TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS COMMITTEE BY REPRESENTATIVE LES ASPIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00735R000200130003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: February 3, 1976
• Content Type: SPEECH

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TE S T IMONY
EEFORE THE
SENATE GOVERNN71,MENT OPERATIONS C ONlMITTEE
By
Representative Les Aspin
February 3, 1976
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Mr. Chairman, I would like to endorse proposals before this
committee to establish a standing committee to watch over the
intelligence community. I make that endorsement with a major caveat,
however.
A committee is no cure-all for control of the community. Many
reforms are required. We in Congress will be deluding ourselves
if we think we can vote for a committee and then walk away, satisfied
that all's now well with the world. A committee is part of the
solution; a committee is not the solution.
This is not the forum for discussing the range of changes needec
in the executive. The House Select Committee is framing its
? recommendations and they will be published in a matter of days. The
Senate Select Committee will be reporting in a few weeks.
I will focus today on three key issues:
what are the limitatior
on a congressional committee, how should a committee be organized,
and what role should a standing committee play in covert operations.
LIMITS ON A CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE
The public should be aware that any standing intelligence
committee will begin life with three heavy weights tied around its
neck.
First, many congressional committees have a way of becoming
advocates of the programs they arc supposed to oversee. We all knok-
of committees famed for taking care of their constituency. The
overseer becomes, instead, the ally.
The Senate and House have each had small subcommittees which
for years were supposed to keep an eye on the intelligence community
But in two decades the watchdogs never barked. It has been suggest:.
? that rotating members on and off a standing committee might lessen
the likelihood of capture. But then the members would lack expertise
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Second, the members of an intelligence committee will be
suffering from limited knowledge. Their knowledge, in fact, will
be limited largely to what the intelligence agencies tell them.
An intelligence committee will be quite different from other
committees. The Education Committee, for example, hears from
teachers, parents and superintendents and doesn't have to rely
solely on the Office of Education to tell it if a program is working
or not.
Environmental groups flock to the Interior Committee when they
feel some administration policy is shafting them. Who is going to
complain to a congressional intelligence committee? The Russian
? Ambassador?
Both the problem of the captive committee and the uninformed
committee will be exacerbated for an intelligence committee because
much of its work will be done behind closed doors where critics
won't be able to point up foibles like they can with other commit-tees.
Third, after the CIA's skeletons have been exposed, the dust
has settled and the CIA is no longer Page C;e news, many members
are likely to lose interest in the subjF.cr: -- including those,
assigned to an intelligence committee. Closed door meetings don't
allow members to make speeches or issue press releases or titillate
? their constituents with inside stories.
Service on an intelligence committee may be a chore bringing
no credit 7;,nd less visibility.
None o1: t:iis is to argue against formation o = a standing
committee. The point is simply that Congress must realize that
when we seek to reform and improve the intelligence community, a
? congressional committee is supplemental and not elemental.
Having beg-.1fi on a sour note by '.'ri'tiC' ~.z1n oin_ uw i institutions
here on Capitol Hill, let me now turn to the question of how to
organize an oversight committee.
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ORGANIZATION OF COMMITTEE
The first point to be decided is whether we want a single
joint committee or parallel committees in the two houses. I opt for
the latter. I think my earlier remarks about captive committees
makes the reason clear. With separate committees there are twice
as many elements that must be captured. With separate committees
there is at least some semblance of competition.
The next question is the jurisdiction and authority of the
committees:
-- they will need oversight authority which should extend into
every nook and cranny of the intelligence community, both foreign
? and domestic. That authority can and should be shared with current
--- the intelligence committees will also need legislative
anthority and budget authority including power over an authorization
bill that should cover not only the independent agencies like the CIA,
but also the intelligence components of the military services, the
State Department, the FBI.
It might appear a little cumbersome to have an intelligence
committee dealing with just a segment of the State Department or FBI.
But that authority is needed if you agree with me that one of the
serious problems of the intelligence community today is the fact that
nobody in Congress or in the Executive is in overall control of
intelligence; it is a fragmented community that too often works at
cross purposes or wastes time and money as two agencies duplicate
standing committees. Then if the intelligence committees should
become captives, others will still have the opportunity to keep
watch over the community.
? one another's work or grind out a product for which there is no demand
I
One way to correct this is to put one pair of committees in charge.
If the committees lack the power of the purse, we will actually
be in an even worse position than in the past. For the past
few decades we have had ineffective subcommittees, but at least they
held the purse strings and could theoretically have wielded that
authority. MORE
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COVERT OPERATIONS
The next major issue is how the committees should deal with
covert operations. Should the committees be notified in advance?
Should the committees be empowered to veto planned operations?
Many reformers suggest that the committees be given real teeth
and required to pass on all covert operations. But most members of
Congress are reluctant to take a position on behalf of their
colleagues. It's one thing to cast a vote on the floor as one of
435 members or one of 100; it's something else to be told to operate
behind closed doors and make a decision for the rest of your
colleagues.
? I'm sure there are many in the Executive Branch who would like
Z
to see the Congress have veto power for exactly the same reasons
that I'm sure most members of Congress don't want that authority --
because it gives future administrations an out. If an operation goes
awry, the executive can point to Congress and say -- as it did with
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution -- "but the members authorized us to
do that." Members also know they could face the reverse charge: a
stern administration saying, "The United States is in trouble in
Majnoonistan today because Cc; ..-^ss wouldn't let us launch a little
covert operation."
Such reluctance is not a political forecast; it's political
history. For years the CIA has been telling those subcommittees abou
their covert operations, although usually only after they began. The
House Select Committee asked CIA Director William Colby what happened
when one of the committees objected. Did that halt an operation?
Colby was stunned. The question had never come up before. The
? subcommittees preferred tit to get involved. Deniability was not
invented by the Nixon Administration.
If a committee is to have veto power, then its political
composition becomes terribly important. A committee filled with
radicals probably wculdn't allow CIA agents to do anything more viole3
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than play darts in the basement of CIA headquarters. Pack the
committee with hawkish conservatives and you're back to square one.
A congressional veto over covert operations is a very unpromising
idea.
Many reformers also suggest that Congress can control covert
operations through control of the budget. As I said before, I think
any congressional committee should have the power of the purse. Still
in intelligence there is not necessarily a correlation between money
and mischief. In Thailand a CIA agent tampered with politics by
sending one forged letter. The cost to the U.S. Treasury: one
postage stamp. The cost to U.S. foreign policy: continuing
? embarrassment. Budget control is no panacea.
Covert actions must be controlled primarily from within the
executive branch. To begin,
the 40 Committee should be regulated by
law rather than executive whim. Each member should be required to
assess in writing every proposed covert operation, analyzing the risks
involved, the benefits of success, the dangers of failure and possible
alternative ways of accomplishing the objective. History shows that
when men are required to write their own reports, they think more
Z clearly of the consequences than if they are simply asked to initial
a committee report.
A congressional committee can supplement these controls. Any
? intelligence committee must be told about all planned operations in
advance -- the entire committee, not just the leaders as in the past.
While no approval or disapproval would be voted, individual members
could send the-ir-own-assessments-to-theePresident.
No doubt a lot of members would simply write up a list of
reservations to cover themselves in case the operation went wrong. Bu:
? that is not all bad. It is a good idea to have advice reaching the
President from a few people who have a bias for negativism. There is
too much me-tooism in the executive branch already.
The purpose of these changes and others under discussion by the
House Committee is to build as many checks and questions as possible
into the decision-making process so that no covert operation will be
undertaken unless the arguments in favor of it are overwhelming.
Mr. Chairman and senators, I've touched on only three issues here
today. There are many others. I will be happy to expand these points
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