U.S. LATE LEARNING OF SADAT'S DEATH
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90-00552R000605720008-5
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 20, 2010
Sequence Number:
8
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 14, 1981
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP90-00552R000605720008-5
ARTICLE Al P1 ARED
ON PAGE
THE WASHINGTON POST
14 October 1981
Late Le.a MI'MIG, of S
By Patrick E. Tyler
and Michael Getter
Wa9hingtohPost Staff Wrttera ?
For at least three hours after
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat
was assassinated .last.-week,., the
White House. was being - told by
Egyptian authorities and: American.
diplomatic and..intelligence;officials
in Cairo:that. he ..was-stali'taiiye,.attd
the Reagan administration-,was re-
acting to the crisis on that basis, ac-;
cording to knowledgeable adminis=
tration-sources.
These sources also revealed that,
the CIA has begun a comprehensive
investigation of the episode.., The
.main goal is trs'deterinini.lf`t1iere
was any involvement, direct or in-
direct, in the assassination by foreign
powers such as Libya.
In addition, the report also is to
assess the U.S. response during. the
unfolding crisis. The -report is ex-
pected to be presented to the White
House in about two weeks. -
In addition, the sources said that
President. Reagan and ::Vice presi-
dent Bush stayed away from the
Sadat funeral partly because the
Libyan ruler, Col. Muammar Qad-
dati,-had discussed-Possible assassi-
nation plots against Reagan. with
"some of his friends," and that these
conversations had been picked up by
U.S. intelligence'.
gainst Rea-
The alleged threats-8
gan reportedly came around the time
of the August aerial dogfight over
the Gulf of Sidra during which U.S...I
carrier: jets shot down two `Soviet-
built Libyan warplanes.
Officials close to the situation say
Reagan and other top U.S. , officials
first heard that Sadat wasdead from
American television , reports.
These' reports, coming, amid the
chaos and confusion of the attack on
Sadat, were labeled immediately as
invalid by.Egyptian leaders-and the
American Embassy in Cairo.
The sources said there were two
main reasons for_tkq.cqpfusion and
uncertainty about whether Sadat was
dead or alive in those first crucial hours.
.Y-.9ne key reason-why Washington be-
Y
liei,ed?Sadat was still alive was an in
eyewitness- assessment that he was
only. slightly-wounded. The assessment
waa telephoned: to the State Department:
by-theUS ambassador to Cairo, Alfred ?1
Jr*
L Atherton . `' "
Atherton;-.whor was on-the reviewing
stand; is understood to have thought Vice
President` Hosni. Mubarak was gravely
wounded and carried out of the reviewing
stand on a stretcher, and not Sadat.
The sources' stressed that, in the'tur-
moil at the scene, with everyhody'duck=
ing for cover, suchconfusion was: under=;
standable. Mubarak. and Sadat 'were
wearing military uniforms and were'
seated next to each other. The senior
CIA official in Egypt reportedly was it
at the parade site.
The second major reason for the delay
in learning that Sadat had been killed--
was that the tiny circle of Egyptian of-
ficials who knew what was happening
were continuing to tell the American Er
bassy that Sadat was still alive long after
he had died from multiple wounds.
They did so for what U.S. officials pre-
sunce. to be understandable reasons: to
gain a little time to settle down and fig-
tire out what to do next.
Though the assassination of'?Sadat
stunned American leaders, who had spent millions of dollars in recent years l
to protect the man they considered one
of the central American allies in the Mid-.
east, the killing did not set off a panic in
Washington because there were no visible-j
signs, of a breakdown of political order in
Egypt.
Some administration .officials said that
if the assassination had been linked to an
attempted' overthrow of'the government,
or an '` invasion:. by foreign armies, this
would. 'have been quickly apparent, and:
that the ypttan*authorities would have
?reactearrigM{ -away and informed the-
"'Aen
m.;
> Z.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
Similarry .these -sources said that key-4
portions of the Egyptian government,
iiccluding the police, military authorities
and other security and intelligence forces,
were in place. . . ..
Officials explained that in a coup the
security apparatus is usually the first
thing that. would break down or show
signs of upheaval: -
Sources say they believe that the Unit-
ed States,-via=a telephone call from Egyp=
tian officials to Atherton, was the first
government informed about ' Sadat's'
death after the decision was made' to ac=
knowledge
, .r
White Hou'se'officials are known to
-disturbed by the'- confusing= and belated
intelligence- reporting from Cairo in the.
chaotic hours after Sadat and a- number;
of spectators were showered with-aut
matic weapons fire and grenade shrapnel
by four military-garbed;assassins who
attacked at 7:10 a.m. Washington time.
One official who is familiar with the
ensuing sequence of .events said the, first l
report from the scene was telephoned in 1
by- Atherton. "The-first report had Mu-'l
bar ak appearing toy be gravelyinjured:4
and carried off on a stretcher," thel
official said.
"As a matter?oE fact, in the first hour,
.we thought he was the . most. seriously
wounded." At the `same time Atherton
-
reported that Sadat;was standing and'
had suffered a wound in his side and one
in his hand`"As-it-turns out,.they were
essentially reversed; the official said:
Atherton, raced to the US. Embasysy
and made the first full report of events to
the State Department on a secure tele-
phone -line, which remained open
throughout the morning.'
When Sadat arrived,at amilitary,hos-.a
pital at nearby Maadi.10 minutes after
the shooting he was reported to'be"1n-a 1
coma, with no detectable heartbeat and -.1
with blood streaming from his mouth.
There were?two b"-wounds in the
--sin the neckilindl
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