SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 1941-68 VOLUME II PERSONNEL SECURITY PART ONE CHAPTERS I, II,

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• Document Creation Date: November 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 16, 2000
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• Publication Date: May 1, 1973
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1941-68
VOLUME II PERSONNEL SECURITY
PART ONE CHAPTERS I, II
Secret
PERMANENT HISTORICAL DOCUM_:
DO NOT DESTROY
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This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States, within the meaning of Title
18, sections 793 and 794, of the US Code, as amended.
Its transmission or revelation of its contents to or re-
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Classified by 61, 4
WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AND METHODS INVOLVED
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SECURITY PROGRAM OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
1941-68
VOLUME II PERSONNEL SECURITY
05-2
by
Directorate for Management
and Services
25 MAY 1973
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Approved by; 25X1A
owa553 s orn
'Director of curity
HISTORICAL STAFF
CENTRAL'INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
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Foreword
Personnel security -- the subject of this, the second in
1
a series of volumes describing the. CIA security program as
it evolved through 1968 -- does not lend itself well to the
straightforward, chronological form of description of some
other histories. There were several related aspects of the
program which come into clearer perspective when they are
dealt with as separate entities. Two important aspects of
the Agency's personnel security program are the subjects
of separate volumes in this series -- OS-5,
Offices, and OS-9, Polygraph Program -- because the subjects
are very extensive, and because not all of the activities de-
scribed related to the personnel security processes. In
addition, all of the other volumes in this series deal at least
to some extent with the subject of personnel security, because
personnel security is the most important aspect of security
work.
Following the introduction, Chapter I of this volume de-
scribes the Agency's personnel security program under
Sheffield Edwards, with the Chapter's principal emphasis on
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the personnel security screening processes. Sheffield Edwards,
CIA's first Director of Security, retired in July 1963 following
a long and distinguished career with the Agency. Chapters II
and III treat the subjects of security records and the ongoing
personnel security program separately. The term "ongoing
personnel security program" was coined by the author to de-
scribe the pattern of activity that is designed to insure the
continued security reliability of the employee after he has
passed, the initial security screening test. Chapter IV describes
other influences affecting the program during the period covering
the years 1963-68 inclusive.
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Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
I The CIA Personnel Security Program
Under Sheffield Edwards . . . . . . . . . 23
A. The Inheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
B. Under CIG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1. Establishment of Overt Criteria . 32
2. Divided Responsibility Under CIG 43
C. Early CIA Program (1947-54) . . . . . . 51
1. The Initial Chaos (1947-50) . . . . . 51
2. Later Adjustments (1951-54) . . . . 62
3. Later Organization and Overall
Statistics . . . . . . . . . . 80
D. The Later Period Under Edwards
(1955-63) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
1. Organization, Trends and
Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
2. Refinements and Additions to the
Program . . . .. . . . . . . . 99
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a.' Spouse Investigation . . . . . . 99
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c. Terminations . . . . . . . . . 102
d. Military Assignees . . . . . . 105
e. GSA and Others . . . . . . . . 106
f. Evaluation Standards -- An IG
Recommendation . . . . . 107
New Problems in Covert Case
Processing . . . . . . . . 109
II. Security Records . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
B. OS Security Records Division
D. Security Records and Communications
Division (SR&CD) . . . . . . . . . 154
III. The On-Going Personnel Security Program. 159
A. General . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
B. Security Indoctrination and
Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
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C. Control of Personal Activities and
the "Open Door" Policy . . . . . . 178
D. Continuing File Review . . . . . . . .
E.. Reinvestigations. . . . . . . . . . . . .
F. Security Research and Counter-
intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . .
G. The Terminated Employee . . . . . . .
IV. Later Developments in Personnel
Security (1963-68). . . . . . . . . . . .
A. Management and Organization . . . . .
B. Trends and Influences. . . . . . . . . .
C. External - CIA Influence . . . . . . . .
D. The Total Personnel Risk
Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . .
E. The Effect of Changing Values and
199
259
273
Attitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
Figures
Figure 1 Security Organization Chart,
6 December 1954 . . . . . . . . . 86
Figure 2 Organizational Structure Office of
Security, August 1965 . . . . . .
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Tables
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1. Security Dismissal Processing,
1946-54 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Resignations Brought About Through
the Polygraph Program, 1948-54 . . .
3. Number of Security Office Screening
Actions, 1947-54 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Processing of Applicant Cases,
1956-63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
5. Yearly Totals of Overt and Semi-Covert
Cases Received, 1956-63 . . . . . . . .
6. Overall Covert Clearance Processing,
1956-63 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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8. Employee Activity Branch Security
Briefing Activities, 1951-68 . . . . . .
9. Employee Activity Branch Review of
Outside Activities, 1955-68 . . . . . .
Page
94
10. RIP Cases Completed, 1961-70 . . . . . . . 206
11. OS Clearance Processing, 1963-68 . . . . .
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Appendixes
Page
A. Source References . . . . . . . . . . . 296
25X1A B. . . . . . . 314
C. Homosexuality as a Security Risk
Factor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Z6
D. Processing of Applicants for Staff
Employment ... . . . . . . . . . . 332
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F. Cases Involving OS Support to Troubled
Agency Employees. . . . . . . . . 355
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1941-68
II. Personnel Security
Personnel security is the pattern of activity necessary to
insure that the individual does not act contrary to the security
trust that has been placed in him. It is an important aspect of
security, because the subversion of personnel represents one
means through which foreign intelligence services can gain
access to information -- otherwise denied them -- that would
be helpful. in meeting their intelligence requirements. A
viable personnel security program should consist of both an
initial screening process and some continuing means to insure
that the individual continues to perform to a standard of trust,
because the individual's subversion can occur either before or
after employment. The success of any personnel security pro-
gram hangs on the fragile thread of the human will -- there are
no three-way combination-locked vault doors, only the individual's
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strength of character. Personnel security, therefore, involves
the science of human behavior.
The personnel security screening process is itself divided
into two parts: the first involves the collection of sufficient
data concerning the individual to perform a security assessment
and to render a security judgment; the second, involves the secu-
rity assessment and judgment, which must be rendered against
some viable standard for judging the individual's security reli-
ability. Within CIA the collection of data is performed by the
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with the aid of the polygraph. Both of these sources service
other OS organizational components -- Personnel Security Divi-
sion (PSD) and the Investigations Division (ID) -- which perform
the actual security assessments and render an appropriate- judg-
ment. Available CIA records as well as those of other Federal
investigative and security services are also checked. The
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judgments are made under the Director of Security's delegated
authority, and security disapprovals, or even approvals in cases
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where questionable information exists, receive a much higher
level of review than "all-clear" cases.
The years following World War II saw the promulgation of
several Executive Orders which set standards for the screening
of Federal personnel, in addition to standards to be applied to
such personnel provided access to classified defense information.
As an Agency of the Federal government, CIA has been required
to meet these minimum standards; although, due to the extreme
sensitivity of its mission, the intensity of its program exceeded
those of other Federal departments and agencies. Another dis-
tinction between CIA's program and other Federal programs is
the great variety in categories of personnel which it either employs
or uses in some capacity in the conduct of its intelligence mission,
who range from staff employees sharing most of the emoluments
of other Federal employees to contacts and agents whose participa-
tion in Agency activities is performed under greatly controlled
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affects the manner in which information concerning the indivi-
dual can be developed and consequently the scope of the inquiry.
As a result, although the philosophy is adhered to that the use of
any individual for Agency purposes should be carefully assessed
against the maximum possible information that can be acquired
concerning the individual, there are in CIA varying security
standards for the different categories of personnel. The resultant
calculated risk is balanced by operational security procedures
which carefully control the individual's access to sensitive infor-
mation. Overall it is a reasonable, workable approach, and the
only approach possible in light of the unusual nature of the intelli-
gence mission.
It is often said that government should not legislate on the
subject of morals or otherwise attempt through its processes to
establish a moral standard of behavior. Conversely, legislation
existing, in almost all jurisdictions making murder and robbery
criminal offenses -- yes, even the Sunday "blue laws" -- can be
traced to the law of Moses. One might argue that these are laws
which are in the best interest of the overall society -- which only
leads to the inevitable conclusion that society itself prescribes
a standard of acceptable conduct -- a fact with which government,
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as an instrumentality of society, must continually reckon, even
as it relates to the preservation of official secrecy. This latter
fact is clearly demonstrated by the following quotation from
Agency regulations which prescribe the personnel security
standards for individuals holding staff positions in CIA.
Who (those employed) are of excellent character, and
of unquestioned loyalty, integrity, discretion, and trust-
worthiness. 1/*
In defense of the above requirement, it might be said that
individuals of poor character are more easily led to committing
acts constituting subversion, because the subversion itself rep-
resents just one more step toward the complete character degra-
dation of the individual. Thus only persons of outstanding char-
acter should be entrusted with information which is the subject
of official secrecy. A problem arises, however, when it is dis-
covered that few -- indeed, if any -- individuals consistently evi-
dence outstanding behavioral characteristics. Furthermore, the
only available evidence concerning the individual's character is
his past conduct, and theologians and psychologists alike have
arrived at the conclusion that deep within the psychological makeup
* For serially numbered source references, see Appendix A.
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of even the finest individuals is the potential for the basest of
acts. The process by which saints become sinners -- and vice
versa -- has been explored only on theoretical bases.
Indeed, even the standards seem to vary -- according to
the existing conditions, and according to the viewpoint of the
particular society in which they are judged. What is bad is
only bad from particular points of view; and, since security
is principally concerned with the protection of classified infor-
mation, personnel security must use standards which are geared
to those individual characteristics which have been demonstrated
to have produced the subversion of individuals, and should not
necessarily attempt to employ conventional standards of
morality. That portion of the Agency's regulations which is
quoted above fails to make this distinction; and, in failing to
do so, it fails the test of a viable standard. This is not to sin-
gle out this particular regulation for criticism, for in fact most
other governmental personnel security directives and regulations
are similarly worded. It does, however, serve to demonstrate
the frustration associated with attempts to establish an appro-
priate yardstick against which to measure the security reliability
of individuals.
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The Government's personnel security program began on
the issue of loyalty, and it is still largely so concerned today.
It had long been the practice of the Federal government to per-
form at least perfunctory investigation of applicants for Federal
employment. The applicant's loyalty was undoubtedly always a
matter of inquiry during the conduct of such, investigations, but
it was not until the late 1930's that legislation was first passed
making the individual's loyalty a matter requiring consideration
for employment in the Federal civil service. In August 1939,
Congress, concerned with the threat that the International
Communist movement and other totalitarian influences posed
to the security of the nation, passed the original Hatch Act,
which included a provision preventing employment in the Federal
service of any individual holding membership in any political
party or organization advocating the overthrow of the US consti-
tutional form of government. Congress further evidenced its
concern in July 1941 when there was added to all appropriation
acts a mandate providing that no part of any appropriation could
be used to pay salaries or wages of persons who were members
of any organization advocating overthrow of the Government by
force or violence. Even the term "disloyalty" required a
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definition; for it might well be asked: Disloyalty to whom and
to what? This definition was stated as advocating the overthrow
of the US constitutional form of government by force or violence.
But, although this excluded many individuals possessing
dangerous political idealogies, it did not take into account the
matter of the clandestine penetration of the Federal personnel
body, allowing that such penetrations would probably be effected
through individuals who either would be more circumspect in
expressing their political viewpoints, or whose motivations
might be other than political ideology. . Such penetrations were
most likely to occur where the "loot" was the greatest -- depart-
ments and agencies dealing with classified information. Conse-
quently, in June 1940 -- with the Nation watching, but still not
participating in the war in Europe -- Congress authorized the
Secretaries of War and Navy to remove summarily any employee
in the interests of national security without regard to any other
provision of law, rule, or regulation governing the removal of
employees. This greatly broadened the discretionary powers of
these two Secretaries.
The military departments had long followed the practice of
identifying and classifying the most sensitive of their information.
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Until 1944 the highest security classification was SECRET.
SECRET information was- the subject of more stringest physical
safeguards; and, additionally, personnel provided access to
SECRET information were investigated and specifically approved
for this level of access -- a personnel security clearance. The
denial of a personnel security clearance did not necessarily
affect the individual's employment rights, since not all employees
required access to classified information. Generally the same
screening processes were followed in the case of personnel
serving in the military services who required access to, classi-
fied information to perform their duties.
The investigations that were conducted pursuant to these
personnel security clearance processes continued to inquire
into the individual's political ideology and loyalty, but they also
inquired into the individual's background and behavioral patterns.
Much attention was paid during World War II to individuals with
foreign backgrounds -- particularly those from the Axis Nations --
because it was feared that such individuals might have divided
loyalties. Inquiry into the behavioral patterns of prospective
employees was not strange to the ways of the Federal service,
for government had historically strived to insure that those
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entrusted with civil service were of outstanding character and
behavior -- now, however, the resulting information was being
used to judge the individual's security reliability. The author is
of the opinion that the personnel security standards employed
during World War II were largely society's consensus of what
constituted conventional morality, judged from the viewpoint of
the individual making the security determination, and refined
by a few professional considerations such as foreign nationality
backgrounds. Aside from the published exploits of Mata Hari,
there were too few existing examples of the manner by which
character deficiencies interacted with the matter of subversion.
In the twenty-seven years following World War II, however, a
considerable experience factor was developed in the form of actual
cases wherein US citizens had been induced to act in a manner con-
trary to their national allegiance. Additionally, the CIA, in the
course of pursuing its national counterintelligence responsibilities,
was able to develop much information related to the modus operandi
of foreign intelligence services, and this information also provided
further insight into those individual characteristics which the oppo-
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sition had concluded could be successfully exploited for their
.intelligence purposes.
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at least lacked adjustment, self-discipline, and the ability to
integrate themselves into complex situations or environments.
But even with an experience factor and a knowledge of the
opposition's techniques, the precise yardstick for the measur-
ing security reliability of an individual continued to be elusive.
The particular character traits which were prevalent in indi-
viduals who conducted themselves in a treasonable manner can
be,found in many other individuals who have not breached their
security trust, and who in all probability will not do so in the
future. This is because the offense in question constitutes an
individual act, which the individual must be personally dis-
posed to commit. An examination of case histories provides
considerable insight into how the degradation proceeded in
the particular cases examined -- the pattern cannot, with
any firm degree of consistency, be applied to other individuals
and other circumstances. Each individual security assessment
must be made on its own merits, and allowance must be made
for occasional failures in the screening processes. This is
* The Story of Disloyalty and Betrayal in American History,
by Nathaniel Weyl, 1950.
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as it might pertain to the particular subject under study.
Guest lecturers are frequently provided from OS; and the
course's content always emphasizes the important relation-
ship of security to the intelligence mission.
Of perhaps even greater significance, the Agency's
Office of Security has fostered an "open door" environment to
permit agency employees to discuss those of their personal
problems having possible potential security ramifications,
with full assurance that the information they disclose will be
treated confidentially, and with promise that OS will engage
its and any other Agency resources necessary to assist the
individual where in the Office's considered judgment such
action is appropriate. The procedure results in many conver-
sations with the security officer which are not really germane
to the subject of security, but it also results in establishing
and maintaining a healthy state of communication. Supervisors
too are encouraged to "know their employees" and to consult
with OS in the event of any unusual occurrence or attitude.
OS's Night Security Office -- operating on a 24-hours-a-day,
seven days-a-week basis -- provides a point of contact for any
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Agency employee experiencing personal difficulties. Special
security personnel operating out of OS's Personnel Security
Division are continually available on call should the problems
of some Agency employee require immediate assistance.
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Naturally, it cannot be said with certainty that the Agency's
personnel security program has been completely effective.
The CIA -- unlike several other Federal departments and
agencies -- has had no known defections from its employee
body; a number of Agency employees have reported attempts
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Personnel security at best is a very
imprecise science; that upon which it principally depends --
the individual human will -- is extremely unpredictable.
Nothing else will suffice other than that the subject be given
close and continuing attention. The collective tools of the
Agency's personnel security program may seem pitifully little
when it is realized that they are intended to prevent each and
every attempted penetration -- not so, however, when they are
being manipulated by competent, professionally trained security
officers.
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I. The CIA Personnel Security Program Under Sheffield Edwards*
A. The Inheritance
When the CIA was established in 1947, its personnel security
program received a respectable inheritance. This included a
set of security files and indices related to OSS personnel, which
had been accumulated during World War II by the OSS Security
Office.** These records are still a part of the total OS record
holdings today (1972). Additional record assets resulted from
the wartime OSS X-2 (Counterintelligence) Branch, which had
been accumulated from a great variety
and OSS's own agent sources, and which
Sheffield Edwards: Executive for Inspection and Security
(July 1947-January 1949), Chief, Inspection and Security Staff
(January 1949-December 1950), Security Officer, CIA (Novem-
ber and December 1950), Assistant Deputy Director for Adminis-
tration for Inspection and Security (December 1950-March 1953),
Director, Security Office (March 1953-February 1955), Director
of Security (February 1955-June 1963).
For the organization of OSS Security Office, see OS-1 of this
series, I, B, 2.
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represented a significant compilation of the identities of known
or suspected subversive individuals and organizations worldwide,
in addition to research related to their methods of operation.
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Of perhaps greater significance, however, the Agency
inherited four years of Federal and OSS wartime experience
and methodology related to the subject of personnel security
-- it knew how to go about the security investigative process;
See OS-l, I, B, 5 regarding X-2 Branch.
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it knew the value of good security record keeping and of liaison
with other established sources of personnel security informa-
tion; it possessed a fairly accurate picture of the types of indi-
viduals who constituted personnel security risks; and, it recog-
nized that good security was essential to the intelligence mission
and that every employee should receive comprehensive instruction
in security in order that everyone could share in the overall
responsibility.
Some problems were also inherited. One of these resulted
from CIA's combined mission, which included both the production
of national intelligence -- a predominantly overt process -- and
the conduct of espionage abroad --almost totally a clandestine
undertaking. The first CIA clandestine office -- Office of Special
Operations (OSO) -- was founded upon organization remnants of
the OSS, which, following the war, had undergone a brief transi-
tional period as the Strategic Services Unit (SSU) of the War Depart-
ment. * The balance of CIA, on the other hand, began as the Central
See OS-1, I, C for description of SSU supporting security
organization.
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Intelligence Group (CIG) in January 1946. It was an entirely
new organization, and its early personnel body was comprised
entirely of individuals detailed from other Federal departments
and agencies, combined for the purpose of producing national
intelligence reports from all available sources. Following July
1946, when OSO was established as an organizational element of
CIG to take over the work of the transitional SSU, it was concluded
that OSO's activities were of an inherently sensitive nature, and
that therefore its work should be strictly compartmented from
the balance of CIG, to the extent of creating a near-autonomous
organization-within-an- organization, to include provision for
compartmented support services. As a result, there existed
under GIG, and during the early years of CIA, two separate secu-
rity offices with responsibility in the field of personnel security --
one for OSO, and one for the balance of CIG and CIA. Evidences of
this early organizational philosophy can still be found today (1972)
in the Agency's security processes.
Another reported problem arose as a result of the character of
some OSS personnel. Although evidence indicates that by 1943 the
OSS Security Office was rejecting personnel possessing questionable
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leftist political ideologies, these persons were not considered
as dangerous as those individuals possessing pro-Axis leanings.
Furthermore, it was not until about 1943 that OSS's personnel
security screening program started to become effective. Many
of OSS's operations involved liaison with foreign partisan forces
which were oriented toward leftist political philosophies. As a
result, a significant number of individuals were employed by OSS
whose continued use in the postwar era of intelligence would
have been questionable, now that the principal adversary had
become International Communism. The author is of the opinion,
however, that this was not really a significant problem to CIA,
for a variety of reasons which are described below.
Because an organizational continuity can be traced from CIA
back to CIG, to SSU, and to the wartime predecessor organizations
OSS and COI, one is prone to envision that there was also almost
a complete continuity of personnel employed under the several
organizations -- this was by no means the case. Undoubtedly,
a large portion of the OSS personnel body had been motivated by
the for the duration" spirit which saw almost every segment of
the nation's citizenry become involved in some aspect of the war
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effort; with the close-out of hostilities, most of these indivi-
duals returned to work in commercial enterprises. That part
of the GIG organization involved in early postwar planning, that
was also envisioned as collating, preparing, and coordinating
national intelligence, consisted by and large of personnel de-
tailed from other departments -- principally the military and very few of these had been associated with OSS.
The most significant continuity of personnel was that in-
volved in the OSO, which organization, as previously explained,
transitioned from OSS through SSU. This transition, however,
was not smooth -- it involved almost a complete stop-and-go
process. When OSS was abolished in September 1945, a large
number of its employees
(1, 33Z), working in OSS's Research
and Analysis, and Presentation Branches, were transferred to
the Department of State. The remaining OSS personnel (9, 058)
were reorganized under the War Department, SSU, which was
established by an order of the Secretary of War on 1 October
1945. By 19 October 1945 SSU had reduced its personnel to
7, 640 and was progressing toward a reduction-to 1, 915 to be
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accomplished by 1 December 1945. 5/ In short, most of OSS's
personnel who had not been transferred to State were given
"pink slips. "
Furthermore, a significant number ,of the 1946 SSU and OSO
personnel had not begun under OSS. Many of the SSU and OSO
personnel, too, were detailed from other departments, and the
influence of the military departments was again significant --
particularly in the managerial positions. In addition, an examina-
tion of the personnel files of many early CIG/OSO employees
reveals that a significant number were hired by SSU during the
summer and fall of 1946, only to be terminated one month later
and immediately given an excepted appointment with CIG. It is
postulated that the DCI was using his authorities related to the
close-out of SSU -- which still possessed authority to hire its
own personnel -- to bring employees on board CIG, which until
January 1946 did not possess authority to hire employees.*
NIA Directive No. 4 of 2 April 1946 authorized CIG to
utilize funds, personnel, and facilities of SSU in the perform-
ance of authorized functions of the CIG.
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It is apparent that some of the weeding out of remaining
OSS security undesirables occurred under SSU. A former
State Department security officer* claims that SSU used the
September 1945 Executive Order abolishing OSS to manuever
many OSS potential security risks, into organizational elements
scheduled for transfer to State. ** The author could find no con-
firmation of this; however, perhaps only by coincidence, a num-
ber of the more notorious OSS,security risks were transferred
to State, from which they were subsequently dismissed follow-
ing considerable procedural difficulties. >~~**
It is a matter of record that no SSU personnel were trans-
ferred from SSU to CIG; all were terminated from SSU and
then immediately given excepted appointments with CIG
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following a, determination that they possessed utility to the new
organization. CIA security personnel dating back to CIG ad-
vise that this provided opportunity to screen out undesirable
security risks -- particularly important since, until enact-
ment of the CIA enabling legislation, the DCI did not possess
authority to summarily dismiss employees for any reason in
the interests of national security. Again, however, the author
was unable to locate any statistics related to the number of SSU
employees rejected for CIG employment as unacceptable security
risks.
Undoubtedly, some must have slipped through; by the
close of 1954, fifteen Agency employees had been terminated
under the DCI's summary dismissal authority. In a number of
these cases, the individual's employment continuity could be
traced back to OSS. In none of these cases, however, was it
established that the individual was engaged in espionage, main-
tained active membership in the Communist Party, or had dis-
closed classified. information to unauthorized persons. In each
case, information was developed of such nature that the con-
tinued employment of the individual represented a greater
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security risk than the Agency should assume on a continuing
basis. 6/ In deference to the personal reputations of the
individuals involved, they are not identified here.
B. Under CIG
1. Establishment of Overt Criteria. NIA Directive No.
1 of 8 February 1946 -- related to organization and functions
of the newly created CIG -- authorized the detail of employees
from State, the military service departments, and other ap-
proved Federal departments, and agencies, to work in CIG.
These individuals constituted the original CIG personnel body,
since GIG at that time possessed no authority to hire its own
employees. On 26 February 1946 the first DCI -- Admiral
Sidney W. Souers -- requested that the intelligence organi-
zations participating in the IAB* assign personnel to, the Cen-
tral Planning Staff (CPS -- an early CIG organizational element
concerned with policy and planning) who should "be cleared to
handle intelligence material. " 7/
IAB: Intelligence Advisory Board -- predecessor of USIB.
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Although it is not clear what Souers meant in his use of
the above-quoted phrase, it can be reasonably postulated that
he is referring to some -- perhaps as yet undefined -- personnel
security selection criteria for intelligence, that were distinct
from those applied to the security selection of individuals pro-
posed for access to other forms of classified defense informa-
tion. In the fifteen months following, prompted by a Congressional
investigation, the Federal Executive Branch considered the latter
subject in depth, and on 22 March 1947 the first of the Federal
"Loyalty Orders" was signed by President Truman, * thus
EO-9835: this order prescribed minimum security investi-
gative coverage and judgment criteria for employment in the
Federal civil service, and it also directed each Federal depart-
ment or agency to establish a Loyalty Board to adjudicate cases
wherein question has arisen concerning any employee's loyalty.
The order was directed at the subject of disloyalty, and acts
constituting disloyalty under its terms included: the attempted
or actual commission of, or preparation leading to sabotage or
espionage; knowingly associating with spies or saboteurs; the ad-
vocacy of treason, sedition, or overthrow of the US Government
through forceful or unconstitutional means; performing duties in
a manner favoring foreign interests over those of the US, or in-
tentionally disclosing US information in such manner as to con-
stitute disloyalty; and membership affiliation or sympathetic
association with organizations listed by the US Attorney General
as totalitarian, fascist, Communist, or subversive..
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laying the original postwar policy basis for the overall Federal
personnel security program. But even during World War II,
procedures had existed calling for the identification and classi-
fication of militarily sensitive information, which included pro-
cedures for establishing the reliability of individuals provided
access to such information.
It is possible that Souers was referring to personnel secu-
rity standards applied throughout World War II to individuals
having access to communications intelligence (COMINT) infor-
mation. * COMINT had represented an important Allied intel-
ligence source during World War II, and, because such sources
could be easily lost if the opposition became aware that their
communications were being read, special security rules were
devised to protect these sources. These included more selec-
tive choice of individuals provided access to COMINT. Indeed,
Souers' parent service -- the US Navy - - had. made a practice
during the war of refusing to provide the results of its intercept
Souers may have been attempting to arrange COMINT clear-
ances and access to COMINT, but the first DCI to effect such
access for Agency personnel was General Vandenberg. See
SIGINT in the Central Intelligence Agency,
DCI-4, Dec. 70.
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activities to the OSS. 8/ Events occurring within the first six
months following Souers' statement, however, indicated that all
security policies affecting COMINT were to be treated separately
from those-,affecting other intelligence source information. Aside
from the fact that COMINT procedures called for a rigidly en-
forced form of compartmentation -- with each individual's
COMINT need-to-know the subject of a formal review and deter-
mination -- in terms of the stated personnel security standards
for COMINT versus those applicable to CIG -- and later CIA --
employment, there appears to have been little substantive differ-
ence. This situation was not necessarily true outside the Agency,
where COMINT personnel security standards and those affecting
other specially compartmented intelligence sources were in ac-
cordance with nationally defined specifications; other intelligence
source information was handled as just one category of classified
defense information, and personnel security screening processes
were not nearly so selective. =F Undoubtedly, good rationale existed
OS-8, of this series, I, A, provides further description and
insight related to COMINT personnel security policy and procedure.
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favoring more selectivity in the choice of CIG employees, be-
cause it could be envisioned that nowhere else in the Federal
bureaucratic structure would such a compendium of sensitive
intelligence source information and activities exist, and it
could be presumed that opposition intelligence services would
single it out for special efforts to effect penetration through sub-
version of its personnel.
On 21 March 1946 the CIG Administrative Officer sub-
mitted a memorandum for Souers's signature addressed to
security liaison representatives to CIG from the Army, Air
Force, Navy, and State. 9/ This memorandum stated that
personnel assigned to CIG should at a minimum be subjected
to "four-way checks" (MID, ONI, FBI, and local police) and
that the detailing department should effect a certification that
investigation had been conducted and that the individual was secu-
rity cleared for handling SECRET and TOP SECRET documents.
The memorandum also stated that it was desirable that the indi-
vidual be a second-generation American, but that this require-
ment could be waived provided the character and loyalty of the
person had been proven in prior government work.
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1
This memorandum -- unsigned -- was referred to the
CIG Central Planning Staff by the DCI on 26 March, and the
CPS Security Branch was assigned the task of preparing
proposed CIG policy related to the security clearance of per-
sonnel. * 10/ Following informal consultation with repre-
sentatives of the LAB departments and the receipt of formal
guidance from the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover, 11/ the CPS Secu-
rity Branch proposed policy was submitted for the approval
of the IAB over the DCI's signature. *m
On 9 May 1946, with the unanimous concurrence of the
IAB, subject: Policy for Clearance of
Personnel/for Duties with the Central Intelligence Group, was
issued. This directive is quoted in part below:
see S-1, I, D, 5.
'~ Officials providing guidance in the preparation of t
001i r innl.,A - 4L _ r
The CPS Security Branch was the first CIG organizational
component involved in the promulgation of CIG security policy.
Following abolishment of CPS Security Branch in July 1946,
the security policy function was temporarily performed by the
OCD Security Branch --
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3. The accomplishment of the security
objective requires that personnel assigned to
the Central Intelligence Group be individuals:
a. of excellent character who are
native-born citizens of the United States
and, who have no member of the immedi-
ate family or next of kin thereof subject
to a foreign power;
b. whose loyalty, integrity, dis-
cretion and trustworthiness are unques-
tioned;
c, whose financial status and habits
are such to render unlikely their suc-
cumbing to any temptation arising from
these sources.
8. Investigation will be conducted to the
extent necessary to enable a proper determina-
tion of an individual's eligibility in accordance
with the provisions of paragraph 3. However,
except for those individuals covered by the pro-
visions of paragraph 9, the minimum investi-
gation of personnel as required under the pro-
visions of paragraph 6 will consist of:
a. Records check of the appropriate
office of each of the following:
(1) Department of State
(2) Federal Bureau of Investigation-
(to include fingerprint files)
(3) Military Intelligence Division,
War Department'
(4) Office of Naval Intelligence,
Navy Department
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(5) Police Department in each city
of employment and residence
(6) Credit agencies
c. Character investigation by inter-
view with personal references of the indi-
vidual and with a minimum of three other
persons who have knowledge of his acti-
vities over a period of time sufficient to
enable a determination as to his character
and integrity. 13/
Additional provisions of the directive required the detail-
ing department to investigate the individual, provide clear-
ance to handle TOP SECRET information, and certify to CIG
that the individual had been investigated pursuant to the di-
rective's provisions and was eligible for assignment thereto.
Reports of investigations were to be reviewed by the CIG Se-
curity Officer, * and final decision as to acceptability of any
individual for CIG assignment rested with the DCI. If a pre-
vious satisfactory background investigation existed, or if
other available, evidence indicated a minimum of ten years
honorable Government service and no subsequent information
The first CIG Security Officer, so designated was Lt.
Col. Claude D. Barton (May 1946-July 1947). From 6 Sep-
tember 1946 to 1 July 1947, Barton also functioned as the
Chief, Security Division, under the Executive for Personnel
and Administration (P&A).
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I 25X1A
of a questionable nature existed, these could substitute as the
basis for clearance of the individual for duties with CIG, al-
though it was additionally required in such cases that a minimum
check of the files of State, FBI, MID, and ONI be made prior to
issuance of the clearance. Under express conditions, and with
the approval of the DCI for due cause, personnel could be as-
signed to CIG prior to, but contingent upon subsequent completion
of the required security processing. Any exceptions to the pro-
visions of the directive required the unanimous concurrence of
the DCI and all member departments of the CIG.
On 6 September 1946 the War Department General Staff
Director of Intelligence advised the DCI that the volume of work
otherwise being performed by the War Department's investigative
services did not permit them to undertake the additional burden
of investigation of CIG assignees to the expanded specifications
prescribed under
14/ Consequently, on 4.October
25X1A 1946 the IAB rescinded and concurred in a DCI
proposal that the CIG undertake the responsibility for all future
security investigations required to clear its personnel, subject
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to the same standards as established by except
for exemptions authorized by the DCI. 15/
Following this decision, CIG requested the FBI to perform
the security investigations incidental to clearance of its em-
ployees, and in late September of that year the FBI agreed to
do so. 16/ Additionally, on 25 October 1946 the policy on
clearance of personnel for duties with CIG was restated in CIG
17/ In addition to no longer re-
quiring the detailing department to conduct the security screening
of CIG assignees, the order dropped the requirement that CIG
personnel be native-born US citizens, and now required only
that they be US citizens possessing no member of the immediate
family or next of kin subject to a foreign power. ~F
related only to the
screening of personnel for assignment or employment with
This change was made at the request of the Assistant
Director, Special Operations. 18/ Policy on clearance of
personnel for duties with CIG was again restated in CIG
1947; there were, however,
no substantive changes at that time. 19 / Administrative
1950 required that individual be
a citizen of the US at least five years.
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CIG; it contained no provision for the termination of security
risks already onboard. In all probability, if it had developed
that such an individual had slipped through the screening pro-
cess during the early months under CIG, DCI negotiation with
the individual's parent service or department would have
brought about a rapid reassignment of the individual. There
are no known cases where this occurred, however, and, until
the effective date of the CIA enabling legislation in September
1947, the DCI did not possess authority to summarily dismiss
employees for any reason in the interests of national security an authority which had existed in the persons of the Secretaries
of War and Navy since June 1940, and in the Secretary of
State since July 1946. Until September 1947, the DCI was limited
to the somewhat restrictive guidelines prescribed by existing
legislation, and later Executive Orders applicable to the over-
all Federal structure (in addition the several other manuevers
previously described) to rid himself of security risks already
onboard. A GIG Personnel Loyalty Board was established
pursuant to the provisions of E. O. 9835 on 16 April 1947;
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board. * 20/ The GIG Personnel Loyalty Board was auto-
matically abolished upon creation of the CIA. Only one case
was referred to this board and the case was rejected due to
insufficient evidence of disloyalty, without notification to the
employee.
2. Divided Responsibility Under CIG. As previously
stated, the personnel security screening responsibility under
CIG and early CIA was divided between two offices. Early
personnel security considerations related to non-OSO em-
ployees was at first the business of the GIG Administrative
Office, and, following 6 September 1946, the Security Divi-
sion under the Executive for Personnel and Administration.
This division, which by the close of 1946 consisted of ten em-
ployees under the" direction of Lieutenant Colonel Barton, also
concerned itself with physical security matters. Following the
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STATSPE
FBI's September 1946 agreement to perform security investigative
services for CIG, these FBI investigations served as the basis
thereafter for the security assessments of prospective CIG
assignees and employees which were performed by the Secu-
rity Division. There is also evidence that during the summer
and early fall of 1946, the Security Division used the investiga-
ployees proposed for continued employment under CIG.
brought on board prior to completion of full security processing --
although subject to subsequent completion thereof --,because of
the low level of sensitivity attached to their total access. It is
apparent that the DCI's lack of summary dismissal authority
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The purpose of these checks was to provide some assessment
of the individuals prior to contact, thereby hopefully establishing
their reliability and providing some, basis upon which to judge
the integrity of such intelligence sources. Even in the early
years under CIG, this case load was fairly significant, with 223
such requests for information made of other departments and
agencies during January 1947. 22/
To provide a complete range of support services to OSO on
a compartmented basis, the Project Support Division was created
under the CIG Executive for Personnel and Administration effec-
tive 4 December 1946. 23/ The division included a Special
Security Section headed by The PSD 25X1A
Special Security Section became in effect the heir apparent of
OSS Security Office. It rendered its services exclusively in
support of OSO, which was itself the heir apparent of SSU the SSU Security Office by this time had been'abolished and its
assets and functions integrated into GIG. In November 1946 a
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Throughout the SSU and CIG transitional period the vetting
and security approval of operational personnel continued to be
exercised by X2-type organizational components, with the SSU
Security Office and the PSD Special Security Unit supporting
the effort through the acquisition of personnel security information
available from domestic sources.
These procedures remained in effect even following the
1 July 1947 creation of the Inspection and Security Office
(I&SO) which brought about a merger of functions previously
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exercised by the OCD Security Branch (concerned with secu-
rity policy) and the Security Division of P and A (concerned
with the security of CIG overt personnel and facilities). * The
Special Security Unit of the PSD was transferred under the
immediate supervision and direction of the ADSO, where it
became the Special Security Division (SSD) of OSO, and it
maintained the almost exclusive responsibility for security
support to OSO personnel and facilities. An August 1947 deli-
neation of responsibilities between OSO and I&SO included
provision that OSO would be responsible for the personal
security of all covert and semi-covert personnel, and for all
I 25X1A
I
25X1A
and, when requested, for other offices of CIG. 26/
consolidated all of I&SO's security functions -- as contrasted
to his inspection function which equated to that of an IG --
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within the I&SO Security Division; which, like the Security
Division of P&A, initially possessed no security responsibil-
ities related to OSO personnel.
C. Early CIA Program (1947-54)*
1. The Initial Chaos (1947-50). With the establishment
of the CIA in September 1947, CIG's I&SO became the Inspection
and Security Office of CIA, with its precise functions and modus
operandi still undergoing a process of definition.
Almost immediately, the Agency's personnel security
screening processes were thrown into a state of chaos when,
on 30 September 1947, J. Edgar Hoover formally advised
the DCI that,
in view of Executive Directives and action taken by
the Congress of the United States, additional re-
sponsibilities have been placed on the Federal Bureau
of Investigation which make it impossible for this
Bureau to continue the present arrangement which
In the interest of clarity, the balance of this chapter and the
following chapter, are devoted exclusively to the subject of per-
sonnel security screening. The subjects of "Security Records"
and "The Ongoing Personal Security Program" are discussed
separately in Chapters II and III. Chapter IV discusses events
affecting the overall program between 1963 and the close of 1968.
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I
exists between the Central Intelligence Agency and
the FBI for the conduct of applicant investigations.
27/
Events which followed, including the August 1948 consolida-
tion of the OSO Special Security Division under I&SO, the
establishment of CIA applicant investigative service -- the
Employee Investigation Branch (EIB) -- under the Executive
for I&S, the December 1948 FBI agreement to again under-
take applicant security investigative service for the Agency,
and the subsequent abolition of EIB, have all been fully de-
scribed in a prior, volume in this series. * For the purposes
of this volume it is important to stress that these events
seriously prejudiced the Agency's personnel security program
during a period when the CIA was undergoing considerable
expansion of its personnel body; and, additionally, the merger
of the two CIA security offices -- occasioned by these events --
remained in effect, even following FBI resumption of applicant
investigative services. Following the second termination of
FBI investigative services in December 1950 -- also described
OS-1, An Overview, II, D.
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Throughout this chaotic period, however, a number of
refinements were made to the program. For example: acti-
vities of the Agency's Office of Operations, related to the ex-
interest for the acquisition of intelligence, resulted in consulta-
tion during the winter of 1947-48 to arrive at procedures to
effect an appropriate security screening of the individuals to be
used as "contact" sources. In January 1948 it was agreed that
under consideration, which would be furnished to I&SO. 28/
I&SO, following National Agency and other appropriate checks,
would then perform a security assessment and would grant
either an approval, a limited approval, or a disapproval for
OS- i, An Overview, II, E.
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I
contact based upon its assessment. In the case of a limited
approval, I&SO would advise OO/Contact Branch of the
qualifying information, and specify the limitations that should
apply to any use of the contact. No approach would be made to
disapproved contacts; although, where special intelligence col-
lection considerations existed, 00 could request I&SO to re-
consider the case and grant a limited approval.
On 5 November 1948, the ADSO and Executive for I&S
agreed that the latter would determine security approval or
disapproval of all OSO staff employees -- vouchered and un-
vouchered -- subject to the right of the ADSO to request con-
sultation, appeal, or waiver of the restrictions concerning
foreign family connections. 29/ At last, at least as it per-
tained to the security screening and selection of Agency staff
employees,, CIA's security officer was to assume the full measure
of his rightful responsibility.
It is apparent, however, that still another personnel secu-
rity matter concerned Edwards, and this was to find some
means whereby there would be a more consistent approach
to the personnel security screening of agents and the other
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security clearance processing of contractors' personnel
was handled exclusively by the Security Division. By the
close of 1954, however, the CIA had become involved in the
large-scale secret development of the U-2 aircraft. Con-
tractors' personnel associated with the U-2 Project were
security processed and cleared by SSD, and the security
nomenclature, Covert Security Approval (CSA), was applied
to these cases. This situation prevailed throughout later CIA
compartmented research and development programs, with
the result that the Security Division was responsible for clear-
ing contractors' personnel involved in contract activities
under the supervision of the Director of Logistics, and SSD
for those involved in contract activities delegated by the DCI
direct to other CIA contracting authorities.
Following the second termination of the FBI security in-
vestigative support to the CIA in December 1950, rather than
reactivate the EIB, Edwards chose to expand the SSD field office
structure to accommodate the needs of both overt and covert
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had been established
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under the Security Division to conduct the CIA polygraph pro-
gram. By 1952, the CIA polygraph program under I&SO was
providing support to the secu-
rity screening processes related to both overt and covert
cases. Thus it evolved that, although the clearance deter-
minations of SD were exclusively related to overt cases and
those of SSD to covert cases, SD and SSD provided support to
both overt and covert security case processing. By the close
of 1952 the Agency's overall modus operandi related to personnel
security screening had begun to arrive at a relative degree of
stability.
2. Later Adjustments (1951-54). In June 1953 the overall
responsibility for deciding.upon individuals to be employed in CIA
-- subject to security and medical clearances, and with psycho-
logical testing provided by OTR -- was vested in the Office of
Personnel (OP). 35/ To assist in determining the overall
suitability of individuals for Agency staff employment, an MPS
(Medical, Personnel, and Security) Panel was established in
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July 1953.'? 36/ This panel, comprised of representatives
from the Medical, Personnel, and Security Offices, assessed
cases where questionable information existed, but not of such
nature as to warrant denial of either a security or medical
clearance. Individual cases were referred to the panel at
the discretion of any one of the three participating offices.
This also made possible the discreet exchange of views and
information obtained from medical and security sources,
thereby resulting in a better overall assessment of an indi-
vidual in terms of his suitability for engaging in activities
such as those in which the CIA was involved.
The matter of procedures related to the personnel secu-
rity screening of clandestine personnel continued to be the
subject of controversy. During the spring and early summer
of 1952, J. Patrick Coyne, Assistant to the NSC for Internal
Security Affairs, conducted a survey of I&SO at the request
Today's (1972) successor to this panel is called the
Applicant Review Panel (ARP).
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of the DCI. In his report dated 25 July 1952, Coyne advised
that there was considerable room for improvement in the
processing of covert personnel cases. His survey had indi-
cated the following areas of deficiency:
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necessity of furnishing required informa-
tion to I&S in order to facilitate the conduct
of adequate investigations and name checks
on all covert personnel cases.
. . . that I&S be notified by all segments
of the Agency whenever a decision is made
with respect to the use or nonuse of any in-
dividual considered for covert duties on
behalf of CIA. 37/
Coyne's survey and recommendations were based entirely
on his observations of I&SO -- he interviewed no DDP per-
sonnel. Consequently, it is possible that opposing arguments
were not duly considered.
During the summer of 1954, however, also at the request
of the DCI, a special study group headed by Lt. General James
H. Doolittle conducted a survey of the Agency's DDP complex.
Concerning security, the Doolittle group made several recom-
mendations, including that there be:
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'It is notable that J. Patrick Coyne was a member of the
Doolittle special study group.
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delegated representative for security matters; security is
indivisible; the Agency can not alibi insecure operations by
pointing to secure staff functions; there is no solid line of
demarcation between covert and staff employees -- together
they form the sum total of the Agency's staff and field work;
the Director of Security should play an influential role in the
security approval of all categories of Agency personnel the prospective employer of the individual, very apt to be
influenced by operational pressures, should not be the author-
ity who security-evaluates him; to perform its security func-
tion OS requires all pertinent information including proposed
usage, background, and investigative information et al. -- two
half-investigations do not make a whole; and, the Director of
Security's role so stated would not constitute a "meddling"
into the affairs of the DDP, but rather a viable method of
discharging the DCI's responsibility for the protection of intel-
ligence sources and methods.
The DDP had a different point of view: the conduct of
clandestine intelligence activities requires the taking of cal-
culated risks these can be compensated for through the
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1
use of operational controls; the operational components are
in the best position to evaluate the risk against the proposed
usage, and implement appropriate controls where needed;
excepting certain types of personnel who should be security
processed in a manner similar to staff employees, OS should
play only a supporting role in the security processing of
covert personnel; and, to this end, and recognizing the sen-
sitivity of the Agency's clandestine activities, there was
much that OS did not need to know in order to perform its
support function.
Edwards formally presented his arguments to the DDCI;
40/ Frank Wisner, the DDP, presented his to the DCI. 41/
Both Edwards and Wisner were adamant with respect to their'
viewpoints; but finally, on 23 December 1954 Edwards and
Wisner advised the DCI that they had reached a workable
agreement. Their brief, jointly signed memorandum to the
Director, however, did not disclose details of this agree-
ment. 42/ These details were revealed in the January 1955
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f
I I 25X1A
rector of Security's responsibilities related to the granting
of operational and covert security approvals to the Chief, CI
Staff, and the Chief, SSD, respectively, and stated the basic
intent that sensitive operational data remain within the cus-
tody and knowledge of DDP, and sensitive security investi-
gative data remain in the custody and knowledge of the Se-
curity Office, while still allowing for the necessary discreet
exchange of information as necessary to the work of either
component. All background, investigative, and security in-
formation -- either available or readily obtainable -- would
be provided the Security Office via CI Staff; all record checks
and/or inquiries in the United States, except for the checks of
certain CIA records, were reserved to the Security Office.
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Chief, CI Staff would be responsible for the granting of
Operational Approvals. * OS would perform all domestic in-
quiries related to such cases and forward the results to CI
Staff --,except in those instances where sensitive personnel
security information was of such nature as to warrant its
retention in OS -- and would also include a recommenda-
tion concerning the case. CI Staff would provide a brief prac-
tical statement of the scope and nature of the proposed usage
to serve as a basis for OS's assessment of the individual.
In those cases where OS recommended against use of the in-
dividual, and the DDP nevertheless decided in favor of taking
a calculated risk, OS would be so advised. In case of either
approval or disapproval, OS would be advised of the DDP de-
cision, and where an OS recommendation was being over-
ruled, CI Staff would wait five days before granting the OA
to permit consultation, and, if necessary, rejoinder by OS.
OS was responsible for the issuance of Covert Security
Approvals (CSA.). In the event of disapproval, however,
Terminology change from Operational Clearance to
Operational Approval (OA).
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provision was made for consultation between OS and CI Staff
so that an attempt could be made to reach agreement in the
event the DDP still desired to use the individual on a calcu-
lated risk basis. In CSA cases, OS would retain all investi-
gative information except where necessary to explain the
basis of its disapprovals and give the CI Staff an opportunity
to request reconsideration. No further clarification was pro-
vided concerning the types of individuals appropriate for OA
versus CSA, therefore it. was presumed that prior definitions
which were based upon CIA confidential funds regulations con-
tinued in effect. Provisional or preliminary OA's and GSA's
prior to completion of full security processing were allowed,
subject to,temporary restrictions on the full use of the indi-
vidual.
It is quite apparent that Edwards did not get all that he
sought in the area of covert personnel security screening.
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1
It is equally apparent, however, that his "heel biting, " aided
by the recommendations of external survey groups, succeeded
in putting the matter on a much more professional and effective
basis.
Authorities and procedures related to the termination of
CIA employees as security risks also became more clearly
defined by 1954. The Agency's enabling legislation had con-
tained the following provision related to the dismissal of
employees whose continued employment might constitute an
unacceptable security risk:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Section
652 /now 7501/ of Title 5, or the provisions of
any other law, the Director of Central Intelli-
gence may, in his discretion, terminate the
employment of any officer or employee of the
Agency whenever he shall deem such termina-
tion necessary or advisable in the interests of
the United States, but such termination shall not
affect the right of such officer or employee
to seek or accept employment in any other de-
partment or agency of the Government if de-
clared eligible for such employment by the
United States Civil Service Commission.
Subparagraph (C), Section 102, National Security Act
of 1947.
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Consequently, effective upon the date of the Agency's estab-
lishment, the DCI designated an Employee Review Board,
chaired by the Executive Director, to advise him on a just
and equitable exercise of this new authority in individual
cases brought to his attention. 45/
Because CIA now possessed a more expedient, legal al-
ternative procedure for the dismissal of employees on secu-
rity ground, an Agency loyalty-board -- as required by provi-
sions of EO-9835 -- was not immediately established under
CIA. Following considerable prompting on the part of the
Civil Service Commission, a CIA Loyalty Board was finally
established on 23 August 1948 -- almost one full year follow-
ing the establishment of the Agency. 46/
What resulted, however, was a duplicative process,
whereby some cases were submitted first to the CIA
Loyalty Board for adjudication under EO-9835's provisions,
following which -- if the decision of the board favored
retention, and in the opinion of. Chief I&S the case required
additional consideration-- the case would be submitted to
ERB. A number of individuals approved by the Loyalty Board
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for retention were subsequently recommended for dismissal
by ERB, because the latter board possessed broader discre-
tionary powers. * Nevertheless, because CIA as a Federal
agency was also bound by the provisions of EO-9835, the pro-
cedure was continued.
After EO-9835 was superseded by the issuance of EO-10450
on 27 April 1953, the loyalty boards were abolished, and
each department and agency head was made responsible for
insuring that all employees met the strict loyalty require-
ments prescribed in the order. In the event that the decision
was contested by the dismissed employee, EO-10450 pro-
vided that a hearing of the case would be conducted by a Secu-
rity Hearing Board composed of impartial officials selected
by CSC from departments and agencies other than the one
See Table 1, Security Dismissal Processing 1946-54, p. 78.
Since many individuals voluntarily. resigned from CIA upon being
confronted with the results of polygraph examinations, Table 2
is also included to demonstrate this statistical factor. Most of
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Security Dismissal Processing (a)
1946-54
Cases
Processed
Dismissals
EO 9835 (CIG)
1
0
EO 9835 (CIA)
62 (b)
0
EO 10450
1 (c)
ERB
39 (plus 2 pending)
16
16
Total
103 (d)
a. For source of statistics, see source reference 47/.
b. Provisions of EO 9835 required that an investigation be
conducted by the FBI in all cases involving a question of
loyalty, including membership in any organization cited by
the Attorney General as subversive. Consequently, many
cases were processed under EO 9835 due to technical con-
siderations despite the fact that available information had
already absolved the individual of disloyal intent.
c. Only one case was heard by a CSC-constituted Security
Hearing Board under the provisions of EO 10450.
d. Actually only 100 individuals were involved, since some
cases were processed under more than one procedure.
I
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a. For source of statistics, see source reference. 48/
b. EOD -- employees entering on duty.
OB -- employees already on board.
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.by which the individual was employed. On 6 May 1954 the
DCI sent a letter to the US Attorney General, in which he
referred to earlier guidance provided by the latter related to
EO-10450. 49/ The DCI stated that the provisions of EO-10450
did not fully meet the needs of CIA, and that the authority granted
him under the National Security Act of 1947 met both the needs
of the Agency and the national security intents of EO-10450
without limiting the DCI's authority for termination by refer-
encing the case to any board selected by the CSC. Consequently,
from that time forward,, the Agency followed a singular pro-
cedure related to the dismissal of employees for reasons of
security, and this procedure was based upon the DCI's sum-
mary dismissal powers.
3. Later Organization and Overall Statistics. Through-
out the 1950-54 period, the Security Office organizational ele-
ments concerned with.'personnel security screening continued
under the divided 'supervision of the Security and Special Secu
' 25X1A
rity Divisions. Under the Security Division, the Personnel
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Number of Security Office Screening Actions (a)
a. All totals represent only those cases carried through to
fruition; cases canceled while in process are not included. For
source of these statistics, see Source Reference 50/.
b. Covering only the six months of I&SO's existence during 1947.
c. Prior to 1948, OO/Contacts Branch performed little prelim-
inary screening of potential contacts prior to initiating the secu-
rity checks. Following consultation between the Agency's Deputy
Security Officer and officials of the Contacts Branch, the volume
of these cases was reduced sharply.
d. This 1954 figure was arrived at by making appropriate de-
ductions from an overall case processing figure. Its accuracy,
however, must be considered tenuous; the author was unable to
locate any more reliable source.
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D. The Later Period Under Edwards (1955-63)
1. Organization. Trends, and Statistics. The principal
effect of the OS reorganization of 5 December 1954 was a
general upgrading of the overall office organizational struc-
ture. * What had previously been three Divisions and four
staffs, became two office Directorates and five staffs. **
The Security and the Special Security Divisions became the
Physical and Personnel Support and the Investigations and
Operational Support Directorates, respectively.-- both headed
by functional Deputy Directors of Security (DD/PPS and DD/IOS).
Responsibilities for, and overall methods of, operations affecting
the personnel security functions were essentially unchanged.
Supporting the personnel security screening processes -- 25X1A
overt and covert cases -- was the
Branch of the Personnel Security Division under the DD/PPS
See OS-1, III, A, for further details concerning this
reorganization.
** A small Inspection Division was redesignated the Inspection
Staff.
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(conducting polygraph interviews), and the OS
25X1A
Case processing controls, and assessments and judgments
were performed by the PSD Clearance Branch (under DD/PPS)
for overt and semi-covert personnel, and the Security Sup-
1
port Division's Investigations Branch assisted by the Cor-
respondent and Records Branch (both under DD/IOS) for all
covert personnel.
The year 1955 saw CIA embark upon a program involving
temporary employment of children of Agency employees to
alleviate critical clerical shortages occasioned by summer
vacation scheduling. Dependent children of high school and
college ages were employed during the summer months to
work in areas and activities where their access could be
limited to the SECRET security classification level. Having
available complete security records related to the employed
parent, and by requiring the employed parent to sign a
statement acknowledging responsibility for the dependent, it
See Figure 1, Office of Security Organizational Chart,
6 December 1954.
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was possible to establish the proposed summer employee's
reliability with a lesser scope of investigation than that
required for full staff employment. 51/ These dependents
were investigated by OS during the spring to enable selections
to be made prior to the end of the school year. This program
is still in effect today (1972) and the Agency's summer employee
program continues to be limited in participation to only
children of employed CIA parents.
The prevailing trend during the 1954-63 period was one
which saw personnel security screening procedures stabilized,
but a considerable expansion of personnel security screening
support provided by OS to large-scale Agency clandestine and/or
covert activities. It was in 1955 that the Agency's clandestine
development of the U-2 Project got seriously underway.
This necessitated the security investigation and clearance
of large numbers of US industrial contractors' employees.
Although the major developmental aspects of this project
were over by 1958, other similar special projects were
undertaken by the Agency's Development Projects Staff (DPS,
later the Development Projects Division of DDP--DPD/DDP)
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Overall covert case processing conducted by the DD/IOS
ebbed in 1958 and rose sharply during the 1961-62 period.
Table 6 provides a statistical compilation of covert clearance
case processing for the years 1956 through 1963 inclusive.*
There were several minor organizational adjustments
during the 1954-63 era which were principally designed to
provide more effective support to Agency operations, based
upon shifting areas of emphasis in overall CIA activities.
A reorganization of the Special Security Division in October
1956 resulted in the establishment of six desks under the
25X1A
Also see Table 7, p. 94, which provides yearly totals
of cases processed (overt, semi-covert, and covert) requiring
full background investigation as opposed to only selected
national agency checks.
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62/ The justification for the
September 1962 change was to accommodate increased Agency
activity related to proprietary organizations and special intel-
ligence projects involving large-scale industrial research and
development programs.
Although more fully discussed in another volume in this
series, * another change in OS personnel security organiza- 25X1A
tion was the 1 May 1957 raising of th
Branch of the Personnel Security Division to full Division
I
status under the DD/PPS. The 13 October 1958 consolidation
of the theretofore separate DD/PPS and DD/IOS record-
keeping functions under a newly created Security Records
Division (SRD) is described in the following chapter of this
volume. Following the 1957 separation of the
Branch, the Personnel Security Division under the DD/PPS
consisted of two branches: the Clearance Branch (CB) and
M See OS-9, Polygraph Program, III, A.
See II, B, below.
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25X1A information can be discussed with representatives of other US
25X1A
Although the work of PSD's Employee Activity Branch
related principally to the "ongoing" personnel security
program, which is discussed in a subsequent chapter***;
one aspect of EAB's work related to personnel security
screening. This was in the area of liaison clearances -- a
security approval action required before Agency classified
Federal departments and agencies. Currently applicable
(1972) M which in substance is similar to earlier Agency
EAB is discussed fully in III, C, below.
MPS (Medical-Personnel-Security) Panel; see I, C, 2,
pp 62-63, above.
*** See III, below.
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regulatory issuances covering this subject, holds the
Director of Security responsible for granting security
approvals for liaison contacts. As a matter of jurisdictional
expediency, the procedure principally depends upon OS
accepting the integrity of actions of other departments and
agencies in security clearing their personnel to the SECRET
and TOP SECRET levels in accordance with the prevailing
Federal orders and regulations. The individual's existing
level of security clearance is verified, usually through the
simple expedient of a telephone call. OS, however, also
checks its own files and indices, and, when unfavorable
information is developed, OS may disapprov^ Lhe liaison
contact, prescribe limitations to the extent and nature of
the contact, or attempt to reconcile the matter with the
individual's parent department -- whichever is more appropriate
to.the particular circumstances.
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.1 25X1 A
25X1A
were of substantially the same nature', however, it was
2. Refinements and Additions to the Program. The
years 1954 through 1963 saw refinements and additions to the
personnel security screening processes, and consideration
given to still others.
a. Spouse Investigations
Recognizing the close personal relationship involved in
the marital association, OS has always considered information
concerning the non-Agency-employed spouse in assessing the
security reliability of Agency applicants, and procedures
were early implemented calling for certain limited checks
and investigation of the spouse, in addition to those conducted
on the applicant. On 29 December 1955 the DDCI, due to his
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following local investigation by available US investigative
facilities (these were stipulated in the case of each bureau)
subject to such other domestic US investigation as might be
appropriate to the individual case, and full clearance by
OS. 66/
c. Terminations
Although all CIA employees suggested for termination
as potential security risks following 1954 were processed
pursuant to the DCI's legislatively enacted summary dismissal
authority, the DCI could, nevertheless, exercise the procedures
available to him under EO 10450 -- it was only necessary to
decide upon which procedural route to follow and, once having
made this decision, he was apparently bound thereafter to it.
67/ The last case processed to a CSC-constituted Security
Hearing Board under the provisions of EO-10450 was in 1954,
and, oddly the case did not result from an appeal; resort to
EO-10450 by the Director on this occasion was influenced by
public and congressional relations considerations. This
case involved an Agency official whose association with a
questionable organization had been the subject of some
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25X1A
notoriety during a period when the Senate Committee on Internal
Security was conducting inquiry into possible Communist pene-
tration of the Federal government. Although CIA and the DCI
were convinced of the individual's loyalty, the DCI felt that
it was in the best interests of the Agency for the matter to
receive a full hearing by a CSC impartially-constituted
Security Hearing Board. Upon ascertaining from CSC that
such procedure would be appropriate in the case of an em-
ployee not dismissed, and therefore not appealing a dismissal
action, the DCI so processed the case under EO 10450 --
with the individual's personal acquiescence -- and the SHB
ruled favorably as to the individual's loyalty. 68/
brought to a close a five-year
period wherein the status of the Agency's Employment Review
Board had apparently vacillated between that of a standing
board and that of one to be constituted on specific occasions
at the discretion of the DCI. 69/ On the matter of involuntary
separations, it cited the DCI's legislatively enacted summary
dismissal authority, and it charged the Director of Personnel,
acting on information provided by the Deputy Directors, operating
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officials, heads of career services, the Director of Security,
and Chief, Medical Staff, to recommend appropriate action
to the DCI in cases suggesting exercise of the Director's
summary dismissal authority. The regulation added that the
DCI "may appoint an Employment Review Board to advise
25X1A
him on any particular case. "
Since the the DCI has not
chosen to convene an ERB. Since 1964, Agency regulations
covering the subject have made no mention of the Employment
Review Board mechanism.
Two subsequent court cases wherein the DCI summary
dismissal powers also upheld actions taken by CIA to terminate
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1
1
the plaintiffs. * In one of these cases
the court noted "that the statute vests in the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency a broad discretion to terminate
employees in the interest of the United States, but it is to
be distinguished from a so-called 'security' discharge as
was involved in Service v. Dulles /a State Department case/
and related cases. " 75/ Consequently, current Agency
regulations related to the matter of involuntary 'separations
do not distinguish between those based upon security versus
other considerations, although the basis for all such actions
is the Director's legislated authority.
d. Military Assignees
Since the inception of CIA the Agency has used its own
facilities to conduct security investigations of military service
personnel detailed to CIA -- a proposition which on its face
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suggests the possibility of jurisdictional problems. In
November 1960 the Navy took issue with the Agency's
practice of investigating US Navy detailees. 76/ The
Agency refused to back off; however, it was agreed that OS
would provide summaries of its investigations of Navy service
personnel to the Director of Naval Intelligence. 77/
e. GSA and Others
OS procedures also provided for its investigation and
approval of GSA employees assigned to work in Agency facil-
ities. It had commenced investigation of charforce personnel
in January 1954, 78/ and the investigation of GSA guards had
been a practice dating back prior to 1950. With the Agency's
move to its new headquarters building in Langley, Virginia
in 1961 -- because of the compendium of sensitive information
and activity now under one roof -- procedures were implemented
requiring the polygraphing of all GSA personnel working at
the Langley facility. 79/ Use of the polygraph was also
extended to cases involving C&P Telephone Company service-
men and certain concessionaires. 80/ Contractors' employees
engaged in construction of the new building too were subjected
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to limited security investigation, but the polygraph was not
used in these cases.
f. Evaluation Standards -- An IG Recommendation
In its 1960 report of inspection of OS, the IG recommended
that the DDS designate the Director of Security, Chief, Medical
Staff, and the Director of Personnel, jointly and in collaboration
with.other appropriate elements of the Agency, to develop a
research program to provide a better basis for estimating
preemployment security risks. 81/ The IG noted that the
guidelines used by OS appraisers might be open to question
in that their recommendation in "gray area" cases was based
upon long experience in personnel security assessment work,
and no extensive research program had ever been conducted
to establish criteria to assist in the identification of potential
security risks. Although the precise format for such a re-
search program was not stated by the IG, it noted that the
Medical Staff was already engaged in research pertaining to
selection of personnel which bore in part on the security
problem. _
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On 20 September 1961, after consulting with other offices,
Edwards advised the DCI that there was and had been no such
research program elsewhere in the Government, and conse-
quently the Agency would have to base such a program entirely
on its own resources. It was estimated that a two- to four-
year effort would be required to analyze all available data,
and there was no assurance that such a research program,
if undertaken, would produce any tangible benefits. Edwards
recommended, therefore, that he (Edwards) undertake to:
a. Insure that the Medical Staff research program
would be supported by other offices and that the Security
Office would contribute to, draw upon, and learn from
that program.
b. Improve further the coordination among the
Offices of Security, Personnel, and Training and the
Medical Staff, and to utilize even more the existing
mechanisms for feed-backs on problem cases and the
lessons that can be learned from them.
c. Instruct the Director of Security to intensify
the less formal research programs and projects and
studies underway in the Office of Security. 82/
The DDCI, General Cabell, acting for the Director, approved
Edwards's recommendations. While it would be desirable to
have more definitive, proven criteria upon which to judge the.
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personnel security risk, the practicalities of the situation --
including the unpredictable nature of the human will -- suggest
that such criteria will in all probability never be forthcoming.
g. New Problems in Covert Case Processing
The problem of covert case processing during the 1955-63
era changed from one involving a DDP-OS, division of responsi-
bility to one involving definitions. Throughout the winter of
1956-57, an Agency committee, constituted at the direction
of the DDCI, studied the matter of CIA contractual relation-
ships with individuals for the purpose of developing suitable
25X1A regulations governing the subject. As a result of the committee's
~~~~~~~~which rescinded
study
applicable provisions of Confidential Funds Regulations (CFR)
governing personal service contracts, replacing an existing
ten contract categories with two legal categories -- Contract
Employee and Contract Agent -- and one functional category --
Career Agent. The regulation also changed the concept of the
Career Agent as an individual having durable, built-in cover,
to an individual representing a long-term Agency asset with
the nature and depth of cover only of secondary importance.
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At the insistence of OS, the Contract Employee category was
further divided into Contract A and Contract B, with the former
required to meet staff employment security standards, and the
latter not so required, but whose access was to be correspond-
ingly limited. On 12 December 1961 Edwards advised the
Director of Personnel that recent actions by OP and the Clan-
destine Service repeatedly transferring personnel back and
forth from contract agent to career agent, and from staff
agent to staff employee status, to meet the requirements of
some particular Agency personnel programming or slotting
action had resulted in a deterioration of the accepted definitions
for agents (implying a clandestine association) and employees.
Consequently access to Agency facilities was being provided
to many personnel, where the extent of such access had not
been considered (or had been misunderstood) at the time of
the security assessment of the individual -- in one case an
Agency badge had been requested for a "career agent." 83/
Edwards recommended that immediate steps be taken to
expand and clarify the various categories of personnel. OP,
however, was not amenable to such action, and Edwards took
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certain internal action in an attempt to alleviate the problem.
This action consisted essentially of transferring responsibility
for Contract B and Staff Agent case processing from DD/IOS/ID
to DD/PPS/PSD. The problem was not fully solved by this
action, however, and subsequent developments concerning
this matter are described in the Chapter IV of this volume.
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H. Security Records
A. The Era of Divided Records
One area of continuity -- beginning with COI and OSS, and
continuing through SSU and CIG to CIA -- was the accumulation
of a body of security records related to individuals and organi-
zations which served the purposes of the personnel security
processes. Part of these record holdings resulted from OSS's
WWII national foreign counterintelligence responsibility -- an
activity centered in the X-2 Branch -- and they consisted of
files and indices related to persons and organizations whose
activities abroad were suspected of being inimical to US national
interests. With CIA given a similar responsibility following
WWII, the process was continued, and today (1972) this activity
is principally centered in the Agency's CI Staff which organi-
zationally is a part of the DDP. Naturally, the resulting records
represent a valuable source of information which can also be used
in the security screening of CIA's own employees, agents, and
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other categories of personnel, and OS had made frequent and
continual use of them. It is not these record holdings, how-
ever, that are the subject'of this chapter.
The record holdings discussed in this chapter are those
which are maintained by OS. These too consist of files and
indices. The files provide a continuing record of the. security
actions related to each individual employed or otherwise used
by the Agency. The files and indices combined also serve the
purposes of personnel security analysis and research, as
significant security information is carefully referenced and
cross-referenced in order that the records might serve as a
,continuing source of intelligence related to the security reliability
of individuals. OS's security record holdings today (1972) consist
of over 700, 000 individual files, and over 1, 955, 246 index refer-
ences* -- the latter available for search with the aid of a computer.
OS index cards would be many times this number, if the
office was not constantly engaged in a refinement process.
Close to 1, 000 index cards are screened from the indices
each month.
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OS's records also began with OSS -- with the Service Re-
cords Division of OSS's Security Office. Like those of OS's
Security Records and Communications Division (SR&CD), they
developed from the various security processing procedures
related to personnel used by OSS. * The Service Records Division
also performed functions related to the control of security investi-
gative case processing, and additionally, it was the OSS Security
Office mailroom. 84/ Thus the combined services of OSS's
Security Records Division bear a marked similarity to those of
OS's present-day SR&CD.
Following the abolition of OSS in September 1945, and pur-
suant to an order of the Secretary of War, the security records
of the Service Records Division were transferred to the SSU, and
SSU's Security Branch became the repository. The SSU continued
to add to the records through its own personnel security operations.
'F By January 1944 over 6, 000 personnel security investi-
gations had been conducted of OSS personnel.
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I
On 4 December 1946, with SSU records in the process of
being integrated into those of CIG, the Assistant Director,
Special Operations (ADSO) published an order stating that the
Special Security Unit -- newly created under the Special Projects
Division of Personnel and Administration to provide security
support to OSO compartmented from those provided the balance
of CIG -- was responsible for maintaining the security files of all
OSO personnel (active and inactive) in addition to those related to
personnel of predecessor organizations* 85/ In the meantime,
the CIG Security Division, also answering to CIG's Executive for
Personnel and Administration -- although through a separate
chain of command -- had been in the process of compiling a
separate set of security records related to all other CIG employees,
excluding those.employed or otherwise used by OSO.
Following the establishment of the Inspection and Security
Office (I&SO) in July 1947, the Security Division was transferred
to I&SO, and the Special Security Unit -- renamed the Special
OSO (Office of Special Operations) had been established as a CIG
organizational element in July 1946 to assume responsibility for the
nations's clandestine espionage activities abroad, previously per-
formed by SSU.
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Security Division (SSD) -- was transferred directly under the
ADSO; the prior position of the Executive for Personnel and
Administration was abolished. 86/ The security records of
OSO personnel, and those of the balance of CIG's personnel,
therefore, continued to be maintained under separate custodians.
I&SO's activities required frequent access to SSD's files,
and the Executive for I&S -- concerned that the double record
keeping system might result in serious errors -- conferred with
ADSO to develop some more satisfactory arrangement. The best
accommodation that he was able to obtain at that time, however,
was reflected in a 19 July 1947 OSO directive, which continued to
maintain responsibility for custody of OSO security files in SSD,
but which provided that access could be provided T&SO, limited
specifically to the person of the Executive for I&S. 87/ A further
accommodation resulted from an OSO directive published on 16
July 1947. This change allowed for the retention by I&SO of the
security files of OSO staff employees -- as contrasted to agents
and other categories of.clandestine personnel -- but ADSO still
insisted that these files be made available for review by I&SO
personnel on a very restrictive basis. 88/
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This situation of dual responsibility for security record
keeping continued until the August 1948 amalgamation of SSD
under the Agency's Executive for I&S. 89/ This amalgamation --
brought about because of the January 1948 termination of FBI
personnel security investigative services to CIA -- resulted in
an organizational consolidation of the two CIA security offices;
however, due to the insistence of ADSO, the security records
continued to be maintained separately -- although the custodian
for both sets of records was now I&SO.
From 1949 through 1954, I&SO evolved into two principal
organizational elements: The Se curity Division (SD) and the
Special Security Division (SSD). Each maintained its own separate
security files and indexes; with SD responsible for the security
processing of Agency employees, guard and housekeeping person-
nel, overt consultants and contractors personnel, and domestic
intelligence contacts, and SSD responsible for security processing
of agents and other categories of personnel supporting CIA's
clandestine intelligence operations. The premise that the associ-
ation of the latter group with CIA was more sensitive than those
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processed by SD continued to provide the justification for the
maintainance of two separate sets of security records within
the Agency's Security Office.
OS Executive
During the winter of 1953/54,
Officer, held a series of meetings with representatives of
25X1A
interested OS divisions concerning the office's security records 25X1A
system. It is not clear whether- acted on his own initiative
or at the request of the Director of Security; nevertheless, it is
apparent that he despaired of the lack of progress made, and on
5 February 1954 submitted his personal survey, with recommenda- 25X1A
tions, to the Director of Security. 90/ report presents
an excellent overview of OS security records processes as they
existed at that time; therefore, it is quoted at length below. In
reviewing the material which follows, it is important for the
reader to understand that, in addition to maintaining the files and
indexes, the SD and SSD Records Sections performed certain
other services for the PSD Clearance Branch in the case of overt
cases, and the SSD area division clearance desks in the case of
covert cases. These services included limited initial security
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analyses of existing record information, preparation of biographical
data forms with which to conduct checks of the files of other US
departmental security organizations, controlling case processing,
and as mail room for the receipt of requests and return of clearances
.from OP -- in the. case of overt cases -- and from the clandestine
I 25X1A ,
operating components -- in the case of covert cases. Additionally,
serviced the investigative requirements of both SD and SSD.
DESCRIPTION OF INDICES:
1. The present file records of the Security Office
are set up and maintained under separate divisions,
namely the Security Division for overt files, and the
Special Security Division for covert files. This arrange-
ment was decided upon at the time the Security Office
came into possession of certain covert files, and it was
done as assurance to the operational offices of CIA that
covert files would be maintained in the most secure man-
ner. All files are recorded and filed by case numbers;
this necessitates the maintenance and use of alphabetical
indices to identify a name with a file. Separate indices
have been established for the overt and covert files,
respectively.
2. Under this separate system of files and indices,
two completely separate organizational and pi-ocedural
setups have materalized.
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-concluded his report by recommending that the case
control, research, and mail teletype functions remain as then
constituted under SD and SSD, but that a Records Branch -- com-
posed of an overall master index and separate covert and overt
file sections -- be established under OS's Administration and
Training Staff (A&TS) to service the requirements of both
25X1A Divisions. Apparently, however, no-one paid much attention to
recommendations, because no part of his recommendations
were implemented at that time. The reason is probably best demon-
strated by a problem which- himself stated in his report: 25X1A
At this point the issue is raised on the question
of where in the organizational structure should be
placed those functions of common concern to the
Security Office. Each interested division (SD and
SSD), most naturally, is reluctant to lose control of
those functions which, though considered by the writer
to be of common concern, are closely associated with
the everyday work of the above mentioned divisions.
It is held that to take the function of control and search
of the indices away from the divisions principally
interested, leaves them dependent on some other com-
ponent of the Security Office to perform functions
closely connected to investigation on one hand and appraisal
and clearance on the other. It is held that thus, control
will be lost of cases in process which, in the search of
indices, should receive the highest priority,'and the
authority for timing and expediting cases will be divided
and lost.
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Adoption o1 recommendations would have disturbed
some seemingly sacred jurisdictional prerogatives. Although
the Agency's security forces had been consolidated as far back
as September 1949, the factions had not as yet discovered the
wherewithal to work fully together as a single integrated organi-
zational entity. What did occur was the formation of an OS Com-
mittee on Records -- comprised of representatives of the interested
staffs and divisions -- which continued to meet throughout most of
1955. 91/ This committee, however, addressed itself principally
to the matter of ironing out anomalies resulting from the situation
of dual records, and did not consider the subject of possible amal-
gamation.
The 5 December 1954 reorganization of the Office of Security --
which abolished the theretofore existing SD and SSD and created in
their place two functional Deputy Directors of Security, namely
Personnel and Physical Support, and Investigations and Operational
Support* -- did nothing in the way of correcting OS's split security
See OS-1, An Overview, III, A, for further information con-
cerning this reorganization.
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records system, although some organizational titles were changed
and the overall structure was upgraded.
B. OS Security Records Division
During the winter of 1957-58, at the direction of the Director
25X1A of Security, the Chief of OS's Inspection Staff,
conducted a comprehensive survey of OS records operations. 92/
report, submitted on 19 February 1958, concluded that the
dual system of security records was causing unjustifiable work
which was impairing the effectiveness of OS operations. He, there-
fore, recommended the consolidation of the overt and covert file
sections under a new Security Records Division (SRD), which would
answer directly to the Director of Security but would service the
requirements of both of the Security Directorates. ^ also
made several secondary recommendations, including the initiation
' 25X1A
of a security file retirement system -
-- in order to alleviate the critical space
problem.
The. Director of Security approved recommendations;
and following coordination with the Agency's Management Staff,
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the Security Records Division was established on 13 October 1958
to assume the consolidated OS record-keeping functions previously
divided between the two Security Directorates. 93/ On 11 December
1958, the Director of Security delegated responsibility for the
management and supervision of SRD to the Deputy Director of
Security for Investigations and Operational Support (DD/IOS),
25 Were it remained until July 1965. 194/
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The IG concluded that continued maintenance of separate
procedures, files and indices for covert and overt cases was not
in the best interest of overall efficiency, that these should be con-
solidated, and added that there was need for a fully integrated and
mechanized index. The IG made the following recommendations:
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Recommendation No. 39:
a. The Director of Security establish the policy
of complete integration of the internal records of the
Office of Security.
b. The DD/S direct the Management Staff to con-
duct a survey of the records requirements of the Of-
fice of Security and submit its proposals for complete
modernization and mechanization of the central re-
cords function.
c. An educational program for personnel of the
Security Records Division be undertaken and they be
encouraged to participate in the informal liaison
which exists between other records components of
the Agency.
Recommendation No. 40:
The Director of Security place the Security Re-
cords Division under the immediate supervision of
the Executive Officer of the Office of Security.
I
The Director of Security took exception to Recommendation
No. 40, pointing out that OS's records operations were an im-
portant integral part of its overall security investigative and
clearance processes, and that they were not an appropriate
responsibility of the Executive Officer. 96/ The DDS agreed
with his exception, and the Director of Security set to work im-
plementing Recommendation No. 39.
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C. Automation and Other Innovations
As early as 1951-52, OS considered the matter of auto-
mation of its records. It was at that time that the Overt
Files Section commenced putting its indexes on IBM cards. 98/
According to an OS official who was associated with the activity, *
the objectives were: (1) to aid the personnel security investi-
gative and clearance control processes, and to provide the basis
for valid statistical reporting, (2) to provide a basis for exchange
of information with OP, the Office of the Comptroller, and
DDP/RID (in anticipation of the latter's eventual conversion to
ADP), and (3) to provide the basis for future programs involving
indexes search with the aid of machine, at such time as this
procedure might prove economically worthwhile. In October 1955
this official investigated the latter proposition -- specifically, an
IBM Corporation machine called RAMAC. 99/ He found, however,
that a machine to effect the indices search would cost OS approxi-
mately $144, 000 per year -- a cost equivalent to 36 GS-4 employees --
' 25X1A
. Branc .
at that time, Chief of PSD's Clearance
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1
and the work was then being adequately handled by
people. Nevertheless, the IBM cards continued to be punched,
25X1A
although for purposes of indices search the operation continued
in a manual mode. By 1960-61, however, apparently records
operations were such that the 1955 estimate was no longer valid.
In November 1961, prompted primarily by the recommendations
of the 1960 IG survey, the Director of Security and Chief, CIA
Automatic Data Processing (ADP) Staff agreed to terms of
reference for a preliminary study of electronic data processing
for OS. 100/ The objectives of the study were to:
1. place the data processing problem in its per-
spective in OS;
2. determine the role of SRD in the overall data
processing function;
3. evaluate OS relationships to other Agency systems;
4. establish a charter and framework for a detailed
system analysis and design; and
5. recommend further action.
The ADP Staff submitted its preliminary study on 1 February
1962. 101/ The report outlined a three-phase program intended
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to develop automatic data processing applications which would
serve worthwhile purposes in terms of OS records operations
and work processes. The preliminary report itself represented
Phase I; it compared OS records keeping with those of the Agency's
RID, traced the major data flows, and identified a number of areas
where implementation of automatic data processing might be
worthwhile, but stopped short of specific recommendations as of
that time. Phase II was to involve the "systems analysis and
design. " This would be conducted by a study team comprising one
systems analyst from the ADP Staff, two representatives from OS,
and the services of one outside ADP specialist-consultant; the
objective. of Phase II would be to accomplish a more comprehensive
study leading to the recommendation of specific applications of ADP
and an overall program for OS. Phase III would involve "program-
ming and conversion"; in short,, this phase would accomplish im-
plementation of the Phase II plan within the frame of reference
allowable by available assets and normal pressure of OS business,
and would also involve a testing of the system prior to full-scale
conversion.
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1
On 13 February 1962 the DDS agreed that the ADP Staff
should proceed with Phase II of the OS study, concurrent with
the initiation of a DDS-wide systems study and development pro-
gram for computer operations. 102/ The final determination as
to what kind of system would be implemented in OS, including
the type of equipment required, would not be made until the
DDS-wide study was either completed or had reached a point
where it could be assured that any system implemented would be
in consonance with the overall system. The Chief, ADP Staff was
specifically enjoined from any action during Phase II of the OS
study incompatible with the objectives and aims of the DDS overall
program. The effect of the DDS's action was to constrain the OS
program to insure a commonality with other Agency ADP programs
not yet developed. 25X1A
The Phase II study team, comprised of of 25X1A
the ADP Staff, of OS, and one -- later two --
representatives of the IBM Corporation, submitted a report on
the SRD Index System on 26 November 1962. 103/ This report was
a partial study of SRD as it related principally to the index system
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1
11
and did not consider in any great detail other existing and pos-
sible aspects of SRD work, such as case control, information
retrieval, file locator, statistical reporting, and the SSC special
clearance registry. The primary purpose was to recommend
any appropriate action in the existing time frame for converting
the SRD indices into machine language.
The study team examined the several approaches to indices
conversion -- e.g., EAM (card punch), magnetic tape or discs
(both elements of a computer-based system), and microfilm.
The study team's report concluded:
Comparing the general advantages and disadvantages
of potential methods of conversion between punched
cards, punched paper tape, and microfilm approaches,
the conversion. using the punched cards offers the most
advantages in terms of total costs, active use during
conversion, usefulness as backup, ease of retrievability,
updating, handling and relationship to future computer-
based systems.
Although the study team did not envision the EAM approach as
meeting all of OS's requirements, it did see it as the appropriate
first step to a viable OS ADP program. Initial benefits would
accrue in such areas as: more accuracy in records keeping,
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improved case control procedures, elimination of duplication
and redundancy, better statistical reporting bases, assistance
to management through identification and elimination of work
bottlenecks, and serving as the initial basis of a Vital Records
Program -- through creation of a duplicate set of cards to be
Eventually --
maintained
MEN==
using transceiver equipment -- the system cou be linked up
with other compatible systems of other Federal security and
investigative services thereby providing the basis for an auto-
mated national agency check program. The cards would still need
to be searched manually -- an estimated 26 hours would be re-
quired to search one name by IBM machine; however, initiation
of an EAM system could look forward to an easy conversion to
a computer-based magnetic tape system. Under the latter system,
it was estimated that 1-2 hours of computer time could handle an
entire OS day's searching work, although priority inquiries would
still require manual search. Subsequent transition to a disc file
or similar system would provide the additional benefit of quick
random access to the indices. The study team recommended a
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two-phase program, with phase one working the conversion of a
small sample of SRD indices concurrent with testing the efficiency
of the system, and phase two proceeding with a full conversion of
SRD index holdings.
The study team's report was submitted to the Director of
Security by the Chief, ADP Staff on 25 January 1963. 104/ In his
covering memorandum, Chief, ADP Staff added one additional
step to the proposal: through the use of currently available Agency
computer systems, continue system development efforts by pre-
paring and testing pilot programs, recognizing that, although the
system would probably undergo subsequent refinement, some
initial benefits would nevertheless accrue from early conversion
of some of the information from IBM card to computer type format.
The plan was, concurred in by the Director of Security; on 12
April 1963 the DDS approved the plan. 105/ Because in the mean-
time the responsibility for all Agency computer planning had been
raised to the Executive level, the plan was submitted to the Agency's
Executive Director-Comptroller who approved it for the DDCI on
20 November 1963 with the proviso that the required personnel not
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be charged against ceiling contingent upon the availability of funds.
106/ In the meantime, an OS/SRD Conversion Manual had been
prepared, and steps taken, pursuant to DDS direction, for establish-
ment of a "common personality numbering system" for OS and DDP/
RID records. 107/ The latter was accomplished through the simple
expedient of reserving blocks of numbers for the exclusive use of
each of the two components.
In July 1963, during meetings of OS representatives with Chief,
DDP Systems Group, the latter stated that OS could not successfully
or properly search an index on magnetic tape -- the name trace
DDP system, still in its infancy, was planning to use paper tape.
Indeed, as of that time no examples had been located of computer
name trace systems using magnetic tape. 108/ DDP was concerned
that the OS name trace system should be compatible with the RID
system and Chief, DDP Systems Group informally recommended
that the ADP Staff (by this time called OCS -- Office of Computer
Services) efforts on the OS project be terminated and that OS rely
on DDP to furnish technical guidance.
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I
OCS continued with the project, however, and the OS and
DDP systems were developed on a compatible basis. A great
deal of credit must go to OCS for the assistance it rendered
to OS records conversion. The principal initial effort, funding,
and assets were by and large theirs. The total OS commitment
during the year 1963 can be said to have been the services of
one individual -- Within a relatively
short period of time, however, OS became fully committed to the
records automation objective, and today (197Z) its program com-
pares favorably with any throughout the Agency, and in all
probability excels that of any other security office in the Federal
service.
In January 1964, the first contract employees were hired
for editing, key-punching, and verifying; and by May 1966, con-
version of all 3x5 records to machine language
had been completed. While this conversion project was underway,
Additionally an OS Policy Committee -- comprised of a
representative of the OS Executive Staff and the Chiefs of PSD,
ID, and SRD -- provided guidance to the effort.
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25X1A
25X1A
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1965, the Compartmented Information Branch (CIB of SR&CD* --
which maintains an overall US Government and industrial listing
of individuals approved for access to special compartmented
sources of intelligence and projects as a service of common con-
cern for the benefit of the entire US intelligence community.
SCC/CIB records were the first of CIA records systems to become
automated. One year following a March 1962 decision to automate
these records, the conversion and programming had been completed
-- a process undoubtedly greatly simplified by earlier NPIC and
DDP/Development Projects Division efforts to adapt the listings
to ADP punch card format, which served as the initial basis for
the conversion.
The purpose of SPECLE is to produce periodic, overall and
organizational listings of persons cleared for access to the many
,special projects and intelligence sources which are the subjects of
formal, compartmented systems of security control. These lists
Security Records and Communications Division, successors
to SRD; see II, D,. below.
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CAPER (Case Processing Evaluation Report) is basically
a system devised for management and security clearance pro-
cessing case control purposes. 112/ CAPER serves as a
memory of all the actions attendant on OS's security clearance
case processing, and, as such, provides an extremely valuable
management tool. CAPER was essentially an outgrowth of
the IBM card case control system for overt cases initiated. by
the Clearance Branch of the old Security Division in July 1952.
In March of 1963, with certain modifications in terms of the
system's output, this program was converted to the computer.
Additional modifications were subsequently made by SIPS
designed to make the program more compatible with Office
of Personnel ADP programming requirements as well as other
offices in the Support Directorate.'
operated on a test basis during 1968, and achieved full-time
SIPS: Support Information Processing Systems Task
Force, explained further below.
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operational status in May 1969. Briefly stated, by the use of
compatible computer programming, this system enabled the
computer-searched exchange of National Agency Check infor-
mation between OS's SANCA index and the Department of Defense
Central Index (DODCI), a listing of all individuals of the Defense
Establishment security investigated and/or cleared in addition to
the location of the individual's security file. 113/
In the meantime, the Support Directorate's and the Agency's
overall transition to records automation had been progressing
rapidly. In March 1965 a Support Information Requirements
Group, headed by a DDS representative and otherwise composed
of representatives from each of the DDS offices, was established
to develop, to the extent practical, an integrated management
information processing system to serve the needs of the Support
Directorate as well as.the Agency at large. 114/ This resulted
in the establishment of a SIPS (Support Information Processing
System) Task Force to which representatives from the several
Support Directorate offices were assigned to develop the indi-
vidual requirements of the offices into an integrated system best
suited to serving the interests of all.
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25X1A
Within OS, following the June 1967 appointment of
earlier involved in OS records automation plan-
ning) to the position of Chief, Executive and Planning Division
(E&PD) of the Executive Staff, the Executive Staff was made re-
sponsible for coordinating all aspects of OS ADP requirements and
planning. 115/ On 23 October 1967 was named as
25X1A
25X1A
' 25X1A the OS Special Assistant for ADP, and he was assigned to E&PD.
25X1A
25X1A
116/ _ was made responsible for all OS ADP planning, but
additionally he served as the OS point of contact related to security
safeguards applicable to the overall Agency ADP program. His
staff was subsequently increased by the addition of two more pro-
fessional and one clerical employees, and it was called the Infor-
mation Processing Branch of E&PD.* Since by this time E&PD
also included the OS Records Management Officer, a good basis
existed for a viable OS Records program using automated techniques.
>x As OS's automated records program gradually became fully
operational, - activities became more and more concerned
with security safeguards applicable to overall Agency ADP oper-
ations; consequently, in July 1970 staff was transferred
to OS's Physical Security Division. 117/
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D. Security Records and Communications Division (SR&CD)
As one result of the August 1965 OS reorganization, * SRD
was renamed SR&CD, and placed under the supervision of the
newly created Deputy Director of Security for Personnel Security
(DD/PS). It was also at that time that the Special Clearance
Center of the Special Security Center (SSC) -- which maintained
a master listing of all individuals approved for special compart-
mented intelligence source information as a service of common
concern for the entire U. S. intelligence community -- was trans-
ferred out from under SSC and renamed the Compartmented Infor-
mation Branch (CIB) of SR&CD. The T/O of SR&CD now. consisted
positions divided between the Office of the Chief (3), Re-
cords Branch The Records Branch was divided
* . See OS-1, An Overview, IV, B, for further details concerning
this reorganization.
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25X1'A
Following is a description of SR&CD mission and organi-
zation prepared in 1966.*
I. Purpose and Mission:
The Security Records & Communications Division
provides current and long-range support to the Office
of Security through the effective development, manage-
ment, utilization and protection of security records
including records research as well as records manage-
ment, maintains ADP programs for Office of Security
components; maintains complete and current records
and indices of security information on personnel and
organizations of interest to the Agency; maintains liaison
with other government agencies for the release of per-
sonnel security information; and initiates records pro-
cessing on all overt and covert clearance and oper-
ational support requests. Maintains a master index of
persons throughout both the intelligence community
and private industry who have been approved for access
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