U.S. LATE LEARNING OF SADAT'S DEATH

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00552R000605720008-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 20, 2010
Sequence Number: 
8
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
October 14, 1981
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00552R000605720008-5.pdf138.88 KB
Body: 
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP90-00552R000605720008-5 ARTICLE Al P1 ARED ON PAGE THE WASHINGTON POST 14 October 1981 Late Le.a MI'MIG, of S By Patrick E. Tyler and Michael Getter Wa9hingtohPost Staff Wrttera ? For at least three hours after Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated .last.-week,., the White House. was being - told by Egyptian authorities and: American. diplomatic and..intelligence;officials in Cairo:that. he ..was-stali'taiiye,.attd the Reagan administration-,was re- acting to the crisis on that basis, ac-; cording to knowledgeable adminis= tration-sources. These sources also revealed that, the CIA has begun a comprehensive investigation of the episode.., The .main goal is trs'deterinini.lf`t1iere was any involvement, direct or in- direct, in the assassination by foreign powers such as Libya. In addition, the report also is to assess the U.S. response during. the unfolding crisis. The -report is ex- pected to be presented to the White House in about two weeks. - In addition, the sources said that President. Reagan and ::Vice presi- dent Bush stayed away from the Sadat funeral partly because the Libyan ruler, Col. Muammar Qad- dati,-had discussed-Possible assassi- nation plots against Reagan. with "some of his friends," and that these conversations had been picked up by U.S. intelligence'. gainst Rea- The alleged threats-8 gan reportedly came around the time of the August aerial dogfight over the Gulf of Sidra during which U.S...I carrier: jets shot down two `Soviet- built Libyan warplanes. Officials close to the situation say Reagan and other top U.S. , officials first heard that Sadat wasdead from American television , reports. These' reports, coming, amid the chaos and confusion of the attack on Sadat, were labeled immediately as invalid by.Egyptian leaders-and the American Embassy in Cairo. The sources said there were two main reasons for_tkq.cqpfusion and uncertainty about whether Sadat was dead or alive in those first crucial hours. .Y-.9ne key reason-why Washington be- Y liei,ed?Sadat was still alive was an in eyewitness- assessment that he was only. slightly-wounded. The assessment waa telephoned: to the State Department: by-theUS ambassador to Cairo, Alfred ?1 Jr* L Atherton . `' " Atherton;-.whor was on-the reviewing stand; is understood to have thought Vice President` Hosni. Mubarak was gravely wounded and carried out of the reviewing stand on a stretcher, and not Sadat. The sources' stressed that, in the'tur- moil at the scene, with everyhody'duck= ing for cover, suchconfusion was: under=; standable. Mubarak. and Sadat 'were wearing military uniforms and were' seated next to each other. The senior CIA official in Egypt reportedly was it at the parade site. The second major reason for the delay in learning that Sadat had been killed-- was that the tiny circle of Egyptian of- ficials who knew what was happening were continuing to tell the American Er bassy that Sadat was still alive long after he had died from multiple wounds. They did so for what U.S. officials pre- sunce. to be understandable reasons: to gain a little time to settle down and fig- tire out what to do next. Though the assassination of'?Sadat stunned American leaders, who had spent millions of dollars in recent years l to protect the man they considered one of the central American allies in the Mid-. east, the killing did not set off a panic in Washington because there were no visible-j signs, of a breakdown of political order in Egypt. Some administration .officials said that if the assassination had been linked to an attempted' overthrow of'the government, or an '` invasion:. by foreign armies, this would. 'have been quickly apparent, and: that the ypttan*authorities would have ?reactearrigM{ -away and informed the- "'Aen m.; > Z. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release Similarry .these -sources said that key-4 portions of the Egyptian government, iiccluding the police, military authorities and other security and intelligence forces, were in place. . . .. Officials explained that in a coup the security apparatus is usually the first thing that. would break down or show signs of upheaval: - Sources say they believe that the Unit- ed States,-via=a telephone call from Egyp= tian officials to Atherton, was the first government informed about ' Sadat's' death after the decision was made' to ac= knowledge , .r White Hou'se'officials are known to -disturbed by the'- confusing= and belated intelligence- reporting from Cairo in the. chaotic hours after Sadat and a- number; of spectators were showered with-aut matic weapons fire and grenade shrapnel by four military-garbed;assassins who attacked at 7:10 a.m. Washington time. One official who is familiar with the ensuing sequence of .events said the, first l report from the scene was telephoned in 1 by- Atherton. "The-first report had Mu-'l bar ak appearing toy be gravelyinjured:4 and carried off on a stretcher," thel official said. "As a matter?oE fact, in the first hour, .we thought he was the . most. seriously wounded." At the `same time Atherton - reported that Sadat;was standing and' had suffered a wound in his side and one in his hand`"As-it-turns out,.they were essentially reversed; the official said: Atherton, raced to the US. Embasysy and made the first full report of events to the State Department on a secure tele- phone -line, which remained open throughout the morning.' When Sadat arrived,at amilitary,hos-.a pital at nearby Maadi.10 minutes after the shooting he was reported to'be"1n-a 1 coma, with no detectable heartbeat and -.1 with blood streaming from his mouth. There were?two b"-wounds in the --sin the neckilindl 2010/08/20: CIA-RDP90-00552R000605720008-5 ;,, .., ;,__ ;L,_L