CASE OF THE BEHEADED RUSSIANS: HOW U.S. MONITORS WORLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000606110002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: January 14, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606110002-7
Work
SAN FRANCISCO EXAMINER (C
14 January 1980
By John P. Wallach from one of its sources ' through a
Examiner Washington Bureau clandestine channel such as a CIA
WASHINGTON - A U.S. intelli- operative in another capital like Isla-
gence report that 35 Soviet military mabad (Pakistan)."
advisers were beheaded in Afghani- There can he and usually are
Sian about six weeks before the
invasion points out several problems in
the -release of information to the
public.
The main problems are:
e How does the government get its
information?
a How rood are its sources?
o What can the public believe?
Marshall Shulman, the State Depart-
ment's Soviet expert who is considered
a supporter of detente, said. that the
Soviets were beheaded in Herat, near
the Iranian border. He added that their
heads were carried around on spears
in a torchlight parade through the
bazaars of Herat.
"If you're looking to apologize for
the Soviet action. you may believe
that," a high-ranking White House
official said when told of the behead
ing report. "On the other hand you
may be intensely skeptical about the
reliability of the source."
National security adviser 7.bigniew
Brzezinski, for example, is known to
believe that Shulman is inclined to be
too soft on the Soviets.
Thus, it can be asked whether
Shulman made the report to help put
the Soviet invasion 'in perspective'
and put brakes on U.S. actions over the
invasion. Unfortunately, the answer.
will probably never be known.
Shulman said that he got the
information from the State Depart-
ment's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (INR) - the in-house intelli-
gence gathering organization that sifts
information from_thq_CLk Defense
Intelligence Agency and National Se-
curity Agency.
INR does technical intercepting
plus the translation,. but does no
intelligence gathering.
Asked where INR would have
received the information on the be-
heading of the Soviets, a State Depart-
ment analyst explained:
'That would be based on a field
report that came in from the CIA, DIA
or our embassy in Kabul, based
presumably on an eyewitness who told
a reporting officer in the field.
"It could have been. an embassy
conflicting intelligence reports. These
create a credibility problem for the
White House or State Department
.spokesman and ultimately, for the
government. So the spokesman, ac-
cording to press officer David Passage,
"will reflect only the official consen-
sus."
That, he explained, "will almost
inevitably be conservative. It will he -1
the lowest common denominator upon
which a majority of intelligence ana-
lysts and polhcyrrtakers can agree."
How then does it happen that last
Monday, for example; State Depart-
ment spokesman Nodding Carter esti-
mated that there are 85,000 Soviet
troops in Afghanistan, while ABC
News reported there are well over
100,000?
And that the U.S. Embassy in Kabul
'vas quoted in a New York Times story
last Tuesday as putting the official
figure at a much more conservative
30,000 to 40,0f0?
"An individual reporter is basing
his information on cultivated sources
like someone on the (State Depart-
ment's) Soviet desk," Passage said. "But
that will be valid only insofar as it
reflects the views of the, person or
persons to whom he talked.
Our process, namely that of a
spokesman - be it Hodding Carter
(State Department), Tom Ross (the
Pentagon) or Jody Powell (the White
House) - is a different one. It consists
of asking questions of the bureaucracY
in order to get a clear, coordinated
response to come back down in the
form of 'guidance.'
"Our procedure would be to go to.
INR or the Bureau of Near East and
Asian Affairs and ask them point-blank
what is the most recent estimate of the
number of Soviet troops in Afghani-
stan?
"They will then go to CIA, DIA,
NSA, NSC and any other sources to put
together something that accurately
reflects the number of troops that are
there. Bingo. Drew Middleton (New
York Times) or someone with a
hawkish bent may have his own
sources within the Senate Select Com-
you ay?' That person may be acting on
fragmentary information and will say
there are 115,000 troops. Maybe there.
are 115,00.
"But until there is a new consensus;
in the intelligence community on the,
higher figure, the official spokesman.
will be reflecting what the consensus,
is. lie will not be reflecting either the.
higher or lower figure"
He conceded that "we were very
slow to confirm the existence of a
Soviet brigade in Cuba."
He said the State Department could
riot do that officially "until therewas a
consensus within the intelligence com-
munity on evidence of ? a brigade
command structure.
"We were not prepared to confirm:
what some autonomous intelligence!
expert decided on his own."
How then was Nodding Carter last'
Monday able to arrive at the figure of.
85,000 Soviet troops? Carter himselfi
"has no intelligence-estimating capabil
ity," Passage explained. "He uses what-;
ever is provided to him thoroughly:
-cleared by whoever ought to have
some influence."
in practical terms, he said, "this
means NSA operating on reports from
our embassy in Kabul; INR operatingi
on the basis of intelligence gathered by
the U.S. intelligence community and'
CIA summaries.
"They will include NSA radio moni-
toring of aircraft flying into and out of
Kabul and one or more Soviet airfields,;
monitoring. of radio intercepts het
tween Soviet units such as who has
been instructed by Moscow- to send
how many men where. ? '
,it may include overhead photogra-
phy by reconnaissance such as SR- i
and U-2 flights, conversations with
friendly governments in the area and
reports from observers on the ground,
for example, a U.S. Army attache
talking to an Indian Army counterpart.
about reports from their embassy in
Kabul.
in sum, there is a wealth of
material," Passage said.
And that is where the problems,
begin - interpreting the "raw intelli-
gence data.
officer or U.S. military attache who ' mittee on Intelligence.
-Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/23: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606110002-7