CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT-CIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00610R000200090001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 37
• Document Creation Date: December 15, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 1
• Content Type: REPORT

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CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT - CIA
A. GENERAL
CIA was established as part of the National Security Act of 1947. The
Agency's enabling legislation, the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949,
provided for the general administration of the Agency and exempted the Agency
from normal reporting requirements which could compromise Agency security.
On the basis of the provisions of this latter Act, the CIA appropriation is
handled securely and the organization, its functions, and the names of its
personnel are protected.
1. The Armed Services Committees (on the basis of juris-
diction over the legislation) and the Appropriations Committees
(to approve funds) have exercised continuous legislative oversight.
(a) The Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Departments (now the Committee on Government Operations)
actually held hearings and reported out the National Security
Act of 1947 but under the new Legislative Reorganization Act
the House Armed Services gained permanent jurisdiction.
(b) In the Senate the corresponding Committee on
Expenditures challenged the referral of the National Security
Act of 1947 to the Armed Services Committee, but it was
defeated when the Senate upheld the ruling of the President
pro tem.
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(c) From time to time the Government Operations
Committees particularly on the. House side have insisted on
a right of congressional oversight of the economy and
efficiency with which the Agency conducts its activities.
Up to now the issue has not been joined, essentially
as a result of our voluntary cooperation with their
various investigations or informal handling between
committees. Chairman Holifield has been generally
supportive of the Agency position. Mr. Moorhead
and Mr. Moss being most interested in asserting
some type of jurisdiction.
(d) The Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
over recent years has pressed to extend its jurisdiction
over intelligence activities through the efforts to establish
the overall authority abroad of State, which it oversees,
and to include broad limitations on funding of programs
principally administered by CIA.
B. CHRONOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. 1947 through early 1950's - Oversight was benign.
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(a) Controlled by strongly entrenched congressional
leadership and senior chairmen.
(b) Cold war psychology--rant: and file not pre-
disposed to interference.
(c) On the appropriation side, the basic concern
was--do you have enough money?
2. Late 1950's
(a) Record of infrequent briefings of oversight
committees leads to Senator Mansfield's initiative for
Joint Committee (defeated in 1956 by vote of 59 to 27, with
12 original sponsors opposing the resolution).
(b) Sputnik era triggered wider congressional
interest in Agei y information on the Soviet threat. Agency
initiated program of debriefing members of Congress who
had travelled abroad, inviting them to visit Agency facilities
and on occasion field installations.
3. Early 1960's
(a) The Agency furnished intelligence briefings to
a number of committees including the Joint Committee on
Atomic Energy on the Soviet nuclear energy program, and
general intelligence briefings to House Foreign Affairs and
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the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Soviet space
program briefings to the House Science and Astronautics
Committee and Senate Aeronautical and Space Sciences
Committee, and Soviet military posture briefings to the full
Armed Services Committees and the Defense Subcommittee
of House Appropriations.
(b) Pressure continued to grow for a Joint Intelligence
Committee which spurred the CIA Subcommittee of House
Armed Services to examine Agency activities rather intensively.
(c) Chairman Vinson appointed Representative Paul J.
Kilday as Chairman of the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed
Services with the mandate to give CIA more attention.
(d) The "Soviet Missile Gap" argument in the 1960
Presidential election spurred further interest in the Agency's
intelligence product.
(e) The U-2 flight of Gary Powers over the Soviet
Union and the Bay of Pigs invasion heightened congressional
debate and the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 refocused attention
on the Agency's capabilities.
(f) Reflecting Senator Russell's growing responsibilities
for appropriations matters, sessions of the CIA Subcommittee
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of Senate Armed Services and Senate Appropriations were
held in joint session. Even so by 1965 Agency briefings of
these Subcommittees rose to 34 as contrasted with 9 the
previous year.
4. Late 1960's
(a) In 1966, the Foreign Relations Committee
reported a resolution to establish a Joint Committee on
Intelligence with Senator Russell defeating the move by 61-29
on jurisdictional grounds.
(b) In 1967 the Agency undertook a programmed
effort to contact and brief all new members of Congress on
the Agency.
(c) 1967 was also the year of exposure of Agency
funding of the National Student Association.
(d) In 1969 the Agency's intelligence product came
to the front again on the ABM system leading to a closed
session of the Senate to discuss the classified aspects of the
subject including data provided by the Agency.
(e) Legislative initiatives were beginning to be
proposed in an effort to circumscribe executive action through
CIA principally i4
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5. 1970's
(a) The congressional structure which has for a
quarter of a century served to shield the Agency from
intrusion or attack by the rank and file membership is in
a state of flux. The Russell's and Rivers' are gone.
McClellan is 78, Mahon is 74, and Stennis and Hebert are
73. Men down the seniority lists have become suspicious
or jealous over the secretive manner in which the oversight
responsibilities have been exercised and their ranks are
being periodically reinforced by newly elected younger
members. Many feel Agency information and Agency
activities should be more broadly accessible to the
Legislative Branch, and particularly to the Foreign
Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees.
(b) In 1971, as a result of the limitation by the
Democratic Caucus on subcommittee chairmanships and
taking note of the writing on the wall, Chairman Hebert
appointed Representative Lucien N. Nedzi (D, Mich.)
as Chairman of a rejuvenated Intelligence Subcommittee
of House Armed Services Committee. Nedzi has proved to
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be an invaluable ally in dealing with problems in the
House because of his reputation for diligence, thoroughness,
objectivity, and skepticism.
(c) In an analogous reaction to the changed political
atmosphere in the Senate, both Chairmen Stennis and McClellan
have changed earlier practices. Thus both now regularly take
transcripts. Senator McClellan invited Senator Church to attend
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(ono
leaks occurred) and Senator McClellan has offered any Senator
the specifics of CIA's budget on a classified basis (Tab A).
(d) Many members while sharply critical of foreign
and defense policy appear to have a high regard for the Agency's
intelligence product, fearful only that the Agency's capabilities in
the covert action field may be misused by an Administration.
They are anxious to have a closer relationship with the Agency and
thus more influence on its activities. Others are highly supportive
in foreign and defense fields, but are anxious to avoid battle on
issues such as the Agency's covert action authorities.
C. CURRENT CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PROCEDURES
1. Under existing guidelines so far supported by the chairmen of
our oversight committees, Agency operational activities are reported
solely to the four oversight committees.
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2. Security Precautions: In formal sessions before these
subcommittees, the following security procedures are followed:
(a) Only selected staff members of the subcommittee
(no personal staff of members) are permitted to attend.
(d) Under House rules all members are entitled
access to all Committee records. (Tab B)
(e) The membership of the four oversight
Subcommittees are set forth in Tab C.
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Stennis had a reporter present who made a
stenotape of the session, at the end of the hearing
Stennis ordered that it not be transcribed and the
stenotape is in the Agency's possession, Senator
Stennis lamented the leak but was glad it did not
occur on the Senate side--where he said the record
is good, and it is--and agreed that the covert action
capability is necessary and he had no problems with
any of the current covert action programs.
(2) On 16 September 1974 the Director met
with the Nedzi Subcommittee and reviewed current
covert action programs. A reporter was present
for a preliminary substantive intelligence briefing
but was dismissed by Chairman Nedzi before the
Director's briefing on covert action. All members
except Messrs. Arends and Fisher were in attendance.
Mr. Nedzi said that the Harrington matter is a matter
for the Committee to investigate and they will be
meeting with Harrington possibly later in the week.
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in a joint session with the Senate Armed Services
xi
The Jafi
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reminding Chairman McClellan of this fact.
Except for the incident involving Mr. Harrington, the four Agency
Subcommittees have had an outstanding record on the protection of covert
operational information.
E. OPTIONS
Clearly the credibility of this Government in its ability to protect
intelligence sources and methods is under suspicion as a result of the
revelations concerning
(3) Chairman Mahon has scheduled a briefing
of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on
19 September 1974 to review the matter.
(4) The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee,
ST
(We have already received many inquiries
from cooperative foreign intelligence services. )
(1) In light of the House rules, the most obvious protective
device is that our Subcommittees not maintain records on covert
operational information provided by the CIA. The Nedzi Subcommittee
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`,udrrrnan ivlorgan, Tab G~ )
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action on 16 September 1974 in dismissing the reporter was a result
of an affirmative determination by the Committee in this regard.
Senator Stennis' action on 12 September is of a like nature. The
problem with this solution is that there is then no evidence of the infor-
mation provided by the .Agency, which makes it possible for the Com-
mittees to distance themselves from responsibility in the event serious
issues arise in the future about the extent to which the Agency has kept
its oversight committees informed.
(2) The overall arrangement could be made for the Committees
to keep no transcripts or records but that CIA would keep them in a
segregated collection. As directed by the four Chairmen, they could
be made available under escort for examination but not copying. Howeve
practical, this might pose political and constitutional problems.
(3) The House rules could be changed to limit access to sensitive
operational information to the Subcommittee and perhaps certain other
designated members in leadership positions. This would not be likely
to be accepted by the full House.
(4) Committee access to certain operational information having
a substantial impact on the deliberations of the House Foreign Affairs
Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee could be
expanded to those Committees, or selected subcommittees thereof,
on the premise that such information would be handled with wisdom
and restraint. The increase in the exposure possibility from such a
course of action is clear. (Letter from Representative Fascell to
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(5) A Joint Committee on Intelligence might be established
with members from Appropriations, Armed Services, Foreign
Affairs and Government Operations, with a separate staff. The
resolution establishing it should clearly state that it will have
access to all information but that no information about intelligence
sources and methods will be made available to other committees
or Members without a specific congressional resolution.
(6) All of the above, of course, would have to be worked
out with the appropriate leadership and, in addition, the President
might want to consult the leadership as to other alternatives.
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On 4 June 1974 the Senate by a vote of 55 to 33
defeated an amendment to the Defense Procurement Authoriza-
tion bill (S. 3000) which would have required the Director
of Central Intelligence to submit an annual unclassified
report to the Congress disclosing the total amount of funds
requested in the budget for the National Intelligence Program.
A number of Senators, including the Chairman of the
Agency's Oversight Committees in the Senate, strongly opposed
the amendment on the basis that such disclosures would
provide valuable assistance to our adversaries by virtue of
the trends disclosed over the years and. that the publication
of the total figure would only stimulate further inquiry for.
greater detail on foreign intelligence activities, for
explanations of changes or trends, and for the component
elements of the total figure.
They also pointed out that the four committees
charged with oversight of the Agency in the Congress are
fully aware of the details of the foreign intelligence.
budget and inquire into these matters deeply. The point was
also made that if any member of the Senate wished to know
what the total figure was it would be furnished to him on a
classified basis.
The discussion on the amendment is covered on pages
S. 9601-9613 in the Congressional Record of 4 June 1974.
Excerpts follow::.
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'Senator Stennis: ". ..
True, we are an open society and, so
far, we have been able to carry on an
intelligence prcgram cffr!,iively which
has been worth to us billions and billions
and billions of dollars in savin ;s. But, if
we are going to abandon the idea of
keeping these figures from being dis-
closed. then, in my humble opinion, we
might as well abolish the agency. It
would be like saying, in effect, that we
do not want this secret intelligence after
all, that we do not need it, and that we
will abandon it.
We will pay an awful price for that.
I am familiar with the CIA budget.
I can satisfy most any Senator in the
cloakroom, talking to him some about
this, but I will publicly say that it is a
clean budget and they have justified
many times over the expenditure of the
money. "
Senator Pastore: "
We have to know
what they are doing, so we can know
what we have to do in order to guarantee.
the security of, our own country.
So we cannot come out here and tell
the whole world, "We spent $1 billion or
$2 billion for the Central Intelligence
Agency." What does that mean to any-
one else, except that perhaps some people
think they are spending too much. And
the minute the question is asked where
they are spending It we are in serious
trouble.
So what happens to your children and
my children; Mr President? What hap-
pens to you when You go home tonight?
What happens tomorrow? What hap-
pens to the security of our country?
Can we afford to tell them? Oh yes, I
would like to tell the public everything it
is possible to tell them. I believe in that.
I have been in public life continually for
40 years. I believe in the right of the
public to know. But I certainly would
not come to the floor of the Senate and
tell you, Mr. President, how rn out to-
gether an atom bomb. I would not tell
you that. I would not tell you how far
our nuclear subs are able to travel; I
would not tell you how we can detect an
enemy sub; and I would not teU you how
they might detect ours.' I would not tell
you that. Why would I not tell you that?
I would not tell you that because the
minute I told you that I would jeopardize
the future of your children.
I have sat down with the Senator from
Wisconsin (Mr. Pnox?.nas), the Senator
from California (Mr. CR,\nsToN), to find
a solution, and I have sat down with Mr.
Colby, who Is a great American. He said,
"Please do not do this. If you want to
make my job easier, please do not do
this." I cannot sit there after that ad-
monition and exhortation and turn
around and say, "Mr. Colby; I do not
believe what you have to say." If I be-
lieved that for 1 minute, I would, say.
"You ought to give up your job.-' . .
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Senator Humphrey:
'rise to commend the Senator from I6iode
Island and to associate myself full? with
his comment,;. The Senator pointed out
very properly that the Central Intelli-
gence Agency has in the past engaged in
activities that have been looked upon by
certain Members of the Congress as im-
desirable: but 'I want to make it clear
that every one of those activities had
been ordered by a President. The Cen-
tral intelligence Agency does not Just
engage in activities for the love of work.
I know that the Central Intelligence
Agency, during the Kennedy years and
the Johnson years, was engaged in ac-
tivities in Laos---
Mr. President, the Central inteugence
Agency is possibly the most important
agency in this Government. By and large,
it is made up of people who are com-
petent, able, and who have served this
country well and faithfully. To be sure,
there are times when it has engaged_ in
activities, as we have said. Chat are
looked upon with suspicion; but I think
it would be folly for us to publicize all of
its activities, to publicize the amounts it
receives, particularly when there are
ways and means within this body and
within the other body of Congress to
superviset it..and to keep a check rein
upon it.
serving on the National Security Council.
and I want to tell my colleagues that the
Central Intelligence Agency was the most
accurate and effective instrument of
Government for that council. Its reports
were most accurate, and had we followed
the advice of the Central Intelligence
Agency in many areas, we would have
been better off, but at least it was there..
But just as surely as we are in this
body today debating whether or not we
ought to have a release of the figure,
next year it will be whether it is too big
or too little, and then it will be what is
in it. Then when we start to say what is
in.it, we are going to have to expose ex-
actly what we have been doing in order
to gain information; for example, years
ago as to where the Soviet Union was
building its nuclear subs and the kind
of nuclear subs they were. I saw that ma-
terial In 1365--how far they were along,
what their scientific progress was. I do
not think it would servg the public in-
terest for all of that information to have
been laid out. It would have destroyed
our intelligence gathering completely.
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Senator McClellan:
But, let us bear in mind that If we are
to have a security intelligence agency, we
cannot have it with. national publicity
on what it does, how it does it, and how
much it spends here` or how much it
spends there. . . ?
On my responsibility to my colleagues,
they in CIA keep a clean house. They
have had a conservative operation dollar-
wise and have accounted for the money
in a splendid way. That has been true
without exception. There has been no
great spillage of money or great extrava.
gances, and not one bit,,of scandal or
odor of any kind.
Senator Thurmond: ".
I believe that our Nation is unique in
the attention ito legislature has given to
specifying and thrum oeri'?invt the activi-
ties of the agency designated to perform
its foreign intelligence missions.,
Senator Proxmire:
Mr. President, the purpose of the
amendment which I am offering now is
to provide that the overall figure for the
intelligence community.as a whole, not
broken down but the overall figure,
would be made available, so that the tax-
payers of this country would have some
ideca of how much, -how many billions of ..
dollars-and it is billions of dollars-
are going for intelligence efforts by our.
Government.
' Now just -what would this tell our ad-?1
.
versaries? They would not know if it all
went to the CIA, or DIA. Whether the-
NSA spent most of the money, or the Air
Force.
How about yearly fluctuations? Say for
example, that the budget went up 10
percent in 1 year. What what they con-
clude? That manpower was more expen-
sive? That the CLA was spending more
for Laos? That the DIA had bought a
new computer division? That NSA was
hiring more people? They would know-
nothing.
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Senator Hughes:
The threat will come from losing con-
trol on the inside. if maiiitaining that
control requires an ounce of rL k, then I
t; inl; we should be Prepared to take that
ounce of risk in at least letting us see
Publicly and the people see publicly
whether we are spending $3 billion, $7
billion. or $90 billion, and how we are
concealing it and hiding it, and if we are
protecting ourselves from the inside as
well as from the outside.
I think that ounce of risk, if it exists,
is worth taking, and I thank the dis-
tinguished Senator from Wisconsin for
y elding.. .. . t... _ _. 1.
Senator Jackson:
In summary, our foreign intelligence
service arises out of an act of Con? Tess
and all of its activities are closely scru-
tinized by n number of representative
members of both the Senate and the
House of Representatives. This is how
we have resolved the balance between
the needs of an open society and the
needs for a secret forei-,m intelligence
service. I certainly do not think that
this is the time t' nnhalan.r;e the situa--
Lion as I am confident enactmeir~ of the
proposed amendment would do.
Senator Young: ". .
I know there is treat interest in the
-public knowing everything possible, but
X think there arc some things that should
be kept secret for our own security.
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RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
? 735. Rule XI.
record vote is demanded. The result of each rollcall
vote in any meeting of any committee shall be made
available by that committee for inspection by the
public at reasonable times in the offices of that com-
mittee. Information so available for public inspection
shall include a description of the amendment, motion,
order, or other proposition and the name of each
Member voting for and each Member voting against
such amendment, motion, order, or proposition, and
whether by proxy or in person, and the names of those
Members present but not voting. With respect to
each record vote by any committee on each motion
to report any bill or resolution of a public character,
the total number of votes cast for, and the total
number of votes cast against, the reporting of such
bill or resolution shall be included in the committee
report.
The first part of this paragraph was derived from See. 133(b) of
the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812) and made
part of the standing rules on January 3, 1953, p. 24. The requirements
that committee roll calls be subject to public inspection and that the
committee report on a public bill or resolution include the vote thereon,
were added by Sec. 104(b) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of
1970 (84 Stat. 1140) and made a part of the rules on January 22, 1971,
p. --, H. Res. 5.
C(@All committee hearings, records, data, charts,
and files shall be kept separate and distinct from the
congressional office records of the Member serving
as chairman of the committee; and such records shall
be the property of the House and all Members of the
House shall have access to such records. Each corn-
RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Rule XI. ? 735.
mittee is authorized to have printed and bound
testimony and other data presented at hearings held
by the committee.
This provision from Sec. 202 (d) of the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946 (60 Stat. 812) was made a part of the standing rules
January 3, 1953, p. 24.
(d)(1) It shall be the duty of the chairman of each
committee to report or cause to be reported promptly
to the House any measure approved by his committee
and to take or cause to be taken necessary steps to
bring the matter to a vote.
(2) In any event, the report of any committee on
a measure which has been approved by the committee
shall be filed within seven calendar days (exclusive
of days on which the House is not in session) after
the day on which there has been filed with the clerk
of the committee a written request, signed by a
majority of the members of the committee, for the
reporting of that measure. Upon the filing of any
such request, the clerk of the committee shall
transmit immediately to the chairman of the com-
mittee notice of the filing of that request. This sub-
paragraph does not apply to a report of the Com-
mittee on Rules with respect to the rules, joint
rules, or order, of business of the House or to the
reporting of a resolution of inquiry addressed to
the head of an executive department.
(3) If, at the time of approval of any measure or
matter by any committee (except the Committee on
Rules) any member of the committee, gives notice of
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September 1974
CIA SUBCOMMITTEES
SENATE APPROPRIATIONS
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
John L. McClellan (D., Ark.), Chairman
John C. Stennis (D., Miss.) Milton R. Young (R. , N. Dak. )
John O. Pastore (D., R. I.) Roman L. Hruska (R., Nebr.)
SENATE ARMED SERVICES
CIA SUBCOMMITTEE
John C. Stennis (D., Miss.), Chairman
Stuart Symington (D., Mo.) Peter H. Dominick (R., Colo.)
Henry M. Jackson (D., Wash.) Strom Thurmond (R., S. C.)
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES
SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Lucien N. Nedzi, (D., Mich.), Chairman
F. Edward Hebert (D., La.) William G. Bray (R. , Ind. )
Melvin Price (D., Ill.) Leslie Arends (R. , Ill.)
O. C. Fisher (D., Texas) Bob Wilson (R., Calif.)
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS
"SPECIAL GROUP"
George H. Mahon (D., Texas), Chairman
Jamie L. Whitten (D., Miss.) William E. Minshall (R., Ohio)
Robert L. F. Sikes (D., Fla.) Elford A. Cederberg (R., Mich)
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TAT
TASS Reports Colby Testimony on CIA actions in Chile
L231442 Moscow TASS in English 1350 GMT 23 Oct 73 L
(TEXT) WASHINGTON OCTOBER 2.3 TASS--FRESH FACTS HAVE BEEN LEARNED
HERE ABOUT THE SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY OF THE USA CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY AGAINST SALVADOR ALLENDE'S POPULAR UNITY GOVERNMENT PRIOR
TO SEPTEMBER ELEVENTH. THESE FACTS ARE CONTAINED IN THE TRANSCRIPT
OF SECRET TESTIMONIES BY CIA DIRECTOR WILLIAM COLBY AND CIA SENIOR
STAFF-MEMBER F. DAVIS AT THE INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. A SUMMARY OF THE TESTIMONIES WAS PUB-
LISHED BY THE"WASHINGTON POST."
THE TESTIMONY OF THE CIA LEADERS SHOWS THAT THE DEPARTMENT
CARRIED ON LARGE-SCALE SECRET INTERVENTION IN THE INNER-POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS OF CHILE. THIS ACTIVITY, THE NEWSPAPER SAID,
INCLUDED INFILTRATION INTO ALL PRINCIPAL POLITICAL PARTIES,
SUPPORT OF ANTI-GOVERNMENTAL DEMONSTRATIONS AND ALIGNMNETS,
SUBSIDIES FOR OPPOSITION PRESS ORGANS.
THE UNITED STATES, THE WASHINGTON POST GOES ON TO SAY,
REFUSED CREDITS TO THE ALLENDE GOVERNMENT TO WRECK THE
CHILEAN ECONOMY AND ALSO OBSTRUCTED THE GRANTING OF LOANS TO
CHILE.-BY INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL AGENCIES. THE ONLY EXCEPTION
WAS MADE FOR THE SALE ON CREDIT OF AMERICAN WEAPONS TO THE
CHILEAN ARMED FORCES. THUS, THE UNITED STATES SOUGHT TO SPEED UP
THE ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE COUNTRY AND TO ENCOURAGE INTERNAL
OPPOSITION TO THE POPULAR UNITY GOVERNMENT.
THE TESTIMONY OF THE CIA DIRECTOR AND OTHER INFORMATION
SHOW THAT THE UNITED STATES MAINTAINED CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE
CHILEAN MILITARY THROUGHOUT THE PERIOD FOLLOWING ALLENDE'S
ELECTORAL VICTORY, THE NEWSPAPER SAYS.
THE WASHINGTON POST ADDS THAT THE CIA ALLOCATED 400,000
DOLLARS FOR SUPPORTING PRESS ORGANS OPPOSING ALLENDE ON THE EVE OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS.
23 OCT 1755Z JB/GS
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By T(td Szulc
Szvlc is a Washington writer -and a
former foreign correspondent. Ifia lat-
est book is "Compulsive Spy: The Strange
Career of E. Howard Hunt."
\,' AS THE United States, through
V the Central Intelligence Agency
or otherwise, directly involved in the
events thst led to the bloody coup d'2tat
in Chile last Sept. 11?
Actual involvement in the military
revolution that ousted the late President
baivador Allende (,ossens, a Socialist,
has been roundly denied by the Nixon
administration and the CIA in particular.
But given the CIA's track record in
overthrowing or attempting to over-
throw foreign governments-] ran, Guate-
mala, the Bay of Pigs, Laos and-so on
-deep suspicions have persisted that,
the agency, operating under White
Ilouse directives, has been much more
than an innocent observer of the Chilean
scene since Allende's election in 1970.
Ten days ago, the CIA rather sur-
prisingly if most reluctantly, went quite
a way to confirm many of these suspi-
cions. It did so in secret testimony on
Oct. 11 before the House Subcommittee
on Inter-American Affairs by its di-
rector, Willian E. Colby, and Frederick
Dixon Davis, a senior official in the
agency's Office of Current Intelligence.
.The transcript of the testimony was
made available to this writer by sources'.
In the intelligence community.
This. extensive testimony touches
principally on the -CIA's own and very
extensive covert role in Chilean poli-
tics, but' it also helps in understanding
and reconstructing the administration's
basic; olicy of bringing about Allende's
fall one wr+y or another.
We are apprised not only that ti?e
Ct \'s estimate of the number of vie-
WASHINGTON POST
21 OCT 1973
war -there remains "a real possibility."
Yet, even Colby warned that the junta
may "overdo" repression.
Colby's and Davis' testimony, in parts
unclear and contradictory, offered a
picture, of the CIA's Activities in Chile
between Allende's election in 19'10 and
the Sept. 11 coup ranging from the
"penetration" of all the major Chilean
.political parties, support for anti-regime
demonstrations and financing of the op-
position press and other groups to here-
tofore unsuspected Agency involvement
in financial negotiations between Wash-
ington and Santiago in last 1972 and
early 1973 when the Chileans were des-
perately seeking an accommodation. ,
There are indications that the CIA,
acting on the basis of its. own reports
on the ."deterioration" of the Chilean
economic situation, was among the agen-
cies counseling the While Mouse to re-
buff Allende's attempts to work out-.a
.
settle jtent on the compensations to be 11. For political reasons, It preferred
paid for naionalized American property, ., a gradual destruction from within of
and a renegotiation of Chile''s $1.7 bit the Chilean economy so that the Al-
lion debt to the Unitotl States. lende regime would collapse of its own'
weight. The CIA's role, it appeared,
A No-HelV Polio] was to help quicken this process.
ACTUALLY, the bhsic U.S.. i,7sture Under questioning by Rep. Michael
toward Allende v:ss set i'orth by J. Harrington (D-Mass.), Colby thus
Henry A. Kissinger, then the White testified that the CIA's "appreciation"
Louse special assistant for national se-' of the Chilean economy was that] it
curity affairs, at a background briefing was on a declining plane on the eco-
for the press in Chicago on Sept. 16,1970, nomlc ground In terms of internal eco-
12 days after Allende won a plurality in nomic problems -- inflation, with 320
the elections and awaited a run-off vote01 per cent inflation in one year, the clos-
in Congress. Kissinger said then. that if ure of the copper mines, and so forth,
Allende were confirmed, a Communist. your total foreign deficit was more
reginte-would emerge in Chile and that than the need for it. They ebuldn't im.
.Argentina, Bolivia and Peru might fol- port the food because their deficit was
low this example. such that over the long term they had
For the next three years, the U.S. no base for It." Elsewhere in his testi-
policy developed along two principal mony, Colby said that the CIA reported
lines. One was the denial of all credits "accurately an overall assessment of
to the .Allende govern ment-Washing- deterioration" and that with the Chilean
ton even blocked loans by international navy pushing for a coup, it was only a
institutions-to aggravate Chile's eco- question of time before it came.
nomic situation when Allende himself But Colby also told the subcommittee
was boggin down in vast mismanage that "our assessment was it might be
ment of his own. The other line was unfortunate if it coup took place. The
the supportive CIA activity to accelerate National Security Council policy was
the economic crisis and thereby encour-7P2.7-that it is consistent with the feeling it
age domestic opposition to Allende's. is not in the United States interest to
Marxist Popular Unity government Lromote it." Ho made this comment
coalition after Rep: Charles W. Whalen (R-Ohio)
The only exception to the ban on
credits was the sale of military equip- -
ment to the Chilean Armed forces-
Including the decision last June S. to
sell Chile F-5E jet fighter planes --
presumably to signal United States sup-
port for the military. Colby's testimony
as well As other information ahowec:
fusel to h"lp Chile, even on humani-
tarian- grounds, was emphasized about
a week before the military coup when
it turned down Santiago's request for
credits to buy 300,000 tons of wheat
here at a time when the Chileans had.
run out of foreign currency and bread
shortages were developing.
On Oct. 5, however, the new military
junta was granted $24.5 million in
wheat credits after the White House
overruled State Department objections.
The department's Bureau of Inter-
American Affairs reportedly believed
that such a gesture was premature and
could be politically embarrassing.
An "Unfortunate" Coup
PARADOXICALLY, Washington had
not hoped for the kind of bloody
military takeover that occurred on Sept
asked Colby whether he agreed with
earlier testimony by Jack Kubi,ch, the
Assistant secretary of state for Inter-
American affatrs, that the administra-
tion believed that. "!t would be adverse
to our own Unit,.d States interest if the
government of Chile were overthrown."
Th1_s theme was further developed In
on Oct. 8 front Richard A. Fagen,
I
l
rt eel actence at Stnn-
tiros of the nlilitar& government's ice'. that tho United States had maintained professor of po
pression is four tI Appf1QVRdcFa rsReleq?#e2QQ4/c,Qa ij;lh:tg"lai?9AtQQ4il0F 0' 0 ~~0t1 e'i. J. William Ful-
lia o figures but that the United States, non , c tairntan of the Senate Foreign
g after Allende 's election. Relations Committee, reporting on a
in effect, condones mass'executions and The Nixon administration's' firm re- meeting between Kubisch and a group
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'A' lie 1 ,oitozrtic Role "Conncern Over Seettrity;'
?
I the dissidents. The military leaders &p
11 NL', OF THE MOST intriguing dlis? ~HIIOUGIIOUT his testimony, Colby p$ parently are willing to alienate some
~J closures made by Colby In his tes- drew a grim picture of the janta'e. support at hone and endure a bad
tintony was that the CIA is actively en- repression and, in effect, predicted thr.t press abroad, in order 1o consolidate
gaged in economic hcgotiations between it would worsen even more becausm of their hold on the country and finish
the United States and foreign coup- the continued strength of the Chilean the job of rooting out Marxist influ?
tries. This has not been generally known left. His estimates of the death toll ence."
here but Colby told. the subcommittee were roughly four tines the figures n
{UtatS"we would normally contribute to announced by the. junta and he told the C}taboo of "Civil War
(a) negotiating team." subcommittee that the Chilean military. HArmed ESCRIBING the present situation.
He said that "we would try to pro. had a list of the "most wanted" Allende Colby said:
vide them intelligence as backdrop for followers whom they hoped to find and resisters continue to be
PSI their negotiations and sometimes help possibly execute. I executed where they are found, and a
them with appreciation of the prob- 'Communist Party chief Luis Corti number of prisoners have been shot,
1em . We follow the day-to-day prog- Lalan Is being or will be tried for PPF upposedly while `trying to escape.'
a ths probably number 200 or
5CE7 ress in negotiatio:,: If it's an import-p/ treason. He may well be sentenced to Such dea
nt economic negotiation, like (Trcas-! death regardless of the effect on inteir- more .; . Several thousand people rn- S.uail 4
ury) Secretary Shultz over in Nairobi death L regardless
opinion," Colby said. This in,, main under arrest, Including high-rank.
and places like that, we would be in
formation led to this exchange: ing 'officials of ? the Allende govern.
formed of what they are doing and try VVIiAL N: You mentioned those moot:'
to help them."
In the context of the Chilean-Amerl- being accused of treason. Did these Al- Answering questions, Colby aoretd
legedly treasonable activities occur after that the CIA's figure of more than Z00
an negotiations before the coup, the
7c CIA's Davis said that..,wc did have the takeover by the militaryT executions was higher than the jttnta's
~?? official estimate. He added that1"thrre
some quite reliable reporting at thepW COLBY: I think what I referred t. rere a couple thousand, at leant, kill-
time indicating that the Russians were was the head of the Communist Party d (luring the fighting which surround.
advising Allende to put his relations who would probably be tried for that L!
with the United States In order, if not treason. d ou the went coup. to a It is city quite morgue possible you tgeoid -
to settle compensation, at least to reach He would probably be tried feY nd that number. The official figure of
some sort of accommodation which treason. He would probably be tricd1l total killed is 476 civilians and 57 troops
7,53 would ease the strain between the two for activities prior to the takeover. You I to a total of 513. We would truess, we
countries. There were reports Indicat? can have some question as to how valid would estimate, it is between 2,000 and
ing that, unlike the Cubans, they were that is In a constitutional legal sense. 3,000 killed during the struggles. That
In effect trying to move Allende 'to- There have been some who have baon would not be in my classification as
9y 7I/' ward a compromise agreement .. . It accused of it since the takeover.
execution Some of those were shot S QF TEj'
was our judgment that the [Chileans]
WHALEN: That confuses me. If he !e down. There is no question about that.
C were interested In working out some
kind of modus vivendi without, however, tried for treason against a government !'hey'arc not just bystanders . .
retreating substantially from their.. po- [he] supported, I cannot understand Colby disagreed, however, with Rep.
sition." that. Q63 Robert I3. Steele (R-Conn.) that the
F Davis added' that "our intelligence L-QQLBY: You are right. . ? junta' killin s have "done no one any
I requirement in the negotiations be- This was Colby's assessment of the good."
twecn the United States and Chile resent situation: "I think our appreciation is that it
-l'- does them some good ;~:. The Junta, %,f: 'ify r
i~S6would be to try to find out, through "Armed opposition now appears to
f our sources, what their reactions to a be confined to sporadic, isolated at. their concern is whether they could
negotiating session were, what thni~r tacks on security forces, but the regime take this action of taking over the
reading of our position was, what their believes that the left Is regrouping farP63 government and not generate a real
assessment of the state of negotiation coordinated sabotage and guerrilla Ll war, which was the real chance
p7-Festivity. The government probably In ause the Allende supporters were
a
right in believing that its opponents ly activist. There were armies In
In his narration of the events leading country. There was at least' a good
have not been fully neutralized. Our
to the coup, Colby said that "under the reports indicate that the extremist nce of a real civil war occurring as
general deterioration, it was only a movement of the Revolutionary Loft esult of this coup," Colby said.
pS -1matter of getting the Army, the Nail believes its assets have not been Asked whether civil war remained a
id the Air Force to cover it. Eventu- damaged beyond repair. It wants to possibility, Colby replied that " was.
? launch anti-government 'activity as It's obviously declining, but it was a
Laally they did get them all i.n. Colby
real possibility. Yea, I think it is it real
__then compared the Chilean coup to thtt soon as practical and is torp.i opposition ~J possibility. Whether it's a certainty or
1967 Indonesian revolution, reputedly parties. Other leftist groups, Including Lnot Is not at.al.l sure."
assisted. by the CIA, when the army the Communist and Socialist parties,
ousted President Sukarno. He said the are in disarray, but they have not bran
CIA shared the suspicions of the CUP destroyed. Exiled supporters of the oust.
~C~I can military that Allende was plan- ed government are organizing abroad,
namely in Rome." . i - -n -fursr
ning a coup of his own on Sept. 19 to Colby -told the subcommittee that
neutralize the armed forces, but ssl'9 "concern over security undoubtedly is
the CIA had no firm information con- what accounts for the junta's contin?
firming these suspicions. ued use of harsh measures to deal with
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DATE COMMITTEE MEMBERS SUBJECT
April 1964
May 1964
19 May 1964
1-louse & Senate Appropriations Chairmen
House & Senate Appropriations Chairmen
CIA Subcommittees Senate Russell
Appropriations & Armed Services Saltonstall
Hayden
Stennis
Young
July 1964 House & Senate Appropriations Chairmen
August 1964 House & Senate Appropriations Chairmen
25 March 1965 CIA Subcommittees Senate Stennis
Appropriations & Armed Services Saltonstall
Young
25 March 1965 CIA Subcommittee of House Rivers
Armed Services Philbin
Hebert
Price
Hardy
Bennett
Bates
Arends
O'Ko.nski
Bray
SECRET)
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15 April 1965
CIA Subcommittee of House Mahon
Appropriations Bow
Lipscomb
11 August 1965 Special Group, House Mahon
Appropriations Committee Andrews
Lipscomb
Bow
14 September CIA Subcommittees of Senate Russell
1965 Appropriations and Armed Stennis
Services Hayden
Young
21 September CIA Subcommittees of Senate Russell
1966 Appropriations and Armed Symington
Services Stennis
Saltonstall
Young
Smith
September 1968 House & Senate Appropriations Chairmen
13 October 1970 CIA Subcommittee of House Mahon
Appropriations Andrews
Bow
Minshall
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No briefing on covert action. Intelli--
gence briefing
7CRET 25X1
2
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-E CB. E
DATE COMMITTEE
November 1970 House & Senate Appropriations
19 November Defense Subcommittee, Senate
1970 Appropriations
Ellender
Stennis
Pastore
Mansfield
Young
Smith
Allott
Hruska
Symington
Jackson
Thurmond
11 June 1971 Intelligence Operations Sub- Ellender
Committee of Senate Stennis
Appropriations Young
3 February 1972 Defense Subcommittee, House Mahon
Appropriations Sike s
Whitten
Flood
Addabbo
McFall
Minshall
Rhodes
Davis
Wyman
May 1972 House & Senate Appropriations Chairmen
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DATE
3 CRS
January 1973 House & Senate Appropriations
16 January 1973 Defense, Military Construction
Subcommittees, House
Appropriations
13 March 1973 CIA Subcommittees of Senate
Armed Services and
Appropriations
13..March 1973 Same
Mahon
Sikes
Whitten
Flood
Addabbo
McFall
Flynt
Minshall
Rhodes
Davis
Wyman
Patten
Long
Hansen
McKay
Cederberg
McClellan
Pastore
Hruska
Symington
Jackson
Thurmond
McClellan
Hruska
Symington
Church (invitee)
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 DATE
March 1974
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COMMITTEE
MEMBERS
Subcommittee on Multinational
Corporations, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee
Church
Fulbright
Symington
Aiken
Case
Percy
.C-'., ,n
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SUBJECT
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DATE COMMITTEE
11 October 1973 Intelligence Operations of
Senate Appropriations
11 October 1973 Inter-American Affairs Fascell
Subcommittee of House Foreign Rosenthal
Affairs Harrington
Steele
Whalen
16 October 1973 Special Group of House
Appropriations
Mahon
Whitten
Sikes
Minshall
Cederberg
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25X
26 November Subcommittee on Western Hemi- McGee
1973 sphere Affairs of Senate Foreign Sparkman
Relations Committee Muskie
Aiken
Case
Scott
Pearson
22 April 1974 Subcommittee on Intelligence of Nedzi
House Armed Services
McClellan
Young
SECR
25
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