LETTER TO MR. JAMES M. FREY FROM GEORGE L. CARY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00735R000200150009-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: March 4, 1976
• Content Type: LETTER

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WASHINGTON,D.C. 20505
4 MAR 1976
Mr. James M. Frey
Assistant Director for Legislative Reference
Office of Management and Budget
Washington, D.C. 20503
Dear Mr. Frey:
This letter is in response to the oral request of Mr. George Gilbert
of your staff for the views of this Agency on S. Res. 400, which would
establish a new standing Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities. The
Central Intelligence Agency takes the position that the way in which. Congress
chooses to exercise its oversight responsibility is basically a question for
the Congress to determine. These comments, therefore, are limited. to those
aspects of congressional oversight which directly affect the ability of this
Agency to fulfill its statutory mission.,
Exclusivity of Jurisdiction of CIA
conduct it. Although a joint House-Senate intelligence committee would
reflect maximum concentration of oversight, CIA believes separate Senate
and House committees are acceptable, as long as the jurisdiction of these
committees is exclusive. The changes in the charters of other relevant
Senate committees would, if not read in conjunction with. Section 7 (c) (2).
centrated exclusively in the minimum number of committees required to effectively
the Jurisdicuon of the proposed Committee on Intelligence Activities. One
of this Agency's major goals in oversight has been that jurisdiction be con-
Section 3(c) amends the jurisdiction of the Armed Services, Foreign Relations,
Government Operations, and Judiciary Committees to exclude matters within
Section 3(a) of S. Res. 400 amends Rule XXV of the Standing Rules
of the Senate to set forth the jurisdiction of the newly proposed committee.
However, Section 7(c) (2) of S. Res. 400 expressly permits the Committee?
on Intelligence Activities or any member thereof, under regulations to be
established by the Committee, to disclose any information "relating to the
lawful intelligence activities of any department or agency of the United
States" [?7(c) (1)) to any other committee or member of the Senate. In. addition,
?7(c) (2) permits a member to disclose any information he has ]earned through
seem to accomplish this desired exclusivity.
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Is
this process to any other member of the Senate, the only condition being he
must inform the Committee on Intelligence Activities that he has done so.
A major advantage of exclusive committee jurisdiction is to halt the prolifera-
tion of sensitive operational information throughout the Congress. Section
7(c) (2) authorizes a Senator to tell any other Senator anything he has
learned from the proposed Committee or a member thereof. This would appear
to negate a major advantage of the jurisdictional exclusivity established in
section 3 of S. Res. 400, and we strongly oppose this subsection..
Jurisdiction of Foreign and Domestic Intelligence
S. Res. 400 would combine jurisdiction of this nations foreign and
domestic intelligence activities within one committee. We believe this in-
advisable, for the following reasons:
(1) The constitutional bases for foreign and domestic
intelligence are fundamentally different, as are the problems,
objective, standards, etc.
(2) Fundamental considerations of individual constitutional
rights are present in domestic intelligence questions, and are not
present in most foreign intelligence questions where Americans are
not involved.
(3) Domestic and foreign intelligence involve quite
different political, foreign, and domestic policy problems. Try
particular, domestic intelligence would not involve the national
defense problems inherent in foreign intelligence.
(4) Domestic intelligence does not involve serious
problems of "leaks" which may involve our security as a nation.
Foreign intelligence activities do.
Section 7(a) purports to establish the right of the Committee on
Intelligence Activities to "disclose publicly any information in the possession.
of such committees after a determination by such committee that the public
interest would be served by such disclosure." Section 7(b) outlines the
procedure to be followed in making such disclosures.
It is the position of this Agency that the Congress constitutionally
does not have the authority to declassify information classified by the Executive
branch. To assert that information which is gathered through the resources
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of the Executive branch, processed and analyzed by the Executive branch,
and is vital to an Executive branch function, can be released by Congress
over the objections of the President, is surely inconsistent with the concept
of separation of powers. In addition, on a practical level, these sections
would obstruct cooperation between the Agency and the Committee, as this
Agency cannot be expected to be forthcoming with the proposed Committee
if there is no assurance that its sensitive information would not be made
public without its agreement.
Authorization of Appropriations
Section 11 of S. Res. 400 establishes a Senate procedure which would
compel the passage of a periodic authorization bill for funds for the activities
of this Agency, despite Section 8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of
1949, which provides continuing authorization authority for CIA. CIA
opposes such a requirement. The purpose of Section 8 of the CIA Act was
to protect against disclosure of the CIA budget. Normal authorization pro-
cedures would involve the disclosure of the budgets of the intelligence
agencies. Although it may be possible that special procedures which would
not bring about the disclosure of the budget could be agreed to, Section 1.1
does not require them.
CIA does not object to the purposes sought to be advanced by this
section--to provide the proposed Committee a means to influence the size
and program content of the budgets of the intelligence agencies under its
jurisdiction. According to the Government Operations Committee's report
(Senate Report 94-675), an annual authorization requirement "should assure
a regular review of each agency's intelligence activities, its efficiency, and
its priorities." We welcome such a review, but oppose any method to accom-
plish it which would disclose the budgets of the intelligence agencies.
Agency Reports
Section 4(b) of S. Res. 400 directs that the Director of Central Intelligence
shall submit unclassified annual reports to the committees on the activities
of their respective intelligence components and the intelligence activities of
foreign countries directed at the United States or its interests.. -It would not
be possible to prepare an annual report on the activities of CIA and hostile
foreign intelligence services which would be unclassified and remain
meaningful and not misleading. Therefore, the Agency does not believe such
a report would substantially contribute to a public understanding of this
Agency, or the intelligence threats facing this country.
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These points represent our major concerns with S. Res. 400. We
believe a highly coordinated Executive branch approach to Senate action
on this resolution is desirable, and my office stands ready to assist in
such an effort.
Sincerely,
George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel
is
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Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - OGC
1-IC
1 - Compt
1 - SC/DCI
1 - Review Staff
1 - OLC Subject
1 - OLC OMB Liaison
1 - OLC Chrono
OLC: DFM: sm (4 Mar 76)
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