'SECRET WAR' IS INEFFECTIVE AND IMMORAL

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CIA-RDP90-00552R000606250003-1
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RIPPUB
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K
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1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
August 27, 2010
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3
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OPEN SOURCE
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606250003-1 USA TODAY 10 June `fret war' is ineffective and immoral WAYNE S. SMITH Guest columnist MIAMI - U.S. involvement rWes seemed to have been sus- in the.-secret war" against Nic pended or reduced. aragua should be .terminated There seemed to be ample as quickly as possible. room for negotiations. But the This covert operation cannot Reagan administration did not achieve U.S. objectives - nei- want to negotiate; it wanted to ther the real objectives nor get rid of the Sandinista gov- those claimed by the adminis ernment, and-so it :mounted its tration. Spokesmen have sug- gested that all the adminish'a- This var threatens to leave tion really wants is for the San- our nation without constructive dinistas to move up election4e4 influence in Nicaragua; It has (now scheduled for 1985) and-A carried us to the brink of a re- -respect human rights. - Lr j -.gional war in Central America Our. policies elsewhere hard!? If thiseffortto overthrow an- ly bear out such concerns. For, other government Is approved, example, Pinochet, the mill- that would be entirely inconsis- tary dictator in Chile, has just tent with the moral values on announced that he will not hold which the nation was founded. elections until 1989. This is the United States, not the Soviet Union. We are guid- A freshman political science red by a different code of con- student knows that one does ,.duct. Let us not forget it not promote liberalization with an external threat That almost WLzyneS' ate Car always results in calls for inter- . Xndowmeret-forma- nal discipline and mobilization. - ., nai. eaoe-ics V former ie So has it in Nicaragua. The :'wr4w -'Arcterests Section-in secret war has discouraged I3avo" elections, not promoted them. 'The administration has also -suggested arms interdiction as its principal .goal. By its own criteria, the administration has failed - it cannot point to a single rifle that has been "inter- The real-purpose -of the "se- cret war" is to overthrow 'the ' Sandinista government But . its has almost no chance of doing so. The few thousand rebels cannot defeat the large, tough; well-trained Sandinista army - not unless there were mas- sive defections within that army and among the people. Yet, by building its "secret" army around a nucleus of hat- ed Somoza supporters, the ad- ministration has virtually as- sured that the rebels will re- ceive no public support All this was unnecessary. In 1981 statements, the adminis- tration said that Sandinista sup- port for the El Salvador guer- Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00552R000606250003-1