CBS LIBEL JURY IS TOLD ENEMY NOT UNDERSTATED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000707160101-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 12, 2010
• Sequence Number: 101
• Publication Date: November 7, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/08/12 :CIA-RDP90-005528000707160101-0
ARTICLE APPEARED NEW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE~~~ 7 November 198+
CBS Libel Jury Is Told
Enemy Not Understated
f By Ai. A. FARBER
? A military intelligence officer testi- 9He was aware that some intelli-
fied yesterday that, contrary to state- Bence officers believed that North Viet-
ments made by CBS in a 1982 documen- ' namese infiltration into South Vietnam ~
tary, North Vietnamese infiltration was substantially higher than was
into South Vietnam in 1967 was not un- being offidally reported but he dis-
derstated by Gen. William C. west- agreed with their conclusions and their
moreland's command. methodology.
Appearing as the 12th witness for In the CBS documentary that was the
General Westmoreland in his 5120 mil- basis for General Westmoreland's libel
lion libel suit against the network, Col. suit - "The Uncounted Enemy: A
John F. Stewart said that offidal infil- Vietnam Deception" -the network
tration figures in the months before the said that reports of high enemy infiltra-
Tet offensive of January 1968 ' `were tion in the fall of 1967 were "systemati-
about right" and that the offensive had cauy blocked" by General westmore-
been expected for half a year. land's command. '
"If we had grossly underestimated CBS also said in the documentary
infiltration we would have seen a much that, by such "tactics" as excluduing ?
larger attack," Colonel Stewart said. the Vietcong's self-defense forces from
"But, in fact, we saw differently." The the order of battle,,~e~uor intelligence
colonel stated that, within a month of officers had engaged in a "conspiracy"
the Tet offensive, about 85 percent of to minimimize enemy strength to make
the estimated 100,000 North Vietnam- it appear that America was winning
ese and Vietooug troops who took part the ~'?
in it were killed or disabled. Colonel Stewart, whose testimony
Colonel Stewart -the only military will conclude today, joined the Army in '
witness so far in the trial who is still on 1962 and served his first of two tours in
active duty -told the jury that mill- Vietnam between March 1967 and April
tary intelligence was "not an enact sci- 1968. He was an analyst in General
~- Westmoreland's "current intelli-
ence and that infiltration and other
estimates of enemy strength should not 8~ "unit and held the rank of cap-
be taken as irrefutable.
.'Numbers Are Not Gospel' Planning 'Major Operation'
"You know,,' he said, '.there was a Colonel Stewart testified that, in Sep? .
love of numbers in Washington in the tember 1967, he was,ordered by his su- ~
1960'x. But these numbers are not gas- periors to evaluate information indi-
pel." sating a change in enemy strategy. He ,
Colonel Stewart, who was chief of found, he said, "that the enemy was
military intelligence on Grenada dur- Planning a major operation in a coordi-1
ing the UNted States invasion in 1983 Hated fashion. I
and is now head of a 1,600-member in- ~ ' `There was a lot of talk, particularly
telligence unit at Fort Bragg, N.C., in the diaries of North Vietnamese sol-
also testified that: Biers, that they were ink to come into
9As a captain in South Vietnam, he populated areas, into ~iamlets and
regularly briefed General westmore- other places, and liberate the people,"
land in the fall of 1967 and the general Colonel Stewart said.
never asked him to skew his analysis of In late November, the colonej said,
enemy activities. "we concluded that the North Vietnam-
9General Westmoreland's decision ese were taking an unprecedented step
to delete the Vietcong's selfdefense in sending major combat troops south"
and secret self-defense forces from the along the Ho Chi Minh Trail and into
official listing of enemy strength sanctuaries in Laos. Colonel Stewart
known as the order o?battle inmid-1967 said he had access at the time to sensi-
was made after much "give and take" five data on enemy movements pro-
andafter the command was told Amer- vided by the National Security Agency.
scan ~ troops had "little contact" with Under direct examination by David
such forces. Dorsey, a lawyer for General West-
' moreland, Colonel Stewart said by
mid-January 1966, the infiltrators in
these units - _ separate from North
Vietnamese who regularly entered
South Vietnam as .'replacements" -
totaled at least six regiments, each
with 2,000 to 2,400 men.
Not all of these regiments, he said,
came into South Vietnam at once. After
the Tet offensive, the colonel added, he
confirmed that seven or eight regi-
ments, numbering at most a total of
20,000 troops, had infiltrated.
Under cross-examination by David
Bofes, a lawyer for CBS, the witness
said that the rate of infiltration be-
tweenning a ma jor November 1967 was
about 5,000 to 8,000 amonth -the ap?
proximate figures published at the
time by General Westmoreland's com-
mand. In December of that year, he
said, the figure jumped to about 10,000;
in January 1968 it doubled.
85 Percent Casualties
Colonel Stewart said that of the
100,000 enemy troops "committed" to
the Tet offensive, 70,000 were killed by
late February 1968, and 15,000 other
casualties were put out of action.
The witness was unable to recall on
the stand how many of the 85,000 were
North Vietnamese forces and how
many were Vietcong. But Mr. Boles
showed Colonel Stewart a copy of a
deposition, taken only days ago, in
which he indicated that North Viet-
namese forces made up 55 to 60 percent
of the kWed or wounded.
"That was only a guess," Colonel
Stewart said.
"Well, you didn't call it a guess then,
did you?" Mr. Boles said.
The CBS documentary quoted some
intelligence officers as saying that in-
filtration throughout the fall of 1967
', was at the rate of 25,000 a month. Those
~ figures, Colonel Stewart said yester-
day, were unreliable.
Colonel Stewart said he that on tbe
occasions when he briefed General
Westmoreland on enemy activities, he
found the general "businesslike, pre-
cise and incisive. He raised questions
in a terse manner and he expected you
to have the answers."
Mr. Dorsey followed up:
Q. Did he ever indicate to you how he
wanted you to come oat with an analy-
sis?
A. No.
Q. Did you ever see that in any intelli-
gence officer?
A. No, I did not.
Approved For Release 2010/08/12 :CIA-RDP90-005528000707160101-0