LETTER TO THE HONORABLE JOHN GLENN FROM FRANK CHURCH

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00735R000200130004-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2003
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: January 30, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

FRANK CHURCH. IDAHO. CHAIRMAN
JDHN U. TOWEAPVt ~rd"'~tlt"Release 2003/08/04: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200130004-7
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. '~ OWARD H. BAK H.
.:SALTER F. MONDALE. MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER. ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON. KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS. JR.. MD.
RT M. COL, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKEA. PA. '~ ~~~~ /}~ /l}~,-`~~(~
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HAR1T, COLO. '^/I
WILLIAM G. MILLER. STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ. JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS. MINORITY COUNSEL SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20510
January 30, 1976
The Honorable John Glenn
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.
I have reflected on the question you asked me during the hearing
held by the Government Operations Committee on January 21, concerning the
desirability of establishing a Senate Committee to oversee the intelligence
functions of the Government. I think it would be helpful if.I put down my
thoughts in this letter.
You asked what the ideal situation would be. Upon considered. reflection,
I am of the view that an oversight committee for each House would serve best
?; to address the serious problems that have been raised over the last 30 years
concerning secret intelligence activities of the U.S. Government. I am in
agreement with those that maintain that the present situation whereby six
committees of the Congress exercise some degree of oversight over covert
operations is not a workable arrangement. It is a situation that verges upon
the chaotic. Clearly, one committee for each House would be a far better
solution than the three in each House that presently are involved in.monitoring
the covert action programs of the United States.
I support the proposal for an oversight committee for each House, because
it is clear that the two Houses function in very different ways. The differences
are many -- some are a result of traditions of long duration. Other differences
are accounted for in part by the size and character of electoral districts,
length of service between elections, and, of course, the respective members
of the two bodies.
One of the important aspects of the oversight proposal (S. 2893) now
before your Committee that I have introduced with seven other colleagues on
the Senate Select Committee, is a reporting requirement contained in Section VI.
The oversight committee would have the obligation to alert committees of the
Senate of information concerning intelligence activities in areas that might
be of relevar.ce to those committees. If this duty was carried out well, some
of the main causes that have contributed to the proliferation of committees
involved in monitoring intelligence.activities would disappear.
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The Honorable John Glenn
Page Two
January 30, 1976
In my view, the issues that have generated so much emotion over the last
year or so will gradually lessen. In a time of consensus, oversight committees
would function effectively without much fanfare or controversy. It is in a
time of consensus, when oversight tends to become lax, that checks and balances
are particularly desirable. The advantages of checks and balances built into
the bicameral structure of our Legislature by the Constitution, of course, have
merit in time of controversy, as the history of the last ten years so well shows.
If the responsibility for monitoring of highly sensitive operations is
reduced to one committee in either House, it seems to me that it would be not
only desirable, but necessary to assure that the perspectives of the two
chambers are strongly represented by separate committees. In the past thirty
years, secret wars have been waged, vast sums transferred to other governments
without Congressional awareness and a host of illegal acts committed. In view
of this past history of the lack of adequate Congressional oversight, it seems,
to me unwise to concentrate oversight in only one committee for the Congress
as a whole. Further, it is my view that it is not only constitutionally
appropriate, and in the best interest of the nation's security to have a committee
for each body given the full powers required for effective oversight. A necessary
requirement whether for two separate committees or a joint committee is that
they must function under agreed upon procedures which would assure that valid
national secrets are protected. There might be occasions when, for security
? reasons, or some other important purpose, the committees of both Houses might
choose to meet together in order to reduce risk or to facilitate action. Such
joint meetings between separate committees could easily be provided for.
In sum, it is my view that the advantages of separate committees for
the Senate and House to oversee intelligence activities outweigh the possible
advantages in limiting the chances for disclosure that might be derived by
a single joint committee. I would welcome discussing this with you at your
convenience.
With kind regards,
Sincerely,
cc: Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff, Chairman Senator Charles H. Percy
Senator John L. McClellan Senator Jacob K. Javits
Senator Henry M. Jackson Senator. William V. Roth, Jr.
Senator J3dmund S. Muskie Senator Bill Brock
Senator bee Metcalf Senator Lowell P. Weicker, Jr..
Senator James B. Allen
Senator Lawton Chiles
Senator S,im Nunn
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