STATEMENT ON S. RES. 400 GEORGE BUSH DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BEFORE COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00735R000200160002-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 12, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 11, 2001
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 31, 1976
• Content Type: STATEMENT

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George Bush
Director of Central Intelligence
Before
Committee on Rules and Administration
of the
United States Senate
March 31, 1976
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Mr. Chairman:
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today on S. Res. 400, which
would establish a new standing Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities.
I will limit my comments to those aspects of this resolution which directly
affect the. ability of the Central Intelligence Agency or the Director of Central
Intelligence to fulfill our respective responsibilities.
Mr. Chairman, the Central Intelligence Agency welcomes strong
and effective congressional oversight. We have a great deal to gain from
it. We gain the advice and counsel of knowledgeable Members. Through
it, we can maintain the trust and support of the American people. We
will retain this support only so long as the people remain confident that
the political structure provides clear accountability of our intelligence
services, through effective Executive and congressional oversight. Good
oversight will insure that the intelligence agencies operate as the Government?
and the nation--wish them to. But in establishing this accountability,
I believe the Congress must also insure that oversight enhances, rather
than hinders, the vital operations of our intelligence agencies. Although
there is much to be admired in S. Res. 400, I am concerned that certain
sections of this resolution would unnecessarily hinder our foreign intelligence
effort.
One of the principles which the President stated in his 18 February
1976 message to Congress was that Congress should seek to centralize the
responsibility for oversight of the foreign intelligence community. The
past year has witnessed the antithesis of this. While eight congressional
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committees (including the select committees) were formally involved in this
oversight process, eleven other committees or subcommittees made oversight
claims and were given access to sensitive intelligence information. This
rapidly broadened access to sensitive material has contributed substantially
to the past year's unprecedented number of leaks of sensitive foreign intel-
ligence information, in addition to placing a heavy burden on senior foreign
intelligence officials in carrying out their regular duties.
As Director of Central Intelligence, I seek to cooperate to the maximum
extent possible with the Congress. I want Congress to be a consumer of
intelligence. CIA provides a daily report on foreign developments to the
congressional committees directly concerned with our national defense and
foreign policy. Intelligence Community members provide background intel-
ligence information on specific events to any Member of Congress who requests
it and to committees on matters within their jurisdiction. In this way, Congress
shares in the fruits of our intelligence effort, and is better able to exercise
its responsibilities to provide for the common defense and share in the formula-
tion of American foreign policy. However, I do not believe that details of
intelligence operations can be spread this widely, for guaranteed secrecy
remains a prerequisite to success in many of our activities. Chinks in our
adversaries' armor are rapidly repaired when made public. Our technical
capabilities are nullified, and our own officers as well as foreign human
sources are senselessly endangered. And so I urge concentrated oversight.
I am not alone in advancing this position. The Government Operations
Committee report on S. Res. 400 states:
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"The Committee was ... very aware of the need to reduce
the proliferation of committees [involved in oversight of
CIA] . This resolution has been drafted with this concern
in mind.
While S. Res. 400 makes significant strides toward concentrating
oversight by altering the charters of other relevant committees to exclude
intelligence activities, it does not, by itself, accomplish this objective.
While the Senate. Select Committee is winding up its affairs, reducing by
one the number of committees involved in intelligence oversight, the Senate
Budget Committee has established an intelligence unit and has begun requesting
access to sensitive information. It is my hope that the interests of the Budget
Committee can somehow be satisfied through the essential role of the Appropriations
Committee, which has traditionally involved oversight of CIA. In addition,
under Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (the ITughes-Ryan
amendment), information regarding covert action is reported to three committees
of the Senate--Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations. Reports
are also made to the corresponding committees of the House. S. Res. 400 will
not affect these reporting requirements. In his message the President recom-
mended that Section 662 be modified.
Section 7 (c) (2) of S. Res. 400 further diminishes the effect of the
proposed Senate Rule XXV changes on consolidated oversight. This section
expressly permits the proposed committee and its members to disclose any
committee information to any other Senate committee or individual Senator.
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Furthermore, any Member who learns information in this manner may also
disclose it to any other Senator. While such a provision is arguably necessary
for substantive intelligence, I can see no justification for unlimited dissemina-
tion of information about this Agency's sources and methods. Section 7(c)(2)
negates a major advantage of consolidated oversight--halting the prolifera-
tion of sensitive operational information throughout the Congress--and in my
opinion must be tightened up considerably.
I do not intend to become involved in any committee debates over the
jurisdiction of various intelligence programs or activities. That is a matter
for you to resolve. My concern is over the proliferation of sensitive intel-
ligence operational information (information concerning intelligence sources
and methods) throughout the Congress. I strongly urge the Senate, in
considering the, oversight issue, to concentrate oversight of foreign intel-
ligence activities. If a new committee is established, perhaps the interests
of other committees might be accommodated by reserving seats on the
intelligence committees for members of other relevant Senate committees,
but again that is a matter for the Senate to resolve.
Mr. Chairman, the second of my major concerns regarding S. Res. 400
relates to Sections 7(a) and (b) which assert the authority of the proposed
committee to disclose information provided by the Executive branch, even
over the objections of the President.
The President addressed this point in his February 18, 1976, message
on foreign intelligence activities to the Congress. The President stated:
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"Any foreign intelligence information transmitted by the
Executive Branch to the Oversight Committee, under an injunction
of secrecy, should not be unilaterally disclosed without my agreement.
Respect for the integrity of the Constitution requires adherence to the
principle that no individual member nor committee, nor single louse
of Congress can overrule an act of the Executive. Unilateral publica-
tion of classified information over the objection of the President, by one
committee or one House of Congress, not only violates the doctrine of
separation of powers, but also effectively overrules the actions of the
other Houses of Congress, and perhaps even the majority of both
Houses."
Aside from the constitutional aspects, sections 7(a) and (b) create
other serious problems.
Much information the Executive branch would
furnish the proposed committee is protected from disclosure by statute.
Disclosure of this material by the Committee or the Senate might in some
circumstances risk a violation of these laws. These sections would also create
a serious conflict in responsibilities for the Director of Central Intelligence. The
DCI must cooperate with the Congress, but if he provided intelligence sources
and methods information with no assurance in return that it will be protected,
he would be violating his statutory responsibility--imposed on him by Congress--
to protect this information from unauthorized disclosure. Moreover, on a
practical level, acceptance of this section would significantly reduce the
chances that the Executive and Congress could work together constructively
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in the intelligence field. I believe this section would immediately place the
Executive branch and the committee in an adversary relationship, and could
impede the flow of sensitive information to the committee. Such a relationship
would detract from good oversight and would not contribute to good intelligence.
I believe what the Senate and this country want is good oversight.
Public disclosure is not synonymous with good oversight. The proposed
committee can do its job responsibly and conscientiously, giving maximum
protection to the rights of American citizens, and yet not disclose sensitive
information to the public--and hostile foreign intelligence services--in the
process. It is my recommendation that the sections permitting the Senate to
disclose Executive branch information over the objection of the President
be deleted from S. Res. 400. I am confident that this problem can be solved
informally to the mutual satisfaction of the Agency and committee concerned.
My third major concern with S. Res. 400 lies in Section 11. This
section would establish a Senate procedure which would compel the passage
of a periodic authorization bill for funds for the activities of this Agency,
despite Section .8 of the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949, which pro-
vides continuing authorization authority for CIA. One purpose of Section 8
was to protect against the disclosure of the CIA budget, in recognition of
the danger inherent in budget disclosure to our foreign intelligence effort.
An annual authorization bill reported from the new committee would reveal
at least the budget total. Both the Senate and the House have in the past
two years voted, by substantial margins, to keep intelligence budgets
secret. I will provide the committee a memorandum on the consequences
of budget disclosure.
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?
It is my belief that this problem can be solved to the satisfaction
of both the Senate and the intelligence agencies. The Congress now, through
the appropriations committees, annually subjects the CIA budget to thorough
and total examination and determines the level and nature of our expenditures.
No budget information is withheld. The purpose sought to be advanced by
an authorization requirement is to give the proposed oversight committee a
means to influence the size and program content of the intelligence budgets.
According to the Government Operations Committee report on S. Res. 400,
an authorization requirement "should assure a regular review of each agency's
intelligence activities, its efficiency and its priorities. " This, Agency would
welcome such a review, but does not believe an authorization requirement
is necessary. We now brief the CIA subcommittees of the House and Senate
Armed Services Committees on our budget. We would not oppose a require-
ment to brief the proposed committee on the CIA budget, and a requirement that
the intelligence committee file a classified letter containing its CIA budget
recommendations with the Appropriations Committee. Such a plan would
insure that the committee was briefed on the Agency budget, that it considered
it carefully and that the Appropriations Committee received its recommendations,
thus satisfying the objective of an annual authorization without disclosing the
budget.
Finally, I would like to comment on the wisdom of combining in one
committee jurisdiction of both domestic and foreign intelligence activities.
I believe it inadvisable to add jurisdiction of the FBI's intelligence activities
to the otherwise solely foreign intelligence jurisdiction of the proposed
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committee. As Attorney General Levi testified before the Government
Operations Committee, the FBI's intelligence activities relate to law enforce-
ment. The counterintelligence activites of the Bureau relate to enforcement
of,the espionage and related laws. Although certain intelligence activities
of the FBI and foreign intelligence agencies may be similar, the constitutional
bases, standards, and problems involved are so different that it would appear
more suitable that all FBI activities be overseen by a committee other than
the one concerned with foreign intelligence activities. Much has been said
about keeping foreign intelligence and law enforcement activities separated
within the Executive branch. I believe the same principle should apply to
the Congress in the exercise of its oversight responsibilities.
As a former. Member of Congress, Mr. Chairman, I am particularly
anxious that relations between the Congress and the intelligence agencies
proceed in a cooperative and harmonious spirit which will contribute to
increased efficiency of our foreign intelligence effort, while yielding
complete protection for the rights of American citizens. It will be iry privilege
as Director of Central Intelligence to serve the Congress by providing intel-
ligence on substantive developments which will aid congressional decision-
making, and to be totally accountable to our designated oversight committees.
What I ask in return is that oversight be concentrated, and that sensitive
information be protected, thus facilitating our total cooperation. Thank you.
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