Qaddafi's fall
will bring any significant and endur-
ing change in Libyan policies."
That 1984 assessment, part of
the analysis that led to the decision
to launch a covert action now, also
concluded that "disaffected ele-
ments in the [Libyan] military could
be spurred to assassination at-
tempts or to cooperate with the
exiles against Qaddafi."
In light of the executive order
banning U.S. involvement in assas-
sination, several sources voiced
surprise that the word was used in
the: vulnerability assessment that
was prepared under the direction of
the national intelligence officer
(NIO) for the Near East and South
Asia, the top analyst in the U.S.
intelligence community for that re-
gion.
The vulnerabilities of the Qaddafi
government could only be ex-
ploited, according to the assess-
ment, "through a broad program in
cooperation with key countries
combining political, economic and
paramilitary action." It also said
that "the exile groups, if supported
to a substantial degree, could soon
begin an intermittent campaign of
sabotage and violence which could
prompt further challenges to Qad-
dafi's authority."
The assessment said Libyan ex-
iles who oppose Qaddafi have re-
ceived support from Egypt, Iraq,
Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan and
Tunisia.
The State Department intelli-
gence branch disagreed with the
vulnerability assessment and said in
a footnote that it "rests too heavily
on fragmentary, unsubstantiated
reporting and fails to give sufficient
weight to Qaddafi's enduring pop-
ularity .... "
Since 1981, the first year of the
Reagan presidency when- Qaddafi
allegedly dispatched "hit teams" to
assassinate the president or other
top U.S. officials, Qaddafi has been
a thorn in the administration's side.
The president has authority to
begin covert operations that he
deems necessary for the national
security. Under the law, the con-
gressional oversight committees
must be informed fully and in a
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timely fashion. If Congress objects
to the operation, the only recourse
is to cut off the funds, as was done
with the CIA covert operation
against Nicaragua.
An alternative to an actual at-
tempt to overthrow Qaddafi, ac-
cording to sources and documents,
might be some paramilitary support
to Egypt or Algeria, the chief coun-
tries that might be able to bring
pressure on Qaddafi, though both
have had serious reservations about
cooperating with the United States
in the past when covert anti-Qaddafi
proposals have been discussed.
Last year, according to sources, a
covert plan against Qaddafi was
blocked by CIA Deputy Director
John N. McMahon on grounds that
the exiles were "Boy Scouts" and
too weak to have even half a chance
at success.
Casey supported that decision
not to move ahead with a covert
operation because no U.S. ally
would support it. Last year Qaddafi
was gaining some respectability in
Europe, expanding intelligence ties
with Greece and enhancing military
relations with Italy and Turkey,
according to intelligence sources.
The sources were unable to ex-
plain exactly why the administration
has chosen this time to launch the
covert operation. But they pointed
to a Special National Intelligence
Estimate entitled, "Libya's Qaddafi:
the Challenge to the United States
and Western Interests," completed
earlier this year, that said Qaddafi
"provides money, weapons, a base
of operations, travel assistance or
training to some 30 insurgent, rad-
ical or terrorist groups."
The report said reliable intelli-
gence showed Qaddafi stirring up
trouble worldwide by continuing
subversion in Chad, Sudan and Tu-
nisia; pursuing common goals with
what the estimate called the "rad-
ical states" of Iran, Syria, Ethiopia
and Nicaragua, and through con-
tinuing support to groups in the
Philippines, New Caledonia, Pak-
istan and Zaire.
A map in the intelligence esti-
mate showed Qaddafi supporting
insurgents or terrorist groups in
countries such as Guatemala, El
Salvador, Chile, Colombia, the Do-
minican Republic, Lebanon and
Iraq.
In addition the map showed Qad-
dafi providing financial support to
the political opposition or to leftist
politicians in Costa Rica, St. Lucia,
and Dominica.
The estimate said there were
50,000 Soviet and Eastern Euro-
pean technicians or advisers in Lib-
ya. Such special or regular intelli-
gence estimates are issued by
Casey with input from the other
U.S. intelligence agencies.
Calling Qaddafi "a judicious po-
litical calculator" and pointedly say-
ing that he was not living up to his
madman image, the intelligence
estimate said that Qaddafi would
continue to be a threat to U.S. and
Western interests.
Early this year some Libyan mil-
itary officers launched two unsuc-
cessful assassination attempts
against Qaddafi, who responded by
executing as many as 75 officers
accused of participating in them.
U.S. intelligence agencies re-
ceive almost a steady stream of re-
ports-many considered reliable--
that Qaddafi is expanding his ter-
rorist capabilities and planning var-
ious actions against U.S. installa-
tions or individuals.
Earlier this year one report said
Qaddafi had formed two new special
operations units to conduct com-
mando and terrorist operations,
including one naval unit headed by a
senior aide.
Within the last two weeks there
have been intelligence reports that
Qaddafi was targeting the U.S. Em-
bassy in Tunis and the U.S. ambas-
sador to Tunisia, according to gov-
ernment sources.
Staff researcher Barbara Feinman
contributed to this report.
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