MEMO TO SPECIAL COUNSEL TO THE DCI FROM JOHN S. WARNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00735R000200120007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 1, 2001
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: January 10, 1976
• Content Type: MF

'pproved For Release'2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200120007-5
? 10 January 1976
MEMORANDUM FOR: Special Counsel to the DCI
It is unfortunate that I was unable to stay with the meeting on Friday
for. the full time because I do still have some serious problems with the draft
bill-resolution.
1. I believe that we ought to go on record with respect to Section 6(c).
If service on this Committee is to be in addition to other committee assignments,
how can a Senator take on these important additional responsibilities? If the
Committee on Intelligence is not a major committee, what is?
2. The disclosure provisions in Section 11(a), (b), and (c) still raise
in my mind a serious constitutional problem. However, since this is to be a
resolution rather than statute, it is possible we could live with it. I think we
should preserve our position, as should the Executive branch, by not agreeing
or concurring with the ultimate principle that two-thirds of the Senate can
? override the President on disclosure, We could merely take the position that,
while it does raise constitutional problems, we would not object to it.
3. Certainly Section 13(c) has been improved. However I think it should
be looked at again most carefully, because as a practical matter these provisions
could seriously limit the flexibility of CIA and the other agencies to carry out
their responsibilities under law. In fact, I believe there is raised the serious
question of congressional delegation of law-making authority to a committee.
This is unlike Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act, where the law itself
specifies the activities which must be certified by the President and reported
to committees. What if urgent action was required to meet the demands of
national security, and the activity falls under the heading specified by the
committee, and the Congress is not in session?
4. There have been papers and other opinions expressed on the contents
of Section 14. Section 8 of the CIA Act of 1949 was enacted to be a permanent
authorization of appropriations for CIA. An annual authorization act will carry
dollar figures and I know of no means by which an authorization act can be
secret. Therefore this provision makes the Agency budget figure public,
which the Agency has resisted and which the Congress itself has approved
remaining secret. Furthermore, annual authorization acts invite yearly
riders of one kind or another. While I know they can be placed on appropriations
? bills or elsewhere, a specific CIA authorization simply attracts attention and
invites more efforts at restricting Agency activities.
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 Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200120007-5
5. Section 15 in its fu.~_T- import wauTd simply not be acceptable to the
Agency. . This is in fact aof our aC h) authority. On its face it.gives
the Comptroller General acces, ~to all docT -- ents we have. This could include
vouchers with names of ages. --'id vouc=t-'s for reimbursement to cooperating
American corporations. As 7z ;z -well knc-.,-_, 8(b) authority in one form or another
has been available to the E~~= -"'ve bran_~ for intelligence purposes since
the times of George Washings This is --=)t the time to eliminate it.
6. I have problems wtT the defin nn in Section 17(l). I would delete
all after the words "which it support c::El, and in lieu insert "national. intel-
ligence." The deleted word. so broad That it could include foreign policy
. actions and military actions surely they are supported by collection, analysis,
production, etc. Furthermc-' the delete= words really add nothing.
7. There is no provis=o = for secrecy agreements for the staff. Under
the present status of the law '_ze only effective tool we have found to prevent
disclosure has been a secret-' = greement. To me this is important enough that
it ought to be specified in the solution .
8. I do not know whe?ti- -r it was d- cussed, but I have serious reservations
about the wisdom and the apr`-?riateness of combining, in one committee, foreign,
intelligence and domestic ir_ = gence. The constitutional responsibilities of
the President are quite diffe~f-=t for these two areas of intelligence. It is much
a case of mixing apples and,.3''='1ges . The considerations that apply to foreign
intelligence activities and drr-stic intelligence activities are, again, quite
. different, and there would hG = tendency to apply the same standards to both.
STATINTL
cc: DD's
OLC
Chief, Review Staff
STATINTL
Approved For Release 2001/03/06 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200120007-5