THE INTELLIGENCE MYSTIQUE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00552R000505380050-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 12, 2010
Sequence Number:
50
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 31, 1985
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000505380050-7
G% E
Joseph Kraft
The
Intelligence
Mystique
Two total different kinds of enter-
prise run ttm!M recent
cases, irst are o erations involy-
mgy argely technical information. ten
there are the tricks mtelli nce ser-
vices a ant oev~n another.
gg is confu-
sion--even se uson-at the high-
est tllevels between these almost
o
site kiads of business. rtin out the
difference and sense
portunityfoitrenewal y foM of t-
insiuions, the intelligence
ovet cornnutteea of Congress.
to Walker case provides a current
example of an operation centering on
technical information. For numerous
reasons what the Walkers and their
friends did poses acute threats to
American security.
The Walker ring had access to data
concerning the positioning, movement
and communications of American sub-
marines. The subs, along with bomb-
ers and missiles, form the famous triad
of nuclear weapons constituting the
American deterrent. But adversaries
know where the missiles and bombers
are based, and both could be erased in
a first strike.
The subs are much less vulnerable
because, in theory at least, their posi-
tions and communications are secret.
If positions and communications be-
came known, however, even the sub-
marines could be taken out. Thus the
Walkers may have passed on data af-
fecting the least vulnerable leg of the
triad-a truly vital key to American
security.
Their motive for espionage, more-
over, was particularly pernicious. Dur-
ing World War II, spies such as. the
Rosenbergs and Klaus Fuchs, acted
with ideological motives Because of
association with various left-wing
WASHINGTON POST
31 October 1985
causes they were easy to identify and
not hard to run down.
But the Walkers were in it for the
money. Their case shows that nearly
all Americans hungry for money-not
merely those with a particular set of
political ideas-are possible spies.
Surveillance, instead of being concen-
tratect aroun a relative handful of
people, has to include every y wit
access o secret information.
That kind of surveillance, the
Walker case also shows, cones wit
great icu y in this country, mer-
'can coup erin e i ence, in act, is
men y weak. John Walker, the
mastermind o t e s ring, worked
WRFER Russians for 17 years before
ing uncover Discovery cane not
a reSWE o some coup by t av
r Me LIA or rift in the
family a suspicious wife to re-
vea what she thought to the autori-
- H
tes. t!SV or that ac Me
Walker ring would still be doing its
stuff.
hut after a first ripple of alarm, the
highest authorities are keeping cool.
The plea-bargaining arranged with
John Walker means there will be no
trial-and no public disclosure of what
damage the Walkers did. William
Casey, the director of Centra ntelli-
gence, in an interview with I-ime
magazine rec en y, sat o vie es-
WIN= e or s: n m t ey
have n notably successful in o ra-
ons in is country.
Most significant of all was the com-
ment made ?resident Reagan at
his news conference of pt. 15.
"'t' e Walker case," he said, how doesn't seem to look as big as it
did aso imeao,nowwith wa
we ve seen happening in other coun-
tries."
"What we've seen happening in
.offiW countries, of course, refers to
the entir different kind of intelli-
gence operations-the games pay
by one intelligence service on another.
bMthcally, ea an had in mind-a
series of defections associated wit
moles planted by the intelligence ser-
vice one country upon another.
Thus two high officials defected
to the United States in the spring and
gave information on various Soviet
moles in the West. In August four
spies planted by the communists in
West Germany sneaked back to East
Germany. In September a longtime
Soviet double agent defected in Brit-
ain, giving information that led to the
expulsion of more than a score of Rus-
sian agents there.
Clearly, the president believes that
the tricks played by one service upon
another have a much higher value than
the collection of technical information.
Casey seems to share that view, and
the plea-bargaining in the Walker case
confirms the judgment tbat_fooling the
rival intelligence service takes top pri-
ority.
But should it? Aren't the games ser-
vices play upon each other a hall of
mirrors? Don't they just work to keep
everybody confused? Does anybody
believe moles? Doesn't the information
they furnish mainly pander to a taste
for inside gossip? Isn't the whole game
reinforced by the mystique of intelli-
gence officers, particularly those with
wartime experience, for derring-do as
opposed to solid information of a tech-
nical (and therefore dull) kind?
I don't know the answers to these
questions. But the country ought to
have them. The United States, after
all, spends billions on inte -ence.
ere is no clear nation sense of
even elementary priorities, ie con-
gressiona oversight committees,
which lave a most given up since tai -
ing to a ect CIA operations in Nicara-
gua, coo +?i ome re t?v:ii:r ;tgriu by
rend a-irg it basic iurigmcnt a bour ,riw
the country uses-and misuses-a;
vast into ligence resources.
A-.. :.n.. A:.eles Thites dva: 1? , r
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000505380050-7