SPY VS. COUNTER-SPY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000707440005-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: September 16, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00552R000707440005-6
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE /CiL
WASHINGTON TIMES
16 SEPTEMBER 1982
ELMO ZUMWALT/WORTH BAGLEY,
Spy vs. counter-spy
Sensible presidential decisions
on international policies and
actions require good intellig-
ence. But public discussions gener-
ally are conducted without adequate
intelligence information and estimates.
One result is unproductive public'
debate about what defense strength
we require. Other consequences,
suggested by recent events, are ques-
tions about whether our intelligence
is good enough and whether we are
prevailing in the undercover con-
test of counter-intelligence.
Quickly suppressed news reports
a month ago revealed that a well-
placed person in the British com-
munications intelligence organization
was found to be a Soviet spy. The
U.S. and Britain coordinate closely
on intelligence collection, exchang-
ing data as well as judgments on its
implications. Thus the Soviets may
have known for some time what we
thought about their defense capabili-
ties and vulnerabilities.
Because our conclusions might
spur altered U.S. forces and tactics,
the Soviets would have sought with
bogus intelligence sources to cast
doubt on accurate information we
collected. We must now question the
intelligence sources we thought use-
ful before the British spy was
uncovered. We must now re-examine
past decisions about what armed
power and weapons systems would
best serve the Western nations.
Beyond those uncertainties, there
is evidence that our strategic intelli-
gence is either deficient or subject
to uncorrectable limitations against
which our foreign and security poli-
cies should guard.
The U.S. declared surprise at the
Israeli invasion of Lebanon and at
Argentine aggression against the
Falkland Islands. We were insuf-
ficiently alerted about the Soviet
attacks in Afghanistan. We warned
Moscow against Soviet armed repres-
Elmo Zumwalt and Worth Bagley
are retired Navy admirals who write
a nationally syndicated column.
sion in Poland, and the Polish army
did it instead.
Unpublicized alarms about poten-
tial aggression in other areas origi-
nate from faulty information and
analysis. We justify our embargo
against the Soviet gas pipeline into
Western Europe, in part, on hurting
the Soviet economy. Yet our allies
using similar economic and politi-
cal information conclude that a coer-
cive Soviet bureaucracy retains
effective options. Faced, in Iran, with
"Quickly suppressed
news reports a
month ago revealed
that a well placed
person in the British
communications
intelligence organiza-
tion was found to be a
Soviet spy. Thus the
Soviets may have
known for some
time what we thought
.about their defense
capabilities."
the same Soviet political motivations
that led to the Afghanistan invasion,
we have no visible policy apparently
because our intelligence in Iran is
inadequate.
Each of these troubling examples
poses current or foreseeable prob-
lems for U.S. strategic interests. Con-
tinued efforts go forward to improve
the quality of our intelligence sources
and estimates, but conditions in this
age are such that a warning of cri-
sis will be short and often unclear.
Modern experience shows aggres-
sion across borders or internal sub-
version may materialize after
ambiguous signals that delay res-
ponses until the then-undeterred
action occurs.
Deception or disinformation, both
Soviet skills, may be used to extend
and exaggerate warning ambiguities.
If we react to one impending crisis
by readying and deploying military
forces from afar, a clever fde may
take advantage of weaknesses then
created at other points.
In these circumstances, it is doubt-
ful if American foreign interests can
have the protection of armed power I
unless we are able to deploy peace-
time forces continuously in regions
of importance. Such regional forces
may help deter preparations for
aggression or subversion and, if hos-
tile actions nevertheless occur, pro-
vide defenses that otherwise might
be critically delayed because warn-
ing was short or ambiguous. That
policy requires more capable U.S.
and allied armed forces and gives
credence to Reagan defense budgets.
The question of the best form for
those defense forces and capabili-
ties is another matter, particularly
since decision-makers may be con-
fused by inadequate or bogus intelli-
gence information: Both our technical
and human sources of intelligence
can be fooled.
The uncovering of the most recent
British spy is but one of a series of
defections in NATO Europe that sug-
gests Moscow has enough informa-
tion on what we know to carry out
useful campaigns of deception and
disinformation. We have no choice
other than strengthening our own
counter intelligence activities,
improving the security of our infor-
mation, and diversifying our intelli-
gence sources.
Finally, there is the issue of pro-
viding requisite intelligence support
so that a policy can be developed
for keeping the Soviets out of strate-
gically critical Iran. Soviet control
in that country would be a disaster
for our security and influence in
the Persian Gulf and throughout the
Middle East. The only thing worse
than mistaken policies is no policy
at all.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/07: CIA-RDP90-00552R000707440005-6