GETTING THE MOST FROM THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505420002-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 31, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/16: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505420002-5
-Getting the' most..from* th.b.intelfige-nde"I
By Allan E: Goodman
President-elect Reagan is right to make
improved performance by US intelligence an
early priority. But he should keep in mind
that intelligence failures often mask more
fundamental policy failures.
Since 1960 there have been 17 so-called in-
telligence failures. They range from the judg-
ment that Francis Gary Powers' U-2 would
not be shot down in 1960, to the assessment by
the CLA's Board of National Estimates in 1962
that the Soviet Union would not deploy offen-
sive missiles in Cuba, to the failure to predict
the radicalization of OPEC in 1970, to the
underestimation of the potential for revolu-
tion in Iran. Each alleged failure has been the
subject of exhaustive study by the Congress,
academic specialists, and investigative re-
porters. Each post-mortem inevitably raises
the question: "Had the intelligence commu-
nity been right, would the policymaker have
listened?"
Both intelligence' officers and foreign
policy officials have made errors of judgment
about the events and trends contributing to
US reversals over the past decade. It now ap-
pears that there has been an underestimation
of such things as the capability of the Soviet
military-industrial complex, the willingness
of Moscow to support armed intervention in
Africa, Southwest- Asia, and Latin America,
and the radicalism of key countries in the
third world. Such blindness to a basically hos-
tile environment is well on the way to being
cured (and this trend would have continued
regardless of who ? was . elected last
November). - -
But what also needs to improve is the over=
all relationship between intelligence and for-
eign policy_
Perhaps more than any other recent presi-
-dent, Ronald Reagan could have a decisive
impact on-this relationship. His administra-
tion will no doubt oversee the design of a new
-legislative charter for the intelligence com-
munity. The scope of congressional oversight
and the span of control now exercised by the
director of central intelligence (DCI) are two-
issues, in particular, on which a Reagan ad
ministration will probably leave a significant
mark. Mr.-Reagan will be the only president;
moreover, to have a former. DCI as vice-_
, : ? ~: , z, : ,
.president.
However, what also-requiresrepair is the'
way presidents use .intelligence. So here are
some suggestions- for the President-elect on
bow to get the most from intelligence:
Don't bemisled by thinking that perfor
mane'will improve through reorganization.:
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CHRISTIAN SC ENCE M0t1IT03
31 December 1980
While it is time to rethink the concept and role
of the DCI as a presidential adviser, the intel-
ligence community has been in an almost con-
stant state of reorganization since James
Schlesinger abolished the Board of National
Estimates in 1974. The community is depleted
of senior managers (who retired or resigned.
in'frustration); those who remain are jaded
about the real impact of, as one put it, "whim-
sical chairs." Other countries reorganized
their intelligence service only in the wake of
hostile penetration. This has not yet happened
in the US, and there-is much that is effective
about the way things are set up now.
Don't ask the DCI for details on every
coup. or crisis that occurs during the night.
The analytical ranks of. the intelligence com-
munity today are the same. size as a decade
ago. But their reporting responsibilities have
substantially increased in scope and complex-
ity. Leave spot. reporting to the State
Department. - . . - .
s Do continue to ask for regular oral
briefings by the DCI. This was started by Ad-
miral Stansfield Turner and it did more to in-
form a new President of the challenges he
faced and the consequences of his actions.
than any series of transition papers or back-.1
ground memoranda.. .:.. _ '.:j
? Do' offer feedback on what you get. Let
the,intelligence professional know what was-
good and bad about what was provided. Wheti
President Carter wrote his famous note to Ad-
miral Turner, Secretary Vance, and Dr.
Brzezinski deploring the quality of the politi-
cal intelligence he had been given on Iran, it
was too late. To have had impact, the critique
should-?have been rendered much earlier.-
Keep your DCI clued in, moreover, to what
you are most worried about achieving (and
failing to achieve); especially in the context of.
meetings with foreign leaders where so much.
of foreign policy is actually made.
Ronald Reagan faces an extremely com-
plex and. dangerous international environ-
ment - and with America in a weakened
state.- Intelligence can help to expand US op-~
Lions and power; it can give policymakers the
time to counter adverse trends or anticipate
and ameliorate their impact. But the quality
and usefulness of such intelligence depends as
much on how well presidents listen as on the
professional competence and morale of those
who provide it:. .
..Allan E.'Goodmaa is associate-dean,
School of Foreign Service, Georgetown
-University. He : served as - presidential
briefing coordinator. for. the Director of _ '
Central Intelligence in 1979 and 1980.. ? :~
c'ommunity
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/16: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505420002-5