OPERATION AGAINST NICARAGUA ROOTED IN REAGAN'S CAMPAIGN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505400108-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 108
• Publication Date: February 16, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09 :CIA-RDP90-005528000505400108-0
THE MIAMI HERALD
16 February 1983
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ARTICLE APPS
4~ Fa~~ /
E.? :1LFONSO CHARDY
Ilr~~: lb'cchinr.;cn Bureau
~'~ ASHINGTON -Details of
t!:~~ Reagan Administration's
co~~ert operations against Nicara-
gua remain largely' secret, but
e;.ou;h information is available
to piece together the origin and
deg elopnent of the plan some
call "a slow-motion Bay of Pigs."
The account is based on infor-
mation from a widening circle of
congressional and administration
sources.
It is believed that the Nicara-
guan covert operation grew out
of informal gatherings during
the presidential campaign in
1980, when Reagan aides ac-
cused the Carter Administration
of weakening U.S: intelligence
capabilities in Central America.
According to campaign docu-
ments, it was decided early on that,
if Ronald Reagan won, the United
States would rebuild its intelligence
network.
The work to organize a new
monitoring ability in the azea for
the Central Intelligance Agency
began shortly after P.eagan took of-
fice.
Before covert action was plan-
ned, the State Department attempt-
ed to persuade Nicaragua's leftist
.Sandinista government to halt its
"Sovietization." It dispatched
Thomas Enders, assistant secretary
of state for inter-American affairs,
to P.Zanagua in the summer of 1981
:to offer a nonaggression proposal.
~. What Enders offered was to rein
:in the counterrevolutionaries train-
ing in Florida and Honduras, in ex-
change for an end to Nicaraguan
support for Salvadoran guerrillas
and expulsion of 2,000 Cuban mili-
tary 2dvisers already in the coun?
try'.
According to U.S. officials, the
Nicaraguans rejected the offer, say-
ing they could not accept negotia-
tions because they were not helping
the Salvadoran guerrillas.
By late 1981, high-level adminis-
tration officials publicly vented
their anger and impatience with
Nicaragua.
s car~lpazg~
? "We have not given up on Nica-
ragua but the hours are growing
Short; 'said Alexander Haig, who as
secretary of state also complained
of adrift toward totalitarianism
and an influx of Soviet-bloc mili-
tary equipment into the Central
American country.
It is understood now that on Dec.
2, 1981, Reagan formally set in mo- ~
tIon the covert operation by signing
a "presidential finding" - a state-
ment, required by law, in which the
President must certify a need for a
specific covert operation.
Congressional oversight commit-
tees may not approve a covert oper?
ation "unless and until the Presi-
dent finds that each such operation
is important to the national securi-
..
ty.
Later. CIA Director William
Casey told the committees in his
first closed briefing on the subject
that the presidential finding includ-
ed "optimal" and "minimal" plans.
Under the optimal plan. the Unit-
ed States would provide funds and
training for an existing anti-Sandi-
nisia force of 1,000 Nicaraguan
exiles and for creation of another
force of 500 commandos of various
.Latin American nationalities. in-
cluding Cuban exiles. Both groups
were to be directly supervised by ~
Argentine military officers.
The optimal plan called for at- i
tacks on Cuban targets in Nicara- j
gun, as well as on bridges, roads,
farms and military posts.
The minimal plan -the one
eventually put into effect -called
for support of existing counterrevo-
lutionary .forces in Honduras in
their attacks on economic targets
and to stop the flow of arms to
guerrillas in El Salvador.
The congressional .committees
approved the minimal-level plan
and issued a set of guidelines for the
CIA that ruled out U.S. involvement
in any overthrow of the Sandinistas
or in provoking a war between Nic-
azagua and Honduras.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09 :CIA-RDP90-005528000505400108-0