USE OF DISCLOSURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505380013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 15, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: June 2, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505380013-8
NEW YORK TIMES
]E
P~t
2 June 1986
Use of Disclosures
Administration Often Unveils Secrets,
At Risk to Security, for Sake of Policy
By LESLIE H. GELS
*WW to no !Mw YO 5 TIMM
WASHINGTON, June 1 - The Rea-
gan Administration has been following
a pattern of disclosing highly classified
information to support its foreign poli-
cies, even though a number of Adminis.
tration officials say these disclosures
have endangered intelli-
gence sources and meth-
News ods. This fits the well-es-
Analysis tablished practice of its
predecessors, with two im-
portant variations: In the
memory of a number of past and
present officials, the Reagan team
does It more often. And this Admiob-
tration has been more aggressive in
threatening the now media with prose-
cution for conveying similar Intelli-
gene information to the American
This has set oft a struggle between
press and government over what Intei-
ligence data should be made public and
who should decide. William J. Casey,
the Director of Central Intelligence,
once again highlighted those issues
with more threats to the press last
week concerning coverage of the trial
of Ronald W. Pelton, a former official
of the National Security Agency who is
accused of spying for the Soviet Union.
By the week's and the White House had
moved to soften the threat somewhat.
Today, in separate television inter-
views, Secretary of State George P.
Shultz and Defense Secretary Caspar
W. Weinberger, while supporting the
view that journalists who break the law
on disclosing intelligence secrets
should be prosecuted, called for volun-
tary restraints and appeals to journal-
ists' sense of reannnsi lity
the right to publish unauthorized inter
matfon. But Admiral Turner insisted:
that the press than had to accept the
rush of prosecution.
In 1982, the Administration made
public Aerial reconnaissance photo-
graphs that Intelligence officials said
proved Nicaragua, with Soviet and
Cuban aid, was assembling the largest
military force in Central America and
was supplying Salvadoran gnerrlllas.
At the time, a senior
Administration od-
ficial said: "It's a no-win situation. jf'
we go public with the information, we
may lose our ability to continue collect-
ing in the field. It we don't, we may lose
our change to build public support fir
the policy."
As It turned out, according to oft
dais, the Administration neither lost
its Intelligence access nor convinced
many of the extent of the military
threat. But the photographs might have
been useful to Soviet intelligence.
In 1983, after the Soviet Union shot
down a Korean airliner, killing 21S pen-
ple aboard, Secretary Shultz revealed
that American *listening posts had in-
tercepted the radio conversations be-
tween the Soviet pilot and his control.
lers.
The disclosure may have failed to
prove his point that the Soviets knew
the plane was not an intelligence air-
craft and, as far as many intelligence
officers were concerned, told Moscow
that the United States could intercept
Important Soviet military communica.
tions.
The disclosures also include an inci-
dent last year in which the Central In-
telligence Agency offered the press de-
tailed information provided by one of
the highest-ranking Soviet defectors of
recent times.
Testimony at Spy Trial
Last week the disclosures entailed a
Federal prosecutor, for the first time
using information supplied by the
United States intelligence community,
speaking in a spy trial of the general
American capability to "exploit,"
,.process," and "analyze" Soviet mes-
sages.
In each instance, according to Ad-
ministration officials, intelligence offi-
cers and others have argued disclosure on the ground that adver-
saries, knowing they were being seen
and heard, could take steps to block
these processes In the future.
To some Administration officials and
others, these authorized dislosures
have been more damaging to intelli-
gence collection than the unauthorized
press disclosures of recent weeks that
have so exercised Administration lead-
era. These include press accounts of the
details of Libyan messages after Presi-
deft Reagan had talked publicly about
the substance of those messages re-
garding terrorist activities in Berlin.
Of the greatest concern to the Admin-
istration were reports that an Amer-
ican spy had told Moscow that United
States submarines were involved in lis-
tening to Soviet communications, infor-
mation presumably already in Mos-
cow's possession:
While the Administration's thrust When to Go Public?
has been to bear down on the press, Nonetheless, the weight of opinion
with frequent warnings in recent prpreaesd by officials of past and
weeks, its own role and reasons in di pmt Presidential administrations is
vulging such information have re- that the one in power has the
celved scant attention. decide when Intelligence must be com-
As Representative Les Aspin, chair- premised to advance policy.
man of the House Armed Services "I've always been of the view that an
Committee, put It: "Every administra- administration has to be able to make
tion wants to have it both wayq - to the judgment when to disclose, even If
keep its secrets, and to reveal them intelligence people are opposed," said
whenever doing so is useful for their ; McGeorge - Bundy, President Ken-
politics and policies." The Wisconsin nedy's national security adviser. He re-
Democrat, a former Intelligence Com- led Kennedy's decision to reveal
mittee member, added that in his judg tellite photographs of Soviet missiles
meet a number of Administration Cuba in 1983 as a legitimate exercise
closures have been "more damaging this
our gal necessary informati S field limner, a retired admiral
i
than tine press disclosures the Adminis ho was. President Carter's InteW-
tration is complaining about." once child, went further, saying that
Administration disclosures include "we always have.. to make comps
revealing the most sensitive communi- muses in balancing intelligence
cations interceptions in the recent case to
cenbideations
y
.
of Libya and the sisviet Union oil a num. But, It '9mpossible to make
her of occasions, as well as releasing this judgment frym outside the Govern-
satellite photographs regarding Nica- menL- ragua in 1982.
The Case of the Deter
In late 1985, the Central Intelligence
Agency made a determined effort to
tell reporters details about their inter-
rogation of Vitaly S. Yurchenko, a key
Soviet intelligence agent who appar-
ently defected and then slipped out of
American control and returned to Moe-
cow. The C.I.A. told its side, as some of
Its officials acknowledged at the time,
to show that he had been a valuable in.,
former, contrary to White House asser-
tions of his uselessness.
A number of Administration officials
at the time maintained that these
C.I.A. disclosures tipped off Moscow to
what Mr. Yurchenko had divulged, in
the same way that Mr. Casey is seeking.
to prevent the press from telling Mos-
cow and the American public about Mr.
Pelton's alleged disclosures.
Earlier this year, Mr. Reagan pub-
licly spoke of the Administration's
knowledge of messages sent to and
from Tripoli and its diplomatic posts.'
He said these proved Libyan involve-
ment in the terrorist attack April 5
against a discotheque in West Berlin, in
w two peop le were killed and 230
others wounded.
Several intelligence officials though(
the disclosure would allow the Libyans
to prevent similar Interception in the
future.
As to the decision to make disclo.
sores at the Pelton trial, Edward P..
Djerijian, a White House spokesman,
said last week that it was "made by ap.
proprlate Government authorities
after careful consideration of the de.
mands of trial and the potential harm
that release of this selected data may
cause the national security!'
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/15: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505380013-8