REAGAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505390121-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 121
• Publication Date: May 11, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505390121-7
ARTICLE aPEAM
ON PAGE' ' I CHICAGO TRIBUNE
11 May 1984
Reagan and Central America
As televised speeches go, President Reagan
produced a masterful rendition Wednesday
night 'of his vintage self at his persuasive best.
There was an illustrated history of commu-
nist encroachment in the Western Hemisphere,
including a sketch of the good guys and the bad
guys. There were stirring phrases like "free-
dom fighters" and "reign of terror," and
hoverio Sppeeccters of peril like Fidel Castro, the
Kremli :Moammar Khadafy and the PLO.
FpI the .fearful, the President offered the
so*in assertion that he has no plans to send
U.S. troops into combat in Central A.merica.
And for the skeptical, there were assurances
that''peace 'in the region--despite the U.S.
military might displayed in Honduras and the
CIA's insurgent war against the Sandinistas-
should, be pursued through economic aid and
through negotiations.
There was a reminder of Washington's "legal
right, and moral duty" to resist subversion and
aid the hemisphere's democratic' governments.
And_ there' was a warning that those who
disagree with his policy toward Central Ameri-
ca riskfitting the label of "new isolationists," a'
bund7h? not. much different from their brethren
of thbllgte;1930s who knew what was happening
in Europe' lout chose not to face the truth.
The,, warning and the rhetoric, florid and
simplistic,as they are, have a valid purpose:
The necessity to nudge skeptical congressmen
into ~3clearin funds for military and economic
aid to El Salvador in the face of a threatening
ma -backed rebel forces.
jor offensive by Cuban
And"fot' that, Mr. Reagan 's timing was impec-
cabkg , the probable election of the moderate
Jose,Napoleon Duarte as president of El Salva-
dor will surely strengthen the President's case
in Congress:
Though there is little doubt in Mr. Reagan's
contention that the Soviets and Cuba wouldn't
miss an opportunity to squeeze the United.
States by backing anti-American subversion in
nations close to the U.S. borders, he oversim-
plifies the situation. As he presents it, what's
going on in Central America is a gladiator
match between Uncle Sam and the Soviet bear,
with the bad guys on their side and-natural-
ly-nobody but good guys on ours.
The bads are the Sandinista rulers of Nicara-
gua, sketched by the President as a devious;
group of anti-Catholic and anti-Semitic aggres-'
sors who betrayed the anti-Somoza revolution
by becoming' Cuban and Soviet lackeys in
league with the PLO and willing to take help
from the likes of a Col. Khadafy.
The goods are the Nicaraguan Contras, the
thousands who fought with the Sandinistas but
have now taken up arms against them-the
"freedom fighters" struggling to wipe out the
Sandinista "communist reign of terror."
This, good guy-bad guy approach is easy to
get across on TV, but it glosses over the'
complicated economic, social, historic and n--
tionalist reasons behind the prolonged struggles
in the troubled region.
Mr. Reagan is correct in his assertion that
the United States has "provided just enough
[military] aid to avoid outright disaster but not.
enough to resolve the crisis." More aid is
needed. But until this country deals Just as
realistically with those complex underlying
problems, there is little hope that negotiations
will lead to any short-term success, and little
reason to believe that the need for massive
military support will end.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505390121-7