Document Type: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
Release Decision: 
Original Classification: 
Document Page Count: 
Document Creation Date: 
December 15, 2016
Document Release Date: 
October 6, 2003
Sequence Number: 
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 4, 1975
Content Type: 
PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6.pdf9.13 MB
$ 1 / ApprQwed For Release 2003/10/16 RbP9D-0 w 00200080001-6 Report of Proceedings Hearing held before Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities Thursday, December 4, 1975 Washington, D. C WARD & PAUL 410 FIRST STREET, S. E. WASHINGTON, -D. C. 20003 (202) 544-6000 ILLEGIB CRC, 9/25/2003 Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/.16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 C 0 N T E N T S STATEMENT OF: William G. Miller, Staff Director, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities William Bader, Professional Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Rick Inderfurth, Professional Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Greg Treverton, Professional. Staff Member, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Ralph Dungan, Former United States Ambassador to Chile Charles A. Meyer, Former Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs 19 Edward M. Korry, Former United States Ambassador To Chile Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-0073.5R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 2164 Thursday, December 4, 1975 AHW/smnl t. 1 0 O 13 16. 19 20 .p v 6 ui United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Washington, D. C. The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:45 o'clock p.m., in Room 318, Russell Senate Office Building, the Honorable Frank Church (Chairman) presiding. Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Goldwater and Schweiker. Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director.; Frederic A. 0. Schwarz, Jr.., Chief'Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; William Bader, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton, Pat Shea,' Peter Fenn, Lock Johnson, Charles Kirbow, David Aaron, Joe Dennin, Burt Wides, Joseph DiGenova, Charles Lombard Rhett Dawson and Bob Kelley,.Professional Staff Members. The Chairman. The hearing will please.come to order. Today the Committee holds public hearings on the involveme t of the United States in covert activities in Chile from 1963 Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 t 6 ~pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 through 1973. It takes this unusual. step because the Committee believes the American people must know and be able to judge what was undertaken by their government in Chile. The nature and extent of the American role in-the overthrow of a democratically-elected Chilean government are matters for deep and continuing public conern. While much of this sad story has been revealed already, the public record remains a jumble of allegations, distortions, and half-truths. This record must be set straight. President Ford has defended covert U.S. activities in Chile during 1970-1973 as "in the best interest of the Chilean people and certainly in our best interest." Why was that so? What was there about the situation in Chile and the threat it posed. to our national security which made covert intervention into the political affairs of another-democratic country either good for Chile or necessary for the United States? These questions must be answered. The Committee's purpose is less to pass judgment on what has been done than to understand, so that it may frame appropriate legislation and recommendations to govern what will be done in the future. Given the President's statement, it is particularly unfortunate in my opinion that the Administration has refused to testify and has planned to boycott the Committee's hearings. The American people deserve to know the reasons why the United States firs,. undertook extensive, if not massive, covert pproved For Release 2003/10/t6 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 J I ft ~ 1 45 3. 14 15 U- 24 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 operations within a democratic state in this hemisphere. They deserve to know why their government sought, in 1970, to overthrow a popularly elected government. The Administration's prohibition on testifying in a public forum on this subject has. extended to the point of preventing CIA employees, both past and present, from coming before this Committee. I find this particularly ironic since I spent the whole morning at the Pacem in Terris conference at the Sheraton Hotel here in Washington, publicly debating with Mr. Colby the covert operations that occurred in.Chile during the period under investigation. And so it is not denied to him to discuss such matters publicly and before the assembled press at the Sheraton-Park Hotel. It is denied him that.he should come and testify here at the Capitol before this Committee. I believe the position of the Administration is completely unjusitifed. Secretary Kissinger has argued that.it would be inappropriate to appear before Congress and the American people to discuss covert action operations in which he was involved, yet only last week-he gave a speech defending covert action. the Secretary-can give speeches on covert action, I believe he should be prepared to answer questions before Congress and the people of the country. The Committee has taken the utmost precautions, both durin its investigations and in what it has written publicly, to protect sensitive sources of intelligence, methods of pproved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 20 approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 intelligence operations, and the names of agents. With regard to .Chile,' the Administration has joined in that effort. Thus, there is no merit to the charge that holding a public hearing on Chile will cause harm to the national security interests.. of the United States. . What will damage the American interest is an Administration that refuses to speak to the issue of why we intervened so heavily in the internal affairs of Chile. The public-has every legitimate right-to such an explanation. This Committee and the American people can not wait foreve- I until the Administration decides to honor the rights of the citizens of this nation to know the policies of their Governmen Today we make"public the results of our own Committee investi- gation into the Chilean intervention. We will also take testimony today from former State Department officials who haves consented to appear and have shown a .sense of responsibility. to ppeak to the issues raised by our Chilean policy. This is the one covert action hearing the Committee will hold in public session. We have taken this unusual step because the Committee believed that revealing the truth about. the Chile episode would serve two important purposes.. First, or the basis of an accurate record, the public would be in a position to decide for itself the wisdom and propriety of the actions taken by its government'in Chile. And, second, the Chile case provides a good example of the full range of pproved For Release. 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6. 1i ;Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 covert action. It permits the Committee, the Senate, and the country to debate and decide the merits of future use of covert action as an instrument of U.S. foreign policy. Our Committee report, which is being released in conjuncti with these hearings this afternoon, is based on an extensive review of documents obtained from the files of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Council, as. well as testimony by present and former Government officials. Except when already well-known, names of Chileans and of Chilean institutions have been omitted in order to avoid revealing intelligence sources and methods, and to limit needless harm to individual Chileans who cooperated with the Central Intelligence Agency. Despite these deletions, the report conveys an accurate picture of the purposes and magnitude of United States covert action in Chile. The. hearings will begin with a presentation by the staff, laying out the bare facts about covert U.S. activities in Chile in the decade.between 1963 and 1973. The Committee will then hear three former State Department officials: Ralph Dungan and Edward Korry,.American Ambassadors in Chile from 1964 through 1967, and 1967 through 1971, respectively; and Charles Meyer, Assistant.Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1969 through 1973.' Tomorrow, with the Chile case but in the open,. a panel of distinguished Americans will pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 smn 6 10 11 2 .24 'Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 discuss covert action in general, its value and costs, its limits and effects. They will offer recommendations concerning whether it should be employed in the future and, if so, in what situation and under what restrictions and controls. Senator Tower, do you have an opening statement? Senator Tower. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have always clung to the view that information concernin the details of United States covert operations should not be made public because of the possible hazards created for individuals and because the release of such information may jeopardize necessary activities. Therefore, while I believe it has been appropriate and useful for this Committee to conduct an executive examination ofl.covert activities and programs, I have been opposed to public sessions; I remain opposed to public sessions. I believe,the national interest would be better served if we had cancelled these particular public sessions. I yield, of course, to the majority of the Committee, that voted to make these hearings public, but in recognizing the right of the majority of the Committee to do so, I must express my own very serious reservations. Thank. you. Senator Goldwater. Mr. Chairman, I would like.to be recorded as being in favor of what Senator Tower has said. T think it.is a mistake, not his statement, but a mistake that we pproved For Release 2.003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 10 it 15. 16 19 21 pApproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 are holding these hearings in public. The Chairman. Very well, Senator Goldwater. Any other comment from any other member of the Committee at this time? If-not, we will turn to our panel of staff e*cperts that will examine the Chilean intervention, and I will call first on the Chief of Staff of the Committee, Bill Miller. ~pproved? For Release 2.003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 0 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 STATEMENT OF WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR, SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, th two days of public hearings on covert action as an instrument of United States policy, which begin today, are based upon an in-depth inquiry done by the Committee and staff over the past eight months. The Committee has been able to examine the full scope of covert action techniques. that have been used by the U.S. Government since the end of World War II, how they relate to publicly declared foreign policy, and how they are initiated, approved, and monitored.. These techniques range fro relatively passive actions, such as passing money to shape the outcome of elections, to the influencing of men's minds through .prpaganda and misinformation placed in the media of other nations, to the more aggressive and belligerent techniques of organizing coup d'etats and engaging in paramilitary warfare. Out of the thousands of covert action projects throughout the world undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency since 1.947, the Committee chose to examine the programs in six countr in detail. These six country programs, which the Committee has already examined in Executive Session, span 30 years.of activit since the end of World War II, and five Administrations. From the.,outset of the Committee's inquiry, it has been clear that a major question to be decided upon by the Committee Approved For Release.2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 smn9 2172 1~pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 0 O O 1 N 0 N 2 is to what extent, if any, covert action should be authorized by the Congress and the people of the United States. A useful place to begin, therefore, in examining the past activities and possible future scope of covert action is a review of the present state of the law. To begin first with definitions of what the law is suppose to govern: According to the CIA's own present definition, covert action means any clandestine or secret activities design d to influence foreign governments, events., organizations, or persons in support of U.S. foreign policy conducted in such manner that the involvement of the U.S. Government is not -.16 17- 19 22 23. apparent. . The present law cited by the Executive Branch covering such activities is ambiguous at best. The appropriate section of the National Security Act of 1947 authorizes the CIA to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting, the national security as the National Security Council may, from time to time, direct." The Committee, over the past eight.months, has examined th legislative history of the 1947 Act, and has interviewed most of the principal living participants who helped draft that Act, and from the fruits of the investigation thus far, there is little in the legislative history, in either Committee, 'Executive Session, or floor debate, that gives credence to the notion that Congress intended to authorize what is now Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200.080001-6 11 14 15 .16 19 22 23 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 2173 the full range of covert action. In particular, there is no evidence that Congress ever addressed the question of whether the U.S. Government should undertake assassination,:.support a coup d'etat, or paramilitary warfare. The law that is now on the books reflects the fact that neither the Executive Branch nor the Congress was able to foretell what perils the future. two or three decades would hold for the United States or what activities the.Government would use to meet situations that.emerged. It has been argued that. the Congress voted appropriations for covert actions and thereby tacitly approved these activitie There has never been an annual authorization of the CIA budget. The Congress has never as a body voted with knowledge on CIA appropriations. But rather, it has voted.for appropriations in which CIA funds were concealed. There are those who maintai that because of that the Congress has never authorized through the appropriations process covert actions by-the CIA, as a result. Two years ago, Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act, an amendment, the Ryan-Hughes Amendment, was passed. It requires the President to report to the appropriate Committees in a timely fashion all covert action programs that he has approved. It.has been argued that the legislation provides congres- sional authorization of covert action thereby. Informing Committees of the Congress and subsequent Congressional Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 awaremess of covert action is not the same thing as approval. A strongly-held point of view is that the'a.im of that legis- lation was to insure that sufficient knowledge of covert action would be available before approval could be considered. The Committee has been studying covert action in order to decide whether to provide statutory authority for covert action. T 1ie"Exe'cutive' branch has defended' covert- factions' as "?hebessa to' meet the situations 'ins the gray- area between"- declared ;aar -and peace `,The.Committee.must decide whether it wishes to enact specific limitations or to permit this area to remain vague and circumlocqtious, as one witness has called it, and subject to the failures and abuses, and the lack of fixed responsibility and. accountability for actions taken. The Committee's inquiry into assassinations and of large-scale covert action program failures that have come before the Committee's inquiry is proof of the problems.crea.ted by this vague and inadequate law. 0 0 0 19 The record examined thus far shows that covert action 6 0 20 programs over the last 30 years have been generally successful 21 against weak nations and far less so against our potential' W 22 enemies. In the view of many who have looked at the question, 23. covert action has become.the national means, the "functional U. o 24 'equivalent" to-,use Secretary Katzenbach's phrase,,. for. acts of It deception, subversion-, and violence, including instances of Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 10 ?15 16 17 18 19 24 warfare The Chairman. Mr. Miller, I wonder if you could suspend for a moment. There's a vote on by virtue of which the other Committee members have absented themselves. I'm going to miss the vote unless we take a very brief recess. You can renew your testimony as soon as other members begin to reappear. (A brief recess was taken.) Senator Tower. Let's have order, please. Mr. Miller, you will continue, please. Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, although there has been a considerable degree of Congressional acquiescence, many of these aggressive covert activities havd.been undertaken without the awareness of the Congress as a whole of the circumstances and reasons for these actions; they have been taken without an annual authorization, or without any explicit statutory authority. The costs of past covert action are considerable. Since the end of World War II, the U.S. has expended many billions of dollars in the carrying out of covert action programs. As is evident in the Chile case,. the amounts spent.on covert action programs are considerable;.however,.they.are extremely small when compared.to.the amounts spent on various forms.of aid. The secrecy required to carry out covert action .,programs all too often has created confusion not only in the. public mind, but has served to cause the Government to work at Approved For Release. 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 0 0 O N U 0 11' 14 ..16 17 19 22 23 ~pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 cross purposes. The positive effects of AID programs and the good will created by programs such as the Peace Corps have been negated by the covert action undertaken in Chile. As pointed out by the former head of covert operations, Mr. Richard. Bissell, there have been many short-term tactl.cal victories but very few lasting successes. in order to examine the broad questions of policy raised by covert action, a detailed examination of Chile has been undertaken. The staff study which members of the Committee have before them is as factual as the Committee staff has been able to make it. Its purpose is to clear up questions arising from allegations of U.S. involvement in Chile, to arrive at an understanding of the general nature of covert action in Chile, to come to an understanding of the general nature of covert action, and perhaps most important, how covert action in this instance served to negate openly-avowed diplomatic policies of the U.S. . The Chile case presents great paradoxes. In 1964, the U.S. through covert action assisted a candidate for the. presidenty to achieve a majority. They gave assistance to a moderate candidate. The reason given was ostensibly to strengthen democratic purposes. In the period 1970 through 1973, in order-to prevent a ,Marxist leader from coming to power by democratic means, the U.S. worked through covert action to subvert democratic processy Approved' For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 If_ 18 ~kpproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 2177 The means used went far beyond those used in 1964 in money, propaganda, and political manipulation. The means used were economic warfare, the encouragement of coup deetat and military violence. . The means were hardly democratic; this assistance, this interference in the internal affairs. of another country, served to weaken'the party we sought to assist and created internal dissensions which, over time, led. to the weakening and, for the present time at least, an end to constitutional government in Chile. The contrast between covert action in Chile during the .1960s and 1970s with the responsibility of the_U.S. under the Organization of American States, to which the U.S.. is party, an the rhetoric of the Alliance for Progress could not be more graphic. Let me quote from the OAS Charter to which the United States is a signatory. Article 18 states: "No State or group of States has the right to intervene, directlyr or indirectly, for any reason' whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also any other form of interference or attempted threat .against the personality of the State or against its political, economic and cultural elements. Article 19 states: "No State may use or encourage the use of coercive measures.of..any economic or political character ~4pproved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 10 11 15 23, Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001=6 in order to force the sovereign will of another State and obtai from it advantages of any kind." Article 21 of the OASiCharter, akin to Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, provides for the use of force for purposes of self-defense, but this could hardly be construed as a justi- fication for the covert activities undertaken in Chile, since the intelligence estimates of the U.S. Government concluded tha the Allende government posed no threat to.vital U.'S. interests or U.S. national security. On October 31, 1969, President Nixon delivered an address on his Action for Progress for the Americas Program. His first principle was as follows: "A firm commitment to the inter- American system, to the compacts which bind us in'that system, as exemplified by the Organization of American States and by .the principles so nobly set forth in its charter." In his State of the World Address delivered on February 25, 1971 to the Congress, the President said: "The United States has a strong political interest in maintaining cooperation with our neighbors' regardless of their domestic viewpoints. We have a clear preference for free and democratic processes. We .hope that governments will evolve toward constitutional procedures. But it' is not-our mission to try to provide -- except by example.-- the.answers.to such questions for other 0 2411 nations. We deal with governments as they are." The new.Government in Chile is a clear case in point. The 25 Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 11 i .! 'IF < L 12 .14 18 0 19 N end 6t. 1 20 G .q 21 3 22 23 LL 24 25 1970 election of. a Socialist President may have profound impli- cations not only for its people but for the inter-American syst r as well. . The President went on: "Our bilateral policy is to keep open lines of communication. We will not be the ones to upset traditional relations. We assume that international rights and obligations will be observed. We also recognize that .the Chilean Government's actions will be determined primarily by its own purposes, and that these will not be deflected simpl by the tone of our policy. In short, we are prepared to have the'kind of relationship with the Chilean government. that it is prepared to have with us." At the very time this speech was delivered, the United .States was already embarked on a Presidentially-approved covert action program designed to control the outcome of the At.this point, Mr..Chairman, I want to turn to Mr. Bader who will describe the pattern of covert action as it was used in Chile. pproved For Release. 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Senator Tower. Mr. Bader is recognized. Mr. Bader. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Sen. Sel. 12/4/?15 Tape N O N 2 13 15 19 23 24 25 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 STATEMENT OF WILLIAM BADER Mr. Bader. The staff study on Chile focuses on what is labeled "covert action" by the Central Intelligence Agency. Covert action, as defined by the Central. Intelligence Agency, describes a policy tool for all seasons and purposes. To the Agency the term "covert action" means, as Mr. Miller has already stated, "any. clandestine operation or activity designed to influence foreign governments,. organizations, persons or events in support of the United States foreign policy objective The definition of "covert action" was not always so embracing, and indeed the term itself was only coined.i.n recent years. This question of defining "covert action" is important as the Committee addresses the central questions: The.central questions are those, as an instrument of foreign policy,.what can covert action do and under what circumstances? What are the costs? We need to answer- these questions in order to address the more fundamental issue of iahether or not covert action should be permitted. If so, under what rules and constraints? Therefore, our interest in Chile, and in this report, .is not only w-,,hat happened there but what the Chilean experience tells us'about covert action as a foreign policy operation of a democratic society. It is important to note that the objectives, the. techniques, and the political. control of covert operations. have pproved For Release.'2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 0 0 0 3~ retypl Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 changed rather fundamentally over the years. It was only in late 1947 -- two and a half years after the end of World War II -- that the United States formally decided that clandestine intelligence, collection activities had to be supplemented by what was described at the time as covert psychological operations. These were described as propaganda and manipulation of the press, and the like. By the late spring of 1948, the Soviet threat was held to be of such seriousness that "covert operations" were expanded to include countering Soviet propaganda and Soviet 17 N 19 0 24 support of labor unions, student groups, support of political parties, economic warfare, sabotage, assistance of refugee liberation groups, and support of anti-communist groups in occupied or even in threatened areas.. Gradually, covert action was extended to include countrie all around the world. Burgeoning from the experience of countering the Soviet Union and its satellites in this early period in 1947. and 1948, the CIA had major covert operations underway in roughly 50 countries by 1953; this represented a commitment of over 50 percent of the Agency's budget during r the 1950s and 1960s. . In broad terms -- and in the langauge of the trade' -- covert activities since the so-called "coming of age" in 1948 have been grouped around three major categories: propaganda, political action, and paramilitary activities. In the Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 (Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 2183 experience with Chile, the largest covert activities were those in the. general. categories of propaganda and political action such'as has been described in this chart, disseminating propaganda; supporting media,:influencing instutitions, influenei elections, supporting political parties, supporting.private sector organizations and the like. Now as far as paramilitary activities are concerned, the last category,. that is covert''and military,operations,'they were not employed to a significant degree in Chile with the possible' exception of the Track II operation and the Schneider kidnapping. Propaganda. As revealed in the staff paper, the' largest covert action activity in Chile in the decade 1963 - 1973 was propaganda. The CIA station in Santiago placed. materials in the Chilean media, maintained a number of assets or agents on major Chilean newspapers, radio and television stations, and_manufactured "black propaganda.-- that-is, materi falsely purporting to be the product of a particular group. Let me give you an illustrative range of the kinds of -propaganda projects that were undertaken in Chile during-the years under discussion, 1963'to 1973: Subsidization of two news services to influence Chilean public opinion; .operation of a press placement service; support of the establishment of a commercial television service in Chile; support of anti-communist propaganda activitiy ,Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 19 23 25 (Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 through wall posters, leaflets, and other street actions; usd a CIA--controlled news agency to counter communist influence in Chile and Latin America; placement of anti-Soviet propaganda on eight radio news'stations and in five provincial By far the largest -- and probably the most significant in this area of propaganda was the money provided out to El Mercurio, the major Santiago daily during the Allende regime. The second category is that of political action. In the intelligence trade, covert political action aims to influence without attribution to the United States political events in a foreign country. Political action can range from- recruiting an agent from within a foreign government for the purpose of influencing. that government to subsidizing political parties friendly to U.S. interests. Starkly put, political action is the covert manipulation of political power abroad. In Chile the CIA undertook a wide range of projects aimed- at influencing political events in Chile, and here are some of them: Wrestling control of Chilean university student organizati from the communists; supporting a women's group active in Chilean political and intellqctual life and hostile to the Allende government; combatting the principal communist-dominate labor union in'.Chile. The most impressive political action in Chile was the Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R0002000&0001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 massive efforts made over the decade from 1964 to 1974 to influence the elections. The Central Intelligence Agency in 1964, for example, spent over $3 million in election programs, financing in this process over half of the Christian Democratic campaign. The charts that I show you here give you some idea of the.measure and extent of the support that I have been talking about. Propaganda, $8 million, producing and disseminat'nc propaganda and supporting mass media, roughly $4 million, and These are the various techniques. of covert actions and the expenditures from 1963 to 1973 to the.nearest $100,000 that we have been able to determine in the staff's work on the techniques of covert action in Chile. Finally, Mr. Chairman, in all the cases I have described, the major objective of U.S. covert policy in Chile. was to influence, control, contain, and manipulate political. power in the country. Mr. Chairman, against this background on the meaning and varieties, and in certain respects, the funding of covert action in Chile, I want to turn to Mr..Inderfu.rth, who will 'discuss the major covert activities taken in Chile in specific detail. Thank you, Mr. . Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you, Mr".. Basler. What is the Approved For Release. 2003/10/1-6 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 11 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 population of Chile? Hold that chart for a moment. Mr. Bader. Roughly 2 million, Senator. The Chairman. Roughly 2 million. And the total we spent in attempting to influence the political process in Chile came to what? Mr. Bader. In the 1964 election it came to roughly million, $2.6 million or $2.7 million. The Chairman. The total on this chart comes to what? Mr. Bader. $14 million, Senator. The Chairman. '$14 million. Flaye you worked that out on a per capita basis? Mr. Bader. I believe Mr. Inderfurth has. The Chairman. The $8 million represents just a little less than $1 a person in direct contributions to the political party. 23 2 3 Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, to get it into perspective, I might's'ay that I spent $2.7 million to run for election in 1972 in a state with a population of 11 million. The Chairman. If we look at that in terms of all population, national population of 200 million, that would be comparable to $160 million of foreign.funds. If a foreign government were given to interfere directly with the American .political process in comparable terms, that $8 million would 4ppgroveaFo? 4,11 e }1 t' '~CIAIA609n-0 5 b b86&lTd~nment money Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pumped into our process, wouldn't it? Mr. Bader. That's right. That's correct, sir. The Chairman. Based on comparable per capita' population. Mr. Bader. In 1964, for example, it would be comparable 14 15 in the American political scene of $50 million of outside foreign funds coming to the American election, the Presidential election of '64. Mr. Inderfurth. As a comparison in the 164 election, President Johnson and Senator Goldwater spent combined $25 million. So there would have been.a $35 million difference there. The Chairman. Would you please restate that? Mr. Inderfurth. The $3 million spent by the CIA in Chili 1964 represents about 30 cents for every man, woman, and child in Chile. Now if a foreign government had spent an equivalent amount per capita in our '64 election, that government would have spent about $60 million, as Mr. Bader indicated. Now President Johnson and Senator Goldwater spent $25 million combined, so this would have been about $35 million .The Chairman. More than twice as much as the two America Presidential candidates actually spent.. Mr. Inderfurth. That's-right. The Chairman. ' All rigc~ht , Mr. Inderfu h would you Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIARDP90-00735R00020008b'0?-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R0002000&0001-6 0 0 0 19 U O 20 6 21 22 23 L 24 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 STATEMENT OF RICK INDERFURTII Mr: Inderfurth. This portion of the staff presentation will outline the major programs of covert action undertaken by the United States in Chile from the early 1960s through 1973'. In every. instance, covert action was an instrument of U.S. foreign policy, decided upon at the highest levels of the government. We will begin with the first major U.S. covert action -in Chile, which was the 1964 Presidential election. The '64 Chilean election was viewed with great concern .in Washington. The New York Times reported: "Officials said they could recall no other foreign' election since the Italian elections in 1948 that had caused as much anxiety in Washington ,as the one in Chile." The United States was involved in the 1964 election on a massive scale.. The Special Group, which was the predecessor of today's 40 Committee, authorized over $3-million between 1962 and 1964 to prevent the election of a Socialist or Communist candidate. In all, a total of'nearly.$4 million was spent by the CIA on some 15 covert action projects. These projects ranged from organizing slum dwellers to passing funds to political parties,. The groundwork for the election, or the plumbing, as it is sometimes called, was laid early in 1961. The CIA established, relationships with key political parties, as well Aopk ig '#gf i4&a ~OWIMI-66:zaAiRu to-OW7 & O6020808g0:01. of luence key (Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 2190 sectors of the population. Projects that had been conducted since the 1950s among peasants, slum dwellers, organized labor, students, and the media provided a basis for much of this pre-election covert action. 0 0 0 0 N 0 6 11 14 15- CF - 20 0 L Covert action during the 19G4 campaign was composed of two major elements. The first was direct financial support to the Christian Democratic Party. The Christian Democrats spent about $6 million to get their candidate, Eduardo Frei, elected. The CIA's contribution was slightly'more than half of this sum, or $3 million. In addition to support for the Christian Democratic party., the CIA mounted a massive anti-Communist propaganda campaign. That campaign was enormous. Extensive use was made of the press, radio, films, pamphlets, posters, direct mailings, and wall paintings. To give some feel for this campaign, a few statistics might be helpful. During the first week of intensive activity, a CIA-funded propaganda group in Chile produced 20 radio spots per day in Santiago and on-44 provencial stations: Twelve-minute news broadcasts were produced five times daily on three Santiago stations and on 24 provencial outlets. By the end of June, the group was producing 24 daily newscasts nationwide and 26 weekly commentary programs. In addition,, 3.,000 posters were distributed daily. The propaganda campaign was, in fact, a scare campaign. It relied heavily on images of Soviet tanks.and Cuban firing pproved For Release. 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 2191 squads and was pitched especially to women. Dis-information ancT black propaganda were used as well. The CIA regards this anti-Communist scare campaign-as-its most effective activity. undertaken on behalf of Eduardo Frei. In addition to support for the Christian Democratic party and the propaganda campaign, the CIA ran a number of political action operations aimed at important Chilean voter blocs, including slum dwellers, peasants, organized labor, and dissident Socialists. This effort made extensive use of. public opinion polls and grass-roots organizing. In other words, it was political campaigning American style. Eduardo Frei won an impressive victory in the 1964 election. He received 56 percent of the vote. Now let's 10 turn'to CIA activities in Chile between Presidential elections. During the 1964 to 1970 period, the CIA spent almost $2 million on 12 covert action projects in Chile.. One fourth of this amount was authorized by the 40 Committee. Various sectors of the Chilean society were affected. All of_these activities were-intended to strengthen groups which supported President Frei and opposed Marxist influences. Tao of the projects during this period were directed toward Congressional campaigns, one in 1965 and one in 1968. The 1965 election project is representative. The 303 Committee approved $175,.1000 for this effort. Twenty-two candidates were selected by the.CIA station and the U.S. Ambassador to receive pproved For Release-2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 3 0 0 0. N V 11 15. .16 18 19 22 23 24 funds. Nine of these candidates were elected. Thirteen candidates of the Socialist-Marxist coalition, known then as FRAP, were defeated. Election efforts were not.the only projects conducted by the CIA during this period. Covert action efforts were also undertaken to influence the political. development of various sectors of the Chilean society. One project helped train and organize anti-Communists among peasants and slum dwellers. Two projects worked within organized labor. One was designed to combat a Communist-dominated labor union; another was conducted in the Catholic labor field. .The media received particular attention during this period. One project supported and operated wire services, equivalent to our AP and. UPI. Another supported a right-wing weekly newspaper. The CIA also developed assets within the Chilean press. Assets are foreign nationals who are either on the. CIA payroll or are subject to CIA guidance. One of these assets produced radio political commentary shows attacking the political parties on .the left and supporting CIA-selected candidates. Other.assets placed CIA-inspired editorials almost daily in. El't4ercurio and, after 1968., exerted substantial control over the content of that paper's inter- national news section. Now let's turn to the period immediately preceding the 1970 Presidential election. The 303 Committee first discussed Approved For Release 2003/1.0/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 the upcoming election in April,.1969. According to a report of that meeting, Director Helms commented that an election effort or operation would not be effective unless an early enough start was made. ITowever, a year passed before any action was taken. In March, 1970, the, Committee decided that the U.S.'would not support any one candidate, as it had in the 1964 election, but that it would instead wage a spoiling operation against Allende's Popular Unity coalition.. In all, the CIA spent about $1 million for this activity. Half was approved by the 40 Committee.. The CIA's spoiling operation had two objectives: First, to undermine Communist efforts to bring about a coalition of leftist forces and second, to strengthen non-Marxist political leaders and forces in Chile. In working towards these objectives, the CIA made use of a half-dozen covert action projects. An extensive propagand campaign.was begun. It made use of virtually all the media within Chile and placed and replayed items in the international press as well...Propaganda placements were achieved through subsidizing right--wing women's and civic action groups. 'Previously developed assets in the Chilean press were used as well. As in 1964, propaganda was used in a care campaign. An Allende victory was equated with violence and Stalinist repression. Sign painting teams were instructed to paint slogans on walls evoking images of Communist firing squads. Approved- For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Posters. warned that an Allende victory.in Chile would mean an end of religion and family life. Unlike 1964, however, the 1970 operation did not involve extensive public opinion polling,, grass roots organizin or, as previously mentioned, direct funding of any candidate. The CIA funded only one political group during the 1970 campaign. This was an effort to reduce the number of Radical Party votes for Allende. The CIA's spoiling operation did not succeed. On Septemb r 15, 16 17 4, Allende won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election. Ile received 36 percent of the vote; the runner-up, Jorge Alessanclri., received 35 percent of the vote. Since no candidate had received a majority, a joint session of the Chilean Congress was required to decide between the first-. and second-place finishers. The date set for the joint session was October 24. Now'we will turn to the period between Allende's plurality victory and the Congressional election. Mr. Treverton will go into this period. to 23 24 25 Approved For Release 2003/1.0/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 C C C P s1~ 15 0 3 E ii pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 STATEMENT OF GREG TREVERTON Mr Treverton. Thank you. The reaction in Washington to Allende's victory was immediate. The 40'Committee met on September 8 and 14 to discuss'what action should be taken. On September 15, President Nixon met with Richard Helms, Henry Kissinger, and John Mitchell at the White House. U.S. Government actions proceeded along two separated but related tracks., Track I, as it came to be called, aimed to induce President Frei to act to prevent Allende from being seated. Track I included an anti-Allende propaganda campaign, economic pressures and a $250,000 contingency fund to be used'at the Ambassador's discretion in support of projects which Frei and his associates deemed important in attempting to..influence the outcome of the October'24.Congressional vote. However, the idea of bribing Chilean Congressmen to vote for Alessandri, and against Allende , the only idea for..use of this contingency fund :which arose, was immediately seen' to b'e 20 o 3 6 22 23 unworkable. The $250,000 fund was never spent. Track II, as it was called by those inside the United .States Government who knew of its existence, was touched off .by the President's September 15th instruction to the CIA. It is. the subject of the Schneider portion of the Committee's recent Report on Alleged Assassinations. I will merely summarize Track II here. Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Track II was to be run 'without the knowledge of the Ambassador, or the Departments of State and Defense.. Richard Helms' handwritten notes of the meeting with the President convey the flavor of that meeting. I will quote from his note: '.'One-in-ten chance perhaps, but save Chile. "Not concerned, risks involved. "No involvement of Embassy. "$10 million available,. more if necessary. "Lull-time job -- best men we have. "Make the economy scream." Between October 5 and October 20,.the CIA made twenty-one contacts with key military and police officials in Chile. Coup .plotters were given assurances of strong support at the 15, 20 0 21 22 a; 23 24 25 highest levels of the United States Government both before and after a coup. The?CIA knew that the coup plans of all the various conspirators included the removal., from the scene of: Chilean General'Rene Schenider, the.Chief of Staff of the Army, and aman who.--opposed any coup. CIA officials passed three submachine guns to two Chilean officers on October 22. Later that day, General Schneider was mortally wounded in an abortive kidnap attempt. However, the group which received CIA weapons was not the same group as'the one which carried off the abortive kidnapping of Schneider. 0 Along the other line of covert action, Track I, the Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 United States Government considered a variety of means considered as constituting quasi-constitutional measures to prevent Allende from taking office. One of these was to induce the Christian Democrats to vote on October 24 for 14 15 Alessandri instead of Allende, the first place finisher, with Alessandri to promise to resign immediately, thereby paving the way for new presidential elections in which. Frei would be a legitimate candidate. Another scheme considered by the government was to persuade Frei to step down, permitting the military to take Both the anti-Allende propaganda campaign and the program of economic pressure were intended to support these. efforts to prevent Allende's accession to power. The propaganda campaign focused on the ills that would befall Chile should Allende be elected, while, the economic offensives were intended to preview those.ills-and demonstrate the'-.foreign, economic reaction i to':an Allende .presidency.. A'few examples: Journalist-agents traveled to Chile for on-the-scene reporting; by September 28, the CIA had journalists from ten different countries in, or in route to Chile. The CIA placed individual propaganda items, financed a small newspaper, and engaged in other propaganda activities. 'o r ApprovedFFL G eya?e b63/Y-f'67bYi-RR~6bbT35%bbi&0O%0-6 briefings to Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 "We're prepared to have the kind of relationship with U.S. journalists. For example, Time magazine requested. and received a CIA briefing on the situation in Chile, and, according to the CIA, the basic thrust and timing of the Time story on Allende's victory were changed asa result of the briefing. In the end, of course, neither Track I nor Track 11 achieved its aim. On October 24, the Chilean Congress voted 153 to 35 to elect Allende. On November 4,..he was inaugurated. U.S. efforts,. both overt and covert, to prevent his assumption of office had failed. Now let me turn to covert action between 1970 and 1973. Mr. Miller mentioned a little while ago, in.his 1971 State of the World Message, President Nixon announced, and I quote: the Chilean government that it is prepared to have with us.." This cool but correct public posture: was. articulated by other senior officials. Yet, public pronouncements notwithstanding, after Allende's inauguration, the 40 Committee approved a total of $7 million in covert support to opposition groups in Chile. That money also funded an extensive anti-Allende propaganda campaign. ~pproved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 AHW/smnl t. 3 fls gsh O O Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 The general goal of United States action toward Allende Chile was to maximize pressures on his government to prevent it internal consolidation and. limit its ability to implement policies contrary to United States interests in the hemisphere. That objective was stated'clearly in a Presidential decision issued in early November 1970. ;U.:. S , policy was designed. to, frustrate Allende ` s experiment . in the 6,,les ei .Hemisphere and thus limit its attractiveness as a model; and 19 20 21 22 the determination to sustain the principle of compensation for U.S. firms nationalized by the Allende government. Throughout the Allende years, but especially after the first year of his government, the American Government's best intelligence, National Intelligence Estimates, prepared by the entire intelligence community, made clear that the more ex- treme fears about the effects of Allende's election were not well founded. There was, for example, never.a significant threat of a Soviet military presence in Chile,. and Allende was little more hospitable to activist exiles from other Latin American countries than had been his predecessor, Eduardo Frei. 'Nevertheless, those fears, sometimes. exaggerated, appeared.to.h activated officials in Washington. . Covert action formed one of a triad of official American actions toward Chile. Covert action supported a vigorous oppo- sition to Allende, while the "cool but correct" overt posture ~pproved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 smn 2 11 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 ?_200 11 17 20 21 22 25 denied the Allende government a handy foreign enemy to use as al rallying point. The third line of U.S. action was economic. Tie United States did what it could to put economic pressure on Chile and encouraged other.nations to adopt similar policies. The subject of this report is covert action, but those operations did not take place in a vacuum. It is worth spendin a moment to describe the economic pressures, overt and covert, which were applied simultaneously. The United States cut off further new economic aid to Chile, denied credits, and made efforts, partially successful, to enlist the cooperation of international financial institutions and private firms in tightening the economic squeeze on Chile. Now to the effort of covert action itself.' More than half of the 40 Committee-approved funds supported the oppositio political parties in Chile: the Christian Democratic Party, the National Party and several splinter groups. CIA funds enabled the major opposition parties to purchase their own radio stations and newspapers. All opposition parties were passed money prior to the April 1971 municipal elections, the March 1973 congressional elections, and periodic by-elections, Covert:-'support also enabled the parties to maintain a vigorous anti-propaganda campaign throughout the Allende years. Besides funding political parties, the 40 Committee approv d .large amounts .to sustain opposition media and thus to maintain a large-scale prpaganda campaign. Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 . Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 As mentioned, before, a million and a half dollars went to one opposition publication alone, the major Santiago newspaper, El Mercurio, Chile's ;oldest: newspaper. The Unitted'.. States Government calculated that El.Mercurio, under pressure from the Allende government, would not survive without covert U.S. support. At the same time, however, CIA documents acknowledged that only El Mercurio, and to a lesser extent, the papers belonging to the opposition parties were under severe pressure from the Chilean government. The freedom of the press continued in Chile until the military coup in 1973. Let me say just a word about two specific topics which hav been the subject of great public interest: The first of these U.S. relations with private sector opposition groups during the Allende years and United States actions vis-a-vis the Chilean military. Covert support for private sector groups was a sensitive issue for the U.S. Government during this period because some of these groups were involved with anti- government strikes and were known to agitate for a military- intervention. In September 1972, the 40 Committee authorized .$24,000 for "emergency support" of a powerful businessmen's .organization at the same. time the 40 Committee decided against financial support to other private sector organizations because of their possible involvement in anti-government strikes.. In October 1972, the 40 Committee approved $100,000 for three private sector groups, but according to the CIA, this m rney 'approved For Release 2003/10116: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 was earmarked only for activities in support of opposition cand~ dates-in' the March 1973 congressional elections. On August 20, the 40 Committee approved further money for private sector groups, but that money was dependent on the approval of the U.S. Ambassador and Department of State, and none of these funds were passed before the military coup. American decisions during this period suggest a careful distinction between supporting opposition groups and aiding elements trying to bring about a military coup on the other. B given the turbulent conditions in Chile, such a distinction was difficult to sustain. There were many close links among the opposition political parties, private sector groups, militant trade associations, and the paramilitary groups of the extreme right. In one instance, a CIA-supported private sector group passed several thousand dollars to striking truck owners. That support was contrary to Agency groundrules, and.th CIA 'rebuked the 'group,-..but nevertheless passed it money the next Mn With respect to the covert links with the Chilean military during the Allende years, the basic U.S. purpose was monitoring coup-plotting within the Chilean military. To that end, the CI. .developed a number of information "assets" at various levels within the-Chilean military.. Once this network was in place, by September 1971, the CIA Station in Santiago and Headquarters in Washington discussed how it should be used. At one point, the Station in Santiago suggested that the pproved For Release.2003/10/1.6 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 14 20 ~pproved For Release 2003/10/16 :.CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 ultimate goal of its military program was a military solution to?the.Chilean problem. But CIA Headquarters cautioned that there was no 40 Committee approval for the United States become involved in coup plotting. There is no evidence:that.- the United States did become so involved in coup plotting. Yet several CIA efforts suggest a more active stance than merely collecting information. One of these operations was a deception operation involving the passage of information, some of it fabricated by the CIA, which would alert Chilean officers to real or purported Cuban involvement in the Chilean Army. At another point, the CIA station in Santiago provided short-lived financial support to one small magazine aimed at military officers. On September 11, 1973, of course, Salvador Allende was toppled by a military coup. Let me just say several words about Chile since the coup, and about U.S. covert action in Chile since the coup. After the coup the military junta moved quickly to consolidate. its political power. Political parties were.banned Congress was put in indefinite recess. Censorship was insti- .tuted. Supporters of Allende and others deemed opponents of the new regime were jailed, and the military leader, Agusto Pinochet indicated. that the military might have to rule Chile ..for two generations. The prospects for revival of democracy in Chile have not pproved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200.080001-6 ~pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 improved over the past two,years. Charges concerning the violations of civil rights in Chile persist. Most recently, the United Nations report on Chile charged that torture centers are being operated in Santiago and other parts of the country. The Pinochet government continues to prevent international investigative groups from.free movement in Chile, and in several instances, has not permitted these groups to enter Chile at all. After the coup, the United STates covert action program in .Chile sank dramatically. No major new initiatives were under- taken, and what projects were continued operated at'a low level These consisted really of maintaining media assets and several other small activities. . During this period, the CIA also renewed its liaison asset with Chilean government's security and intelligence forces. However, in doing so, the CIA was sensitive to worries that liaison with such organiza-cions would open the CIA to charges of political repression, and the CIA sought to ensure that its support for activities designed to control external subversives were not used on internal subversives as well. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Thank you very much. That concludes thq panel presentation. There is---another vote on the Senate floor. I think this might be a good.time'for a brief recess to. give the members a Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-0073.5R000200080001-6 smn 7 ;Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 chance to return. 2205 (A brief recess was taken.) The Chairman. The staff members on the panel have finished their presentation, and before we go to our next witnesses, Senator Goldwater has indicated that he has some questions for the panel, and so I recognize Senator Goldwater for that purpose.4 Senator Goldwater. Mr. Miller, on page 6 of your presen- tation, you say the record examined thus far shows that covert action programs over the past 30 years have been successful generally against weak nations and far less so against our major potential enemies. How many cases have you examined over the past 30 years? Mr. Miller. How many cases has the Committee staff reviewed? Well, in depth, Senator, we have done six. We have reviewed in general terms the entire. scale of covert action, both in budgetary terms, geographical coverage, and with some attempt to measure success and quality. The reason for this disparity of success against the major potential enemies such as the Soviet Union and China I -think are fairly clear. Those nations have very . strong.authori tarian governments. It is very difficult to collect information there. It is very difficult to mount operations. -It is not the case in the nations which are not authoritarian in structure or do not have such disciplined secret services, and have the pproved For Release 2003/10/16 :CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 smn I O C 0 14 19 ;Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 2206 police state that is not as effective as those of the Soviet Union and China, but I do not think I should go into any detail in open session. Senator Goldwater. Well, has the Committee examined any cases that involved Soviet Russia or Red China or any other potential strong adversary? Mr. Miller. We have in certain areas. We have had an inquiry into particularly the areas of counterintelligence, and also the area of'collection. Senator Goldwater. Are you saying we've conducted covert actions against major potential enemies?. Mr. Miller. There have been attempts, particularly in the period immediately following the end.of the Second World War, the beginning of the Cold War. Senator Goldwater. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think this is a rather important. statement. I know we cannot discuss it in public, but: I would suggest that proper officials of the CIA be recalled to testify as to what we have done in this general field. If we are going to.pick on-Chile alone as an example of covert action while we have heard testimony that there have .been covert actions against major enemies, I think we have to look into that also, and I would request that Mr. Bader or Mr. -- or any representative of the CIA be called back to testify as to what we're talking about when we hear this kind of testimony. Approved For Release 2003/10/16 :.CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 The Chairman. Senator, I have no objection to your request of.thi.s Committee. As far as I am concerned, I would like to examine all of.these covert actions in, the past, because I thi so many of them have been wrong, and our problem. is that we cannot get the Administration to agree to any kind of public presentation to any of these operations. It has only been as aresult of very extended. efforts that we have been able to present the Chilean case, to obtain the cooperation of the Administration in a very limited way, with respect to sanitizin the presentation ' to protect legitimate security interests of the United States. We've had no such offer from the administration with respect to any other covert operation. Senator Goldwater. We've heard nothing about any other covert action such as has been discussed by Mr. Miller. Had we heard of it, I think the members on my side would certainly have requested that a study be done, and I would suggest that if this team can do as thorough job on Chile as they have done, they certainly ought to be able to do an equally good job on a much larger country such as the Soviet Union or Red China, or any other large potential enemy. I don't think we can let a statement like this stand. Now, if Mr. Miller wants to change it, fine. But I don't want to see this made a matter of public record that we, without saying so, that we have conducted covert actions against 'Approved For Release. 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 . 14 C 0 N 19 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 potential enemies of a large scale. I think this is wrong. However, before you start I might say that had we seen Mr. Miller's statement before he read it, we might have. been ab. to clear this up. We did not see any statements on this side of the table. We listened to them, and I think this is the first time in the whole history of this Committee that the minority side had been sort of kept outside the tent. And I just want to register my protest against that kind of treatment.. If the press is going to be given statements that we're not allowed to see, I've served on these committees before and I can tell you, when the bell of end comes, that is when it rings. We didn't see the report until we sat down today. If we're going to have to put upwith that The Chairman. Senator Goldwater, may I simply say that no member of the Committee on either side had the statement. That was an oversight on the part of the Committee.. Each member_;should have had these statements before every Senator. That is the normal procedure. That is the procedure that we have followed in the past and will-follow in the future. This was purely an oversight and when it was called to my attentionn.. I immediately asked that'the'statements be placed before all members. Senator Goldwater. Well, I would like to have an answer to my request :that we get a statement from the CIA -- if they say they can't do it,' then we're going to have to go higher, to Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 ~4pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 see what we've done against the Soviets and Red China, because to my knowledge we have done nothing. The Chairman. Well, the covert operations have been reviewed in executive session, all of them,.and?it has been the objection of the Administration itself that has largely prevented the Committee from developing any more cases in public session than this one, and so I have no objection to your request, Senator Goldwater, but I would solicit your help with the Administration in hopes that we could clear the way for a public presentation of other covert actions-. But it has been the opposition of the Administration and their refusal to make witnesses available that has handicapped the Committee in this regard. Senator Goldwater. It might have been done in some other administration. I'd like to find out whether it happened under Kennedy or Johnson or Nixon or just who was the one that though they could perpetrate a covert action upon the Soviets. That's a rather sneaky task. I'd like to know how they came out, not that I'm opposed to..it. . The Chairman. Well, Mr. Miller, do you have any further response to the Senato'r's question? Mr. Miller. No, I will endeavor to fulfill Senator Goldwater's request. I think that is the best response. The Chairman. Very well. Well., while the-panel is.here, if anybody wants to questio pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 snQ.mnl2 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 members, please feel free. Senator Mondale? Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. What do the records show to be-the threat that we thought we had.to meet by frustrating and overthrowing Allende?' (Pause) What is this, a commercial break? Mr. Treverton. Well, let me. say a word about that. The question is, what -- you are interested in what the perception of officials in Washington were about -.- Senator Mondale. Why did we want to get rid of!Allende? What did our specialists say was at stake? Mr. Treverton. There is some difficulty with that questio because as we pointed out in the report, there is some dif- ?ference between what the government's-intelligence specialists were saying and the National Intelligence Estimates about Chile.and the threat it posed to the United States. Senator Mondale. In other words, this was the apparatus that we have established to collect information and evaluate it is that right? Mr. Treverton. That's right. Senator Mondale. And what did they say about the threat that Mr. Allende posed to this country? Mr.Inderfurth. I think the official threats that were perceived had to do with the presence of the Soviets in Chile, Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved.For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 . the question of subversion of other Latin American Governments using Chile as a base. There was a concern about a movement by Allende, despite the fact that he had been elected consti- tutionally, moving down the road toward a Marxist totalitarian state. There was a press conference given September 16th, 1970 in which -- it was a background press briefing, in which Dr. Kissinger referred to the irreversibility of the Chilean election, meaning that it was doubtful there would be another free election in Chile. So I think that these concerns, as well as the economic concerns. The U.S. had quite a bit of private capital invested in Chile. I think these were the motivating factors that had raised our concern. Now, in our examination of the NIE's, over a period of time, the threat that Allende posed to Chile seemed to be less shrill. Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 221.2 Senator Mondale. On page 229 of the Assassination Report, the CIA's Director of Intelligence circulated an intelligence community assessment on the impact of the Allende government on U.S. national interest. Mr. Inderfurth. That's right. Senator Mondale. September 7, 1970. It says, one, the u has no vital ria.tiorial interest .in:Chi.lie.and there could be some economic losses. Two, the world military balance would not be significantly altered by the Allede government. Three, an Allende victory would create. considerable political and psychological cost and the hemisphere collision would be threatened by the challenge of Allenge. that right? WARD :CSI I Sen. Sel. CIA 12/4/075 Tape 4 1 N 0 N I8 24 Mr. Inderfurth. Yes, sir. Senator riondale. So that in terms of this nation's interest, at least the 1970 estimate was that it did not directly threaten America. Mr. Inderfurth. That's correct. Senator Mondale . I~Tow did Mr. Allende ever act in. a way' which undermined the democratic procedures established by the constitution of Chile? Mr. Inderfurth. That has been. the subject of debate. Two charges have been raised about his opposition to political parties, as well as his oT-)positlon to the media. We have looked into both of those areas and despite the fear that there ~4pproved~lor elease~~lb8!t'~&/ 6 f' Tk-R%~P~d ~~0~3~5R b0 00Q8D001t ere were i n C 3 0 E 11 16 18 (Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 2213 fact national elections, municipal elections, there were Congressional elections, trade union elections continued, the political parties prospered. Of course today you see there are no political parties functioning is Chile.. C.oncerning the press, the record there does indicate that Allende was exerting some pressure on the opposition press, especially El .-Mercurio. There were'instances in which radio stations were closed. I think the number is three. El Mercurio itself was closed down for a day, but the court invalidated that and it was reopen the next day. There are also charges that the government was attempting to take over a paper company which was the.suppiying company for the newsprint in Chile. The government backed off. .The NIE is taking note of this growing government domination of the press, indicated that El Mercurio had, managed to retain its independence or had been able to continue operating. This was in 1971. . . . 'In '72 it.stated that the opposition news media in Chile persisted in denouncing the Allende regime and continued to resist government intimidation. At no point during Allende's regime was there press censorship. Of course that is the state today. . So 'I think the record shows that in some ways he was moving forcefully to stifle some of the opposition press, but -pproved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 certainly not all. Senator Mondale. In the hearings, with Mr. David Phillips, I Asked Mr. Phillips on page 59, and he had extensive background 15. and experience in Chile, whether although -- is it your judgement that although Allende was Marxist and espoused Marxism, that he also wanted to achieve this through the democratic process? And although there was some rough stuff in the press, essentially that was the course he was pursuing. Mr: Phillips said, I don't recall what he said but he indeed acted that way. And-did he attempt to achieve his Marxist philosophy with popular support under the Constitutions system? Mr. Phillips said, yes, essentially that is, true. the record-we have seen. In Chile.they have a term for it, Via Pacifica, which is the peaceful road, which is the road that Allende had followed. He had run for the Presidency four times, each time going back to try again, And the record is unclear, obviously,. where he would have taken Chile. . Senator Mondale. They were afraid that although he had never made a move by force to take it over, that he might. Mr. Inderfurth. That was the concern. Senator 1,1ondale. Even though he'd never done it. Mr. Inderfurth. That's right. Senator _Mondale. And I believe Mr. Kissinger, when we 25 asked him that, said what we are afraid of is that he would pproved For Release. 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 10 16' 17 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 establish a Communist-dominated dictatorship very similar to Portugal.. Mr. Inderfurth. He's used that example as well as Cuba. The fear-of another Cuba in Latin America was very strong. Senator Mondale. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Senator Hart. Senator Hart of Colorado. -I don't know which member of the'staff to direct the question,: but there have been suggestions .that. a considerable amount'of money, which was funne~]_ed into Chile from this country, went into assistance of labor unions, trade unions, in Chile in support of strike efforts against the Allende government.*. Could you provide information to the Committee in this regard as to amounts of money. and whether in fact substantial amounts did in fact provide covert support to strikers,: particularly between 1971 and 1973? Mr. Inderfurth. I think the record here is clear, at least from the approval stage. We have approved the.records and there was never a 40 Committee authorization for funding strikers in Chile. Shortly before the coup there was a CIA recommendation for funding. of the strikers. It is unclear whether or not that proposal ever reached the 40 Committee, but it is clear that the 40 Committee never approved any funds. Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 'pp'roved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 The 40 Committee approval of funding private sector organizations. is another matter:. These organizations were sympathetic to and in support of the strikers, and on three separate occasions the 40 Committee did approve funding for these private sector organizations. The total amount spent was something around $100,000. Now these funds. were provided with the contingency that 'they would not filter down to the strikers, but at least in one instance, and.the sum is rather small, $2,800. These funds did go through a private sector organization to a strikin group. These were against the Agency's ground rules for funding strikers. In fact, Nathaniel Davis, who was there at the time, and the State Department, had strenuously. objected The total amount authorized was something over $1 million. to any funding of the strikers. So I think where.we come out on that is that the 40 Committee never really approved any funds. A small amount we know of did filter down. Whether or not other CIA money that went into private sector operations or private parties ever made it to the strikers, we have not been able to determine from the record. Senator Hart of Colorado. C Ihy was there a . policy against this assistance to strikers? Mr. Inderfurth. There's no question that the strikers were creating the climate in which military coup appeared to %pproved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 2217 be inevitable. So any direct assistance to the strikers would be directly heating up, building up tension,in*Chile, which eventually did lead toward the'coup. So whereas we would support El Mercurio, the political parties, when you moved into the private sector area, you got closer and closer to real tension within the society and to the coup eventually. So I think that was a concern. Senator Hart of Colorado. That's all, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Do any other Senators desire to ask questions of the panel. Senator Schweiker? Senator.Schweiker.. Yes,.Mr. Chairman. What time frame .did we start funding El Mercurio? Do you have any kind of date as to when we started putting money into El Mercurio. 23 24 25 as a CIA expenditure? Mr.'Treverton. The first funds went to El Mercurio in the late spring of 1970 -- I'm sorry, the late' fall of 19.70 or the early spring of 1971. ? Senator Schweiker. Did we previously put money into prior to that period in El Mercurio? Mr. Treverton. Yes. Part of that period we financed assets. That is people who worked for El Mercurio and who received small amounts of money from the CIA to write stories or run stories favorable to American interests. pproved For Release 2003/10116: CIA-RDP90-00735R00020008000-1-6 14 15 21 23 25 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 We had-not prior to that time provided substantial support to the operation of the paper. Senator Schwelker. And we are not certain when the support for the operation began, or are we? Mr. Treverton. We a.re.certain. I just don't have it right here in front of me. Senator Schweiker. Is it prior to our involvement 1,-with going ahead with the 1970 program against Allendge? Or don't we have that?',;,-. Mr. Treverton. It would have been after Allende's inauguration. That is after the Track I, Track II period. After the election period. It came,in'the period after Allende'sinauguration._.,'We decided'on this program-to support opposition parties and.media. Senator Schweiker. Would it have been before the Septemb the. 15th meeting, 1970? Mr. Treverton. It was after that. It was either November,. 1970, or April, 1971. Perhaps I can,give you the exact date. (Pause) . Mr. Treverton. Perhaps it was as late as September, 1971, so it was surely after the '70 election period. Senator Schweiker. That's all?I have, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. The Chairman. Senator IIud(, leston? pproved For Release. 2003/10/16- : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6' pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Senator IIuddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I've not heard all the questioning and I hope I'm not repetitious, but in the original presentation, it was not. clear in our relationship with the removal and subsequent death of General Schneider that our policy clearly was it was not that he should be clone away with. There was no tension there, although we were attempting to forment a coup d'etat to prevent the ascension of Allende to President. Also, I think it is important to understand that the reason that General Schneider had to he removed was that even though he. was not a particular sympathizer with Allende, he was a constitutionalist and he believed in his government's constitution, which subordinated the military to the civilian rule.. And. because of that, he was not interested in leading a coup or participating in one. Is that not accurate? Mr. Treverton. Yes, those points are correct and well Senator Huddleston. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The Chairman. Any further questions of this panel? ,If not,. thank you very much, gentlemen. We will call.-,the next three witnesses, Mr. Ralph' Duncan, .-Ir. Charles Meyer, . and Mr. Edward I:or.ry. (Pause) The Chairman. gentlemen, in accordance with the practice pproved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200-080001-6 11 14 15 16 17 18 23 25 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735ROO0200080001-6 of the Committee would you stand and be sworn? Do you solemnly swear that. all the testimony you will give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you Cod? t-Mr. r:orry. I do., Mr. . Dungan. I do. Mr. Meyer. I do. The Chairman. Thank you. I understand each of you has an opening statement and perhaps the logical way to proceed would be chronologically starting with Mr. Dungan, please. Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735ROO020008O001-6 C 3 E 14 15 18 23 25 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 TESTIMONY OF RALPH DUNGAN, FORMER UNITED STATES AMB ISSADOR TO CHILE I?Ir. . Dungan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I appreciate your invitation'to testify in this public hearing on U.S. intelligence activities in Chile. You are ultimately. interested,, I-take .it, in the question of what changes in policies, laws, and administrative procedures are.indicated as a result of this Committee's inquiries and other information which. has been made public recently. I am prepared to answer questions'about any matter of interest to the Committee about which I had knowledge and which I can recollect but I shall refrain with your indulgence from mentioning names of either.Chilean or U.S. nationals. As a citzen who for many years in and out of government had advocated stringent. curbs on covert action, I must candidly state that I have very serious doubts that further public disclosure of specific instances of excess, of illegal or immoral. operations are necessary to enable the Congress to act forthrightly, intelligently, and effectively'.in correcting what has been for many years we. now see with the amazing clarity of hindsight -- a national disgrace. But whatever the Committee: decision is with respect to the revelation of.specific actions, I intend to assist in any way that you think I can in your difficult task. With. the cgreatest respect to the members of pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Ipproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 this Committee, to the Senate, to the House, it is well to remember that to the extent that excessed have occurred in the past in Chile, or elsewhere, they have transpired under imprecir, Congressional mandates, haphazard Congressional oversight and with moneys provided by.the Congress. During the 1964-67 period, when.I was Ambassador to Chile,.U.S. covert activities in Chile were.not extensive and most, were irrelevant to and not directed at Chilean political institutions. They were on the whole directed toward the gathering and cross checking of intelligence about internal, hemispheric and international affairs.. The Chief of Station was an old hand in Latin America and had a strong bias toward the intelligence function and.shared my personal skepticism about-the desirability or utility of U.S. involvement in covert activities not specifically oriented toward the collection of intelligence. The naives of CIA agents or sources Were not made known to me except on specific request. First-hand sources tended to be on.the political right. in addition to. covert intelligence gathering there were three other types of covert activities-- my-classification. Those involving international- targets or problems such as surveillance of suspected agents from other countries, those activities of the agency of a benign nature -- my term, benign albeit interventionist, such as support for a private agency engaged in social or economic development, and finally Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 w 0 23 25 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 those directed toward the influencing of some Chilean insti- tution, individual, or even for the purpose of producing a result which ostensibly advanced U.S. interests. None of these three types of actions were extensively engaged in Chile during the 1964-67 period. To the extent that they were especially as regards the latter category , that is,'intervening political activity, they were reprehensible in principle, I now believe. I might add that at the time they were relatively harmless and ineffective. To sum up, during the 1964-67 period in Chile relatively little covert activity was undertaken and little of more than marginal significance or effectiveness T,,as directed at Chilean institutions or political processes. It seems to me, Mr. Chairman, that we should: accept. the fact that covert activity has . characterized. and will continue to characterize statecraft. It would he foolish and hypocritic for the Congress or the Executive Branch to pretent that we can will, or should abstain from covert activity. Nor do I think- that it is realistic to confine cevert.actions by law.solely to intelligence gathering or counter-intelligence, much as one might be tempted to follow this course. .I noted with interest the staff report makes that point very clear. You cannot distinguish intelligence from other kinds of covert. activity. On the other hand, the inquiries of this Committee seem 4pproved . For Release. 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 to me to establish conclusively the urgent need to define with greater clarity and precision than we have in the past, the limits we impose on ourselves in utilizing covert action ir,.the pursuit of our objectives. Of equal. importance is the necessity to establish processes and procedures which establish an effective system of checks and balances in accordance with the fundamental constitutional principle to which we subscribe. I submit that as regards our treatment of.covert?action we have neglected to apply rigorously either this principle or the principle of enumerated powers. It is difficult to specify in detail covert actions which may be utilized but I believe that Congress should examin the basic.statutes under which the Agency operates with a view to introducing general prohibitions against certain types'of .actions except under extraordinary'circumstances and pursuant 23 25 to specific approvals defined by regulation. For example, one might wish to prdhibit generally any action to be taken outside the U.S. which if committed in the continental limits would be subject to criminal penalties. Murder would be one of those. I do not mean to suggest that this is the only or .necessarily the most important statutory guideline or restriction I use it only as an example. If.anything is clear from the record you have compiled and from the experience of many over the years, it is that individuals at all level, have taken great liberties without pproved. For Release. 2003/10/16 :.CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release. 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 the knowledge or authorization or any responsible person or group. To be fair, responsible persons may have knowingly or unwittingly given some signal or tacit approval or so it may have been perceived by those with operational responsibiI i Suffice it to say that it is high time we state at.least in general what type of covert actions we as a nation believe are. permissible and in accord with our values and traditions. I think that with respect to our intelligence activities, we have forgotten that we are a government of laws and not of men. We have relied excessively on the best and the brightest. We need to return to a system grounded in law, regulation, and procedure. Therefore, I believe that, at a minimum, we need to develop more explicit procedures which must be.followed and approvals which must be obtained before departing from the usual standards which should be set forth generally in statute and, faith greater particularity,.in regulation. Mr. Chairman, as important as a.general statutory definit'o of the rules of the game is, it is of paramount importance that a structure of statutory and regulatory checks and balances be created promptly. One should strive for simple mechanisms so that the lines of responsiblity and accountability are clear and unambiguous. My experience and a reacting of the record suggests that any future President -~zould be well-advised to appoint a deputy pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 rroved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 2226 0 11 19 to the National Security Advisor whose sole responsibility would be to monitor intelligence activities of all agencies, especially covert actions. It is apparent to me now and should have been in years past, that the special intricacies of this field and the special responsibility of the President strongly"suggests the need for more capability than we had in the early '60s in the Office of the National Security Advisor. Those who might argue that this arrangement unnecessa concentrates in the President's.office super-operational power ignore, I believe, the burden which the President bears in this area and his need'-for capable, informed, and inclependeni{ judgment. While I feel less secure in this suggestion because I do not consider myself an expert in the internal' organization .and structure of the CIA, I'th'ink it worth considering the adverse results which oftentimes flow from the establishment' of a permanent organization and cadre of bright, active persons. Like any other, bureaucracy, private or public, an established group tends, following the Parkinson principle, to generate work to keep it occupied. Where, as I believe has been the case with CIA, a unit is amply funded, prides itself in being gung ho and capable of response to the'most extravagant demands, you.have the ingredients of trouble. If you add a degree of ideological bias within the limit and lack. of restraint by political authority outside the unit, Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 0 0 0 sh o16 2 10 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 almost any excess is imaginable. All- of this leads me to suggest that a drastic cutback in the number of parsons involved both in.the field and t'lashington should be examined. As regards what is now known as DDO, I would venture to say that the elimination of permanent personnel and units dedicated, to the perfection of devices or techniques to meet esoteric contingencies would go far to eliminate some of the excesses which have crept into the system, and which you have documented very well. I do not maintain that there are some capabilities which should be maintained at the. ready, hut'I suspect that mos could be energized as requirements arose and that any delays which might be involved would be beneficial rather than otherwise. I am hopeful that these few remarks may be helpful to the Committee, Mr. Chairman, and I stand ready to answer any questions you may have. The Chairman. Thanl_ you very much, Mr. Dungan. Mr. Meyer? Approved For Release.2003/10/16: C1A-RDP90-0073.5R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 TESTIMONY OP CHARLES A. MEYER, FORMER ASSISTANT 10~ 11 SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTER-N1ERICAN AFFAIRS Mr. Meyer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, distinguished Senators. I am present by your invitation, Mr. Chairman, and as I wrote this on December 3rd, I hadn't received for study your Committee paper on Chile. I had received the published document on,"alleged assassination." And quite obviously, I hadn't a clue as to the staff statement.which I understood would introduce this meeting. My statement, therefore, does not respond to any of the specifics of your Chilean examination except that I am not, never have been, and never expect to be party to assassination. Instead, if I may, I'll simply say that my reason for being here in the context of the long work of your Committee is that I believe it is fundamentally of great importance to our country. I know little or nothing of the domestic aspect of your work.-.- I'm focused on the international aspect. I want to start with a bit from the past, an excerpt from a fascinating article in Smithsonian Magazine of January, 1975. The article, by Robert Wallace, is called, in short, "The Barbary Wars." 0 "In Washington., Eaton, the U.S. Consul in Tunis, laid Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 before Jefferson a scheme that had been developing among Americans in the Mediterranean for a couple of years. The Dashaw of. Tripoli was a usurper, having stolen the throne from an older brother who was now wandering forlornly somewhere in Africa. Eaton proposed to find the. brother, give him sympathy and support and install him as rightful head of state. Jefferson approved the idea and thus was launched the first, although not the last, American effort to overthrow an -objectionable-foreign ruler and put a cooperative one in his place. Jefferson also chose to.have that plot proceed quietly, in twilight. He would send the would-be bashaw, through Eaton, a few artillery pieces and 1000'small arms. Eaton himself was to be given .a vague title --."Navy agent of the United States for Barbary regencies" -- and placed under the jurisdiction of the commodore of the Mediterranean squadron. If he could accomplish something,, fine. If not, small loss." This issue, resolved by the U.S. Navy in 1815, was piracy against American merchantrien and tribute paid by the USA. It was in in modern translation, expropriation with negative compensation. Interestingly, the Barbary t'7ars story, while unique in its time and place, has in it many of the seeds which over 160 years have grown into the forest of U.S. interest versus foreign policy versus practice which this Committee is tring, or so it seems to me, to. cut its way through, not just pproved For Release. 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 intelligence. Speaking to intelligence, I have to reminisce about visiting President Kennedy at his request shortly after the Bay of Pigs. He met me outside- the Oval Office door and after hells from both families, he held his arm next to mine and said, "Iley, look., we're wearing the same suit." I answered, "Not exactly, Mr. President, because I bought mine at X and you bought yours at Y He looked at rae, paused, smiled wryly and said, "Charlie, your intelligence is a hell of a lot better than mine." In support of his implication, I.uncderstand -- and I .hope accurately that this Committed has thoughtfully recognized the essentiality of an intelligence capability of the highest order as. indispensable to the national and vital interests of our country and indeed the free world. ? If that is correct, the next question:is what.do you do with it. And that question cannot be fully answered without concurrent consideration of the evolution of: The perceived national interests, and the perceived vital interests of our country. The actions taken in the defense of these interests. ,.The decision-making process, both in relation to defini of national.and vital interests and in relation to actions Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 21 All of us know that the Congress has played a large part in,the overt decision-making process in relation to national interest, and the laws of our land are heavy with overtly interventionist intent. All of us know that an overview linkage has long existed between the Executive and the Legislative in the pure intelligence area, designating those on the Bill, by Congressional action, who had a "need to know." Therefore, when asked, as I constantly have been, what is the Church Committee trying to do, I've replied that I' believed that this Committee under your Chairmanship, Senator Church, was working apolitically towarck a responsible mechanism for definition of and defense of the national interest -- further, that I thought I knew many of you well enough to be able to discern a high level of concern for the future quality of and maintenance of U.S. moral leadership in concert with the responsibility of political and economic and military preeminent and in a very tough world. _ Given the accuracy of that evaluation, and the excellence of the staff work done to date, I have in honesty asked myself the question continuously whether the committee really needs further testimony in depth on any geographical or national area. That is not a question motivated by SYA -- but rather by the hope that the formation by new parameters for policy arid practice at the dawn of our third century does not require Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 10 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 that we throw the baby out with the bath water. You all recognize that any action by the USA or even.perhaps specifically the action of revelation can be destabilizing where least expected. My point is not whitewash but that the staff has information from which to proceed constructively. We three here,. as Ralph has already said, and countless others can he useful in consultation toward a desired end -- we can countless others can be helpful in .arriving at answers to the many parts of the great questions your Committee' has raised, generic questions from the past, but most imporantly, questions for the future and not answered easily: Who in our sovereign nation should define and periodicall update our national and vital interests? Who shall be the judge as to whether intelligence collect indicated movements inimical to our interests? What may our sovereign nation-do, if anything, when intelligence is judged to indicate movements inimical to our interests and, who makes that decision?' And a cruestion of my own -- given the ideal solutions to these questions, what should our nation do about kiss and tell syndrome which confuses public confession and traitorous action. I wonder if somebody wrote that with an expatriate, entrepreneur-agent 'in mind. The.. future credibility of the USA will be tough to- Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 r 2233 11 25 maintain no matter how high the level of international judiciousness to which we aim if nobody trusts the USA to keep a shared confidence in confidence or a shared secret in secret. I know that all of you know from career experiences that one of the agonizing processes in any aspect of public, life is that of learning what not to disclose. Mr. Chairman and gentlemen, it has taken me since Thanksgiving day to compress a kaleidoscopic view of the complex world out there and my four years in it into these observations.. They are not.subjectively motivated, hut they do reflect my objective conviction of the great responsibilities you have shouldered Thank you for your invitation; 'The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Meyer, for your statement. We have a vote again. I think we,had better stretch so we will. hold a brief-recess for the vote. (A brief recess was taken) Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 AMI/smnl t. 5Q, fls ogsh Ipproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 The Chairman. The members of the panel will please-return ? Mr. Korry, you have a statement you would like to make at Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Lproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 STATEMENT OF MR. EDWARD M. KORRY, FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO CHILE Mr. Korry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and gentlemen. I requested the CIA program in Chile. I planned much of the covert action in 1970. I drafted most of the policy that the United States pursued with the Allende Government in 1971, the year of my departure. I met with President Nixon in the Oval Office two weeks before General Schneider was murdered. Italked with Dr. Kissinger before and after'that grotesque and inexcusable episode, and met with. several layers of CIA official men. I was propositioned by key Chileans anxious to involve the United States in hair-brained plots. I even attended a 40 Committee meeting. Yet this is the first time I appear before your Committee. For the past year I assumed, and I requested and demanded,. finally I implored to be interrogated by you gentlemen. I said? as I said today, that every cable of mine, good and bad, and there were plenty of bad ones, could be open to the public. No Daniel has ever tried so`hard to get. inside the lion's den. The Chairman. Well, you are here, Mr. Korry. Mr. Korry. Yes. The equivalent'of due process is what I was counting upon, fair play, decency, justice, call it what you will, guaranteed, -I thought, at least one occasion'to talk to you before you 2.5 wrote and published a. report which deals with serious public pproved For Release. 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 issues, grave questions of morality, and which invokes my name often. Again, and again, you, Senator Church, and your staff promised a hearing. The fact, though, is that I was barred fro speaking to this Committee, even in executive session before your Assassination Report was published and propagated, even delayed this public appearance until they had their second. report on Chile written, reviewed and ready for the printing. The Chairman. Mr. Korry, I don't mean to interrupt you because if we're going to make charges.-- Mr. Korry. I will make many so, sir, so perhaps it would be better to save it to the end. The Chairman. I just want to say that you were interviewe for about five hours by a member of the staff. At'that time we were looking into the assassination question. We were informed by the staff that you had no knowledge. Your transcri showed that you had no knowledge of the .so-called-Track ]1, which was the thing we were.looking at, and it was for that reason that we didn't call you in executive session for further testimony. It was not for the purpose of excluding you. We were looking for witnesses at that time who could give us testimony relating to the general subject of assassination, which was then the subject of our executive. hearing. But it was not for any purpose of excluding you. 25 The.staff member who'interviewed you concluded that you pproved. For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 had no information to give on that subject. That was the only reason why you were not called. Mr. Korry. Mr. Chairman, if I may respond to just that one point, if that were true, Mr. Treverton, the man who inter- viewed me, would not have written subsequently to me asking me to be prepared to address myself to questions on the Assassination Report. I will submit his letter in the record. So, to get back to the narrative. I wrote a 27 1/2 page typewritten statement, 10,000 words, which you received October 28th, according to the Postal Service. I asked that each Senator be given a copy promptly so that each would have one full week to consider it with care, but without publicity, before I testified on the scheduled date; November 4th. I thought it was only fair and honorable.to give you an opportu to review the rather meaty disclosures I make, as well as the charges I level against you, Senator. Church, and the staff another Committee that you Chair. I also wanted everyone to reflect on some rescuing truths; that America deserves and needs, truths that will push some air into the suffocating national guilt that you, Mr. Chairman have done so much in the_past~ three years to propagate. Your staff, though, blamed your peers, Senator Church, for the decision that the public hearing be-delayed. I was told that you, Senator, wanted the hearing, but minority members, Republicans; were responding to White House pressure. pproved For Release. 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release'2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 The majority members, Democrats, were chary about what might be-said ih public concerning the Kennedy years. I now formally resubmit that written statement, together with Mr. Treverton's letter to me, for the. record. The Chairman. Well, for the record, then, it is incumbent, upon me to say that your original statement, when it was received, was distributed. to all members of the Committee. Mr. Korry. I didn't say that it wasn't. The Chairman. They did have an opportunity to read it, and I received no special request, based upon the reading of this document, that you be called at executive session from any member of,-the Committee, Republican or Democrat. Mr. Korry. The Assassination Report was sent to me after it was made public, out of courtesy, your'staff wrote, with what I considered to be an exquisite irony. And I read it, I comprehended why it was indispensable that we be kept mart. Almost every page of the chapter dealing with Chile, almost every page, that is, of which I have some knowledge of the facts, contains .a. dishonesty, a distortion, or a doctrine... Much is made in the Assassination report of the "II Tracks that the U.S. policy followed in Chile 'in September and October of 1970. The report stitches a new myth to suit some consciences or some ambitions or some institutions. There are, many who it might the public and history to believe that no real difference existed between the diplomatic Track I that pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 smn 6 O O 0 a 1 0 N 2 (Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 I followed, and the covert military Track II that the White? House launched. It is hog wash. Track I followed Mr. Frei, then the President of Chile and its constitutional leader. It adopted certain minimal and cosmetic sug.gestions';put'forward by one purportedly in President Frei's confidence. Track I led nowhere because President Frei would not encourage or lead any Chilean military action, and because I would neither have the U.S. through the CIA or anyone else even in the private community, assume a responsibility that had to be Chilean. I never informed President Frei of the money which was authorized for work for Track I, and not a penny, as. you also say, was spent on it. Track II, on the other hand, did not deal with Frei, did not seek his concurrence, did not follow his lead, did not. 0 O O N 19 'U C 20 p o, 1 21 pretend to be within any constitutional framework of Chile.. Track II is the track to which I've often alluded and to which my embassy had alluded in cables since 1969. The Socialist Party, Allende's party, had conspired with the same plotters in 1969's abortive coup by General.Viaux and the extreme left that is part of Allende's party, was very much involved as .the embassy reported. Indeed, the Allende government was remarkably lenient in its punishment of killers, of Schneiderls killers, and of:those.in'crlminated. because. among -'other .considerations, the military investigators who, tracked and named the murderers and. their accomplices discovered the links Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 to the extreme left activists who were intimates of and support of Allende. Now, why suppress that. Because of the propensity for rewriting history, I state here some of.the actions that I took to follow a policy totally different in direction than Trail, II and to protect the United States from any complicity in Chilean military inventions. A. I barred, from 1969 on, any U.S. Embassy or U.S. military contact with the circle around General Viaux, the man who planned the murder of Schneider. I renewed this ban in the strongest terms again and again in 1970 and thereafter. B. I barred the CIA, in late 1968 or early 1969, from any operational contact with the Chilean military without my prior. knowledge and approval. I can recall no permissive instance, from any contact with'President Frei or any Minister or deputy minister, from any contact with any major political figure without my prior approval, which was rarely gi.ven,.or any contact with the head of, or a leading figure in a government agency. C. I informed the Frei government at great personal risk,1 .without daring to inform. the. white House in-the September 15- to' October 15 period of 1970 of the most likely assassin of Allende a military man-who was then involved in provocative axts, bombings throughout Santiago. Major Arturo Marshal, General Viaux"s right hand man, was arrested thereafter, a few days pproved.Foor Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 smn 8 0 0 O O N N d d 0 1.1 in 23 LL 24 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 before the assassination of General Schneider. Why suppress D. I dissuaded U.S. private citizens who were about to be drawn into the machinations of Chilean military opponents of Allende in the September-October 1970 period. Isteered them clear, on pain of being reported to their home offices.. E. I informed the Frei government unequivocally in September and in October 1970 on several occasions that the United States had not supported, had not encouraged, would not any action by the Chilean military taken outside the constitution, independent of President Frei. F. I consistently warned the Nixon Administration., starting in early '70, 1970, months before the election, that the Chilean military was no policy alternative in Chile. I. was pressed.in September-and October by-Washington to develop possible scenarios for independent Chilean military interventio in Chile.. Without exception, my responses excluded all possibilities. Indeed, I warned gratuitously and very strongly on two occasions that if anyone were considering such schemes, it would be disastrous for U.S. interests. . Let me read from two cables.sent to Undersecretary of State, U. Alexis Johnson and Dr. Henry Kissinger, so that the public can judge for itself. . One, on September 25, "Aside from the merits of a coup and its implications-for the United States, .I am convinced we Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 cannot provoke one and that we should not run any risks simply to-have another Bay of Pigs. Hence I have instructed our military and CAS" that is, the CIA, "not to engage in the Again on October 9, the same two addresses, eyes: only, ".In sum, I think any attempt on our part actively to encourage a coup, could lead us to a Bay of Pigs failure. I am appalled to discover that there is liaison for terrorists and coup plotting," names deleted. "I have never been consulted or informed of what, if any role, the U.S. may have in the financing of" names deleted. "An abortive coup, and I and my chief State colleagues, FSO's, are unalterably convinced that this is what is here under discussion, not more beknownst to me, would be an unbelieved disaster for the U.S. and for the President. It's consequences would be to strongly reinforce Allende now and in the future, and do the gravest harm to U. S. interests throughout Latin America, if not beyond." Letter G. I was so alarmed by a coup possibility that I requested my deputy, now the U.S. Ambassador to Venezuela, in late September or early October to investigate my suspicion .that the CIA was "up to something behind my back.".I.questione him and others closely and repeatedly as to whether they had discovered anything corroborative. ' No one could find any basis for suspicion. So I asked on October 1 to fly to Washington for consultations on how to deal with Allende in Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 13 15 17 .18 22 23 office. Permission was refused.for ten days. I requested in that same cable that executive sessions be arranged with Senators and Congressmen, Permission was denied. At no time did I'suggest or did Washington instruct me to work for .the overthrow of the Allende Government. Let that be very clear. At no time, to my knowledge, did the U.S. engage in bribery of any Chilean congressman, at no time did anyone give me "a green light", in September 1970, or any instruction in that period, not firmly predicated on prior constitutional action and concurrence of the Frei government. At no time until I read it four years later in the New York Times, did I see or hear the word "destabilize" in connection with the policy toward the Allende government. At no time did .I recommend nor did I receive instructions .from Washington to follow with the Allende government any policy other than the one I launched, against Presidential preference, the policy I launched and pursued to reach an understanding with it, the sole policy to which I adhered throughout my four full years in Chile was to protect and to strengthen liberal and progressive democracy. in one of the -shrinking circle of nations that practices that form of government. I told President Nixon in the Oval Office in mid-October 1970 that the U.S. had to.avoid'a self-fulfilling prophesy, however correct my reporting and analysis might be, by seeking pproved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080.001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 generally an understanding with Allende, starting even before his inauguration. I said this effort need not prevent subsidie by the CIA to non-conformist media and to non-conformist, non- extremist political parties which we knew, we knew from .superb-CIA penetrations and from excellent State Department reporting were soon going to be squeezed to the wall. Starting a fortnight. after Allende's inauguration in mid-November 1970, the U.S. through me, with the support of. the State Department, made-anunremitting,. strenuous, innovative effort to reach a modus vivendi with Allende, the culmination of which a copy and return its The only deletions in it, sir, are 'those that refer to the four western European countries who were briefed in detail my.on'ly, copy so I would appreciate it if somebody would make was the offer to have the United States Treasury guarantee. long term bonds of the Chilean government. And I would like to submit the unclassified, de-classified I should say, cable summarizing that entire effort. It is and who supported me in that.. effort. . Incidentally,. that offer was far more generous than the one made to the City of New York and New York State very recently as you will see in that document.. Allende chose not to accept. The ultras in the leadership of the Socialist Party vetoed compromizing in any way with "imperialism," and let me add that President Allende in July Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 11 ~pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 of 1970, three. months before he was elected, said from a public platform 'that the number one public enemy in the hemisphere was the United States. They ruled out also any cooperation with "the bourgeoise reformists" in the Christian Democratic Party. They insisted on an all or nothing policy, even though by 1973 the Soviet Union, China and others had refused to encourage such a self-destructive, egocentrism.. I hone you. compre'hdnd my view?.that: you 'report on Track I and Track II. 'does not accord with the facts. The authors do not seem to be able to distinguish between a consultative process and an action, nor do they comprehend that an ambassador, as the higher ranking American in the country and the personal representative. of a President, can ignore, can reject, can string out, can string along, can do many things with a "authorization". Hence the report unconsciously, unconsciously-falls in with a monstrous black-white mythology foisted on this country durii the past three years, a morality fable in which American officials were all Nazi-like bully boys cuffing around decent Social Democrats, although Dr. Allende had his left .Len-inist Socialist Party, had nothing but contempt for Social Democrats, and although Dr. Allende, as the embassy had reporte. for many, many years, had personally .beeri.?finance'd from. foreign Communist: enemies. My time has run out. I had intended on November 4th, when I thought I would come here to address the very complex and Approved For Release. 2003110/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 smn 12 smn 13 18 19 pproved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 serious questions- rightly raised by an inquiry into the intelligence community. You forced me today to try to expose what is wrong with government by headline. What happens when the public interest turns into a porno-flick,:'a sensate experience into a cynical careening from one superficial sensation, dart guns, poison, and all that, to another, to divert the public from the complexity of reality, what happens to the civil rights of an individual, me in.this case, but it can happen to anybody, to the quality of political life, to the national interest, to the truth, when moral fervor runs over into the moral absolutism that has now led to the desolation of Chile. Thank you. The Chairman. Yes, I agree it has led to the desolation of Chile. I will have some questions.' But we have another vote, I am sorry to say,.and we'll have to take a short recess, and we'll come back for questions. (A brief recess was taken.) (The prepared. documents referred to by Mr. Korry follow: Approved. For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 EDWARD M. KORRY 351 ELM ROAD BRIARCLIFF MANOR, NEW YORK 10510 October 23, 1975 ti The Honorable Frank Church United States Senate ,Washington, D.C. 20510 Dear Senator Church: I have, as you know, confirmed my desire to testify before the Senate Select Committee at its pleasure.,:Since I requested a CIA program and since that program has been linked both to the tragedy that wracked Chile and to the abuse of Executive power in this country, my appearance before your Committee is a moral imperative and a civic necessity. As Ambassador to Chile four full years (October 12, 1967 to October 12, 1971) I wrote more cables and dispatches than any of my rank in that period, deliberately accounting, as best I could,.to current consumers throughout the government, and to future political,*economic and social historians, the motives, the atmospherics, the hopes and disappointments that enveloped my decisions and actions. For reasons of ignorance, of self- interest, of conflicting loyalties, of clashing principles and of percussive pressures of various types, not everything salient or sentient could be recorded even if comprehended then. Hence, new facts and fresh insights still can be contributed to an illuminating case study of the dizzying inter- action of national security actions abroad, partisan competition for votes at home, covert ect1ivity, economic interests, espionage, Ideological rivalries.: aucial i'actors and individual wills, of how, in sum, the United Stato:l--nut juot thl:: White Houie, and/or the CIA, the Embassy, and other Executive agencie!I, but the, nation as a dynamic entity--strode, stumbled or sneaked to find its proper footing in the massive tides of history. The Committee, as I understand it, has judicial powers. In effect,it sits as.a court, a court of the people, one might say. As such,'then, its function is to expose and to explore, without prejudice, the relevant facts, to sift their implications. and to reach conclusions on past performance which will, in turn, permit judgments on future lines of conduct. Your direction as presiding officer of the proceedings have demonstrated that the Committee Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 is not interpreting its mandate narrowly; it is examining an Executive branch decision-making-and-action process as it was affected by the in- telligence agencies. It is, I submit, investigating one manifestation of Authority at a time whan all forms of it are in,or near,crisis. The US-in-Chile case is a thicket of ironies. Good and bead lie so clone together, as Acton said, that to seek artistic unity of chnra3cter, or purpose, or performance, is, in this instance, an anile absurdity. Your own role,. no lass than CIAlp,illustrates the point. You would be judge and Jury when justice and decency suggest that 'it would be more appropriate for you to be witness and defendant. An outrageous proposition, you will doubtless retort, one that might, as I recognize from past experience with anuther of your investigative committees, provoke a prodigiously hostile and costly reaction. No matter. "My heart has followed all my days," the poet writes, "Something I cannot name." Mine cannot and will not live or die quiescently while you and others fashion abedlam of humbug and.a blaze of unwarranted national guilt. If we have entered the new era of ultra-brite, klieg-lighted honesty 'and openness, of "letting it all hang out" as you and your admirers advertise, then your wash must be pinned on the same sunlit line with mine. By that, I mean this appalling, disqualifying record: 1. You were Chairman of the Subcommittee responsible for Inter- American affairs of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1969 and 1970 when.I inquired of its staffman on three separate occasions, in Washington and in Santiago, if a Subcommittee meeting could be arranged. Each time, Mr. Pat Holt repliers, with some embarassment, that the Chairman did not wish hearings. He gave me to understand that Latin American affairs did not arouse sufficient interest or promise ennutjh headlines to merit even one executive rump sess'on. Your successor as subcommittee Chairman was sub- sequently briefed on CIA operations in.Chib.;, I am reliably informed, long before the leaks to the media by Congressman Harrington (and your staff) In .1974 of Mr. Colby's secret testimony earlier that year to a House Committee. Is It unfair to compare your looking-the-ether-way in 1969-70 to a sentry asleep on duty on the eve of battle? Is it not right to inquire how such a negligent guard turns up as presiding judge in the resultant court-martial? Is it not logical. to speculate that you did not wish to Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 know too much, did not cant to be saddled with any responsibility for the agonizing decisions or recommendations that the best of puhlic servants willingly confront, must confront, if our system is to avoid a demoralizing paralysis? Or was it disinterest iri a taxpayer investment, authorized step by step by the Congress, of approximately $2,000,000,000 (billions)-- dollars of 1964-69 vintages and values? 2. You were, next, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations of the Senate Foreign Rol.aticuns Committee, having transferred to that limelightad role in mid-1972 when Jack Anderson published the. sensational and grotesque ITT memos. Because my name appeared in several- of those papers, I was, quite rightly, soon contacted (the summer of 1972) by Mr. Jack Blum, Subcommittee deputy Counsel. In his second utterance on the telephone, he said "ITT is trying to make you the fall guy, you know" (I didn't) and added that if I did not cooperate with the Subcommittee to "get" ITT and the White House people behind the corporation, the Subcommittee would "let" me be a scapegoat. My employers' attorney contacted Mr. Olum straightaway and in November, 1972,accompanied me as a silent inhibitor to my one pre-hearing interrogation with Blum and his superior, Mr. Jerry Levir;nso.n, the Counsel; we insisted they tape the multi-hour session. Events have justified your staff's zeal to expose and to. rid the country of the' then abusers of Executive authority although, I might add parenthetically, their lack of pursuit in certain areas is intriguing. I ask, in this connection, however, if the Senate empowers its Sub- committees to abuse its authority with the same "enemies list" tactic!] of its targets? Would you say that the ends justify the means? 3.? Your Counsel, Mr. Levinson, and I participated soon after in a Dusseldorf, Germany, Conference on Multinational Corporations, January 5-7, 1973 (two months before your Subcommittee began hearings). Levr4isnn re- counted to several participants one evening, in my presence, that the US government in 1963-64 had spent "$12,000,000--even more" to defeat Allende. He elaborated' briefly on the effort and purpose. When I asked him, in privacy later, how he could Justify such past intervention and yet be so .outraged by a very muted US hostility-in 1970 against the same man and the same-forces-La CIA program, in fact, whose reach and cost were tiny fraction,, of the earlier one---he replied that "we had a democratic alternative worth Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 ? Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 backing in 1964". Not for a second did he, your representative, argue that the United States had no moral right to intervene or that the CIA had no legal basis to engage in covert political action overseas or that inter- national treaties forbade such intervention or that Allende and his forces had changed stripes. Quite the contrary. His was a partisan, an ideologic- al, distinction. He contended, entirely erroneously, that the US in 1970 had supported a conservative candidate, Jorge Alessandri, when, in truth, my position, and therefore the Embassy's, was strongly biased (much to the annoyance of all of the CIA) in favor of President Eduardo Frei and his Christian Democratic party---.the "Democrati,c.Left" force that Mr. Levinson extols in his book.The Alliance That Lost Its Way (Quadrangle, 1970); I had even argued in writing to the Nixon Administration that if the Democratic Christian candidate in 1970, Tomic, were,by the most unlikely miracle, to fashion and to lead a coalition with the Communists, as. he proclaimed he would, it should not trigger US hostility. Even more relevant to the US Committee's inquiry, one powerful incentive for.the structure I recommended of anti-Allende covert propaganda action in the 1970 campaign---no funds to any candidate or party---was my determination to-guard against an indirect commitment by the US to a discredited Right that was so clearly in a minor- ity'and with whose tactics and objectives I was in profound disagreement. My question; to you here, Sir, is whether you were no less aware than Levinson in January 1973, and before, of the pervasive US intervention in the Chilean electoral campaign of 1963-64? Is it not a fact that you de- liberately suppressed this chapter of US activities in Chile in your' 1973 hearings and later, because of its partisan embarrassment, becuuse it i.nvolvcac a 'President we both cherished? Is it not true,. therefore, that you expanded public funds to convert a public investigation into a private internecine vendetta? Did .you not gra~;p, by the way, that the 1963-64 covert operations involved the de facto overthrow of an existing government---that the program conceived by the Kennedy Administration and executed by the Johnson team to elect Christian Democracy depended on the prior repudiation by the Chilean electorate of the conservative political coalition in pokier, and tha' the US government, in many ways, worked to this end? Is it note thEnrefore. correct to assert that your energetic campaign the past three years to persuade the media and the world of the CIA's alleged "overthrow of' a Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 democratic government" in 1973 was, among other things, an effort to draw a false distinction between a past you labored to cover up and a present you willfully distorted for partisan and personal advantage? 4. Twice during our European stay in January, 1973, Mr. Levinuon pleaded with me to help "get" President Nixon, Dr. Kissinger and others involved in the 1910 decisions affecting Chile. He asked how I,. a lifelong "liberal" and a Kennedy admirer and appointee, could "defend" Nixon and Kissinger and company. I told Levinson, as I had others over the years, I had never voted for Nixon and had never contributed a penny or anything else to any of his campaigns; nor was Kissinger a friend, as I, no less than Levenson, was painfully aware. The issues for me, .I told Levinson, were of another order: 'A::.'I.had been so opposed to the Marxist-Leninist forces re- presented by Dr. Allende, it would be craven dishonesty to seek d.ispen- sation by accusing others of actions based on shared perceptions; B. It would entail the dredging of.secret decisions and acti- vilties in a country where the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations had placed their highest hopes and the greatest per capita American investments, morel and material, in the hemisphere; such muck-rakj.,ng, I said, might bury living Chilean politicians, and would muddy two dead'US Presidents. The. costs, I held, would he very high to this country's standing and to Chile's stability. C. The Allende government had entered its third critical year and the US taxpayer still had in the balance hundreds of millions of dollars of US-Trea99ury-backed guarantees of American corporate investors plus morn than one and a quarter billion dollars of other public monies; although I had no doubt that the Allende government wus determinud to levy this charge on the US taxpayer, I.did not wish to give any further pretext. D. The sum of these constraint., subjective and objective, and of the unending complexities flowing from them, were too overwhelming. for me to play the dummy for him and for you. My que3tion here, Senator, is who authorized your Subcommittee to concentrate on "getting", to usU' the recurrent parlance of your staff, Dr. Kissinger, and to rewrite history, IF necessary, to achieve that end? Why did you and Mr. Levinson, for example, manipulate the subsequent hearings Approved For Release 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 and the background briefings to selected journalists---before, during and after those sessions---to propagate the dernogogic, specious suspicion that US actions in'Chile, in my time, were motivated importantly because of fealty to, or concern ford the monetary interests of, the multinational corporations there? (What was true is that I had argued that the "Allt,nde doctrine", of non-negotiable, unilateral grubs of US property, if unoppuaod, would be emulated by many others, in one fashion or u.nother; I had said that the consequences of Allende's uncompromising behaviour would also reduce aid had gratuitously. declared, in Levinson's presence, to the Dusseldorf Con- ference, as the published record (Ins.tute for International and Foreign Trade Law, Georgetown University, and Praeger, 1974) states: "Ambassador Iorry has given only part of the information and investment, bilateral and multilateral, by a more isolationist US in those areas of the world that needed it most; T had avowed my fiduciary responsibility for the heavy texpayer exposure through guaranties and the tied risks of other US government funds.) Did you not believe what Senor Raul.Prebisch, the first Secretary General of UNCTAD (the third world grouping) and an Argentine economist and socialist of International repute on this matter (the evolution of relationships between .multinational corporation's and less developed countries) and I will complete it. The truth is that he was one of the first---perhaps the first---to develop this idea (of foreign corporate fade-out from absolute to shared or minority ownership in LDCs) but only within a narrow circle of friends. Indeed I had the privilege in 1967 to listen to his idea:; about this matter presented with hic customary lucidity. I have ample proof Ambassador Korry,,while Ambassador to Chile, was instrumental in shaping new ideas in this matter of investment." -00 (He was, as,youwill see below, speaking of both the Allende and the Frei years.) Did Mr. Levinson not tell you, as he had written in his book, that my defiance of the Anaconda Company in 1969 enabled the Chilean government to gain immediate majority interest and control of that giant corporation's mines in what was the largest-ever peaceful transfer of resources in an LDC? Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Had you not been briefed on my, persistent maneuverings in 1971 to prevent ITT from exploiting its Chilean difficulties at the US taxpayers' expense? Did you and-Levinson not manage events to avoid any public airing of this .or of additional reasons for ITT's hostility to me because it would not fit the single-minded partisan script you had drafted? Where was the moral compulsion to "get" at the truth as the public expected and indeed paid for? by Congressman Harrington (and Mr. Levinson) that led to the formation of the. Select Committee. I denied than, as I do now,. that we had ever attempted to bribe Chilean Congressman. I asserted then, as I do again now, that I had imposed the most extraordinary precautions to prevent any U. S. complicity in a.Chilean military insurrection against the Chilean government, either 5. Mr. Levinson Is interrogation of me in public Subcommittee hearing brought out, intur!Alia, my confirmation of a CIA electoral program in Chile In.1970 as the New York-Times reported prominently in a two column story .March 28, 1973,---a full year and a half, no less, before the disrloHures policy: diplomatically doing its utmost to negotiate a solution acceptable to the majority of. Congress and to most Americans as fair and just by the most liberal measure; publicly adhering to a cool but correct posture; covertly providing funds that did, in fact, permit newspapers (and their labor unions), other media outlets and two major political parties to ful- fill their democratic functions. Is it not true that you and your staff were aware-in 1972-3 of the hundreds of cables sent from Embassy Santiago between November 1970 and October 1971 reporting to Washington in swamping detail the genuine, the strenuous and the innovative efforts. to reach an accomodation with the Allende regime? Is it not true that you decided to muffle this aspect eventuality. I maintained then, as I do now, that the United States had dealt with the Allende government, from the moment of his inauguration to the day of my departure eleven months and one week later more generously than anyone could have imagined or anticipated. The United States was following, In fact, a sophisticated three:-tier unusual---some today might sayhigh-risk --measures to guard against such an Frei's or Allende's, and that between 1969 Approved For Release.2003/10/16: CIA-RDP?90-00735R000200080001-6 and 1971, I had personally taken Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 -8- of the US-in-CHILE case? Is it not true that you and yourcounsel con- scientiously stifled any public ventilation of an offer that Mayor 8eame, Governor Carey and the people of New York, might have been intrigued by-- my offer to the Allende government, Marxist-Leninist in composition and thrust, to have the US guaranty its almost worthless, bonds as part of a fair, non-dogmatic and inexpensive settlement of its conflicts with the US? Had I not provided on tape in 1972 the precise details to Levinson and Diem? Had I not informed four major Western powers of them'in.timely fashion? Was not.Levcnson also cognizant that oven within the Allende government,not to mention several Santiago residents of international kad w,)n support For standing, such as PrebiOc this unusual proposition? Why,shouldn't the public conclude that your deliberate coverup of a major initiative was indispensable to your concoction of a simplistic and monstrous black-white mythology---a legend in which the American bullyboys kicked and cuffed small and innocent social democrats because they only wanted control of their resources,' and because they only wished to implement some progressive socio-economic programs,,and besides, weren't they demo- cratically elected? Why would a Senator of your moral repute. and standing lend himself to, let alone lead and orchestrate, a campaign of such half- truths,. outright lies or distortions to discredit not merely the Nixon Administration but an American society which had., in so many varied ways, participated in the government's covert operation Why was suppression so unavoidable or so essential when the truth, damning in some of its other implications, would have permitted a salutary and. intelligent debate and appraisal of the perplexing issues involved in Chile? If Dr. Allende could, to my surprise, write a letter to the US President after my departure to praise my efforts,' if his ultra-Soc1ilist Foreign Minister Mr. Almeyda, could extol my endeavors to negotiate,. aettlementn before a multi-party farewell gathering for. me in Santiago----- even though both men were aware of almost all CIA activit legj ~at~n 1963 and 1970-----why should a US :.Dunator seek to erase so much of the tapo of history? ?. Why, to take another example, did you and your staff let stand the .impression in your final report that the US had nbt, in fact, ceased all further. economic loaning to Chile in October 1968-----two years before the election of Allende and that in 1969, I had protested explosively this Nixon Approved For Release. 2003/10/16: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 b .Administration decision? Dir.l Mr. Levenson,(himself 0"ow a high A.I.D. official in Guatemala and Brazil, both repressive military regimes by the way, before his bureaucratic career was ended by Nixon's electia,) not demystify the misleading AID'statistical tables included in your;. Subcommittee's record? Why, too, did you bar from the final report and economic aid to Chile because of Allende's "socialism" or uMarxisrn"? Haven't your selective-outrages-and excisions the past three years been akin to a conductor performing Beethoven only with kettles?and trumpets, reducing incredible complexity to the drum-and-bugle thumping of a political convention? , .6. The State Department's Foreign Service observer et'.the.', ,. 1973 hearings of your Subcommittee reported on the. extraordinary daily working relationships between your staff and a Chilean Embassy diplomat. I'witnessedit during my one day there. D'oubtless, the State Department had not shared the coincidental intelligence that this Chilean had been nicknamed by fellow Embassy officials, also loyal to Allende, as the"Commissar: Nor would I suggest here that you perceived the thread of logic that led from Mr. LevQnson's endorsement of this Chilean to from the public the no less crucial information concerning the US offers, through me, of loans and credits to the Allende government, again and again in 1971, if it would only cease reneging an President Allondu's explicit promises to U.S. officials, reiterated often in Washington by its Ambassador? Did you and he not wish these ruscuing facto, ploi.rn .and provable, to kill your morality fable of the U.S. cutting off further the'Chilean Embassy's reinforced influence with several very well- placed journalists in Washington, and how that success,in turn, amplified Allende', authority in Chile, in this country and in the world, at the price of moderation in Chile and of U. S. standing everywhere. It is pertinent, though, to ask you why you should prefer such source,, of information, guidance and judgments to the affirmation of not just one inriapondent-minded Ambassador but the documented reports and analysis over many years of many, highly-regarded f=oreign Service Officers? Why would you not even explore the ontocoricnts of the Socialist Party of Chile o' of its best known member, Dr. Allende? Was it-because'the immutable imprin rt /the official Party histories would strike at the heart of so many of your Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 =10- of Marxist - Leninist dogma who ruled out any oAm Q HM-iur with the U.S.? Why hide the fact that.the majority of this party's ruling Committee (by a in every meeting of its Central Committee for decades as extreme interpreters in those of the British, Swedish;i, or German Socialist parties? Why.. turn the blame uniquely on the U.S. when Dr. Allende's party had unwaveringly, for decades, espoused violent revolution for Chile and throughout Latin America---when it had gone on record in every national party conclave an:i had unremittingly and vehemently opposed social democracy for a quarter of a century, that it was pledged against reform, and everything rational. contained not only in the founding proclamations of Chile (arid the US) but postulations, preconceptions, and prejudices? Surely it wasn't necessary to agree with my recommendations or actions for you, to lot some light shine on the primordial phenomenon: --- that the Socialist Party of Chile vote of 11 for, 13 encT six absent) had refused to endorse Allende as -the party's candidate for Presidrant in 1970 because of his 18 years of close collaboration with the less violrnnt,but stronger and totally subservient-to- Moscow Communist Party of Chile? Why shouldn't there be a sober study of the implications of Allende having bu:en the compromised. recipient of large amounts of funds over many years from various Communist capitals and organizations? Or that his first foreign political act on the very day of his inauguration was to promise covert support to the Puerto Rican Independence movement? Why not explore the reasons for the US Embassy, in advance of his election, reporting the step by step process by which US influence--cultural, economic, commercial, political, and military---was to be extirpated? Or why we concluded before the elections tha Communist and Socialist parties planned to use the default of their debts to the American taxpayer as a means to impose their political will on Chile and the U.S. Most important query, can you grasp that your refusal tn'Iaermit any serious consideration by the Congress, and therefore, the public, allowed you and thereby the Senate to be exploited within and without Chile in a dis- astvrouo, in b catastrophic, mannur---that you unwittingly became a powerful agent, as an Allende apologist, for. the polarization within Chile, and for the reign of terror that ensued? No American, not even Mr. Nixon, had more devastating effect in Chile, as I have good reason to assort, than you, Sir. No one proved the adage that "what is earnust is not always true; on the contrary-erro.r is often more earnest than truth". 7. Your man, Levdnson, next acted as one of the two channels for Congrossnpprovedr orc ejnAsac b6jfllb%% tdlkjkbW -'6d7 '$ 1 00> 6O 6ulge, to l.r:ak, Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 -The.Hersh stories of the week disseminated the impression that I was Ambassador to Chile for the two Allende years following my departure in 1971, that the in September, 1974, Mr. Colby's secret testimony on Chile. (Congressman Harrington's other channel wag Mr. Laurence Stern of the Washington Post, a confidante of Luvl:nson and of the aforementioned 'Commissar", who published during the March, 1973, hearings of your Subcommittee a front-page story stating that the United States government had funnelled up to $20,000,000 through official agencies in 1964 to elect Eduardo Frei. By design or occident, that story was timed to obliterate Frei, the strongest single democratic, moral and Intellectual obstacle to the Marxist-Leninist re- volution then entering its runaway phase.) Mr. Levinson, still your-ongoing Subcommittee Counsel, was the anonymous source for the publication of the Harrington leak in the New York Times by Seymour Hersh on September 8, 1974. of the Times on September 13, 1974, He did so in the context of "now we are going to nail Kissinger" and "this time we have Kissinger" and appeals to me to help "get" Kissinger (as I informed the Times in my letter). Then, on September 17, 1974, Harsh reported in the Times to the effect that Levenson had presented you with t3 staff report urging strong action against Secretary Kissinger along with recommendations for perjury and contempt charges against five other former and active LIS ufficials including mu. Do you not find these accusations by your staff, leaked in sneaky anonymity without any prior notification, without any communication to me, -sourco for the comments concerning me, as I stated in a letter to the Editor with the Johnson Administration in 1964, rather Stern's above-mentioned story had), toat bribe, through me, Chilean' Congressmen at that I had denied to you and your Subcommittee campaign In Chile,.that_.I had invoked executive privilege to evade responses., that I had lied under oath and would be subject to immediate investigation for perjury. In his telephone calls .to me some days later ~r~et~st~sttlfesttrnr Hersh Identified Levinson as his CIA programs in Chile began nrzt than with Kennedy, (just as Mr. the US government had sought to the time of Allende's election, any CIA involvement in the 1970 of any kind, without any opportunity to this date to examine the charges or to rebut them, a callous, even criminal, abuse of US judicial process? Wtiare is fairness? Where is decency? Where is morality? Whore is the essential differs ~~4r4Y~#~,F fr ~~~1~eL 9s ~~Q~~6 ~~fi~P~lRl rn9%-p97KF (OA,OOQ80001 6McCa:thy's Cohn Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 and 1tiine? Or Mr. Nixon's dirty tricks. department? How does it come about that a Senate employee paid by public funds Can impose'on the country, by trading secrets for space in the media on your behalf, his ";idualriOY, his politics, his double-standards of justice, murall ty, perception and action? Is it stretching the evidence to ask you why anyone in public life 'should not emulate this performance---to exploit the protection offered by a powerful Find approving patron,to insist on his criteria, to convert evfury public interest matter into savage poll ti co3 of F3mbi tian, to abuse his F3uthority? Is this riot the essence of the Watergate case? Is the lesson you would have the public draw that such abuse is tolerable as long as you agree with the abuser? mental ussues on which the Congress must still. decide. You stated on national television this past summer (and on many other occasions in 1975) that you do not in any way criticize the efforts by. the. I recite these details to prove the existence from 1972 to the present of a t,iab of connected events in the new era of openness you proclaim so often that nuithor the public or the Congress :;er:mud to bu privvy to. Also, I wit3hod to lay a foundation of fact to support the observations contained in this document, not the least of which 1:.3 my initial questioning as t'o whether you have not disqualified yourself as Judge and jury in anything relating to the US-in-CHILE case. They also provide an.introduction to the funda- Social Democratic parties in Europe to aid their sister party and to save liberty and democratic process in Portugal. You added that if the US were to be involved in that effort, it would only embarasr.s and. weaken the Europouna' endeavors and damage the Socialist Party of Portugal. You explained that your insistence on the CIA being tethered was based on the risk of exposure in Portugal. And then you omphusized with rightrouon.e:3s -quivering from every; pore that Portugal teas quite the oppositu of Chile because in the former a military dictatorshitpt had been overthrown while in Chile the US engaged in overthrowing a democratically elected government. Approved For Release 2003/10/16.: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 What unredeeming rubbish! Morally shameless, intellectually insulting, factually incredible and politically asinine. Either the United States condones or does not covert political action. Either it does or does not condemn the interference by one government in another's internal political affairs and processes. (Oe.cause Olaf Palma or Harold Wilson or Holmut Schmidt can wear tho hat of party leader for such exercises, it does not dilute his-role as the leader of the government responsible for them.) Either the United States can display the Aristo.talaL capacity to discern that is the source of political wisdom be it should renounce its claims to thought, to rippreciatlon, to mural leadership. To contemplate with equanimity covert political Fiction by others --- presumably Soviet as well as Swedish or German or British--.-and to worry aloud that the most powerful democracy might be nabbed if it defended principles in wh'' it believed)is, to my mind, an incitement to every American to abjure his religious faith, his political beliefs, his hurnpnistic,yearnings, his plura istic attachments. Yours is a prescription for isolation.' Not just the - isolation of a Fortress American byt the more devastating entombment of rninc and.of spirit. No wonder Americans despise all politicians! It..is'also a reckless invitation. Why should militant, terroristic, willful, or dedicated groups not read such a declaration from you---as indeE they did in Chile ---as.a signal to advance their stratagems, their interest! their passions, their absolutisms? After all,.if they have the.courage of their convictions, why not? Wasn't the lack of an inhibiting signal from the Nixon Administration---if not worse---an encouragement to the Chilean military in September, 1973, and, more horrifying, later? As for the consequences of US covert action, you prove how much easier it is to predict the future than the past. Before the disclosure of the US covert efforts to block the imposition of Marxism-Leninism on Chile, you and your supporters maintained uninterruptedly that such defense of US interest, as perceived by me and others, would worsen the cold war- tensions-that thFiy would, for example, delay, Impede, hinder, block meaningful nagot! tibno with the Soviet Union, or, say, i,ii th Cuba. The cold writ' would go on, you forecast. Of course, thii exact contrary occured. Not to my uurpri rie. - I had predicated my Chilean r?ucommenrlutionu on the assumption that if the 0! rudently defended Its declared policies---the Congrsss'?s-declared policies. ? a the USSR and China would respect us find that they would becom' moderating Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 influence in Chile. Even after your rigged III hearings, Allende sent in mid-1973 to me (a private citizen in New Yorlg:, a high official of his yovernmen.t to inquire; if my 1971 offers could sumehuw be updated and revived. (I immediately apprised the State Department. As with all Allender dualinge, Ernd as he often boasted in privo tf3, eppearunce were much more important than reality; he could not, would nut, oppose the voto of the Socialist Party leadership which insisted on the same oil-or-nothing terms, according to that same official, now living in exile.) In Portugal itself, the :-jnmrs point applies. No souner dirt the Now York limes publish last month the reports of large-scale CIA invoivernunt than the Lisbon government concluded its first major negotiation with Washington. What might well be hypothi,ized, on the other hand,. is that your declara- tions emboldened the anti-democratic forces within Portugal to emulate their ideological cousins in Chile, to ignore the majority will and to hurl the country into civil war if necessary to have their way. If one accepts the unarguable evidence that the Socialist Party of Chile was, in fact, n `Left Communist party (since: it had scorned and spurned .this Third tnturnut.ionel for decades) and that the Christian Democratic party' was, ins fact, the democratic socialist party of Chile, by western European political standards, then you will comprehend why every event inPortugal since the overthrow of the Salazar dictatorship has repeated a Chilean experience---even the manner in which the non-democratic Left deals with the military. You tnikrsd of the dumoerr.rtic electiens by which Allende became Pruoident_ 1f we e,u_rru to contildel' the must rrxegrle;rutud iristnncrr, the dennucrrrtic ttuluctiura in preswur Girrmuny of Hl tier, am t to unlur:storud that you would havfr pro('orr(_reL the hulucoiu:3t first ruthur than launch a covert: e.rctl.on rirogrum to pruvunt excesses you knew were being plonneord by o"durnocruuticul ty-elected government"? Obviously nut. We are, in Allesrrdu'o case, not spooking of diabolical per- versities of the Hitlerian dimension, nor are we talking)P8 than a modest, covert-US effort to dissuade immoderation and to prevent it from running wild., as it did. The point is only that a human judgment based on the real world .cannot be evaded by recourse to hollow slogrrns. In Chile, throe successive US Ambeosadors---each originally appointed to government by the Iennedy Adrniniotrotion---plug the Foreign Survicrs, not to mention the CIA or John F. and Hobert Kennedy, or an army of 11 berel Am?ruricart ucodemictoons, chr.irchmursl,, Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 labor observers had over a period of eight or nine years stated that'a government led by Allende and dominated by the Communist and Socialist parties intended to constrict very markedly, at the least, the two freedoms on which our form of democracy is based---of press and of association, particularly labor unions. In 1970, as in 1963, we knew beyond a shadow of reasonable doubt that an Allende government intended to use the processes and laws of what it called "formal democracy" to eliminate rim and replace it with what it called "popular democracy"---ran accurate description whose .meaning is known to every member of the Congress. From 1961 to 1970, the Embassy like the majority of Congress agreed that such a development would do serious harm to US interests and influence-for-good in the world. As far as interference in internal political affairs is concerned, the US Congress has been knowingly engaged in it for years. At very high cost. Not always with candor either. The voting or withholding of funds for food, for arms, for loans, had political aim,as often as not although .cloaked in the pretext of "development". Is it riot fair to say that when the Nixon Administration ignored my explosive protests and denied further economic aid to the Frei Government in early 1969, it was casting massive and deliberate political vote---with CIA connivance---for the Right, and ironically, for Allende? It could do so with. impunity,incidentally, because groups such as your subcommittee on Latin American affairs had no interest. Who, then, had to deal with the consequences? Or consider the same problem from another angle. The majority of -Congress and of the American electorate have expressed,pne way or another, the suspicion, or the finding, that the events surrounding the Watergate affair threatened democratic process in the US. Yet nothing Richard Nixon and his associates did, or even contemplated, hogan to approximate the actions of a Chilean President you persist to this day in labeling "democratic' Rock-hard information shows that Allende: A. Arranged for the covert importation and distribution of . illegal arms int7 his country. Sought by bribery, coercion and covert political action to gain ownership or control of all media not conforming to government',s desires. C. Blackmailed, literally, the two major opposition parties (the Christian Democrats and the Nationals) and many of ApprovedFor Release 2003/10/16: CI'A-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 .under-Frei, Chile was one of the most politically free places on earth, freer, in fact, than the US. I assort, too, that had the United States ?a diluted definition for Chile? If so, I state here categorically that Approved For Release 2003/10116 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 their individual Senators and Congressem,,by threoteneng to expose incriminating, albeit generalized and customary, misuse of the loaning mechanism of the private banking system. D. Approved and shared very large bribes from foreign corpo- retions. L. Flouted the will of an. independent Congress by invoking dozens of times the rarely-used, ultimate constitutional device of "a degree of insistence" to iynnru vetoes and/or lrigiulation. F. Ignored major judicial decisions and denied the authority of the courts. G. Approved and exploited the altering of union ballots to win determinant control of the centralized labor union confederation and to become the first government in the hemisphere whose Minister of Labor was al:io head of the labor confederation (as was once the case in the Soviet- Union). Much more could. be said. I would only inquire here by what elastic yardstick do you gauge "democratic". Is it the double standard that some apply .to race? Is it that Latin America is somehow inferior, as your lack of interest in the late 1960s. might indicate, and that "democracy" has, not pursued my suggestion to provide covert aid to the media and to key politicians committed, I helin vcd,to democratic and pq~ constitutional irrevc.., r~,tihl.c t~~ procuocers, All ndo would hove un(IuFJt3tionobIV won/control pfd nl'Jn-conforming media that mattered, of the labor tile rnrchius, and of a Congress truns- formed Into a "Peopluu- 11HHCmbly". How long, by the wuy, do you think thu indepcendence of some newspapers .:arm some radio ntations whose vigor so impressed you in 1972 and '73 would have endured if I had furnished the Y details Mr. Levson was so anxious.to pressure out of me? I don't know whether the disappearance of democracy in Chile merited a $2,000,000 insurance policy in covert action, as I proposed in 1970, on the two billion dollars.voted by Congress in the previous decade to safeguarApowvu FnayRbleaCsbi2M3MZl&oOiA# F 9to-oo7mBRooo'2Mowo0t.6st of Latin Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 America. know only that I had said at the beginning of 1968 and in the 1969 annual Embassy Policy Statements that the only vital interest the US had in Chile was that it remain a democracy and that if' we were to become indifferent to the fate of democracy in a country of Chile's caliber,, we would inevitably become indifferent to how we practiced democracy at home, a forecast that T beleive was borne out. By mid-1970, a number of other motivations---strategic and tactical, international and regional, weighed so heavily that Iofened my previous Iron determination, often expressed, to have the US stay on the sidelines, to follow a strictly non-interventions}., policy I suggested a and then, qqne t or pu .i ca a71T6 n modest electoral propaganda erogram% Yau may.not wish to have all my reasons discussed in public but I em prepared to do so. I offer here the full catalogue for public :perusal: 1. The avowed aims of the Marxist-Leninist Socialist and Communist parties, and of their governmental leader Salvador Allende, tb eliminate '"formalistic" democracy---the kind that the United States, Canada, Sweeden and Britain have---and to replace it with "popular dumocracy"---the kind that Cuba, East Germany and Czechoslovakia have. 2.. The declared aims of the two parties to extirpate US influence the US, in Chile and in Latin America---to treat./ in Allende's pre-election words, as "public enemy number one" in the hemisphere. .3. The.Allende Government's intention, as reported painstakingly forri'in reams.of Foreign Service Officer cables and dispatches, in thousands of CIA messages from clandestine sources, in the assessments of the three successive Ambassadors in Santiago, from 1961 to 1970, each appointed to government originally by John F. hunnedy, to align itself with the Castro government in Cuba in a hemispheric effort to wipe out US influences, and to become, in the words of John F. Kennedy "a second bridgehead" for the Soviet Union in the humi;-3phuura. 4. The knowledge that an Allende government would seek to maneuver the United States into a scapegoat role so as to avoid repayment of/Mount approaching one billion dollars in loans originating with the US taxpayer and to justify the unpaid--the uncompensated--nationalization of US citizens property guarantees by the.US taxpayer under Congressional legislation in the amount of hundreds of millions of dollars. 5. The certain knowledge that the Soviet Union and other Communist governments and organizations had provided for man_~/ years and were providing Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 Approved For Release 2003/10/16 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 very substantial sums for covert political action to the Communist party, to the Socialist Party and to Allende himself. Therefore we anticipated (as quickly proved to be the case in 1971) that the USSR and Cuba would exploit fully these relationships and that the USSR might (as promptly occurred in 1971) exert strong pressures on the Chilean armed forces with the active support of Allende, to accept it as the main military supplier and military advisory group. years. 6. The certain knowledge that the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the largest single political grouping in Chile and the representative of the Democratic Left, would be the main internal target of the Marxist- Leninist government. I had very, very, good reasons to anticipate that the party would not have the material means or the moral or Organizational impetus to sustain itself as a vital party in Chile for very long without outside help in advance of its certain crisis. 'The PDC owed large amounts of money to banks the Allende government would quickly nationalize;, we reckoned that the Allende government would exploit bank nationalization to blackmail, to coerce and to starve financially (as proved to be the case starting quickly in 1971') numerous and influential,members of the party. SSG The Allende bjectives were to silence political opposition, to compel the Congress..to.accept its bills, and most important,. to destroy the PDC by sowinc internal dissension at every level. The PDC owned no national newspaper, had no TV outlet and influenced few of Santiago's many radio stations at the time of Allende's election although it had been the governnent for six to undertake such risky and costly non-conformity on their own---without some material manifestation of a shared US concern for a free press. that the effluent proprietors could not alone sustain for long the huge deficits the Allende Government would..(and did) rig or would be willing . 7.. The. certain knowledge that the Allende government planned to gain quick control by coercion, bribery and monopoly authority (over all credit, imports and prices) of the major independent media outlets. The CIA persuaded me---and I beleive today their assessment was probably correct-- 8. The certain knowledge that the Allende government planned to use bribery, coercion and its monopoly powers to achieve monopoly control of organized labor. (The Allende government did, in fact, resort to large Approved For Release 2003/10/16 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200080001-6 _~ .r''iyri;..