THE INTELLIGENCE MYSTIQUE

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00552R000505380050-7
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 12, 2010
Sequence Number: 
50
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 31, 1985
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00552R000505380050-7.pdf105.17 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000505380050-7 G% E Joseph Kraft The Intelligence Mystique Two total different kinds of enter- prise run ttm!M recent cases, irst are o erations involy- mgy argely technical information. ten there are the tricks mtelli nce ser- vices a ant oev~n another. gg is confu- sion--even se uson-at the high- est tllevels between these almost o site kiads of business. rtin out the difference and sense portunityfoitrenewal y foM of t- insiuions, the intelligence ovet cornnutteea of Congress. to Walker case provides a current example of an operation centering on technical information. For numerous reasons what the Walkers and their friends did poses acute threats to American security. The Walker ring had access to data concerning the positioning, movement and communications of American sub- marines. The subs, along with bomb- ers and missiles, form the famous triad of nuclear weapons constituting the American deterrent. But adversaries know where the missiles and bombers are based, and both could be erased in a first strike. The subs are much less vulnerable because, in theory at least, their posi- tions and communications are secret. If positions and communications be- came known, however, even the sub- marines could be taken out. Thus the Walkers may have passed on data af- fecting the least vulnerable leg of the triad-a truly vital key to American security. Their motive for espionage, more- over, was particularly pernicious. Dur- ing World War II, spies such as. the Rosenbergs and Klaus Fuchs, acted with ideological motives Because of association with various left-wing WASHINGTON POST 31 October 1985 causes they were easy to identify and not hard to run down. But the Walkers were in it for the money. Their case shows that nearly all Americans hungry for money-not merely those with a particular set of political ideas-are possible spies. Surveillance, instead of being concen- tratect aroun a relative handful of people, has to include every y wit access o secret information. That kind of surveillance, the Walker case also shows, cones wit great icu y in this country, mer- 'can coup erin e i ence, in act, is men y weak. John Walker, the mastermind o t e s ring, worked WRFER Russians for 17 years before ing uncover Discovery cane not a reSWE o some coup by t av r Me LIA or rift in the family a suspicious wife to re- vea what she thought to the autori- - H tes. t!SV or that ac Me Walker ring would still be doing its stuff. hut after a first ripple of alarm, the highest authorities are keeping cool. The plea-bargaining arranged with John Walker means there will be no trial-and no public disclosure of what damage the Walkers did. William Casey, the director of Centra ntelli- gence, in an interview with I-ime magazine rec en y, sat o vie es- WIN= e or s: n m t ey have n notably successful in o ra- ons in is country. Most significant of all was the com- ment made ?resident Reagan at his news conference of pt. 15. "'t' e Walker case," he said, how doesn't seem to look as big as it did aso imeao,nowwith wa we ve seen happening in other coun- tries." "What we've seen happening in .offiW countries, of course, refers to the entir different kind of intelli- gence operations-the games pay by one intelligence service on another. bMthcally, ea an had in mind-a series of defections associated wit moles planted by the intelligence ser- vice one country upon another. Thus two high officials defected to the United States in the spring and gave information on various Soviet moles in the West. In August four spies planted by the communists in West Germany sneaked back to East Germany. In September a longtime Soviet double agent defected in Brit- ain, giving information that led to the expulsion of more than a score of Rus- sian agents there. Clearly, the president believes that the tricks played by one service upon another have a much higher value than the collection of technical information. Casey seems to share that view, and the plea-bargaining in the Walker case confirms the judgment tbat_fooling the rival intelligence service takes top pri- ority. But should it? Aren't the games ser- vices play upon each other a hall of mirrors? Don't they just work to keep everybody confused? Does anybody believe moles? Doesn't the information they furnish mainly pander to a taste for inside gossip? Isn't the whole game reinforced by the mystique of intelli- gence officers, particularly those with wartime experience, for derring-do as opposed to solid information of a tech- nical (and therefore dull) kind? I don't know the answers to these questions. But the country ought to have them. The United States, after all, spends billions on inte -ence. ere is no clear nation sense of even elementary priorities, ie con- gressiona oversight committees, which lave a most given up since tai - ing to a ect CIA operations in Nicara- gua, coo +?i ome re t?v:ii:r ;tgriu by rend a-irg it basic iurigmcnt a bour ,riw the country uses-and misuses-a; vast into ligence resources. A-.. :.n.. A:.eles Thites dva: 1? , r Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/12 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000505380050-7