S. RES. 400 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
186
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 3, 2004
Sequence Number: 
1
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 12, 1976
Content Type: 
OPEN
File: 
AttachmentSize
PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5.pdf25.29 MB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 9 Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90-00735R000206t' W03 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Calendar No. 728 S. RES. 400 94TI-I CONGRESS 2D SESSION IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 12,1976 Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed AMENDMENT Intended to be -proposed by Mr. ROTH (for himself and Mr. HUDDLESTON) to S. Res. 400, a resolution to establish a Standing Committee on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes, viz : Strike section 8 (d) and insert in lieu thereof : (d) The Select Committee on Standards and Conduct 2 shall have the duty to investigate alleged disclosures of intel- 3 ligence information by a Member, officer, or employee of 4 the Senate, in violation of subsection (c) . At the request of 5 five of the members of the Committee on Intelligence Activi- 6 ties or sixteen Members of the Senate, the Select Committee 7 on Standards and Conduct shall investigate any such alleged S disclosure of intelligence information and report its findings 9 and recommendations to the Senate.. Arndt. No. 1642 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 AMENDMENT Intended to be proposed by Mr. ROTH (for him- self and Mr. HUDDLESTON) to S. Res. 400, a resolution to establish a Standing Commit- tee on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes. MAY 12,1976 Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 ? 94r11 CONGRESS 2D SESSION Calendar No. 728 S. RESO 400 IN HIE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES ? MAY 12,1976 Ordered to be printed (IN THE NATURE OF A SUBSTITUTE) Proposed by Mr. CANNON (for himself, Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. HUGII SCOTT, Mr. P,RCY, Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. R,IPICOFF, Mr. CIIURCII, Mr. MOND A.LE, Mr. BAKER, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. PHILIP A. HART, Mr. IIUDDLESTON, Mr. MORGAN, Mr. GARY HART', Mr. MATIIIAS, Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. DURKIN, Mr. ROTH, Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. BROOKE, Mr. BROCK, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. HUMPHRj, "Y, Mr. CLARK, and Mr. PELL) to S. Res. 400, a resolution to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes, viz: in lieu of the language intended to be substituted by the committee amendment insert the following : 3 Committee on Intelligence, to oversee and make continuing Arndt. No. 1643 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 That it is the purpose of this resolution to establish a new select committee of the Senate, to be known. as the Select Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 2 1 studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the 2 United States Government, and to submit to the Senate 3 appropriate proposals for legislation and report to the Senate 4 concerning such intelligence activities and programs. In 5 carrying out this purpose, the Select Committee on Intelli- 6 gence shall make every effort to assure that the appro- 7 priate departments and agencies of the United States provide 8 informed and timely intelligence necessary for the execu- 9 tive and legislative branches to make sound decisions affect- 10 ing the security and vital interests of the Nation. It is further 11 the purpose of this resolution to provide vigilant legislative 12 oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States 13 to assure that such activities are in conformity with the 14 Constitution and laws of the United States. 15 SEC. 2. (a) (1) There is hereby established a select 16 committee to be known as the Select Committee on Intel- 17 ligence (hereinafter in this resolution referred to as the 18 "select committee") . The select committee shall be com- 19 posed of seventeen members appointed as follows : 20 (A) two members from the Committee on A.ppro- 21 priatons ; 22 (B) two members from the Committee on Armed 23 Services; 24 (C) two members from the Committee on Foreign 25 Relations; Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 0 0 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 3 ? 1 (D) two members from the Committee- on -tile 2 Judiciary ; and 3 (E) nine members from the Senate who are not 4 members of any :of the committees named in clauses 5 (A) through (D) . 6 (2) Members appointed from each committee named in 7 clauses (A) through (D) of paragraph (1) shall be evenly 8 divided between the two major political parties and shall 9 be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate an -1 an ling minority member. J. ive of the members ap- upon the recommendations of the majority and minority leaders of the Senate after consultation with their chairman d 1 pointed under clause (E) of. paragraph (1) shall be ap- pointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the-: recommendation of the majority leader of the Senate and four shall be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the,- 18 Senate. (3) The majority leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the Senate shall be ex officio members of the select, committee but shall have no vote in the committee and 22 shall not be counted for purposes of determining a. quorum. (b) No Senator may serve on the select committee for 24 more than nine years of continuous service, exclusive of.serv 25 ice by any Senator on such committee during the Ninety- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 4 1 fourth Congress. To the greatest extent practicable, one-third 2 of the Members of the Senate appointed to the select com- 3 mitte'e at the beginning of the Ninety-seventh Congress and 4 -eaeh Congress thereafter shall be Members o'f the Senate who 5 did not serve on such committee during the preceding -,:Congress. -7 . '(c) At the beginning of each Congress, the Members 8 of the Senate who are members of the majority party of g the Senate shall elect a chairman for the select committee, 10 and the Members of the Senate who are from the minority 11 party of the Senate shall elect a vice chairman for such 12 committee. The vice chairman shall act in the place and 13 stead of the chairman in the absence of the chairman. Neither 14 the chairman nor the vice chairman of the select conunittee 15 shall at the same time serve as chairman or ranking minority 16 member of any other committee referred to in paragraph 17 6 (f) of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate. 18 (d) For the purposes of paragraph 6 (a) of rule XXV 19 of the Standing Rules of the Senate, service of a Senator as 20 a member of the select committee shall not be taken into 21 account. 22 SEC. 3. (a) There shall be referred to the select com- 23 mittee all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memo- 24 rials, and other matters relating to the following : Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 ? ? Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 5 1 (1) The Central Intelligence Agency and the Di- 2 rector of Central Intelligence. 3- (2) Intelligence activities of all other departments. 4 and agencies of the Government, including, but not lim- 5 ited to, the intelligence activities of the Defense Intelli- 6 gence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other 7 agencies of the Department of Defense; the Department 10 of State; the Department of Justice; ' and the Depart- ment of the Treasury. . ~ (3) The organization or reorganization of any de- 11 partment or agency, of the Government to the extent 12 that the organization or reorganization relates to a func- 13 tion or activity involving intelligence activities. 14 (4) Authorizations for appropriations, both direct 21 23 and indirect, for the following : (A) The Central Intelligence Agency and Di- rector of Central Intelligence. (B) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (C) The National Security Agency. (D) The intelligence activities of other agen- cies and subdivisions of the Department of Defense. (E) The intelligence activities of the Depart- ment of State. (F) The intelligence activities of the Federal Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 6 1 Bureau of Investigation, including all activities of 2 the Intelligence Division. 3 (G) Any department, agency, or subdivision 4 which is the successor to any agency named in 5 clause (A), (B), or (C) ; and the activities of any department, agency, or subdivision which is the 7 successor to any department, agency, bureau, or 9 10 subdivision named in clause (D) , (E), or (F) to the extent that the activities of such successor depart- ment, agency, or subdivision are activities described 11 in clause (D) , (E) , or (F) . 12 (b) Any proposed legislation reported by the select 13 committee, except any legislation involving matters specified 14 in clause (1) or (4) (A) of subsection (a), containing any 15 matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of any standing com- 16 rnittee shall, at the request of the chairman of such standing 17 committee, be referred to such standing committee for its 18 consideration of such matter and be reported to the Senate 19 by such standing committee within thirty days after the day 20 on which such proposed legislation is referred to such stand- 21 ing committee; and any proposed legislation reported by any 22 committee, other than the select committee, which contains 23 any matter within the jurisdiction of the select committee 24 shall, qt the request of the chairman of the select committee, In ?'t~l't'ec to the select Poanlnitteo for its consideration of Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 ? Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 is ? 7 such matter and be reported to the Senate by the select com- mittee within thirty days after the day on which such pro- posed legislation is referred to such committee. In any case in which committee fails to report any proposed legislation referred to it within the time limit prescribed herein, such committee shall be automatically discharged from further consideration of such proposed legislation on the thirtieth day following the day on which such proposed legislation is referred to such committee unless the Senate provides other- wise. In computing any thirty-day period under this para- graph there shall be excluded from such computation any days on which the Senate is not in session. (c) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as pro- hibiting or otherwise restricting the authority of any other committee to study and review any intelligence activity to the extent that such activity directly affects a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee. 18 (d) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as 19 amending, limiting, or otherwise changing the authority of 20. any standing committee of the Senate to obtain full and 21 prompt access to the product of the intelligence activities of any department or agency of the Government relevant to a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee. SEC. 4. (a) The select committee, for the purposes of accountability to the Senate, shall make regular and periodic Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 8 1 reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the intelli- 2 gence activities of the various departments and agencies of the 3 'United States. Such committee shall promptly call to the 4 attention of the Senate or to any other appropriate commit- 5 tee or committees of the Senate any matters deemed by the 6 select committee to require the immediate attention of the 7 Senate or such other committee or committees. In making 8 such reports, the select committee shall proceed in a manner 9 consistent with section 8 (c) (2) to protect national security. 10 (b) The select committee shall obtain an annual report 11 from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the 12 Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director 13 of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for public dissemi- 14 nation. Such reports shall review the intelligence activities 15 of the agency or department concerned and the intelligence 16 activities of foreign countries directed at the United States 17 or its interests. An unclassified version of each report shall 18 be made available to the public by the select committee. 19 Nothing herein- shall be construed as requiring the disclosure 20 in such reports of the names of individuals engaged in intelli- 21 gence activities for the United States or the sources of infor- 22 mation on which such reports are based. 23 (c) On or before March 15 of each year, the select com- 24 mittee shall submit to the Committee on the Budget of the 25 Senate the views and estimates described in section 301 (c) Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 ? 9 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 regarding matters within the jurisdiction of the select committee. SEe. 5. (a) For the purposes of this resolution, the select committee is authorized in its discretion (1) to make 5 investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction, (2) to make ependitures ftom the contingent fund of the Senate, (3) to employ personnel, (4) to hold hearings, ' ' (5) "to sit and act at any time or place during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, (6) to require, by subpena or otherwise, the attendance of witnesses -and the production of correspondence, hooks, papers, and documents, (7) to take depositions and other testimony, (8) to procure the service of individual consultants or oigariizations thereof, in accordance with the provisions of section 202 (1) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and (9) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency con- cerned and the Committee on Rules and Administration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any 19 such department or agency. 20 (b) The chairman of the select committee or any mem= 21 her thereof may administer oaths to witnesses. 22 (c) Subpenas authorized by the select committee may 23 be issued over the signature of the chairman, the vice chair= ? 24 man, or any member of the select committee designated by Amdt. No. 1643 2 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 10 1 the, chairman, and may be served by any person designated 2 by the chairman or any member signing the subpena-. 3 SEC. 6. No employee of the select committee or any 4 person engaged by contract or otherwise to perform services 5 . for or .at the request of such committee shall be given access 6 to any classified information by such committee unless such .7 employee or person has .(1) agreed in writing and under 8 oath to be bound by the rules of the Senate (including the 9 jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Standards and Con- 10 duct) and of such committee as to the security of such in- 11 formation during and. after the period of his employment or 12 contractual agreement with. such committee; and (2) re- 13 ceived an appropriate security clearance as determined by 14 such committee in consultation with the Director of Central 15. Intelligence. The type of security clearance to be required in 16 the case of any. such employee or person shall, within the 17. determination of such committee in consultation with the 18. 19 20 21 23- Director of Central Intelligence, be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such em- ployee or person will be given access by such committee. SEC. 7. The select committee shall formulate and carry out, such rules and procedures as it deems necessary to pre- vent.the disclosure, without the consent of the person or per- sons concerned, of information in the possession of such committee which unduly infringes upon the privacy or which 0 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 11 f violates the constitutional rights of such person or persons. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent such committee from publicly disclosing any such information in any case in which such committee determines the national interest in the disclosure of such information clearly outweighs any infringement on the privacy of any person or persons. SEC. 8. (a) The select committee may, subject to the provisions of this section, disclose publicly any informa- tion in the possession of such committee after a determina- 10` tion by such committee that the public interest would be 11 served by such disclosure. Whenever committee action is required to disclose any information under this section, the - committee shall meet to vote on the matter within five days after any member of the committee requests such a vote. No member of the select committee shall disclose any infor- mation, the disclosure of which requires a committee vote, prior to a vote by the committee on the question of the _dis- closure of such information or after such vote except. in 19 accordance with this section. (b) (1) In any case in which the select committee votes to disclose publicly any information which has been classi- fied under established security procedures, which has been submitted to it by the executive branch, and which the executive branch requests be kept secret, such committee 25 shall notify the President of such vote. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 12 1 (2) The select committee may disclose publicly such 2 information after the expiration of a five-day period follow- 3, ing the day on which notice of such vote is transmitted to 4, the President, unless, prior to the expiration of such five-day 5 period, the President notifies the committee that he objects 6 to the disclosure of such information, provides his reasons 7 therefor, and certifies that the threat to the national interest of the United States posed by such disclosure is vital and. 9 outweighs any public interest. in the disclosure. 10. (3) If the President notifies the select committee of his 11- objections to. the disclosure of such information as provided 12 . - -in - paragraph (2), such committee may; by majority vote, 13 refer the question of the disclosure of such information to. the 14 . Senate- for consideration. Such information shall not there- 15, after be publicly disclosed without leave of the Senate. 16. (.4) Whenever the select committee votes to refer the 17 question of-disclosure of any information to the Senate under 18 ? paragraph (3), the chairman shall, not later than the first 20 day on which the Senate is in session following the day _ on which the vote occurs; report the matter to the Senate for its 21- consideration. 22 23 24 25 (5) One hour after the Senate convenes on the fourth. day -on which the Senate is in session following the day, on which any such matter is reported to the Senate, or, at such earlier time as the majority leader and the minority 0 0 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 1 13 1 leader of the Senate jointly agree upon in accordance with 2 section 133 (f) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 3 1946, the Senate shall go into closed session and the matter 4 shall be the pending business. In considering the matter in 5 closed session the Senate may- 6 (A) approve the public disclosure of all or any 7 portion of the information in question, in which case S the committee shall publicly disclose the information 9 ordered to be disclosed, 10 (B) disapprove the public disclosure of all or any . 11 portion of the information in question, in which case 12 the committee shall not publicly disclose the information 13 ordered not to be disclosed, or 14 (C) refer all or any portion of the matter back to 15 the committee, in which case -the committee shall make 166 17 19 the final determination with respect to the public dis- closure of the information in question. Upon conclusion of the. consideration of such matter in close- d session, which may not extend beyond the close of the ninth day on which the Senate is in session following the day on which such matter was reported to the Senate; or the,-close of the fifth day following the day agreed upon jointly by the majority and minority leaders in accordance with section 133 (f) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 25 . - (whichever the case may be), the Senate shall immediately Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 14= 1 vote on the disposition of such matter in open session; with= 2 out debate, and without divulging the information with re- 3 spect to which the vote is being taken. The Senate shall. 4 vote to dispose of such matter by one or more of the means 5 specified in clauses (A) , (B) , and (C) -of the second sen- 6- tence of this paragraph. Any vote of the Senate to disclose 12 13 18 any information pursuant to this paragraph shall be subject to the right of a Member of the !Senate to move for recon- sideration of the vote within the time and pursuant to the procedures specified in rule XIII of the Standing Rules of the' Senate,' and the disclosure of such information shall be made consistent with that right. (c) (1) No information in the possession of the select committee relating to the lawful intelligence activities of any department or agency of the United States which has been classified under established security procedures and which the select committee, pursuant' to subsection (a) or (b) of this section, has determined should not be disclosed shall be 19 made available to any person by a Member, officer, or em- 20 ployee' of the Senate except in a closed session of the Senate 24 or as provided in paragraph (2) (2) ' The select committee may, under such regulations as the committee shall prescribe to protect the confidentiality of such information, make any information described in para- 25 graph (1) available, to any other committee or any other 0 0 9 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 16 15 Member of the Senate. Whenever the select committee makes such information available, the committee shall keep a writ- ten record showing, in the case of any particular informa- tion, 'Which committee or which Members of the Senate received such information. No Member of the Senate who, and no committee which, receives any information- under this subsection, shall disclose such information except in a closed session of the Senate. (d) It shall be the duty of the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct to investigate any alleged disclosure of intelligence information by a Member, officer, or employee, of the Senate in violation of subsection (c) and to report thereon to the Senate. - - (e) Upon the request of any person- who is subject to any such investigation, the Select Committee- on Stand- ards and Conduct shall release to such individual at the conclusion of its investigation a summary of its investigation together with its findings. If, at the conclusion of its- investi- gation, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct determines that there has been a significant breach of con- fidentiality or unauthorized -disclosure by a Member, officer, or employee of -the Senate, it shall report its findings to the Senate - and- recommend appropriate action such as censure, removal from committee membership; or expulsion from the Senate, in the case of Member, or removal from office or Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 employment or punishment for contempt, in the case of an officer or employee. SEC. 9. The select committee is authorized to permit any personal representative of the President, designated by the President to serve as a liaison to such committee, to attend any closed meeting of such committee. SEC. 10. Upon expiration of the Select Committee on 8 Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Ac- 9 tivities, established by Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth 10 Congress, all records, files, documents, and other materials 11 in the possession, custody, or control of such committee, 12 under appropriate conditions established by it, shall be trans- 13 ferred to the select committee. 14 SEC. 11. (a) It is the sense of the Senate that the head 15 of each department and agency of the United States should 16 keep the select committee fully and currently informed with 17 respect to intelligence activities, including any significant 18 anticipated activities, which are the responsibility of or 19 engaged in by such department or agency : Provided, That 20 this does not constitute a condition precedent to the imple- 21 menta.tion of any such anticipated intelligence activity. 22 (b) It is the sense of the Senate that the head of any 23 department or agency of the United States involved in any 0 24 intelligence activities should furnish any information or docu- 25 ment in the possession, custody, or control of the depart- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 17 1 ment or agency, or person paid -by such department or 2 agency, whenever requested by the select committee with 3 respect to any matter within such committee's jurisdiction. 4 (c) It. is the sense of the Senate that each department 5 and agency of the United States should report immediately 6 upon discovery to the select committee any and all intelli- 7 gence -activities - which constitute violations of the consti-tu- 8 tional rights of any - person, - violations of -la`v, or violations 9 of Executive orders, Presidential directives, or departmental 10 or agency rules or`regulations; each department and agency 11 should further report to such committee what actions have 12 been taken or are expected to he -taken by the dep,rtments 13 or agencies- with respect to such violations. SEC. 12. Subject to the Standing Rules of the Senate, no funds shall be appropriated for any 'fise it year beginning after September- 30, 1976, -with the exception of a con- tinuing bill or resolution, -or- arnendrfient thereto, or con- 18 ference report thereon, to, or for - use of, : any department 19 or. aagency of the United- States to carry out any of the fol- 20 - lowing activities, unless such -funds shall have been pre- 21 viously authorized by a . bill or joint "resolution passed -by 22 - the Senate during' the same or preceding fiscal year to carry 23 out such activity for such fiscal year::,, 24 (1) The activities of the Central Intelligence Agency 25 and the Director of Central Intelligence.. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 11 12 13 14 15 18 20 22 24 25 18 (2) The activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency. (3) The activities of the National Security Agency. (4) The intelligence activities of other agencies and subdivisions of the Department of Defense. (5) The intelligence activities of the Department of State. (6) The intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, including all activities of the Intelligence Division. SEC. 13. (a) The select committee shall make a study with respect to the following matters, taking into consider- ation with respect to each such matter, all relevant aspects of the effectiveness of planning, gathering, use, security, and dissemination of intelligence : (1) the quality of the analytical capabilities of United States foreign intelligence agencies and means for integrating more closely analytical intelligence and policy formulation; (2) the extent and nature of the authority of the departments and agencies of the executive branch to engage in intelligence activities and the desirability of developing charters for each intelligence agency or department; (3) the organization of intelligence activities in the executive branch to maximize the effectiveness of 0 9 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 19 1 the conduct, oversight, and accountability of intelligence 2 activities; to reduce duplication or overlap; and to im- 3 prove the morale of the personnel of the foreign intelli- 4 gence agencies; 5 (4) the conduct of covert and clandestine activities 6 and the procedures by which Congress is informed of 7 such activities; 8 (5) the desirability of changing any law, Senate 9 rule or procedure, or any Executive order, rule, or regu- 10 lation to improve the protection of intelligence secrets 11 and provide for disclosure of information for which there 12 is no compelling reason for secrecy; 13 (6) the desirability of establishing a standing com- 14 mittee of the Senate on intelligence activities; 15 (7) the desirability of establishing a joint com- 16 mittee of the Senate and the House of Representatives on 17 intelligence activities in lieu of having separate com- 18 mittees in each House of Congress, or of establishing 19 procedures under which separate committees on intelli- 20 gence activities of the two Houses of Congress would 21 receive joint briefings from the intelligence agencies and 22 coordinate their policies with respect to ' the safeguarding 23 of sensitive intelligence information; 24 (8) the authorization of funds for the intelligence 25 activitio of the Government and whether disclosure of Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 20 1 any of the amounts of such funds is in the public interest; .2 and 3 (9) the development of a uniform set of definitions 4 for terns to be used in policies or guidelines which may 5 be adopted by the executive or legislative branches to 6 govern, clarify, and strengthen the operation of intelli- 11. 12 13 14 gence activities. (b) The select committee may, in its discretion, omit from the special study required by this section any matter it determines has been adequately studied by the Select Com- mittee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, established by Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress. (c) The select committee shall report the results of the study provided for by this section to the Senate, together with any recommendations for legislative or other actions it deems appropriate, no later than July 1, 1977, and from time to time thereafter as it deems appropriate. SEC. 14. (a) As used in this resolution, the term "intel- ligence activities" includes (1) the collection, analysis, pro- duction, dissemination, or use of information which relates to any foreign country, or any government, political group, party, military force, movement, or other association in such foreign country, and which relates to the defense, foreign policy, national security, or related policies of the United 0 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 21 1 States, and other activity which is in support of such activi- 2 ties; (2) activities taken to counter similar activities directed 3 against the United States; (3) covert or clandestine activities 4 affecting the relations of the United States with any foreign 5 government, political group, party, military force, movement '6 or -other association; (4) the collection, analysis, production, 7 dissemination, or use of information about activities of per- 8 sons within the United States, its territories and possessions, 9 or nationals of the United States abroad whose political 10 and related activities pose, or may be considered' by any 11 department, agency, bureau, office, division, instrumentality, . 12 or employee of the United States to pose, a threat to the 13 internal security -of 'the United States, and covert or clan- 14 'destine activities directed against such persons. Such term 15 does not include tactical foreign military intelligence serving 16 no national policymaking function. 17 (b) As used in this resolution, the term "department or 18 agency" includes any organization, committee, council, estab- 19 lishment, or office within the Federal Government. 20 (c) For purposes of this resolution, reference to any 21 department, agency, bureau, or subdivision shall include a 22 reference to any successor department, -agency, bureau, or 23 subdivision to the extent that such successor engages in intel- 24 ligence activities now conducted by the department, agency, 25 bureau, or subdivision referred to in this resolution. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 22 I SEC. 15. For the period from the date this resolution is 2 agreed to through February 28, 1977, the expenses of the 3 select committee under this resolution shall not exceed 4 $275,000, of which amount not to exceed $30,000 shall be 5 available for the procurement of the services of individual 6 consultants, or organizations thereof, as authorized by section 7 202 (i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. 8 Expenses of the select committee under this resolution shall 9 be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers 10 approved by the chairman of the select committee, except; 11 that vouchers shall not be required for the disbursement of_ 12 salaries of employees paid at an annual rate. 13 SEC. 16. Nothing in this resolution shall be construed- 14 as constituting acquiescence by the Senate in any practice, 15 or in the conduct of any activity, not otherwise authorized 16 by law. 0 0 0 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 0 0 Amdt. No. 1643 Calendar No. 728 94TH CONGRESS ~ 2D SESSION S. RES.. 400 AMENDMENT Proposed by Mr. CANNON (for himself, Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. HUGH SCOTT, Mr. PERCY, Mr. HATFIELD, Mr. RIBI- COFF, Mr. CHURCH, Mr. MONDALE, Mr. BAKER, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. PHILIP A. HART, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. MORGAN, Mr. GARY HART, Mr. MATHIAS, Mr. SCHWEIKER, Mr. JAVITS, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. DURKIN, Mr. ROTH, Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. BROOKE, Mr. BROCK, Mr. WVEICKER, Mr. HUMPHREY, Mr. CLARK, and Mr. PELL) to S. Res. 400, a reso- lution to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes. MAY 12,1976 Ordered to be printed Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Calendar No. 728 94TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION So RESe 400 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 13) 1976 Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed AMENDMENT .Intended to be proposed by Mr. TAFT to amendment numbered 4643 to S. Res. 400, a resolution to establish a Standing :Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for .other purposes, viz: 1 On page 4, line 20, delete the word "not". Amdt. No. 1645 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Cs b W CS' CD z? o 0~ cn is Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 94TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION Calendar No. 728 So RES9400 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 13,1976 Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed AMENDMENT Intended to be proposed by Mr. TAFT to amendment numbered 1643 to S. Res. 400, a resolution to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes, viz : On page 6, line 12, delete paragraph (b) and substitute the following provision : 1 . (b) Any proposed legislation or other intelligence matter 2 considered by the select committee, except any legislation 3 involving matters specified in clause (1) or (4) (A) of 4 subsection (a) , containing any matter otherwise within the 5 jurisdiction of any standing committee shall be communi- 6 cated to the chairman and ranking member, respectively, 7 of such standing committee, and at the request of the chair- 8 man of such standing committee any proposed legislation 9 shall be referred to such standing committee for its con- Amdt. No. 1646 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 2 1 such date was a. member of more than one committee of the 2 classes described in the second sentence of paragraph 6 (a) 3 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate may serve 4 on a number of committees within those classes equal to the number of committees of those classes on which he was 6 serving on such day. No Senator who is a member of more 7 than two standing committees named in paragraph 2 of rule 8 XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate may serve on the 9 Select Committee on Intelligence Activities. 0 0 0 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 ? c % V N 00 ? Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 . Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Calendar No. 728 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 13, 1976 Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed 94Th CONGRESS 2D SESSION S? RES. 400 AMENDMENTS Intended to be proposed by-_- Mr. Ir. TAFT to amendment num- bered 1643 ,to S. Iles. 400, a resolution to establish a Stand- ing Oomnli-ttee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes, viz : On page 8, -lines 13 mid 14, delete the term "for public dissemination". On page 8, line 17, delete all after the period and delete all of line 18. Amdt. No. 1647 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 ? Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 94TH CONGRESS 2D SESSION Calendar No. 728 S. RES. 400 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 13,1976 Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed AMENDMENT Intended to be proposed by Mr. NELSON to the amendment (in the nature of a substitute) numbered 1643 submitted by Mr. CANNON (for himself and others) to S. Res. 400, a res- olution to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes, viz : Strike out subsection (d) of section 2 and insert in lieu thereof the following : 1 (d) For the purposes of the second sentence of para- 2 graph 6 (a) of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the 3 Senate, membership on the Select Committee. on Intelligence 4 Activities shall not be taken into account until that date oc- 5 curring during the first session of the Ninety-sixth Congress, 6 upon which the appointment of the majority and minority 7 party members of the standing committees of the Senate is 8 initially completed. Each Senator who on the day preceding Amdt. No. 1648 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 such date was a member of more than one committee of the 2 classes described in the second sentence of paragraph 6 (a) 3 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate may serve 4 on a number of committees within those classes equal to the number of committees of those classes on which he was 6 serving, on such day. No Senator who is a member of more 7 than two standing committees named in paragraph 2 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate may serve on the 9 Select Committee on Iatt li.igezice Activities.. ? 0 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 a y ~.. P F,, c-t C O LS'' p to~ 0 m 0 `I :n nr~7 CD C C Approved For Release 2004/05/1.3 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 ' Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 94TII CONGRESS 2D SESSION Calendar No. 728 S. RES. 400. IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES MAY 13,1976 Ordered to lie on the table and to be printed AMENDMENTS Intended to be proposed by Mr. TowER (for himself, Mr. STEN- NIS, Mr. - GOLDWATER, and Mr. TIIURMOND) to the 'amend- ment (in the nature of a substitute) numbered 1643 sub- mitted by Mr. CANNON (for himself and others) to S. Res. 400, a resolution to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate oh Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes, viz : 1 On page 5 strike out paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 2 3 (a) of the amendment and insert in lieu 'thereof the 3 following: 4 " (2) Intelligence activities of all other departments and 5 agencies of the Government except the Defense Intelligence 6 Agency, the National Security Agency, and other agencies 7 and subdivisions of the Department of Defense. 8 " (3) The organization or reorganization of any depart- 9 ment or agency of the Government, other than the Depart- Amdt. No. 1649 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 2 1 ment of Defense, to the extent that the organization or reor- 2 ganization relates to a function or activity involving 3 intelligence activities. 4 Strike out clauses (B), (C), and (D) of paragraph 5 (4) of section 3 (a) of the amendment and redesignate 6 clauses (E) and (F) as clauses (B) and (C), respectively. 7 Strike out clause (G) of paragraph (4) of section 3 (a) 8 of the amendment and insert in lieu thereof the following : 9 " (D) Any department, agency, or subdivision 10 which is the successor to the agency named in clause 11 (A) ; and the activities of any department, agency, or 12 - , subdivision which is the successor to any department or 13 bureau named in clause (B) or (C), to the extent the 14 activities of such successor department, agency, or sub- 15 division are described in clause (B) or (C ), .". 16 Strike. out the period in section 4 (c) and insert in lieu 17 thereof ''as specified in section 3 (a,.) .'.'. 18 19 20 Strike out clauses (2), (3), and (4) of section 12 and. redesignate clauses (5) and (6) as clauses (2) and (3) respectively. ? Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CAD' cP-? R+ m O CD P2 ? CAA I 0 0 Z Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90-00735R0 INDEX OF DEBATE (Pages and Dates of the Congressional Record) S 7082 - 5/12 - Text of Cannon Amendment. 2 7085 - 5/12 - Ribicoff introduction - principles. S 7087 - 5/12 .- Explanation Section by Section of Compromise S Res 400. S 7090 - 5/12 Summary of S Res 400 as reported out by Government Operations Committee. S 7092 - 5/12 - Summary of S Res 400 substitute. S 7096 - 5/12 Pell-Ribicoff Colloquy on Concurrent Jurisdiction. S 7256 - 5/13 Text of Cederberg H Res. for a Joint Committee. S 7261 - 5/13 - Baker on "prior approval". S 7262 5/13 - Church on the Resolution. S 7270 - 5/13 - Hart on Notification of Covert Actions. S 7340 - 5/17 - Percy on Concentrated Oversight. S 7344 - 5/17 - Inclusion, of David .Kahn article on USA in NYT Mag. 5/16/76 - "Big Ear on Big Brother" inserted by Mondale. S 7353 - 5/17. - Thurmond on Security and Jurisdiction. S 7354 - 5/17 - Thurmond Insertion of testimony on S Res 400 before Armed Services 'Committee - Ellsworth et. al. S 7361 - 5/17 - Taft on standing committees vs select committee - Colloquy with Ribicoff on ability of standing committee member of Select Committee to inform his parent committee. STATINTL S 7409 - 5/18 -. Ribicoff on term of serving on Select Committee. S 7535 - 5/19 - Stennis-Tower effort to-exclude DOD intelli- gence activities from oversight by new committee. S 7438 - 5/19 - Nunn-Ribicoff colloquy - on authorization authority and disclosure and intelligence manpower. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 -2- 0 S 7540 - 5/19 - The American Legion on S Res 400 - inserted by Cannon. S 7547 - 5/19 - Cranston on Disclosure - Ribicoff on Presidential restraint on using "National Security" 4 S 7553 - 5/19 - Stennis in defense of the existing system Vote on Stennis-Tower Amendment -.(#1649) S-7555.63-31. S 7559 - 5/19 - Vote on Cannon Amendment (no. 1643) 87-7. S 7559 - 5/19 - Hollings on a Commission rather than a committee. S 7563 - 5/19 - Text of S Res 400 - Final Version - and the vote - 72-22 with 6 not voting. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 DIGEST OF THE SENATE DEBATE ON SENATE RESOLUTION 400 12-19 MAY 1976 Because of the numerous amendments proposed to Resolution 400 in the debate before.the Senate Rules Committee after its being reported out by the Government Operations Committee, and because the final version of S Res 400 was arrived at by a compromise among Senate leaders in camera, there is no record of hearings on the final version nor a committee report to interpret the provisions of the bill. The legislative history of the resolution thus lies in the debate that followed the compromise version - with the result that many, points of procedure remain obscured and are possibly subject to differences among members of the new Select Committee on Intelligence as the Committee begins its operations. There follows an effort to identify key interpretations of the provisions of S. Res 400 as they emerged in the process of debate. (Numbers and dates refer to pages in the Congressional Record covering. the debate 12-19 May 1976): JURISDICTION Hruska: Argues strongly against inclusion of FBI in the scope of the oversight committee. This divides jurisdiction with the Judiciary Committee. The FBI should be viewed as integral part of the Justice Department under the Attorney General (S-7094-5/12). Pell-Ribicoff Colloquy on Concurrent Jurisdiction: Pell fears the Hughes-Ryan Amendment will be superseded by the new Committee, restricting the Foreign Relations Committee's access to Presidential reports on covert action - seeks clarification. Ribicoff assures that S?Res 400 does not repeal the Hughes-Ryan Amendment - "as a resolution it could not do so". The jurisdiction of the: Foreign Relations Committee is not changed by S Res 400. Legislation. bearing primarily on foreign policy,. rather than intelligence, would go to the Foreign Relations Committee, with the new committee having the .right to request sequential referral - and vice versa if intelligence were primary in proposed legislation. Creation of the new committee should not be used by the intelligence community to deny a standing. committee any information on any matter with which the committee is concerned" (S-7096-7-.5/12). Mondale: We should have a single committee with primary legislative jurisdiction and for annual authorization of budgets with concurrent jurisdiction with Judiciary, Armed Services.and Foreign Relations. Annual budget authorization is essential to oversight. Only if Congress can cross agency lines can it establish interactions among agencies, obtain necessary information without resorting to subpoenas, and take action where secrecy is necessary (S-7259-5/13). Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/9,'43 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Church: Necessary that the oversight committee have annual authorization authority over CIA and all intelligence elements of other departments and agencies. "The power of the purse is the most effective means that the legislature can have to assure that the will of Congress is observed." The new committee for the first time, can consider all budgetary requests of the national intelligence community on an annual basis. (S-7263-5/13) Eastland: Argues against inclusion of the FBI in the jurisdiction of the new oversight committee on grounds of.. the differences between domestic and foreign intelligence and the fractionating of consideration of the Justice Department (S-7265-5/13). Argues against the whole of S Res 400 as too insecure to protect intelligence operations. Cranston: The Committee will have jurisdiction throughout the national intelligence community - especially in annual authorization of funds which should help in fiscal and organizational planning. in the Executive Branch. Stresses. sequential referral to stimulate other committees to examine intelligence activities. But there is a major exception: the exclusive jurisdiction of the new Committee over CIA, a good measure to end the Armed Services control of a civilian agency. (S-7267-5/13) Weicker: Objects.to the procedures for appointing members from the standing: committees - a continuation of previous failures to carry out oversight (S-7276-5/13). Cannon's amendment to. force consultation with the chairmen of the standing committees as to their members to be appointed to.the oversight . committee. passed 75-17 + 8 not voting. Symington: Hopes for Foreign Relations and Armed Services to jointly review national intelligence in all its ramifications since 95% of all our intelligence in peacetime has,to do with foreign relations as against military operations (S-7281-5/13). Percy: Argues for inclusion of Defense intelligence activities in the jurisdiction of the new committee on grounds that Defense accounts for nearly 90% of US'spending on intelli- gence. It would defeat the essence of the compromise on concurrent jurisdiction and return oversight to the standing committees. Believes that any Senator, whether or not he sits on the oversight committee, can get the information he needs from intelligence, and that, even though NSA and DIA Activities are sensitive, the Committee must go into them for management efficiency, duplication and the value of the end product. Argues against fractionalized responsibility for oversight on the basis of past.oversight performance. Argues for.stric.t legislative charters for such as NSA and Army intelligence to prevent wrongdoing. (S-7340-5/17) Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For-Release 2004/05/13 :.CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 -3- Mondale: Argues against Stennis-Tower amendment which would remove all DOD intelligence activities from the over- sight of the new Committee. DIA was involved in covert action (Track 2 in Chile); NSA was involved in domestic surveillance [NYT Magazine 5/16/76 - Kahn-Big Ear on Big Brother]; Army was involved in spying on innocent Americans and para- military operations. We must have defense within the law. (S-7343-5/17) Taft: Questions how a chairman of a standing committee can know what is before the Select Committee so to ask for referral - cites the Armed Services Committee testimony. Hart reminds Taft that Sec 4(a) calls for the Select Committee to call to the attention of the Senate or an appropriate committee any matter requiring attention. Taft still is concerned that informing the standing committees is up to a judgment of the select committee. Ribicoff effort to reassure Taft. Sec 4(a) already requires prompt communication by the select committee to the appropriate standing committee, but is concerned that "any matter" could be burdensome to the new committee, so prefers existing language in 4(a) as it stands - and 3(d) calls for "nothing in this resolution shall be construed as....changing the authority of any. standing committee... to obtain full and prompt access to the product of the intelligence activities... relevant to a matter of otherwise in the jurisdiction of such a committee". Ribicoff stresses sequential referral and the need for comity among the Select Committee and the standing committees and the Executive Branch. Taft is still concerned whether the members of the Armed Services Committee on the Select Committee can communicate information they obtain on the Select Committee to the Armed Services Committee Chairman and Ranking Minority Member. Ribicoff feels the members from the standing committees will determine. proper rules. for such informing,. Percy agrees and feels that procedures are adequate for making certain that information will be transmitted to the appropriate committees,,, but sees the Taft Amendment (S Amend. 1646) would require - in the stipulation "any matter" - too much reporting. by the Select Committee of matters not requiring concurrent legislative jurisdiction and which are sensitive and would reduce the independence of the Select Committee. Taft.continues concerned that a member of the Select Committee from a standing committee would be in a conflict of interest position in informing the chairman or other members of his parent committee - sees his amendment as correcting that conflict of interest. Ribicoff insists that when a matter.of substance comes to the Select Committee it then will go over to the appropriate standing committee and amends the resolution to.make that sure, with Tafts and Percy's agreement. (S-7361-5/17) Approved For Release 2004/05113.: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 ? Taft: Concerned that the Select Committee is a "B" committee - one involved with secondary matters. is intelli- gence not a critical matter for the Congress? Members will avoid serving on an add-on committee which will prevent the best minds being available for judgments on intelligence. Fears the Staff will become the real experts on intelligence and thus become the real Select Committee and the dominant, un-overseen, force in the intelligence activities of the US. (S-7408-5/18) Tower and Stennis: Effort to amend to exclude DOD agencies from the jurisdiction of the new Select Committee on the grounds it is impossible to separate the Defense intelligence budget from other Defense appropriations. Young opposes S Res 400 as creating a committee of excessive membership and staff - a.major security hazard. (S-7534-5/19) Ribicoff strongly opposes (S-7537-5/19) - the new committee must have concurrent jurisdiction over DOD activities because Defense is the primary collector of national intelligence with 80-90% of the intelligence expenditures; it is impossible to separate civilian and military intelligence agencies in legislative and fiscal considerations; and the interests of the Armed Services Committee are adequately protected by clauses in ? Sec 3(b), 3(c), 3(d) and 4(a) as to notification, informing and investigation of DOD intelligence activities. Tactical intelligence remains solely within the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Committee; the new committee will have jurisdiction only over that part of DOD intelligence activities that provide national intelligence information. The distinction between tactical and national intelligence is already well established by EO 11905 and its charter for the CFI and by the Church Committee Report. Yet, as Ellsworth noted, there are grey areas between the two. Definition-of what is spent on tactical and national intelligence intelligence is one of the first tasks of the new committee. Tower is only concerned about legislative authority, not oversight. Ribicoff reminds that there is shared legislative functions and that the standing committees are represented. Nunn-Ribicoff'Colloquy: [See Security and. Disclosure] - On intelligence manpower'- who would authorize. Ribicoff sees Armed Services as first reference, with the new committee in sequential referral, depending on the view of the Parliamentarian. Admits grey areas in the legislation requiring a working out between the new committee and the standing committees. (S-7438-5/19) Thurmond: Continues to argue separation of Armed Services from consideration by the Select Committee (S-7545-5/19) - with . illustrations of responsibility to SecDef and the services of DIA, NSA, the Service Intelligence Agencies and overlap with service budgets - how to charge costs attributable to intelli- gence in military operations? Again raises risks of expanded Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 disclosure and urges avoidance of new layers-of supervision. Notes the problem of coordination with the House on appropriations. (5-7545-5/19) Huddleston: Opposes the Stennis-Tower amendment removing DOD intelligence activities from the jurisdiction of the new Committee. "Oversight without legislative participation is toothless oversight". Defense constitutes 80-90% of intelli- gence expenditures and must remain in the oversight of the new Committee. (S-7549-5/19) Goldwater: Supports Stennis-Tower amendment to give Armed Services sole jurisdiction to prevent leaks and to afford concentration on military intelligence. "Create a committee to take care of abuses of the American people, but allow military intelligence to go on as it has in the past". A 15-man committee will not conceal covert action so useful because it avoids wars. (S-7550-5/19) Morgan: Disagrees with Stennis-Tower amendment. Believes it possible to separate DOD intelligence activities contributing to national intelligence from tactical intelligence. DOD already makes this distinction in programs submitted to Congress for ? budget authorization. The new committee would have concurrent jurisdiction over all DOD agencies and programs created for national intelligence functions, and the Armed Services would retain sole jurisdiction over those intelligence activities that serve military commanders. It would be impossible for the new committee to exercise effective oversight if it cannot oversee DOD activities. Fears that if the Armed Services Committee proves more favorable to intelligence activities, the tendency will be to let the military handle more and more intelligence operations. Stennis: Fears for military intelligence appropriations since there is no parallel committee on intelligence in the House. (S-7551-5/19) Symington: Disagrees with the Stennis-Tower amendment - it would drown CIA which is the only brake on DOD having an exclusive right to define threats to national security. It would end civilian supervision of intelligence, 90% of which is a matter for the Foreign Relations Committee. (S-7551-5/19) Church: Insists the new committee have concurrent jurisdiction over DOD intelligence. Repeats previous anti-Stennis amendment arguments. The new committee will have jurisdiction only over national intelligence. We need a Committee that can embrace all intelligence to cure the piecemeal oversight of the past. (S-7552-5/19) Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R0002001.80001-5 -6- Tower: Fears the new committee will create more problems than it solves, particularly regarding clandestine operations. Foreign confidence in our intelligence services is already damaged and foreign services are.less disposed to cooperate with us. Fears the new committee means proliferation in the disclosure of sensitive information. The people fear we have disclosed too much already, with adverse impact on national security. (S-7552-5/19) Stennis: Supports the Stennis-Tower amendment - objects to breaking Defense intelligence out of the Defense budget, sees proliferation of involvement in sensitive activities, desires strengthening of military intelligence, asserts the amendment will not reduce the power of the new committee but will preserve regular Defense authorization procedures, claims that abuses are few in the military intelligence activities, fears additional disclosures of sensitive information in separate authorizations. Argues that the new committee is unfitted to handle Defense intelligence matters. (S-7553-5/19) Stennis-Tower Amendment (no. 1649) defeated 63-31 with 6 not voting. Byrd: Supports the Cannon compromise - urges study by ? the Senate Select Study Committee -.sees proliferation of involvement and risks of disclosure - urgesa joint committee with the House to handle as broad a matter as intelligence - cites the Cederberg resolution and suggests the creation of a Senate committee would foreclose a joint committee. (S-7556-5/19) Kennedy: Supports the Cannon compromise. Cites vast abuses.of power by intelligence in the past - calls for Congressional charters for the agencies and guidelines for their activities, particularly. in the area of electronic. surveillance. S Res 400 provides the means to fulfill the Senate's obligations to provide control and guidance over the Executive Branch's intelligence activities.. Believes the new committee must have jurisdiction over the FBI to check its documented abuses, and the DOD activities as well, since it is also involved in domestic intelligence activities. (S-7557-5/19) Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 20.04/05/13.: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 SECURITY AND DISCLOSURE Huddleston: Security restrictions on members and staff will go far to prevent security considerations from impeding the intelligence community dealing frankly with Congress. .(S-7094-5/12) Baker: Objects to the 9-day limit (Sec 8c) on debate on disclosure. Believes that a serious matter of releasing classified information over the objection of the President should have full and complete debate, but welcomes the /requirement for a vote of the full Senate on disclosure. (S-7261-5/13) Church: The proper role of secrecy in a democracy must be carefully addressed. Those who argue to keep a matter secret should have the burden of proof to show why a secret should be withheld from public scrutiny. Such questions should be debated by the full Senate. Votes that there is no agreement as to what a valid national secret is and that the Senate has no procedure to decide on. matters classified secret by the Executive Branch. Argues that the Senate should address violation of disclosure rules and that the Senate, once it sets rules, should impose them on improper disclosure and assure is violations are properly dealt with. (S-7263-5/13) Cannon: "We do have a responsibility among ourselves to be sure that information that should be kept classified is kept classified". We have the procedure to declassify what the Senate feels should be declassified but we must.look after the security of the country. (S-7265-5/13) Cranston: Objects to provision for Presidential objection to disclosure as an injection of the Executive Branch into the activities of the Legislative. Also objects to a Presidential representative attending closed committee sessions as a bad precedent.. Congress is not invited to sit in on NSC or USIB meetings. Hopes for public. disclosure of the.lump sum of the intelligence budget, referring to Article I, Sec 9, clause 7 of the Constitution. (S-7261-5/13). Roth: The only way the oversight committee is going to get the information it needs is to make certain the Executive Branch believes Congress can exert the self-discipline necessary to protect sensitive information. Supports the Huddleston Amendment (S-7273-5/13) providing for investigation by the ethics committee of any allegations of unauthorized disclosure. Is supported by Percy. (S-7273-5/13). Huddleston fears harassment by the Executive in this and calls for responsible investigation of charges of violation. by the ethics committee. (S-7273-5/13) Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 -8- Abourezk: Re Sec 8 of S Res 400: - re committee action by majority vote on Presidential objection to disclosure. Stresses fear that disclosure is up to the full Senate, setting dangerous precedents: the Executive classification system will be applied to Congress, surrendering Congress' independent power to classify or not, and affect every committee in Congress; the Executive can. control Legislative decision on declassification, robbing the Senate of its power to operate - a dangerous usurpation of power. Calls for cooperative negotiation on matters of this kind. Presidential certification (that the threat to national security outweighs the public interest) promotes Executive refusal to negotiate with the committee, moving the matter to the full Senate - while the President is free to declassify as he sees fit politically. The administration has set up a public relations campaign to demonstrate that the Executive can protect secrets but the Congress cannot. The restrictions of Sec 8(c)(2) impose a bar to communication between members of the Committee and other Members of the Senate and inhibits "full and robust discussion" of important issues. (S-7277-5/13) Ribicoff: Any Senator can use Rule XXXV(35) of the Senate Rules to bring to a closed session of the Senate a difference with the President over the disclosure of information, and the Senate can then make its will known. (S-7278-5/13) Abourezk: Cites Pike Report as an example of how the. Executive can suppress the release of a Congressional.report to the public by parliamentary maneuvers. Abourezk Amendment (relating to majority vote of the Committee-on disclosure and referral to the Senate) was moved to be tabled - this was passed 77-13 with 10 not voting - so it was tabled. (S-7280-5/13) Taft: Concerned about security. More people have to be privy to sensitive information than in the. past. Presses an amendment to Sec 4(b).on annual reports and their unclassified versions to be made public by the Committee. Cites Ellsworth in opposition before Stennis and Thurmond. Urges that such reports not be made public - including funds appropriated. Percy agrees. Ribicoff notes that Senate Rule XXXV permits any two Senators to raise the amount of funds appropriated, and the Senate could vote to disclose the amount appropriated. Taft notes that the language of the resolution does not require disclosure, but that disclosure of funds appropriated would be up to the committee and then the Senate, but urges the Senate to be aware of the dangers involved in giving aid to adversary intelligence services. Is supported by Allen. (S-7349-5/17) Urges, after colloquy with Brock, that public dissemination be left to the Senate or the committee. Ribicoff agrees, so does Percy. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Thurmond: Concerned about security with a large committee and with concurrent jurisdiction with four other committees - 50 or 60 staff people will be involved and a "vast proliferation of sensitive data" threatening our intelligence effectiveness. Concerned over prior notification, authorization fo funds by such a large committee which is sure to leak the members and the possibility that the full Senate could make public the most sensitive information - making the CIA an arm of Congress, rather than the President. Also fears release of information to other committees as the Select Committee may consider necessary. Argues for retention of oversight in the standing committees with qualified staffs. (S-7353-5/17) Inserts lengthy record of hearings on S Res 400 before the Armed Services Committee (S-7354-5/17). Ellsworth, primarily. Thurmond fears new committee will lead to much proliferation of disclosure. Cranston: Proposes that the President be required to certify personally. and in writing that the threat of disclosure poses a threat to national security interest such as to out- weigh. public interest in disclosure. (5-7413-5/18) Weicker and Stennis and Huddleston: Re Welch and security problems to protect people in intelligence. (S-7534-5/19) Nunn-Ribicoff Colloquy on Authorization and Disclosure: Nunn - is there any requirement for disclosure of the amount spent on intelligence? Ribicoff - no - S Res 400 does not define this matter. It is up to the new committee. (See Sec 12) - goes on to describe how the full Senate could continue to conceal expenditures for intelligence and, under Rule XXXV, go into closed session and debate the authorization. Assumes the Intelligence Committee would in comity allow standing committees full time to consider authorizations that affect them. (S-7538-5/19) Weicker: Denounces Stennis-Tower Amendment.as un- constitutional in violating Act I Sec 9 and as continuing the old concealment system. Tower replies that not every expenditure is involved and that intelligence costs must be kept secret. Despite Nunn, presses for public disclosure of a total figure for intelligence expenditures. Percy feels it possible to authorize funds for intelligence without public disclosure, with the debate in closed Senate proceedings. (S-7542-5/19) Cranston: Colloquy on Disclosure - Ribicoff: The President would invoke grounds of national security only in the gravest cases - "a matter of gravity". Imagines a President would use such certification sparingly so as not to wear out his credibility with the Senate. Cranston: sees it up to Senate to determine whether the gravity of the matter (of disclosure) .is sufficient to prevent disclosure. Ribicoff: Release would be.permissable, without reference to the full Senate, only if Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 10- the material does not conform to the operational procedure of Presidential certification under Sec 8(b)(1) of S Res 400. (S-7547-5/19) Stennis: Expresses fears of disclosure of sensitive collection capabilities and R&D and argues for the separation of DOD activities from oversight by the new committee. Opposes disclosure of budget figures - which the Senate has kept secret for years - and for good cause. (S-7548-5/19) Nunn: Concerned over the possibility that the language of Sec 8 b 3 could permit the Committee to disclose information over the President's objection if it did not, by majority vote, submit the matter to the full Senate. Submits an amendment "The committee shall not publicly disclose such information without leave of.the Senate". Ribicoff accepts. (S-7549-5/19) Hollings: Sees danger in the new committee as involving 40 Senators and, if the House establishes a similar committee, some 200 members of the House being involved in sensitive activities. Urges a small bi-partisan commission of members of both Houses of Congress and 5 prominent non-government people to make periodic surveys of intelligence activities, with fundings to go to the Congress and the President. Beall: Stresses importance of confidentiality in Select Committee activities, particularly with respect to intelligence personnel - his S-3242 providing for fines and imprisonment for identifying people in intelligence operations - currently pending before the Judiciary Committee. (S-7559-5/19) Huddleston: There has been too much secrecy in the past, but this must not be used to abolish all secrecy or controls. Covert action is only.a.small part of intelligence, and its errors obscure the achievements of other parts of intelligence. Defends the Roth-Huddleston amendment for sanctions on un- authorized disclosures - to be investigated by the ethics committee and sanctions approved by the full Senate. Congress must discipline its own. (S-7560-5/19) Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/1311 IA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 PRIOR APPROVAL AND COVERT ACTION Perc : The Oversight Committee should not be in the position where it is asked for prior approval which would put the Members in a position of having been part and parcel of the original decision and thus unable to exercise proper oversight. (S-7091-5/12) Goldwater: The President must have the ability to carry out covert actions - which offers a range of options between diplomatic notes and economic sanctions and outright war. But the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, requiring six Committees and over 50 Senators and 120 Congressmen and their staffs to receive notification of covert action, has about destroyed this capability. Argues for a single joint committee on the model of the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. Cites Cederberg Res in the House. (S-7256-5/13.) Baker: Did not intend, in inserting language that prior notification would not constitute a condition precedent to implementation of action, (Sec 11) that this requires prior approval, only prior consultation. (5-7261-5/13) Church: Cites for "fully and currently informed" the Atomic Energy Act, Sec 202(d) as requiring prior legislative authorization of intelligence activities - which is essential for vigilant oversight and a means of providing the advice of Congress. (S-7263-5/13) Cranston: See "Fully and Currently Informed". (S-7268-5/13) Notes that Sec 16 re acquiescence of the Senate in unlawful activity is to prevent CIA or any other. intelligence agency as citing S Res 400 as authority to conduct covert operations. Schweiker: Re "anticipated significant activities" "while the Committee's consent would not be required before covert actions could be implemented, it is.clear that the Committee must be provided advance notice about significant activities". And, as the Government Operations Committee /noted, "it would be in the interest of sound national policy for the President to be apprised in advance if the committee is strongly opposed to any particular proposed activity". (S-7269-5/13) Gary Hart: Re Sec 11(a) - considers Baker's language re "condition precedent to implementation" to be ambiguous. Traces legislative history of prior notification: Church - S-2893-13(c) 1/29/76 - called for the Executive to notify the committee prior to implementation of covert actions. Asks inclusion of S-2893 in the Record. S-2983 did not call for prior approval, only prior notice, and did not require notification of all covert actions, only "significant ones". The intent of 13(c) was to permit Congress to advise the President before significant CIA covert operations were begun. Activities heretofore submitted . Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 -12- to the 40 Committee are "significant" and would require prior notice to the committee. The Government Operations Committee defined as "significant" those activities. which are "particularly costly" or which affect diplomatic, political or military relations with other nations. The Government Operations Committee did not envision a veto on any activity the new committee knew of in advance, but recognized that the President should know of the views of the committee on the action proposed. The President is not legally bound to notify the oversight committee since this action is a resolution, not a statute. It expresses the "sense of the Senate". The only statute going to notification is the Hughes-Ryan Amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act. The Senate must have prior notification of significant CIA covert operations so that it may advise the President; covert action is "too dangerous a tool to be used by the .President without congressional consultation". Covert action cannot be used to circumvent debate and public accountability or as a Presidential "convenience". Cites Clifford as for joint Congressional and Executive decision making on covert action. Likewise Cy Vance - who rejected a Congressional veto, and Helms - who ifet Congressional approval was necessary to avoid subsequent repudiation by Congress. "It is the clear intent of the Senate that it be given advance notice of approved CIA covert operations before they are implemented". (S-7270-5/13) Clark: Can we allow a policy of covert action to continue to interfere and violate laws of other nations wherever we think it. useful? The resolution fails to cure this policy. (S-7276-5/13) Thurmond: Testimony before the Armed Services Committee by Ellsworth - re no problem that the military will swallow CIA in the resource allocation process under the CFI. Fears that prior notification and the capacity of the Senate to leak will endanger the lives of those engaged in covert operations. "The President has to have some flexibility on when to move". (S-7355-5/17) Pastore: Rejects CIA having to have approval from the Senate for actions it takes, but insists the Senate be informed - as per Sec 211 of the Atomic Energy Act (Sec 11 of S Res 400). Percy: The Senate must avoid taking over Executive responsibilities, but the President has agreed that the options and problems would be committed to. writing and signed by a "top officer", himself, in extraordinary cases.. (S-7545-5/19) Goldwater: Fears a 15-man committee cannot conceal covert action - thus reviving a useful means of avoiding wars. (S-7550-5/19) Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/0.5/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 -13- "FULLY AND CURRENTLY INFORMED" Baker: Re Sec 11: wanted the "fully and currently informed" language to conform with the practice of the Joint Atomic Intelligence Committee precedent. Adds that he recommended the language "Provided that this does not constitute-a condition precedent to the implementation of any anticipated intelligence activity". This was not intended to require prior approval before Executive Branch implementation, only prior consultation. (S-7261 - 5/13) Church: The oversight committee must have the right to acquire necessary information - that it be "fully and completely informed". "The Executive Branch should be obligated to answer any requests made by the Committee for information within its jurisdiction". Cites the Atomic Energy Act Sec 202(d). (S-7263-5/13) Cranston: Cites.the importance of the proviso for keeping the Committee"fully and currently informed". "The new committee is to have access to any information within the possession of the agencies relating to any matter within the committee's jurisdiction". In combination with the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, this should provide a meaningful check on clandestine operations. This will make it possible to bar funds for operations such as Angola - Tunney Amendment 12/75. (S-7267-5/13) Pastore.: Cites the precedent of the Atomic Bomb and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy for "fully and currently informed no leaks from the Committee - but rejects CIA having to come to the Senate for approval. (S-7545-5/19) Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 20i/1.CIA-&9730200180001-5 May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE beef producers and consumers will be' fostered by this legislation. I noted this morning at hearings before the Commit-' teQ Agriculture and Forestry that rep- organizations, were present to testify in support of the Farmers Market Act and similar legislation which was introduced last year by Senator HUMPHREY and my- self. At the hearings, Senator HUDDLE- STON commented to the young lady from the Consumer Federation that he felt a growing awareness among consumer ad- vocates of the difficulties faced by those who provide food and fiber for the United States. I think this is laudable, and absolutely necessary. We owe it not only to those in agriculture, but also those who are served by agriculture, to find ways in which cooperation and un- derstanding can be developed. Mr. President, this bill does just that, and I believe if for no other reason, it merits enactment. I would urge my col- leagues to support the bill with me, for the 'benefit of American ranchers and consumers. Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I am ready to yield back the remainder of my time. Mr. ALLEN. I yield back the remainder of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. STAFFORD). All time is yielded back. The question is on agreeing to the conference report on the Beef Research and Infor- mation Act. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce the Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), the Senator from Califor- nia (Mr. TUNNEY) and the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) are neces- sarily absent. Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE) and the Senator from Michigan (Mr. GRIFFIN) are necessarily absent. The result was announced-yeas 65, nays 27, as follows: fRollcall Vote No. 375 Leg.] Allen Bartlett Buckley Burdick YEAS-65 Goldwater Mondale Gravel Moss Hansen Nunn Hart, Gary Packwood Hartke Pearson Haskell Percy Hatfield Randolph Helms Roth Hollings Scott, Hruska William L. n'u,11 Byrd, Robert C. Eagleton Biden Case Glenn Hart, Philip A. Morgan Ribicof Hathaway Muskie Schweiker Javits Nelson Scott, Hugh Kennedy Pastore Stevenson Mathias Pell Weicker McIntyre Proxmire Williams NOT VOTING-8 Baker Griffin Montoya Brooke Inouye Tunney Church McGee So the conference report was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Nevada is recognized. ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN- ATOR RIBICOFF Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the Sen- ator from Nevada has completed his re- marks the distinguished Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) then be recognized. S7081 The select committee would have sub- Pena power, a staff, and funds to keep- itself informed so as to equip itself to provide effective oversight of the intelli- gence community. Before the committee voted to report the substitute amendment it had adopted numerous perfecting amendments to the resolution as opposed to the form in which it was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration. Some of those perfecting amendments were unanimously approved while others were agreed to by a bare majority vote. The amendments changed various parts of the resolution while leaving some por- tions thereof unamended although many of them were not favored by various members of the committee. Hence, when there were no further perfecting amend- ments to be offered to the resolution, the question was put on agreeing to a com- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without - plete substitute amendment for the reso- objection, it is so ordered. lution, which was agreed to by a vote of PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now resume consideration of the unfinished business, Senate Resolution 400, which the clerk will state. The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on In- telligence Activities, and for other purposes. The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution. - Mr. CANNON Mr. President, before I get to discuss the history and action by the Committee on Rules and Administxa-' tion on Senate Resolution 400, I state that several Senators, including myself, representing groups of Senators holding various points of view have been meet- ing and discussing the possibility of working out a compromise version. While our resolve might not be completely satisfactory to all parties, it is the best possible compromise we could reach. Later on I propose to offer this substitute as a proposed amendment in the nature of a substitute for the committee sub- stitute as reported. Mr. President, the Committee on Rules and Administration on April 29, 1976, reported Senate Resolution 400, to estab- lish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the resolution as referred to the committee, and an amendment to the title of the resolution. The title amendment reads "A resolution establishing a Select Committee on In- telligence." The committee substitute would estab- lish a permanent select, not a standing committee, on intelligence with oversight jurisdiction over the intelligence com- munity but without legislative jurisdic- tion; it proposes to leave within the standing committees on Armed Services, Foreign Relations, the Judiciary, or any other committee their existing legislative jurisdiction with respect to intelligence activities. 5 to 4. The ? committee, both in the case of perfecting amendments to the resolution and the substitute therefor, proposed that the intelligence committee not be made a standing committee, but instead a select committee. The perfecting amendments approved by the committee before agreeing to the substitute pro- posed to give the select committee se- quential, concurrent jurisdiction over the Central Intelligence Agency, the intelli- gence activities of all other departments and agencies of the Government, the organization and reorganization plans affecting intelligence activities within Government agencies, as well as author- ization for appropriations for practically all such agencies. The substitute' for the resolution re-, ported by the committee would not ex- tend any legislative jurisdiction to the select committee. The composition of the select committee as approved by the Committee on Rules and Administration was virtually the same in both the amended version and the substitute therefor. In my opinion, in observing the action taken by the Committee on Rules and Administration, the committee was very much concerned with, and emphasized Congressional oversight of the intel- ligence activities of the Administration but at the same time it was particularly concerned that national security secrets were not to be leaked or divulged to Our enemies abroad. The Rules Committee wanted to establish a committee fortified with the powers to do a good job without doing harm to the operations of the in- telligence agencies of the Government in carrying out their functions and duties for which they were created. The com- mittee was particularly concerned to tighten up the provisions of the resolu- tion for preventing the leakage of in- formation as well as the provision au- thorizing the committee to make public classified information; it was the feel- ing of a majority of the committee that confidential and secret information should not be released by the committee but that the committee when requested by the administration or agencies there- of to keep certain information confiden- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7082 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May-12, 1976 tial should vote to report that informa- tion to the Senate in closed session, and then let the Senate work its will as to whether such information should be re- leased to the public. The committee was concerned that the select committee should have a competent staff and there- fore voted to eliminate the provision which would restrict the tenure of serv- ice of its employees. Personally, I am opposed to the provi- sions of the resolution as approved which restrict the service of a Senator on the select committee to a 6-year term. I am also opposed to the provision which would authorize the select committee to obtain annual reports -from the intelligence agencies on their intelligence - activities and the intelligence activities of foreign countries directed at the United States or its interests and to direct the select committee to unclassify these reports in- eluding individuals engaged in intel- ligence activities for the United States or the sources of information on which such reports are based. After the committee voted to report the committee substitute for the resolution, I have engaged in conversations with Sen- ators representing different points of view on the resolution and because of the sen- timents expressed; I proceeded -to discuss the possibility with other senators. of working out some kind. of a compromise- version which would be acceptable to the Senate. This ,substitute I propose to In- troduce is flow cosponsored- by a great number of other Senators. - - In submitting this amendment; the Senate -will be given an opportunity -to vote on a compromise version between tha,t reported by the Committee on Gov- ernment Operations and the substitute amendments acted on by the Committee on Rules and Administration. The compromise would establish a new select committee to be known as the Se- lect Committee on Intelligence. it would be composed of 17 Senators-as now drafted, however, there is some contro- versy as to the size of the committee, which undoubtedly will be considered on the floor-two.each from the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the-Committee on For- eign: Relations, and the_ Committee on the Judiciary, and- 9 members from- the Senate who are not .members of these committees. No Senator would be Per- mitted to serve more. than 10 years, to be appointed so as to give them a rotat- ing membership with one-third of the members to the greatest extent possible being appointed at the beginning of each Congress. All of the members are to be appointed by the President pro tempore on the recommendations of the major- ity and minority leaders, after consulta- tion with the respective committee chair- men. The majority and minority leaders will be ex officio members but without a vote. The chairman and vice chairman are to be elected at the beginning of each Congress by the members of their respec- tive political parties. Senators appointed to this committee will be exempt from the limitations placed on the number of committee assignments to which a Sena- for Is entitled. The committee is given Investigatory and oversight authority which would a1- low it to study all Intelligence activities and programs by the Government; It would also have legislative jurisdiction over matters enumerated in section 3, in- cluding authorizations therefor. This jurisdiction would be shared with the standing committees which already have jurisdiction over such subject matter ex- cept in the case of the Central Intelli- gence Agency ,and the Director of Cen- tral Intelligence, which would fall solely within the jurisdiction of the select com- mittee-that is, except for the Central Intelligence - Agency and the Director thereof, certain .committees would be given sequential, concurrent jurisdiction over the intelligence community. The existing committees of the Senate would in no way be restricted in making studies and reviews of matters which fall within their jurisdiction, respectively. Regular and periodic reports to the Senate on the nature and extent c the intelligence activities 'of the various de- partments and agencies . would be re-. quired. The committee would be directed to obtain annual reports from agencies participating in intelligence activities and make public such unclassified in- formation-I repeat, unclassified infor- mation. The committee would also be required to report on or before March 15 of each year to the Committee on the Budget of the Senate the views and estimates "de- sbribed in section 301(c) of the Congres- sional Budget Act regarding matters within its jurisdiction." The committee -would be authorized to make investigations, armed with subpena power. It would be authorized a staff and funds to keep itself informed on the in- telligence activities within its jurisdic- tion to insure effective oversight of the intelligence community. . Effort was made to assure security against divulging unlawful Intelligence activities and to protect our national security. Reports on lawful, classified in- formation by this group will be made to the Senate in closed session to determine if such information should be released. The - formula for this protection is set forth in sections '6 through 8. All of the records, files, documents, and other materials held by- the Select Committee on Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities will be transferred to this committee. Section 11 expresses the sense of the Senate as to the responsibility of the departments and agencies of the Govern- ment to keep the select committee in- formed of all developments in intelli- gence activities by the respective depart- ments and agencies. Subjects to be studied by the select committee and on which the committee is directed to file a report not later than. July 1, 1977, are set forth in section 13. These matters include, among other things, the question of whether a stand- ing committee should be formed and the question of whether a joint committee should be formed, such as the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. A proposal already has been made In the House to create a joint committee, between the House and the Senate, on intelligence activities. Funds are authorized in the amount not to exceed $275,000 through February 28, 1977, paid out of thWe tingent fund of the Senate. I submit this compromise to the for its decision and judgment. There is no question in my mind but that all Sen- ators share with me the desire to strengthen and to improve the Govern- ment's role in the intelligence field. In that spirit, I submit the compromise for the approval of the Senate. I send to the desk an amendment in the nature of a substitute, to be considered as a substi- tute for the committee amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, there is one slight modification that has been agreed upon, and I. ask unanimous con- sent to submit it at a later time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The legislative clerk read as follows; AMENDMENT No. 1643 The Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) (for himself, Mr. ROBERT G. BYRD, Mr. MANSFIELD, Mr. HUGH SCOTT, Mr. PERCY, MT. HATFIELD, Mr. RmicoFF, Mr. CHuacH, Mr. - MONDALE, Mr. BAKER, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. PH=n' A. HART, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. MORGAN, Mr. GARY HART, Mr. MATHIAS, Mr. SCHWEIKTR, Mr. JAvrrs, Mr. KENNEDY, Mr. Dunxav, Mr. ROTH, Mr. STEVENSON, Mr. BRooxE, Mr. Baocx, Mr. WEICKER, Mr. HuMP.HREY, Mr. CLARx, and Mr. PELL) proposes an amend- meat In the nature of a substitute: in lieu of the language intended to be substituted by the committee amendment insert the fol- lowing: That it is the purpose of this resolutiogiAQ establish a new select- committee of Senate, to be known as the Select Co on Intelligence to oversee and make con- tinuing studies of the intelligence activities and programs of the United States Govern- ment, and to submit to the Senate appro- priate proposals for legislation and report to the Senate concerning such intelligence activities and programs. In carrying out this purpose, the Select Committee on Intelli- gence shall make every effort to assure that the appropriate departments and agencies of the United States provide informed and timely intelligence necessary for the execu- tive and legislative branches to make sound decisions affecting the security and vital interests of the Nation. It is further the pur- pose of this resolution to provide vigilant legislative oversight over the intelligence activities of the United States to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Constitution and laws of the United States. SEc. 2. (a) (1) There is hereby established a select committee to be known as the Select Committee on Intelligence (hereinafter in this resolution referred to as the. "select committee"). The select committee shall be composed of seventeen members appointed as follows: (A) two members from the Committee, on Appropriations; (B) two members from the Committee on Armed Services; (C) two members from the Committee on (D) two members from the Committee on the Judiciary; and (E) nine members from the Senate who are not members of any of the committees named in clauses (A) through (D). (2) Members appointed from each, Co mittee named in clauses (A) through (D paragraph (1) shall be evenly divided tween the two major political parties an Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 LVJay: 12,:1.976 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -SENATE shall be appointed by the President pro tern- pore of the Senate upon the recommenda- tions of the majority and minority leaders -of the Senate after consultation with their cnan and ranking minority member. oW (E) of paragraph (1) shall be ap- pointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the recommendation of the ma- jority leader of the Senate and four shall be appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the recommendation of the minority leader of the Senate. (3) The majority leader of the Senate and the minority leader of the Senate shall be ex officio members of the select committee, but shall have no vote in the committee and shall not be ounted for purposes of deter= miffing a quoium. (b) No Senator may serve on the select committee for more than nine years of con- tinuous service, exclusive of service by any Senator on such committee during the ninety-fourth Congress. To the greatest ex- tent practicable, one-third of the Members of the Senate appointed to the select com- mitteo at the beginning of the ninety-seventh Congress and each Congress thereafter shall be Members of the Senate who did not serve on such committee during the preceding Congress. (c) At the beginning of each Congress, the Members of the Senate who are members of the majority party of the Senate shall elect a chairman for the select committee, and the Members of the Senate who are from the minority party of the Senate shall elect a vice chairman for such committee. The vice chairman shall act in the place and stead of the chairman in the absence of the chair- man. Neither the chairman nor the vice chairman - of the select committee shall at the same time serve as chairman or ranking minority member of any other committee referred to in paragraph 6(f) of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate. For the purposes of paragraph 6(a) e XXV of the Standing Rules of the the select committee shall not be taken into account. - SEC. 3. (a) There shall be referred to the select committee all proposed legislation, messages, petitions, memorials, and other matters relating to the following: (1) The Central Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence. (2) Intelligence activities of all other de- partments and agencies of the Government, including, but not limited to, the intelligence activities of the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other agencies of the Department of Defense; the Department of State; the Department of Jus- tice; and the Department of the Treasury. (3) The organization or reorganization of any department or agency of the Government to the extent that the organization or reor- ganization relates to a function or activity involving intelligence activities. (4) Authorizations for appropriations, both direct and indirect, for the following: (A) The Central Intelligence Agency and Director of Central Intelligence. (B) The Defense Intelligence Agency. (C) The National Security Agency. (D) The intelligence activities of other agencies and subdivisions of the Department of Defense. (E) The intelligence activities of the De- partment of State. (F) The intelligence activities of the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation, including all activities of the Intelligence Division. (G) Any department, agency, or subdivi- sion which is the successor to any agency named in clause (A), (B), or (C); and the the activities of such successor department, agency, or subdivision are activities described in: clause (D); (E), or (F). (b) Any proposed legislation reported by the select committee, except any legislation involving-matters specified in clause (1) or (4) (A) of subsection (a),. containing any matter otherwise within the. jurisdiction of any standing committee shall, at the request of the chairman of such standing committee, be referred to such standing committee for its consideration of such matter and be re- ported to the Senate by such standing com- mittee within 30 days after the day on which such proposed legislation is referred to such standing committee; and any proposed leg- islation reported by any committee, other than the select committee, which contains any matter within the jurisdiction of the select committee shall, at the request of the chairman of the select committee, be referred to the select committee for its consideration of, such matter and be reported to the Sen- ate by the select committee within 30 days after the day on which such proposed leg- islation is referred to such committee. In any ease in which a committee fails to report any proposed legislation referred to it within the time limit prescribed herein, such commit- tee shall be automatically discharged from further consideration of such proposed legis- lation on the thirtieth day following the day on which such proposed legislation is re- ferred to such committee unless the Senate provides otherwise. In computing any thirty- day period under this paragraph there shall be excluded from such computation any days on which the Senate is not in session. . (c) , Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as prohibiting or otherwise re- stricting the authority of any other com- mittee to study and review any, intelligence activity to the extent that such activity directly affects a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee. (d) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as amending, limiting, or other- wise changing the authority of any standing committee of the Senate to obtain full and prompt access to the product of the intel- ligence activities of any department or agency of the Government relevant to a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee. SEC. 4. (a) The select committee, for the purposes of accountability t6 the Senate, shall make regular and periodic reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the intelligence activities of the various depart- ments and agencies of the United States. Such committee shall promptly call to the attention of the Senate or to any other' appropriate committee or committees of the Senate any matters deemed by the select committee to require the immediate atten- tion of the Senate or such other.committee or committees. In making such reports, the select committee shall proceed in a manner consistent with section 8(c) (2) to protect national security. - (b) The select committee shall obtain an annual report from the Director of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investiga- tion for public dissemination. Such reports shall review the intelligence activities of the agency or department concerned and the intelligence activities of foreign countries directed at the United States or its interests. An unclassified version of each report shall be made available to the public by the select committee. Nothing herein shall be construed as requiring the disclosure in such reports of the names of individuals engaged in Intel- ligence activities for the United States or the sources of information on which such re- ports are based. . (c) On or before March 15 of each year, the select committee shall submit to the Committee on the Budget of the Senate the S 7083 views and estimates described in section 301(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. regarding matters within the jurisdic- tion of the select'committee. SEC. 5. (a) For the purposes of-this resolu- tion, the select committee is authorized in its discretion (1) to make investigations into any matter within its jurisdiction, (2) to make expenditures from the contingent fund of the Senate, (3) to employ personnel, (4) to hold hearings, (5) to sit and act at any time or place during the sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Senate, (6) to require, by subpena or otherwise, the attend- ance of witnesses and the production of correspondence, books, papers, and docu- ments, (7) to take depositions and other tes- tirimony, (8) to procure the service of individ- ual consultants or organizations thereof, in accordance with the provisions of section 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, and (9) with the prior consent of the Government department or agency concerned and the Committee on Rules and Adminis-' tration, to use on a reimbursable basis the services of personnel of any such department or agency. (b) The chairman of the select committee or any member thereof may administer oaths to witnesses. (c) Subpenas authorized by the select committee may be issued over the signature of the chairman, the vice chairman, or any member of the select committee designated by the chairman, and may be served by any person designated by the chairman or any member signing the subpena. SEC. 6. No employee of the select committee or any person engaged by contract or other- wise to perform services for or at the request of such committee shall be given access to any classified information by such committee unless such employee or person has (1) agreed in writing and under oath to. be bour}d by.the rules of the Senate (including the jurisdiction of the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct) and of such com- mittee as to the security of such information during and after the period 'of his employ- ment or contractual agreement with such committee; and (2) received an appropriate security. clearance as determined by such committee in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence. The type of security clearance to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall, within the determination of such committee in con- sultation with the Director of Central Intelli- gence, be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such employee or person will be given access by such committee. SEC. It. The select committee shall formu- late and carry out such rules and procedures as it deems necessary to prevent the dis- closure, without the consent of the person or persons concerned, of information in the possession of such committee which- unduly 'Infringes upon the privacy or which violates the constitutional rights of. such person or persons. Nothing herein shall be construed to prevent such committee from publicly dis- closing any such information in any case in which such committee determines the na- tional interest in the disclosure of such in- formation clearly outweighs any infringe- ment on the privacy of any person or persons. SEC. 8. (a) The select committee may, sub- ject to the provisions of this section, disclose publicly any information in the possession of such committee after a determination by such committee that the public interest would be served by such disclosure. When- ever committee action is required to disclose any information under this section, the com- mittee shall meet to vote on the matter within five days after any member of, the committee requests such a vote. No member of the select committee shall disclose any information, the disclosure of which requires a committee vote, prior to a vote by the Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7084 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 12, 1976 committee on the question of the disclosure of such information, or after such vote except in accordance with tbba, Section (b) (1) In any case In which.. the select committee votes to disclose publicly any in- formation which has been classified under established security procedures, which has been submitted to it by the executive branch, and which the executive branch requests be kept secret, such committee shall notify the President of such vote. I . (2) The select committee may disclose publicly such information after the expira- tion of a five-day period following-the day on which noticerof such vote Is transmitted to the President, unless, prior to the expira- tion of such five-day period, the President notifies the committee that he objects to the disclosure of such information, provides his reasons therefor, and certifies that the threat to the national interest of the United States posed by such disclosure fs vital and outweighs any public interest in the dis- closure. (3) If the President notifies the select committee of his objections to the disclosure of such information as provided- in para- graph (2), such committee may, by major- ity vote, refer the question of the disclosure of such Information to the Senate for con- sideration. Such information shall not thereafter' be* publicly disclosed without leave of the Senate. (4)' Whenever the select committee votes to refer the question of disclosure of any information to the Senate under paragraph (3), the chairman shall, not later than the first day on which the Senate is in session following the day on which the vote occurs, report the matter to the Senate for its con- sideration: (5) One hour after the Senate convenes on the fourth day on which the Senate Is In session following the day on which any such matter is reported to the Senate, or at such earlier time as the majority leader and the minority leader of the Senate jointly agree upon in accordance with section 133(f) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the Senate shall go into closed session and the matter shall be the pending business. In considering the matter in closed' session the Senate may- (A) approve the public disclosure of all or any portion of the informtion in ques- tion, in which case the committee shall pub- licly disclose the information ordered to be discosed, (B) disapprove the public disclosure of all of any portion of the information in question, in which case the committee shall not publicly disclose the information ordered not to be diclosed, or (C) refer all or any portion of the matter back to the committee, in which case the committee shall make the final determi- nation with respect to the public disclosure of the information in question. a Upon conclusion of the consideration of such matter in closed session, which may not extend beyond the close of the ninth day on which the Senate is in session following the day on which such matter-was reported to the Senate, or the cose of the fifth day following the day agreed upon jointly by the majority and minority leaders in accordance with section 133(f) of the Legislative Re- organization Act of 1946 (whichever the case may be), the Senate shall immediately vote on the disposition of such matter in open session, without debate, and without divulging the information with respect to which the vote is being taken. The Senate shall vote to dispose of such matter by one or more of the means specified in clauses (A), (B), and (C) of the second sentence of this paragraph. Any vote of the Senate to disclose any information pursuant to this paragraph shall be subject to the right of aMember of the.Senate to move for recon- sideration of the vote within the time and pursuant to the procedures specified in rule XIII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, and the disclosure of such information shall be made consistent with that right. (c) (1) No information in the possession of the select committee relating to the lawful intelligence activities of any department or agency of the United States which has been classified under established security proce- dures and which the select committee, pur- suant to subsection (a) and (b) of this sec- tion, has determined should not be disclosed shall be made available to any person by a Member, officer, or employee of the Senate except in a closed session of the Senate or as provided in paragraph (2). (2) The select committee may, under such regulations as the committee shall prescribe to protect the confidentiality of such infor- mation, make any information described in paragraph. (1) available to any other. com- mittee or any other Member of the Senate. Whenever the select committee makes such information available, the committee shall keep a written record showing, in the case of any particular information, which com- mittee or which Members of the Senate re- ceived such information. No Member of the Senate who, and no committee which, re- ceives any information under this subsection, shall disclose such information except in a closed session of the Senate. (d) It shall be the duty of the Select Com- mittee on Standards and Conduct to investi- gate any alleged disclosure of intelligence information by a member, officer, or em- ployee of the Senate In violation of subsec- tion (c) and to report thereon to the Senate. (e) Upon the request of any person who Is subject to any such investigation, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct shall release to such individual at the conclusion of its investigation a summary of its investi- gation together with its findings. If, at the conclusion of its investigation, the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct deter- mines that there has been a significant breach of confidentiality' or unauthorized disclosure by a Member, officer, or employee of the Senate, it shall report its findings to the Senate and recommend appropriate. ac- tion such as censure, removal from commit- tee membership, or expulsion from the Sen- ate, in the case of Member,' or removal from office or employment or punishment for con- tempt, in the case of an officer or employee. SEC. 9. The select committee is authorized to permit any personal representative of the President, designated by the President to serve as a liaison to such committee, to at- tend any closed meeting of such committee. SEC. 10. Upon expiration of the Select Com- mittee on Government Operations With Re- spect to Intelligence Activities, established by Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Con- gress, all records, files, documents, and other materials in the possession, custody, or con- trol of such committee, under appropriate conditions established by it, shall be trans- ferred to the select committee. . SEC. 11. (a) It is the sense of the Senate that the head of each department and agency of the United States should keep the select committee fully and currently in- formed with respect to intelligence activities, including any significant anticipated activi- ties, which are the responsibility of or en- gaged in by such department or agency: Provided, That this does not constitute a condition precedent to the implementation of any such anticipated intelligence activity. (b) it Is the sense of the Senate that the head of any department or, agency of the United States involved in any 'intelligence activities should furnish any information or document in the possession, custody, or con- trol of the department or agency, or!person paid by such depatrment or. agency, when- ever requested by the select committee with respect to any matter within such commit- tee's jurisdiction. - (c) It is the sense of the Senate that each department and agency of the United States Bence activities which constitute 'vioIWs of the constitutional rights of any person, violations of law, or violations of Executive orders, Presidential directives, or' depart- mental or agency rules or regulations; each department and agency should further re- port to such committee what actions have been taken or are expected to be taken by the departments or agencies with respect to such violations. SEC. 12. Subject to the Standing Rules of the Senate, no funds shall bei appropriated for any fiscal year beginning ter Septem- ber-30, 1976, with the exception of a con- tinuing bill or resolution, or amendment thereto, or conference report thereon, to, or for use of, any department or agency of the United States to carry out any of the follow- ing activities, unless such funds shall have been previously authorized by a bill or joint resolution passed by the Senate during the same or preceding fiscal year to carry out such activity for such fiscal year- (1) The activities of the Central Intelli- gency Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence. (2) The activities of the Defense Intelli- gence Agency. (3) The activities of the National Security Agency. (4) The intelligence activities of other agencies and subdivisions of the Departn;ent of Defense. (5) The intelligence activities of the De- partment of State. (6) The intelligence activities of the Fed- eral Bureau of Investigation, Including all activities of the Intelligence Division. SEC. 13. (a) The select committee shall make a study with respect to the following of the effectiveness of planning, gatheiTllg, use, security, and. dissemination of intelli- gence- (1) the quality of the analytical capabili- ties _ of United States foreign intelligence agencies and means for integrating' more closely analytical intelligence and policy formulation; (2) the extent and nature of the authority of the departments and agencies of the ex- ecutive branch to engage in intelligence ac- tivities and the desirability of developing chatters for each intelligence agency or department; (3) the organization of intelligence activi- ties in the executive branch to maximize the effectiveness of the conduct, oversight, and accountability of intelligence activities; to reduce duplication or overlap; and to improve the morale of the personnel of the foreign intelligence agencies; (4) the conduct of covert and clandestine activities and the procedures by which Con- gress is informed of such activities; (5) the desirability of changing any law, Senate rule or procedure, or any Executive order, rule, or regulation to improve the pro- tecation of intelligence secrets and provide for disclosure of information for which there is no compelling reason for secrecy; (6) the desirability of establishing a stand- ing committee of the Senate on Intelligence activities; (7) the desirability of establishing a joint committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives on intelligence activities in lieu of having separate committees in each House of Congress, or of establishing proce- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE policies with respect to the safeguarding of sensitive intelligence information; (8) the authorization of funds for the in- a ence activities of the government and vjWer disclosure of any of the amounts of Wends is in the public interest; and the development of a uniform set of definitions for terms to be used in policies or guidelines which may be adopted by the executive or legislative branches to govern, clarify, and strengthen the operation of intel- ligence activities. (b) The select committee may, in its dis- cretion, omit from the special study required by this section any matter it determines has been adequately studied by the Select Com- mittee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, estab- lished by Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress. (c) The select committee shall report the results of, the study provided for by this section to the Senate, together. with any recommendations for legislative or other ac- tions it deems appropriate, no later than July 1, 1977, and from time to time there- after as it deems appropriate. SEC. 14. (a) As used in this resolution, the term "intelligence activities" includes (1) the collection, analysis, production, dissemi- nation or use of information which relates to any foreign country, or any government, political group, party, military force, move- ment, or other association in such foreign country, and which relates to the defense, foreign policy, national security, or related policies of the United States, and other ac- tivity which is in support of such activities; (2) activities taken to counter similar ac- tivities directed against the United States; (3) covert or clandestine activities affecting the relations of the United States with any foreign government, political group, party, military force, movement or other associa- tion; (4) the collection, analysis, production, domination, or use of information about tionals of the United States abroad whose political and related activities pose, or may be considered by any department, agency, bureau, office, division, instrumentality, or employee of the United States to pose, a threat to the internal security of the United States, and covert or clandestine activities directed against such persons. Such term does not include tactical foreign military in- telligence serving no national policymaking function. (b) As used in this resolution, the term "department or agency" includes any or- ganization, committee, council, establish- ment, or office within the Federal Govern- ment. (c) For purposes of this resolution, ref- erence to any department, agency, bureau. or subdivision shall include a reference to any successor department, agency, bureau, or subdivision to the extent that such succes- sor engages in intelligence activities now conducted by the department, agency, bureau, or 'subdivision referred to in this resolution. SEC. 15. For the period from the date this resolution is agreed to through February 28, 1977, the expenses of the select committee under this resolution shall not exceed $275,- 000, of which amount not to exceed $30,000 shall be available for the procurement of the services of individual consultants, or organizations thereof, as authorized by sec- tion 202(i) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. Expenses of the select commit- tee under this resolution shall be paid from the contingent fund of the Senate upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the select committee, except that vouchers shall n be required for the disbursement of. by the Senate in any practice, or in the con- duct of any activity, not otherwise author- ized by law. PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, before Senator RIBICOFF speaks, I ask unani- mous consent that Bill Cochran and Miss McPherson, of the committee staff, have the privilege of the floor during the con- sideration of this matter. The PRESIDING. OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr..RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the following staff members have the privilege of the floor during the debate and voting on Senate Resolution 400: Richard Weg- man, Paul Hoff, Paul Rosenthal, John Childers, Andrew Loewi, Claudia Ingram, James Davidson, Tom Dine, Brian Con- boy Charles Morrison, William Jackson, Carolyn Fuller, Britt Synder, and Walter Riggs. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without ,objection, it is so ordered. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, before making my statement, I take this op- portunity to pay special tribute to Sen- ator CANNON, Senator ROBERT C. BYRD, Senator PERCY, and Senator CRANSTON- and there are many others-who worked hard to make.this legislation possible. During the entire discussion before the Committee on Government Operations and before the Committee on Rules and Administration, and thereafter, while there were differences of opinion, I found that Senator CANNON and Senator ROBERT C. BYRD had open minds, on all the problems and controversies that' swirled around this measure. Senator ROBERT C. BYRD was particu- larly 'concerned that the Senate act on this important subject. He was aware of what had transpired and the need for a strong intelligence oversight committee, as well as the implications of trying to work out a compromise that was worthy of the Senate and would not lead to deep divisions in the Senate and in the Na- tion., I especially take this opportunity to pay tribute to Senator ROBERT C. BYRD and Senator CANNON. I also want to pay tribute to the dis- tinguished majority leader, Senator MANSFIELD, and to Senators BAKER, MONDALE, JAVITS, HATFIELD, CLARK, CHURCH and WEICKER for their great help in working to bring about this compro- mise. Today, the Senate begins considera- tion of legislation to create a permanent committee on intelligence activities. I strongly support creation of a new intelligence committee with full legisla- tive and authorization authority. At this time, I point out that the first person who proposed a committee on intelligence was our majority leader. Senator Mansfield, who, more than 20 yars ago, suggested that it * was ab- solutely essential for us to have a legis- lative committee in the entire field of intelligence. Since then, a number of studies have recommended' taking this step. In 1975 the Commission on CIA Activities headed by Vice President ROCKEFELLER recommended creation of a new committee on intelligence follow- ing their study of the activities of the, S 7085 CIA in the United States. Most recently, the select committee recommnded a new committee after a 15-month study of the intelligence community. Creation of the committee can be postponed no longer. Mr. President, I believe creation of a new committee with the necessary au- thorities will be good for the country, good for ' the intelligence community, and good for the Senate. A new committee will help protect the constitutional rights of our citizens and help restore the confidence of the Amer- ican people in their intelligence agencies. A recent public opinion poll found that while 78 percent of the public believe it is very important to have the best in- telligence agency in the world, the public also believes by a 66-percent to 18-per- cent margin that both Congress and the White House should monitor the CIA more closely. Public confidence in the intelligence community will remain un- certain until the public knows that its elected representatives are effectively overseeing and working with the intelli- gence agencies. Creation of a permanent new com- mittee with a clear authority to reorga- nize the intelligence community can help end the uncertainties and distractions which now plague the intelligence agen- cies, thereby making it difficult for the agencies to concentrate on their proper job of providing the intelligence this country needs. A new committee can help restore a sense of comity between the executive branch and the Senate and help reassert the proper role of Congress in the con- duct of foreign affairs. A full and frank exchange of views between the Senate and the President -will help avoid such embarrassing situations as Angola and promote a more unified foreign policy. Witnesses who' testified before the Government Operations Committee in favor of a strong new committee in- cluded: Senators MANSFIELD, CHURCH, CRANSTON, HUDDLESTON, and BAKER; Dean Rusk; Nicholas Katzenbach; Wil- liam Colby; McGeorge Bundy; Clark Clifford; Richard Helms; Morton Hal- perin; John McCone; and Henry Kis- singer. Dr. Kissinger testified that crea- tion of such a new committee would be in the interest of national security. Mr. David Phillips, president of the Associa- tion of Retired Intelligence Officers, said that 98 percent of his membership re- sponding to a poll favored creation of a new intelligence committee. On the basis of those hearings, the committee came to the following con- clusions which were in turn embodied in Senate Resolution 400 as reported by the committee: First. There is a need for vigorous con- gressional oversight of the intelligence community. Congress cannot simply pro- ceed in the future as if nothing has hap- pened. Second. To provide this effective over- sight of the intelligence agencies, a per- manent new Senate committee must be established. The present committees have too many other important responsibilities to permit them to devote the time and re- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 9 7086 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976 sources necessary for really effective oversight. Third. Oversight and legislative au- thority over the intelligence community should be centered in this new Senate committee. The vast majority of wit- nesses who testified before the committee stressed the need for centralizing the in- telligence oversight function into as few committees as possible. The present proliferation of committees increases the chances for unauthorized disclosures of sensitive information and diffuses over- sight responsibility. Fourth. Because the Government's in- telligence activities, both here and abroad, are so interrelated, the new com- mittee's jurisdiction must cover all agen- des that engage in intelligence activities, Including the Central Intelligence Agen- cy and the Departments of State, De- fense, and Justice, including the FBI. Fifth. The new committee must have the formal authority and the practical means to obtain access to all the infor- mation it needs. The abuses of the intelligence commu- nity that have been disclosed in the last few years dramatically demonstrate the need-for creating a new intelligence com- mittee with the powers set out in the Cannon proposal. In considering the need for a strong new -committee, we- cannot forget the abuses described in the final report of the select committee. These include: The FBI counterintelligence programs designed to disrupt political groups in the United States. Under these programs, the Bureau engaged in, hundreds of burglaries of nonviolent domestic groups. The wiretapping, bugging, and harassing of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. by the FBI. Indeed, on the eve of Dr. King's receipt of the Nobel Prize, the FBI sent him a note suggesting that he commit suicide. The CIA's Operation CHAOS, which, in violation of the agency's chapter, com- piled files on over 300,000 American citizens and organizations. Under Oper- ation CHAOS, . CIA agents infiltrated antiwar and civil rights groups in an attempt to disrupt them. Drug testing on unsuspecting citizens. The use of covert relationships with newspaper reporters and the covert use of American student, labor, and reli- gious, groups. I The National Security Agency's "Op- eration Shamrock," which transmitted international telegraph traffic to the NSA from 1948 onward., "Operation Minaret," in which the Na- tional Security Agency gathered infor- mation on antiwar protestors. The 100,000 files that Army intelli- gence opened on civilians and groups unaffiliated with the Armed Forces. The IRS "special services staff" which gathered information on 3,000 domestic organizations and 8,000 individuals, and the IRS audits on individuals and groups because of their beliefs and political ac- tivities. . The thousands of foreign covert op- erations, including assassination plots, undertaken since 2961. The Senate-cannot simply turn its back on these revelations. Nor can It simply create a new study committee to study once more what the Select Committee on Intelligence and other committees, commissions, and others have already studied. The excellent work of the se- lect committee has now been done. It is now time for the Senate to begin to act on the over 170 recommendations made by the select committee in its final re- port, including 'many recommendations for legislation. Legislation must be con- sidered and procedures established that will make it certain that the Govern- ment's intelligence activities are subject, like everything else the Government does, to the rule of law and the will of the people. Legislation must be considered and procedures established to assure that the intelligence community is organized as efficiently as possible to provide ac- curate and timely intelligence at a rea- sonable cost and with a minimum of duplication. To do all this, a new committee with broad legislative authority must be created in this session of Congress. It is not enough to say that the abuses will not happen again, that the present com- mittees will hire more staff, and that the present system of oversightcan be made to work. Under the present system, at least three committees, in addition to the Committee on Appropriations, have over- sight responsibilities, each for a limited part of the , intelligence community. Oversight of the Government's intelli- gence activities, although a difficult and time-consuming task in, itself, is in fact only a small portion of the full respon- sibilities of these committees. It is small wonder that none of these committees is able to exercise comprehensive over- sight over the intelligence community. In the domestic intelligence area, for example, the. Church committee found that Congress "has failed to define the scope of domestic intelligence activities or intelligence collection techniques, to uncover excesses, or to propose legislative solutions. Some Members have failed to object to improper activities of which they were aware and have prodded agen- cies into questionable activities." Select committee report, book II, page 277. The most important means of over- sight is the power of the purse. Yet Con- gress, as a whole, has never known how much the intelligence agencies are spend- ing or how much is spent on intelligence activities generally. Select committee report, book I, page 469. Nor will it do just to. Place on top of the present inadequate system a new committee without legislative and au- thorization authority. It would be equally unwise to create a committee which must share all of its legislative or authoriza- tion jurisdiction with-other committees. Although a number of the Govern- ment's intelligence agencies are part of larger departments, the President has recognized that the Government's intel- ligence activities are an integral whole that must be looked at as a single whole. In February, he moved to centralize fur- ther executive branch supervision of all the Government's intelligence activities, whether they are part of the Department of Justice,. the Department of Defense, the Department of State, or the like. The Senate must do the same. Only a single committee with full leg- islative and. authorization: aathori4ftl assure comprehensive and coati oversight of the intelligence comm y on a permanent basis. Only a single com- mittee with the necessary authority can consider comprehensive legislation to rewrite the charters and structures of the 11 or more intelligence agencies scat- tered throughout the Government. Only a single committee with the necessary authority will have the time and ability to review adequately the expenditures of all the intelligence community and to approve annual authorizations. Mr. President, Senate Resolution 400, as reported by the Government Opera- tions Committee, will give us the means for.exercising the necessary type of com- prehensive oversight over the intelli- gence community. If there are changes that may be made to, perfect this resolu- tion without changing its essential na= ture, I hope they will, be proposed. But the Senate cannot allow the jurisdic- tional concerns of its own committees to overshadow the national interest. In the long run, it is not crucial that one com- mittee or another loses or gains jurisdic- tion. What is crucial in. the long run is to establish a new committee to exert effec- tive congressional control over the intel- ligence community. I strongly urge the Senate to promptly create such a com- mittee. Mr. President, the need for improved oversight of the intelligence agencies is apparent. I am pleased that in theg]W few days my colleagues and I have able to work out a compromise tha provide that much-needed oversight. The compromise substitute that will be pro- posed will assure that the Senate will as- sume its proper place in our constitu- tional system. The compromise substitute is the prod- uct of much hard work and a commend- able spirit of compromise and accom- mqdation. It is a delicately balanced pro- posal that addresses the concerns of the intelligence community, the executive branch, the Senate, and most important- ly, the public. It gives the new committee the essen- tial elements and powers which any committee must have to do an effective job of oversight. The new committee will pay a very important role In oversee- ing and legislating for the intelligence community. At the same time, the com- promise protects the legitimate interests and concerns of the standing commit- tees. The key elements of the substitute are as follows: First, the new intelligence committee would be a select committee with 17 members-9 majority members and 8 mi- nority members-appointed by the lead- ership on a 9-year rotating basis. Four majority and' four minority seats are reserved for members of Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Judiciary, and Ap- propriations. Second, the new committee. would legislative and authorization jurition over all U.S. Intelligence activities, Including CIA, FBI, and DOD. The juris- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 1,2,. 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,-SENATE diction is exclusive over the CIA and its authorization. The intelligence committee will have usive legislation and authorization diction over the CIA and the Direc- of Central Intelligence. But if the se- lect committee reports legislation, in- cluding authorization legislation, that affects agencies other than the CIA or the Director of Central Intelligence, the legislation may be .sequentially referred for up to 30 days to the appropriate standing committee with general juris- diction over that agency. Under similar .procedures the Intelligence committee chairman could ask for referral to his committee of legislation affecting any of the intelligence activities of the Gov- ernment which has been reported by an- other committee. The original referral of any legislation will be to the intelligence committee if it predominately Involves the intelligence activities of the Government. Third, the compromise provides that the intelligence community budget will be annually authorized. Annual authori- zation will constitute a very important aspect of the committee's oversight of the agencies. It should assure a regular review of each agency's activities, Its ef- ficiency, and its priorities. The annual authorization procedure preserves the Senate's ability to act via the continuing resolution route In an emergency situ- ation. Fourth, committee has full subpena and Investigative authorities. The in- telligence community is expected to keep the committee fully and currently in- ,ed about the intelligence activities responsible for, or engages In, in- c uding any significant anticipated ac- tivities. Intelligence agencies must pro- vide all necessary information and doc- uments to the intelligence committee. Fifth, the committee may disclose in- formation where, disclosure is in the Public interest. If the President objects to committee disclosure of any classified Information the full Senate must decide the matter of disclosure. The resolution In no way affects the right of two sen- ators under rule 35 to ask for a closed session of the Senate to discuss sensitive matters, including the question of whether the Senate should disclose classified information. disclosed clasified information. Committee disclosure of classified in- formation to other Senators is governed by specific Provisions, including a re- quirement that there be a written rec- ord of such disclosure. Mr. President, I want to commend my colleagues on their hard work and great concern for the national interest that this substitute embodies. I urge my fel- low Senators to adopt this substitute. By doing so we may close the book on an unpleasant past and begin to restore the Nation's confidence in the intelligence community, the Senate, and itself. -Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have a section-by-section analy- sis of the Cannon substitute printed in the RECORD. ere being no objection, the mate- was ordered to be printed In the RtEbORD, as follows: S 7087 SENATE RESOLtOTION 400 COMPROMISE- the Department of Defense, Including the SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Na- SECTION 1-STATEMENT OF PURPOSE tional Security Agency, and the intelligence This section states that it Is the purpose of activities of the Departments of State, Jus- the resolution to create a new select com- tice, and Treasury. The jurisdiction includes mittee of the Senate with legislative juris- legislation reorganizing the intelligence com- diction to oversee and make continuing stud- munity. In- lea of the intelligence activities and pro- Subsection 3(a) also specifies that the in- grams of the U.S. Government. This section telligence committee will have jurisdiction obliges the committee to make every effort over authorizations of budget authority for to assure that the appropriate departments the chief intelligence agencies in the gov- and agencies of the United States provide ernment: the Central Intelligence Agency; informed and timely intelligence necessary the intelligence activities of the Department for the executive and legislative branches of Defense (including the Defense Intelli- to make sound decisions affecting the secu- gence Agency and the National Security rity and vital interests of the nations. As,the wording of the section suggests, one of the goals of the new committee should be to as- sure that other members and committees of the Senate receive directly from the agencies all the intelligence analysis they need to ful- fill their responsibilities. It is further the purpose of the new committee to provide vigilant oversight of the intelligence activi- ties of the United States. - Agency); the intelligence activities of the Department of State; and the intelligence activities of the Federal Bureau of Investi- gation, specifically, all activities of the Bu- reau's Intelligence Division. The committee will continue to have jurisdiction over these parts of the intelligence community even if they are transferred to successor agencies. Subsection (b) provides that the intelli- gence committee will have exclusive legisla- tion and authorization jurisdiction over the SECTION -2-COMMITTEE STRUCTURE Subsection (a) establishes the Select Com- mittee on Intelligence Activities. It provides that the committee will be composed of 9 majority and 8 minority members. Two mem- bers will be drawn from each of the follow- ing committees: Appropriations, Armed Serv- ices, Foreign Relations, and Judiciary' Com- mittees. The other 9 members of the new, committee may not be members of the above- named four committees. Clause 2 of this subsection provides that members appointed from each of those four named committees will be evenly divided be- tween the two major political parties and appointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon the recommendations of the majority and minority leaders of the Senate, respectively. Five of the remaining 9 at large members will be appointed by the Pres- ident pro tempore of the Senate upon the recommendation of the majority leader and four will be appointed by the President pro tempore upon the recommendation of the minority leader. The majority leader and minority leader of the Senate are to be ex officio members of the Select Committee but will have no vote on the committee. Subsection (b) prohibits a Senator from serving on the committee for more than 9 consecutive years. It is expected that in each Congress approximately- one-third of the 17- member committee will be new members. This section also provides that, at the beginning of each Congress, the members of the full Senate who are members of the majority party will select a chairman and the minority members of the full Senate will select a vice chairman. The resolution expressly provides that neither the chair- man nor the vice chairman may serve at the same time as a chairman or ranking minority member of any other permanent committee. The vice chairman is to act in the place of the chairman in the chairman's absence. . Subsection (d) provides that membership on the new intelligence committee will not be taken into account for purposes of deter- mining the number of committees a Sena- tor may serve on. A Senator need not give up a seat on another committee in order to serve on the new intelligence committee. SECTION 3-JURISDICTION This section defines the new committee's jurisdiction. Subsection (a) gives the com- mittee legislative jurisdiction over the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and the Director of Central Intelligence, as well as over the in- telligence activities of all other departments and agencies of the Government. These other mittee. Any report the intelligence commit- agencies and departments include, but are tee makes will be subject to the provision in not limited to, the intelligence activities of section 8(c) (2) to protect national security. CIA and the Director of Central Intelligence. The subsection also provides, however, that if the select committee reports legislation, including authorization legislation, that af- fects agencies other than the CIA or the Director of Central Intelligence, the legisla- tion may be sequentially referred for up to 30 days to the appropriate standing commit- tee with general jurisdiction over that agency. Under similar procedures the intelli- gence committee chairman could ask for re- ferral to his committee of legislation affect- ing any of the intelligence activities of the government which has been reported by another committee. The original referral of any legislation will be to the intelligence committee if it pre- dominately involves the intelligence activ- ities of -the government. If the legislation predominately involves non-intelligence mat- ters and secondarily intelligence, the legis- lation will be referred to a standing commit- tee, and then sequentially refersed to the intelligence committee. Subsection (c) makes it clear that noth- ing in the resolution prohibits or restricts the authority of any other committee to study and review any intelligence activity to the extent that such activity directly af- fects a matter otherwise within the jurisdic- tion of the committee, Any committee may conduct oversight hearings concerning an agency's intelligence activities and the affect of the intelligence activities on the ability of the agency to perform its overall mission. Subsection (d) provides that nothing in the resolution limits or inhibits any other Senate committee from continuing to obtain full and direct access to the product of the intelligence. agencies where that informa- tion is relevant to a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee. This provision specifically assures the right of any other committee, such as the Foreign Relations Committee, to receive briefings on the political situation in any part of the world. SECTION 4-COMMITTEE REPORTS Subsection (a) requires the new commit- tee to make regular and periodic. reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the Government's intelligence activities. The committee must can to the attention of the Senate or any other appropriate committee any matters which require the immediate attention of the Senate or other committees. If, for example, the intelligence committee possesses information on intelligence activ- ities that may have a significant affect on foreign policy, the intelligence committee should notify the Foreign Relations Com- Approved ,For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7088 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976 Subsection ('b) requires the intelligence committee to obtain a report each year from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, the Sec- retary of State, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for purposes of public dissemination. Each report should review the intelligence activities of the par- ticular agency or department submitting the report. Included in this report should be a review of the intelligence activities directed against the United States or its interests by other countries. The reports by the four intelligence agencies and departments are to be made public in an unclassified form. , Subsectipn (c) makes it clear A hat the new committee must comply, like any other committee,. with the reporting requirements of the Budget Act of 1974. SECTION 5-INCIDENTAL POWERS Subsection (a) gives the new committee all the incidental powers it must have to operate effectively as a'committee. The pow- ers spelled out in this subsection include the power to investigate, to issue subpoenas and take depositions, and to exercise the normal administrative and financial powers of a committee. Subsection (b) authorizes the chairman of the committee or any member thereof to administer oaths. Subsection (c) provides that the chairman, vice chairman, or any other member designated by the chairman may issue a subpoena and speci- fies the procedure for serving the subpoena. SECTION 6-COMMITTEE STAFF This section spegifies the security provi- sions applicable to committee staff. It re- quires staff to pledge in writing, and under oath, to observe the security rules of the Senate and of the new committee both while employed by the new committee and after- wards. Staff must receive a security clearance under a system directed by the new commit- tee, but developed in consultation with the Director of Central Intelligence. SECTION 7-INDIVIDUAL PRIVACY The sectipn requires the committee to for- mulate and carry out rules and procedures to prevent the disclosure of information which unnecessarily infringes upon anyone's privacy: The committee may disclose infor- mation if it determines that the national interest in the disclosure of the information outweighs any privacy concerns. SECTION 8-DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION Subsection, (a) establishes the basic rule that the committee may disclose information where disclosure is in the public interest. It also establishes basic rules governing those instances, which will certainly not occur in every case; where the committee must vote on whether to disclose particular information such as classified information governed by subsection (b). In those instances, the com- mittee must vote on the matter within five days if any member requests a meeting for, such purpose. When such a meeting is nec- essary, a committee member may not pub- licly disclose the information until the com- mittee votes to do so, and then only in accordance with the procedures established by the rest of this section, as well as any other procedures established by the com- mittee. Subsection 7(b) governs the public dis- closure of information which the executive branch has classified under established se- curity procedures. If the committee wishes to disclose such classified information it must inform the President and give him five days to respond. If the President does not object, the committee may disclose. If the President does object, and certifies that dis- closure would threaten vital national inter- ests, the committee may determine that dis- closure should occur despite the President's objections. The committee may then .refer the matter to the full Senate for its deter- mination pursuant to the expedited proce- dures spelled out in the remainder of the subsection. Under this expedited procedure the com- mittee must refer the matter within a day to the Senate. After the matter lays over a max- imum of three days, it would then automat- ically become the pending order of business and the Senate would have up to 5 days to discuss in closed session whether or not there should be public disclosure. No later than the close of the fifth day after the matter is taken up the Senate must vote in open ses- sion either to disclose, not to disclose, or to refer the matter back to the committe for its final determination. Subsection 8(c) governs the disclosure by the committee to other Senators of informa- tion classified under established security provisions relating to the lawful intelligence activities of the government which the com- mittee has determined should not be dis- closed. An$* such disclosure may only occur in a closed session of the Senate, or pursuant to the rules of the committees and the proce- dures described in this subsection. Under these procedures the committee must keep a written record in each case, showing which committee or member received the informa- tion. The subsection contains a prohibition against any Member of. the Senate, or any committee, which receives the information from the select committee disclosing the in- formation to any other person. In addition to these protections, disclosure of such sen- sitive information will be subject to what- ever additional rules the committee adopts on its own to protect the confidentiality of such information. Subsection (d) requires the Select Com- mittee on Standards and Conduct to in- vestigate any alleged disclosure of classified information in violation of the provisions of this section. Subsection (e) states that if the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct decides at the conclusion of its investigations that any Member, officer, or employee of the Senate has committed a significant breach of confidentiality it must report its findings to the Senate and recommend appropriate action. In the case of a Senator this may be censure, removal from committee member- ship, or expulsion. In the case of an officer or employee, it may be removal from em- ployment or punishment for contempt. SECTION 9-PRESIDENTIAL REPRESENTATIVE AT COMMITTEE MEETING This section authorizes the committee to permit, under rules established by the com- mittee, a personal representative of the Presi- dent to attend the closed meetings. The pro- vision does not require the new committee to invite a representative of the executive branch to attend closed meetings, or estab- lish a presumption that. the committee will do so. It merely makes explicit the power that any committee has to invite a Presidential representative to attend committee delibera- tions if the committee finds such representa- tion helpful in conducting its duties. Be- cause of the special nature of the new com- mittee's work, however, it may find this pro- cedure especially useful. SECTION 10-DISPOSITION OF THE MATERIAL OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE This section provides for the transfer of documents, records, files and other materials from the Select Committee on Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Acti- vities to the new committee. Since its inception, the Church Committee has reached certain understandings with the CIA and other intelligence agencies concern- ing the ultimate disposition of written ma- terial provided to the select committee. Under these agreements, some material pro- vided to the select committee was to be re- turned to the appropriate agencies. Other materials were not to have been re- turned. This section respects those agree- ments. The new committee will obtain posses should be returned to the executive branch. SECTION 11-COMMITTEE ACCESS TO INFORMATION Subsection (a) governs the information which the intelligence agencies must pro- vide on their own initiative to the new com- mittee. The subsection expresses the sense of the Senate that the. 'intelligence agencies should keep the committee fully and cur- rently informed about its activities. This re- quirement does not apply to the myriad de- tails of day-to-day intelligence operations, but only to information which the commit- tee needs to make informed judgments on policy questions. ' The requirement extends to briefing the committee in advance of any significant anticipated activities, such as covert opera- tions. An anticipated activity may be sig- nificant because it is financially costly, or because it may affect this country's dip- lomatic, political, or military relations with -other countries or groups. The Proviso clause makes it clear that while the agencies are expected to brief the intelligence committee in advance on proposed covert operations, implementation of the covert action is not dependent upon the committee in turn ap- proving the proposed activity. Affirmative ac- tion by the committee is not a condition precedent to implementation of the activity. Subsection (b) expresses the sense of the Senate that the head of any department or agency of the United States involved in any intelligence activities should make available to the committee any person paid by the agency to provide any information the com- mittee requests, and to furnish upon request any document or information which the partment or agency has in its possess vision, the committee will, of course, have the subpena power to enforce its requests for information. Subsection (c) expresses the sense of the Senate that each department and agency re- port any intelligence activity that may vio- late the constitutional rights of any person, or may violate any law, Executive order, Pres- idential directive, or departmental or agency rule or regulation. Such reports should be made to the intel- ligence committee immediately upon dis- covery of the wrongdoing. Each department or agency should further report to the com- mittee what action is taken or expected to be taken by the department or agency with respect to such violations. SECTION 12-ANNUAL AUTHORIZATIONS This ?ection insures an annual or bian- nual authorization of funds for the intelli- gence agencies over which the new committee had jurisdiction beginning September 30, 1976. In the past some of the intelligence activities have been governed by openended authorizations. The section places clearly upon the record a decision by the Senate that in the future this will no longer be the case and that, instead, there will be annual or biannual authorizations. The section rec- ognizes, however, that as in the case of other agencies, the intelligence agencies may have to be funded in an emergency by continuing resolutions pending adoption of the authori- zation. It also recognizes that' the funding of the intelligence agencies will be subject to the standing rules of the Senate. Periodic authorizations of the intelligence agencies will constitute a very important aspect of the committee's oversight over agencies. It should assure a regular rev of each agency's intelligence activities, efficiency, and its priorities. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE SECTION 13-COMMITTEE STUDIES This section sets forth important subject matter areas which the new committee would .Jae required to study and report on by July 1, A7 and from time to time thereafter as eems appropriate. Those study areas are 'W 'deems (1) the quality of the analysis of foreign intelligence information and the use of anal- ysis in policymaking; (2) the authority of each agency to engage in intelligence activities and the desirability of developing legislative .charters for the agencies; (3) the organization of the executive branch to maximize oversight, efficiency and morale; (4) the conduct of covert and clandestine activities and the process of Informing the Congress of such activities; (5) the desirability of changing laws and rules to protect necessary secrets and to pub- licly disclose information that should be disclosed; (6) the desirability of establishing a stand- ing committee of the Senate on intelligence activities; (7) the desirability of establishing a joint Senate-House committee on intelligence activities; (8) the procedures under which funds for intelligence activities are authorized and whether disclosure of the amounts of fund- ing is in the public interest; (9) the development of a common set of terms to be used by the executive and legis- lative branches in policy statements and guidelines it issues in the intelligence area. Subsection (b) specifically provides that the new committee may omit from its study any matter which the committee feels the Church committee has already adequately studied. SECTION 14-DEFINITIONS Subsection (a) defines four aspects of the "intelligence activities." They are: na- il or foreign intelligence, counterintelli- gence, foreign covert or clandestine activi- ties, and domestic intelligence. National or foreign intelligence covers intelligence which is relevant to the govern- ment's national decision-making. The definition of domestic intelligence does not cover the normal investigatory work that all enforcement agencies engage in as a part of their normal responsibilities to enforce the law. The only domestic intel- ligence activities that are covered by the term intelligence are those activities that focus on the political and related activities of Americans because of the threat those activities pose, or are alleged to pose, to the internal security (i.e., fundamental inter- ests) of the United States. The definition of intelligence activities does not include tactical foreign military intelligence serving no national policy- making function. SECTION 15-FUNDING FOR THE NEW COMMITTEE This section authorizes start up funds for the select committee. It provides up to $275,000 for the period between the time the new committee is created and February 28, 1977. SECTION 16-EFFECT ON OTHER LAWS Section 16 states that nothing in the reso- lution is intended to imply approval by the Senate in any activity or practice not other- wise authorized by law. The section is in- tended to make it clear that by assigning the new committee jurisdiction over a particular activity, such as covert or clandestine activ- ities, or the domestic intelligence activities o the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the to does not thereby intend to express view as to the legality of any such ac ity. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I wish to make just one inquiry of the distin- guished Senator from Nevada. In setting forth his understanding of the compro- mise proposal, I do not know whether it was just -a slip of the tongue, but he mentioned the fact that there would be a limit of 10 years on the terms that Senators would serve. I have had the un- derstanding that we had agreed on a 9- year -term. - Mr. CANNON. Yes, we agreed ill our meeting on 9 years. In working with the staff, the suggestion was made on the part of some of the staff members, and it was, I understand, cleared with staff members all around, that it would be better if it went either 8 or 10 so that it coincided with the terms of a par- ticular Congress and we would not have a change in the middle of a Congress. That was reported back to me as having been cleared by staff members. I did say 10 deliberately and put that in the bill as a result of that discussion. I have no feeling for whether it is 8 or 10, but I think it makes sense to have it one or the other, rather than the 9-year term which we had discussed. Mr. RIBICOFF. I understand the posi- tion of the Senator. The only thing is that our staff was not informed and Sen- ator PERCY and I heard it here for the first time. I am sure that before the bill is decided on, we shall have opportunity to discuss this during the next day or so and clarify it. I did want to call atten- tion to the fact that the Senator's de- scription of the bill is accurate, with that minor discrepancy. Mr. PERCY. Will the Senator yield to me? Mr. RIBICOFF. Yes. Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Con- necticut and I have confirmed with the acting majority leader (Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD) that 9 years was the agreement. But the Senator from Illinois would like Senator CANNON to know that if chang- ing in the middle of a Congress does pre- sent a problem, and it certainly is a fac- tor that we had not considered, the Sen- ator from Illinois will be very pleased to change it to 8 years, but not 10. The Sen- ator from Illinois preferred the 6-year period but'V#ceded in order to reach the compromise. Mr. C ON. Nine years was the fig- ure we a eed on. It was drafted that way. But when the suggestions came back to me from staff, from discussion, after meetings by some staff with both the majority and minority members, that we ought to go to 10 or 8, I felt that would pose no problem. I am perfectly willing to go to 9. It does not pose any problem as far I am concerned, but it may be bett to go 8 or 10 rather than because of the break-in Congress. MI'AWBICOFF. I just waited to clar- ify tl e record and some time tomorrow. I am sure we can straighten out that dif- ferenc Mr. If the Senator will yield further, cause the.y istinguished Sena- tor put in a compromise cosponsored by so many who attended that meeting, per- haps it would be best to leave that figure at nine, which did represent the agree- ment at that time. Then obviously, we S 7089 can change it to 8 or 10, as the Senate desires. Mr. CANNON. The Senator makes a good point. I thought it had been cleared with all people. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent that where the figure 10 is inserted for the figure 9, it-be changed to the fig- ure 9. 1 The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? The Chair hears none. With- out objection, it is so ordered. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, before be- ginning my comments, my first thoughts turn again toward the remarkable work- ings of the U.S. Senate. - Despite the anti-Washington attitude and the anticongressional feelings ex- pressed by opinion polls, where we are rated relatively low, the observation of the Senator from Illinois has been that when a critical issue is faced by the Sen- ate, the Senate generally faces up to that issue. Whereas we may have had an ex- tended-and I do mean extended-de- bate, and it appeared a few days ago as though there would be great disharmony on this matter, through the diligent ef- fort of a number of my colleagues, we have now reached a compromise that is incorporated in the amendment- offered by Senator CANNON on behalf of a great many of us. I do wish to pay great tribute not only to my own distinguished chair- man (Mr. RIBICOFF) with whom I have enjoyed working for so many years, but to Senator CANNON, who has contributed so much to this effort, and Senator ROBERT C. BYRD of the Committee on Rules and Administration. Mr. President, I wish to express my deep appreciation to Senator Sam Ervin, who undertook the chairmanship of the Select Committee on Watergate, and who did an absolutely outstanding job. That investigation, conducted with him. as chairman, and my distinguished col- league (Mr. BAKER) as his vice chairman, provided a basis for many years in the future, I believe, for the Senate inves- tigating malfeasance in the executive branch of Government. Certainly, I com- mend Senator BAKER for his work and help on Senate Resolution 400. Compromise would have been impos- sible without the work that has been undertaken by every Senator who has worked on this compromise resolution. Also on the Government Operations Committee are Senators MusKIE, JAVITS, WEICKER? ROTH, and BROCK, who have contributed greatly, as have other Sena- tors such as Senators MONDALE, CRANS- TON, SCHWEIKER, HATFIELD, CLARK and HUDDLESTON. I know we are going to benefit tremen- dously by the continuing participation of the distinguished Senator from Alabama (Mr. ALLEN), who worked on this matter diligently in the Rules Committee. The Government Operations Commit- tee staff-and the Senator from Illinois is not qualified to speak of staff members from other committees-but certainly Dick Wegman, John Childers, Paul Hoff, Claudia Ingram, Charles Morrison, Brian Conboy, Ted van Gilder, and James Davidson of the Government Operations Committee staff performed a remarkable ApprofedFor.Release 2004/05/13 : C1A-R[OP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7090 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976 service in bringing us to-this particular point. Mr. President, today we do face one of the most vital issues before this body in many years. It is a question that in- volves the national security of this coun- try. It is a question that involves the personal rights and freedoms of all American citizens. It is a question that involves whether or not Congress is will- ing to stand up to its constitutional re- sponsibilities to adequately oversee the operations of the executive branch. it is a question of whether or not we are a nation of laws and constitutional procedures or whether we are going to abdicate our oversight responsibilities and, in effect, delegate important powers of this country to a; select, nonelected group in the executive branch, without providing for adequate accountability. This is not a new question before us, Mr. President. Ten Congresses ago, in 4955, Senator MANSFIELD introduced a resolution which would have established a Joint Committee on Central Intelli- gence. The new committee would have had legislative authority over the agency, and required that the CIA keep the new committee "fully and currently informed with respect to ,its current activities." That resolution was defeated by the full Senate. There have been other attempts to create such a committee in the interven-, ing 20 years. All have failed, but now we have the facts that demonstrate beyond a doubt that such a new committee is needed. Investigations of the past year and a half have shown that the intelligence agencies of this Government have gone beyond their charters and committed illegal actions. The CIA, the FBI, and NSA have all abused the right of Ameri- can citizens, and committed illegal ac- tions. The need for better oversight by Con- gress over the intelligence community is clear. This is not just the feeling of cer- tain Members of the Senate; it is also the recommendation of the executive branch. The Commission on the Orga- nization of Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, the so-called Murphy Commission, recommended that Con- gress create a new structure for oversee- ing the intelligence community. Last year, in June 1975, the President's Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States recommended that a new intelligence committee be established in order to improve the operations of the intelligence agencies and to prevent abuses in the future. This Commission was headed by Vice President RocxE- FELLER. In addition to these executive branch recommendatons, the Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence has made a major study of the intelligence community and has come forward with recommendations. Certainly in mentioning that committee, a great many Members of the Senate worked with'great diligence, but I should like to particularly point out the work of such distinguished Members as Sen- ator CHURCH, Senator TOWER, Senator BAKER, Senator MATHIAS, and others who have contributed immensely to the work of that select committee. The resolution before the Senate to- day, Senate Resolution 400, is the prod- uct of all these investigations and rec- ommendations. It contains the recom mendations of all these investigatory bodies. Senate Resolution 400 is an at- tempt to respond to the need for more effective oversight of the intelligence community. Not only would it prevent abuse in the future, but I feel it would begin to restore the trust and confidence in the intelligence community that we all desperately need. In the hearings the Government Oper- ations Committee held, the call for a new committee to oversee the activities of the intelligence community was made clear. Secretary of State Kissinger supported the creation of a new committee; former Director of CIA Colby supported a new committee; -two other former Directors of the CIA, John McCone and Richard Helms, supported the creation of a new committee; Clark Clifford, former Secre- tary of Defense, supported a new com- mittee; Mr. McGeorge Bundy, former National Security Adviser to *the Presi- dent, supported such a new committee; Mr. David Phillips, president of the As- sociation of Retired Intelligence Officers, supported a new committee, and said that 98 percent of the members of his associa- tion, who were retired intelligence offi- cers, favored the creation of a new over- sight committee. The need for such a new committee seems clear to me and I believe it was made very clear by the testimony and the inferences in the testimony of Secre- tary Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State. He made the astounding comment that he thought as Secretary of State he knew all the major activities being carried on by the Central Intelligence Agency overseas that affected foreign policy for which he had direct respon- sibility to the President of the United States. He only learned subsequently, by read- ing the newspapers and reports that came out of Senate committees and other committees established for that purpose, that he did not know all that he was supposed to know and that he thought he knew, and I rather imagine. he was shocked to find that. What we want to prevent is any future Secretary of State, responsible for carry- ing out foreign policy of this Govern- ment, not even knowing some of the activities carried on by the Government that affect foreign policy. Nor should we be surprised as a Congress to find that -activities have been carried out over which we have really nl't had adequate access to the,, information in some form or other. The question is, wh4010 rm should oversight take now? i would not question at all the inten- tions and desires of the Member . -of the Senate in the past who ha over- sight responsibility. But th ponsi- bility has been franented. M y times committees have, simply not been told. If they did not ask the right question, the information was not volunteered to them. There was not an open basis and there was not a clear overall responsibil- ity in one single central committee for the operation of the CIA. So there is no use looking to the past. What we need to do is work together find a basis in the future for overco ing the deficiencies of the past. With what has been said, though, wha kind of a committee should we have? Based on recommendations of the Sen- ate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Government Operations Committee unanimously reported Senate Resolution 400. Senate Resolution 400, as original- ly reported, would have created a strong oversight committee with legislative au- thority and authorization authority. As reported by the Senate Government Operations Committee, Senate Resolu- tion 400 would have created a new stand- ing committee of the Senate with legis- lation and authorization authority over the intelligence community. It would have required the intelligence commun- ity to keep the new committee fully and currently informed, and would have pro- vided oversight over the intelligence ac- tivities of the United States to assure that actions taken by the intelligence agencies were legal. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed at this point in the RECORD a summary of the provisions of Senate Resolution 400 as originally in- troduced. There being no objection, the sum- mary was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: ,SUMMARY Specifically, S. Res. 400 provided that: 1) The committee would have been com- posed of 11 members of the Senate, six lected from the majority party of the Sen and five members from the minority party the Senate. Members of the new committee would be selected by their respective cau- cuses. 2) The resolution provided for rotating membership by members of the committee, as well as rotating staff. 3) The new committee would have pro- vided exclusive legislative jurisdiction over the intelligence agencies of the United States government to ensure consolidated legislative authority over the intelligence community. 4) Disclosure provisions were written into the bill so that if the President objected to the release of any information provided to the new committee, the new committee could not release such information if three mem- bers of the committee objected. In such case, the question of whether or not to disclose would have to be referred to the full Sen- ate for disposition. Procedures were also writ- ten into the resolution to establish a record of to whom information was provided by the intelligence committee. Further, sanctions were written into the bill mandating the Select Committee on Standards and Con- duct to investigate any alleged disclosure of intelligence information in violation of the resolution. 5) S. Res. 400 as originally reported re- quired the committee to be kept fully and currently informed with respect to intel- ligence activities by executive branch agen- cies, including any significant anticipated activities. This did not require and was never intended to require prior approval by the committee of intelligence activities, but did mandate that the new committee be kept fully and currently informed of the activities of the agencies. 6) The new committee was to be provi exclusive authorization authority over budgets of the intelligence agencies. This was considered to be a most vital factor for Approved For Release 2004105/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R0002g0010001-5 May 12, 1976 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R0002001-80001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7091 the new committee to be. able to operate be in a position where it is going to take reorganization effort to bring these ac- properly and with atuhority. For the first for granted that the executive branch tivities together and have someone who time, this would have provided consolidated- control over the of government alone will carry out this could be held responsible for the overall intelligence community Zgets. operation. They do not want to have the activity. I think we knew that when we feeling that the material, the function, confirmed Mr. George Bush to that po- r.'PERCY. The basic reason for the and the purpose of such an organization, sition. He has been given that responsi- tion of a new committee is to pro- the intelligence community, has to be so bility. vide a single focal point in the Senate to secretive that Members of Congress who The Congress has made it very clear, oversee the intelligence community. At have a responsibility and who are cleared indeed, that it expects all activities in the present time, executive branch re- for top secret cannot be taken into the the intelligence community to cooperate sponsibility for intelligence is spread confidence. with that Presidential direction and re- among a number of organizations, some But I have resisted mightily every ef- organization in structure and that we civilian and some military. No one fort to have oversight by the Congress will, in our oversight responsibilities, do agency or department is solely respon- in such a way that Congress would be everything we can to determine that sible for our intelligence program, part and parcel of the decisionmaking structure and organization is being car- Jurisdiction in the Senate over intel- process. ried out as originally conceived. ligence matters and oversight of the in- How can we exercise oversight ac- In no way is Senate Resolution 400 de- telligence community Is also widespread, tivity, as a we should, and be in on the signed to mean that Congress actually and a number of committees have a piece day-by-day decisions for, say, covert op- runs the intelligence agencies. Direction of the action. There is no single commit- erations? and implementation of policy must come tee at the moment that has overall over- Those operations belong in the juris- from the executive branch. However, sight of legislative functions for the in- diction of the executive branch of Gov- Congress must exercise consolidated telligence community. Responsibility in ernment, so long as they are committed oversight over the intelligence commu- the Seante at the present time is spread .to writing, so long as there is a top of nity. If we expect, as we did, the exec- among the Armed Services Committee, ficial responsible, and for a major ac- utive branch to reorganize that activity the Foreign Relations Committee, the tivity the President of the United States so it could bring its own organization to- Judiciary Committee, and the Appro- must be responsible. President Ford has gether, we have to, ourselves, then bring priations Committee. The responsibility said to me, the Senator from Illinois, ourselves together in such a way that we for oversight for the intelligence com- that he would personally sign in writ- can operate without duplication, over- munity is the prime focus of no single ing the options placed before him, the lapping inefficiencies, and, we might say, committee in the Senate. In some in- problem being faced up to, and the de- overlooking, because our oversight activ- stances now there Is not even oversight cision made. ity is not properly structured and proper- staff or there is at best a limited staff to The congressional oversight can be ly organized. oversee the intelligence community. fully informed, can be kept up to date, We have to do so in such a way that Intelligence is so vital and so impor- but should not be in the position where we do not authorize and appropriate tant to the security of this country that it is being asked for prior approval which money for organizations and then im- any effective congressional oversight re- might jeopardize the intelligence activ- pose upon them such a burden so that quires that any oversight committee ity and :which might then put the Con- they literally are incapable of carrying make the intelligence community its gress in a position where it truly could out their responsibilities. prime focus. not perform an oversight function be- The Senator from Illinois was, very I would like to digress, Mr. President, cause Members of Congress have been disturbed and literally shocked when Mr. just a moment on that particular part and parcel of the original decision- Colby testified, in response to a question t. I have talked to a great many making process. from the Senator from Illinois, as to americans in many States, but particu- The Senator from Illinois has been what proportion of his time as Director larly in the State of Illinois, during the extraordinarily concerned that the Con- of the CIA he spent preparing for testi- process of the investigation of our Intel- gress, in a reaction to Watergate, to mony before congressional committees, ligence activities. Lockheed, to the CIA, FBI, and Internal appearing before Congressional commit- (At this point, Mr. CULVER assumed the Revenue revelations, is going to overre- tees of the House and Senate, and then chair as Presiding Officer.) act and, really, in a sense, assume unto responding to the work given to him by Mr. PERCY. At no time have I ever itself executive branch responsibility. the committees before whom he had found any reasonable or rational per- Clearly, we must exercise oversight. appeared. son who in any way questioned for one But clearly, we cannot run the Govern- Mr. Colby thought about it, put a few moment the need for a strong, powerful ment-by a committee of 535 people. That figures on a piece of paper, and has not nation that is the leader of the free is why the executive branch of Govern- since corrected the figure he gave the world and that has a tremendous bur- ment was conceived, to have a chief ex- Senator from Illinois. den of responsibility on its shoulders to ecutive officer who could react -to all of Sixty percent of his time in 3 years as have an effective, efficient intelligence the arguments and had the authority to Director of the CIA was spent before community. say that this is what we are going to do Congress. I asked him what he thought That is not subject to question. I think or not to do, subject always to our ap- should be the proportionate amount of anyone who would demagogue this issue propriation process, subject always to time. He thought 10 percent-90 percent and point to the abuses that have been our oversight responsibilities. to direct the activities and do the work carried out as a means of trying to de- I think we have presented to the Con- and 10 percent to be accountable to Con- stroy the intelligence community would gress, to the Senate for its consideration, gross would be a fair proportionate share in so doing, destroy the ability of the the creation of a new committee that of his time. United States to protect its vital inter- can be a single focal point in the Sen- I think that possibly might apply to ests and the vital interests of the free ate to oversee the intelligence commu- virtually every member of the executive world. nity, and yet an oversight committee or- branch of Government unless an agency I do not think that is really an issue. ganized in such a way that it is clearly is in deep trouble. Obviously intelligence The people of this country expect us to determined that it is not going to be a has been in some deep trouble for a few have a thorough,, ongoing intelligence part of the decisionmaking process and years now. facility and capability. I think they ex- that is not going to usurp the responsi- But I think our aim ought to be to pect us to have the finest in the world. bilities of the intelligence community organize in such a way that the Director What they do not want is abuse in the itself. can devote a reasonable proportion of name of law enforcement. They do not Intelligence activities are spread his time to Congress, but not be on the want such an agency breaking the law. among a large number of executive Hill so much that, literally, the Agency's They do not want people in that agency branch organizations today-some civil- direction is being left to subordinates to feel that they somehow have a mission ian and some military. No one agency or who are not. personally directly account- in life so important that they are above department is solely responsible for our able to the Congress. law. They do not want complicity intelligence program. We know that inefficiencies in the per- ,hat. They do not want Congress to It was the purpose of'the Presidential formance of. the intelligence community Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : AiRDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7092 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976 can really cost billions of dollars. We know that. based on studies to date, there are inefficiencies and duplications in the inteftggence agencies. But there is no single co mittee to Pull all this in- formation together in the Senate at the moment. Therefore, I strongly support consoli- dated oversight over the intelligence community. It is time for the Senate to take such action. Throughout the debate on this Issue, my primary goal will be to assure that we have strong, effective oversight over the intelligence community. Certainly, the Senator from Illinois, and every other Senator, I trust, will be willing to be flexible. Already, the-dis- tinguished Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) has indicated there has come an issue on the tenure of the Senators serving on the committee that should be subject to floor discussion. He has indicated a willingness to be flexible. Certainly, the Senator from Illinois will be flexible on that issue, as I am sure my distinguished colleague from Con- necticut will be. We are not .saying this compromise is final. It is subject to amendment. It is subject to discussion. But it does repre- sent a remarkable effort by a group of Senators determined to try to resolve some of the major points of controversy prior to placing the substitute on the floor. Senate Resolution 400, as reported by Government Operations, is certainly sub- ject to amendment in itself, and has been these divergent opinions and to reach a by the new intelligence Committee. I~ the general consensus that is in the realm of case of the CIA, exclusively; in the case of the possible and at the same time is other agencies, on the concurrent basis. How- _ ever, language will be written into the reso- Today we have before us a proposed should an authorization not be appro substitute for Senate Resolution 400 that prior to the appropriations process. I cosponsored which can hopefully re- 5) On disclosure, if the new committee ceive maximum support. It is a product been classified as release any submmtte ion it which has of days of discussion and intense con- executive branch, the committee shall notify sideration of vitally important issues in the President of such vote. The Select Com- an attempt to reconcile divergent views. mittee may then publicly release such infor- We hope that the proposed substitute, mation after 5 days unless during that inter- which blends widely differing points of vening period of time the President notifies view, will accomplish what most of us the Committee that he objects to the dis- seek to accomplish. closure of such information. After review of I am able to offer my wholehearted the President's objections, if the Committee suppord to the compromise proposal, and still wishes to release the information it may I ask -unanimous consent that the sum- refer the question of disclosure to the full mary, as I understand the: substitute, be Senate for consideration. The Senate will then make the final decision in closed ses- printed in the RECORD at this point sion, and may take any one of the following There being no objection, the summary three courses of action: (1) approve the pub- Was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, lic disclosure of any or all of the Informa- as follows: tion in question; or (2) disapprove the pub- SUMMARY lic disclosure of amy or all of the informa- Following are the major points of the sub- tion in question; or (3) refer any or all of the stitute: information in question back to the Com- 1) There is established a Select Committee mittee, in which case the Committee shall to be known as the Select Committee on make the final determination with respect Intelligence Activities. The Select Commit- to the public disclosure of'the information tee shall be composed of 17 members-nine in question. members selected at large, 2 members from There is a provision in the resolution which the Appropriations Committee, 2 members requires that the final vote on the question from the Armed Services Committee, 2 mem- of whether or not to release shall not occur bers from the Foreign Relations Committee later than the close of the ninth day on and 2 members from the Judiciary Commit- which the Senate is in session following the tee. day on which such question was reported The Majority Leader of the Senate and the to the Senate. Minority Leader shall be. ex officio members 6) No information in the possession of of the Committee and shall have no `vote.' . 'the Select Committee which the Committee The members of the Committee shall be has determined should not be disclosed shall be made available to any person except in appointed by the Majority and Minority a closed Cessio of the Senate nr_ information confirmed by the respective caucuses. agree, during the course of debate this mittee to another committee or ono week, to amendments that would emas- The Committee will be a bipartisan com- member of the Senate according to rules thW culate the proposed new committee; that mittee with nine members from the majority Select Committee lays down. No member of would make it weak; that would make it and eight members from the minority. The the Senate receiving such information can a toothless watchdog; that Would pro- majority members of the Senate shall select disclose such information to any other parties the chairman for the Select Committee and except in a closed session of the Senate or vide no real, effective oversight. That I the minority members of the senate shall with the permission of the Select Committee. cannot agree to. Nor do I feel my col- select the vice chairman for the committee. 7) The Select Committee on Standards and leagues on the Government Operations Service in the -Select Committee shall not Conduct shall investigate any alleged -disclo- Committee and the Select Committee on count against a member's service on any sure of intelligence information in violation Intelligence or the committee on Rules, other committee. In other words, this is an of these rules. The Select Committee on which has heard for so many days hear- add-on committee. Standards and Conduct shall investigate any ings on this matter, could agree to that. 2) The members of the Select Committee alleged violation and report Its findings and Certainly, after weeks of hearings, in shall rotate with the maximum term being 9 recommendations to the Senate. years of membership on the committee; 1/3 of 8) The head of any department or agency good conscience none of us could agree the committee will rotate each 3 years. The of the United States engaged in intelligence to emaseculating amendments that staff shall be permanent with no rotation. - activities shall keep the Select Committee would betray the trust placed in us by 3) The new committee shall. have legisla- fully and currently informed, including any the American public, and I think in this tive and authorization authority. In the case significant anticipated activities which are respect by the executive branch of Gov- of the CIA, such legislative and authoriza- the responsibility. of such department or ernment. Time after time they have said tion authority shall be exclusive. In the case agency. It is the mandate of the agency or they wanted effective oversight. They are of other covered intelligence agencies in this department to keep the committee informed. legislation, the authority shall be shared with In no way is this requiring committee ap- ing tee it; they are looking for it. But the standing committee with over- proval before engaging in such activities. In they y want it organized in such a a way present other words, there is a mandate to keep the that it is not disruptive to their own sight responsibility. There shall be a process committee fully and currently informed but of concurrent sequential referral of legisla- the committee does not have a veto power operations. tton and authorizations. In other words, in over activities of such agency or department. Mr. President, it comes as no surprise the case of an agency such as the NSA, both to Members of this body that the precise the intelligence Committee and the current Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the dis-- form that oversight should take has been standing committee would share jurisdiction. closures of the last few days have made extremely controversial. Some have ad- In any case where either the Intelligence the need for oversight in the Intelli- vocated maintaining the status quo, some Committee or the standing committee re- gence community painfully evident. I ported out legislation or an authorization, it have preferred a new study, while others would then be referred to the other com- venture to say there are few Members of have spoken in favor of a strong new mittee for a period not to exceed 30 days. If this body who would wish to see repeated committee with concentrated authority. the second committee did not take action the violations of our civil liberties which This diversity of view, Mr. President, is within 30 days, the second committee would have occurred. I believe that the pro- what makes this institution so great and be automatically discharged from responsi- posed new committee represents the most so representative of the American peo- bility for the legislation and it would go to effective possible check against repeated the Senate floor. A major addition to the activities s which are a threat to the very pie. it is a source of strength rather than substitute was the re-inclusion of the FBI foundation our democracy. of weakness. Our strength is in our in the jurisdiction of the Intelligence Com- - diversity. mittee. - Mr. President, over 200 years of o Another source of strength, Mr. Presi- 4) The budgets for the covered intelli- Nation's history have shown we must dent, is this body's ability to reconcile gence agencies shall be annually authorized ever alert to the dangers posed by those Approved For Release 2004/O CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For 3 B~p 90 00200180001-5 May 12, 1976 VRiZgREc -IZD - SENATE S 7093 who_wlsh us no well. The American peo- agencies and evaluating their perform- provide us, often under the most .trying pie need a strong intelligence commu- ance. Our findings, reported in more and dangerous circumstances. Without nity. than 600 pages of text on April 26, re- their work, we could not feel militarily undreds of editorials and hundreds of is required. tegod'abuses point out a need for better That report, together with others Sersight of the intelligence agencies. which have, been made public, demon- The American people need to be assured strates with clarity that the intelligence that these necessarily,secret agencies op- agencies of our Government have at erate within the law. The American peo- times operated outside both the law and ple and the Senate need strong oversight their charters and outside the bounds of of the intelligence community. The pro- wisdom. The information which has posed new Committee on Intelligence Ac- been released over the last few months tivities will do the job and do it well. I regarding drug testing on unwitting urge my colleageus to offer their support. Americans, assassination plots and the Finally, I ask unanimous consent that interception of millions of messages sent Elliot Maxwell, Mike Madigan, and Bob by private citizens reflect activities Kelly, of the Select Committee on Intelli- which have simply gotten out of hand gence, be granted access to the floor, in- and indicate a pressing need for our cluding votes, during the consideration intelligence agencies. to return to ac- of Senate Resolution 400, and that the cepted practices. same privilege be granted to Mr. John These reports also indicate that the Childers, minority counsel for the Gov- United States is involved in a multitude ernment Operations Committee. of so-called covert activities abroad- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without activities which by their nature cannot objection, it is so ordered. be subjected to public scrutiny and de- Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I, bate as can, for example, the activities too, commend the distinguished chair- of the Department of Agriculture, or the man of the Government Operations Department of Commerce or most of the Committee, the chairman of the Rules other activities of our Government. Committee, and the others who have Our Government has been involved in participated in developing this substi- some 900 such major or sensitive projects tute amendment which has been intro-. since 1961 and several thousand minor duced this afternoon. ones, many of which, especially in the It was just a week ago that the press earlier years were undertaken without reports indicated that the prospects for the approval or review of a high level developing a strong oversight Commit- body outside the Central Intelligence tee on Intelligence in the U.S. Senate Agency. I, and the committee in general, were rather bleak. I would say that those concluded that we must maintain a ca- reports were somewhat premature, even pability for such actions and that our though perhaps it is a little early now Nation will be forced in a number of in- il predict that this body will accept the stances to continue to utilize covert ac- islation which is now before it, or tivities. But; at the least, additional l l accept it without substantial oversight and accountability must be ap- change. But I think certainly we can say plied to this area which has to operate that the prospects are greatly improved. under a certain veil of secrecy. In my own judgment we will have a Finally, our report indicates that de- good oversight committee established to spite the fact that our intelligence agen- look after the intelligence operations of cies have served well in many areas, there this Nation. , are aspects of their operations which Mr. President, in the days ahead we could be improved. For example, more will be discussing what I view as one of attention should be given to producing the most important pieces of legislation the so-called finished product of Intelli- which will come before this Congress. gence information; more coordination During those days of debate, we will and less waste and inefficiency might re- touch upon many issues-issues regard- suit from strengthening the Director of ing Senate rules, the role of a new com- the Central Intelligence-DCI. With the mittee, the authorities for that commit- large increase in the number of Soviets tee, the manner of selecting members. There are many differences of opinion with regard to these issues-differences which will have to be worked out in our deliberations and perhaps in Senate rollcall votes. Each of these matters is of importance, and I do not believe that any should be slighted in considerate But, in addressing the various s sidiary issues, I hope that we will not lose sight of what I consider to be the our intelligence community-argue or to propose legislative solutions. Some of foremost one-the need for a strong strongly for increased oversight, central- its members have failed to object to im- committee for the intelligence com- ized in a committee whose principal con- proper activities of which they were aware munity with legislative and authorizing cern shgll be intelligence. and have prodded agencies into questionable authority. If there is one thing that my service activities. As chairman of the Foreign and Mili- on the Intelligence Investigating Com- Then the report concludes: tary Intelligence Subcommittee of the mittee has done, it is to reinforce my be- If Congress had addressed the issues of Select Committee to Study Governmen- lief in, and commitment to a strong and domestic intelligence and passed regulatory tal Operations with Respect to Intel- effective intelligence system. In the legislation, and if it had probed into the ligence Activities, I have spent many world in which we live, we could not activities of intelligence agencies and re-quired s during the past 15 months review- survive without the information which of the excesses account thet for their deeds, many the activities of our intelligence thousands of dedicated men and women occurred. Past) might not have secure. We could not conduct foreign re- lations with assurance. We could not en- -ter treaties with confidence. Quite sim- ply, we could not adequately protect our- selves. Yet, perhaps the most insidous danger is intelligence agencies which operate under a cloud of suspicion and doubt. But, that is what the situation has been. That is what effective oversight can help prevent. So, as consideration of this measure continues, I hope that we will all remem- ber that the heart of the matter is over- sight and accountability. Past wrongs argue to be righted as best they can; future effectiveness and legality de- mands to be secured. The most import- ant single move we could make toward accomplishing that is to create a strong, responsible oversight committee which can exercise that eternal vigilance which Thomas Jefferson warned us its the. price of liberty. I thank the Chair. Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, the matter before the Senate today and that will be before the Senate for the next few days comes down to one very simple question: Will we ignore the past, or will we learn from it? We now have the reports of the Select Committee on Intelligence which care- fully document over 40 years of abuse by, and misuse of, the intelligence agencies of the Federal Government. For nearly 15 months, Mr. President, I sat as a member of that committee and listened to the testimony concerning the abuses and misuses of the Agency. In the course of those 40 years, we have had the rights and the privacy of Americans violated in countless episodes. Furthermore, we have seen that many of these episodes were not the isolated aberrations'of agents out in the field, but rather were part of concerted programs ap oved at the highest levels of these agcies. I remind my colleagues of the FBI's program called COINTELPRO and the CIA's program called CHAOS. Despite the fact that these programs did have high-level approval and resulted in widespread and systematic violations of the rights of law-abidin citizens g , and other"nationals whose interests may Congress, until recently, had never be contrary to ours, in our country, addi- sought to learn about them or control tional counterespionage efforts may need them. Indeed, on some occasions, I am to be made. afraid our actions in Congress actually These three situtaions-the unfortu- encouraged them. nate episodes which have occurred in the As the select committee 'put it in its past, the necess*r of maintaining our final report: ability to conduct 'covert actions and the Congress has failed to define the scope of need for improvement in th? effective- domestic intelligence activities or intelligence neon d effi i . f -- t- ` - - - - - - an c ncy o aspec vario Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7094 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE May 12, 1976 We have the opportunity to remedy this situation by creating a committee with the authority to propose legislative solutions, and the power to make these agencies accountable for their activities._ Mr. President, as I mentioned, I served on the Church committee, and while I initially approached that assignment with considerable skepticism, I came to realize that the abuses of the intelligence agencies were real, and that people who had done nothing wrong in the eyes of the law, had nonetheless suffered at the hands of the Government for the simple reason that they had dared to be differ- ent. Most importantly, the Church commit- tee's work demonstrated to me that there is no activity undertaken by the Federal Government which so jeopardizes the rights guaranteed to us by the Constitu-_ tion. Intelligence activity, almost by def- inition, is directed at persons and orga- nizations who have committed no crime but whose activities are thought to pose a danger to our internal security or of fect our foreign relations. By`its very nature, therefore, intelligence activity tends to skirt the traditional notion that governmental surveillance will be em- ployed only after a warrant has been issued on the grounds that there is prob- able cause that a crime has been, or is about to be, committed. Again, I remind my colleagues that the record of the select committee shows us that intelligence activities of the past have resulted in the Government's open- ing mail and reading telegrams, in its tapping telephones, and its breaking into homes-all without benefit of a search warrant or indication that a crime was being committed. In short, there is no activity carried out by the Federal Government which can have so' devastating an impact on the Bill of Rights. While intelligence activ- ities cost us relatively little in terms of money, they can cost us very dearly, in terms of our principles. It is for this reason, then-the particu- lar sensitivity of intelligence activities with respect :to the impact on the rights of indivduals-that convinces me that we need a strong oversight committee to deal exclusively with this area. I realize that adoption of the approach suggested here will result in-the juris- diction of existing committees being diminished insofar as their oversight of intelligence activity is concerned. But by concentrating oversight in a new com- mittee with jurisdiction to treat intelli- gence activity exclusively, we should not only get better oversight of intelligence, but existing committees should them- selves be able to devote greater time to non-intelligence operations of the agen- cies they oversee. One of the problems of the past has been that questionable intelligence activ- ities have not been brought to the atten- tion of existing oversight committees be- cause they have constituted a relatively small part of an agency's operations, and have involved relatively small sums of money. The possibility that certain pro- grams might intrude on the rights of in- dividuals has seldom motivated any in- telligence agency to seek approval from Congress. I foresee this new committee, however, as being informed, in advance, of any intelligence activity which could affect the rights of Americans. I furthermore foresee such a committee investigating allegations that intelligence activities have violated constitutional guarantees. Finally, I foresee this new committee de- veloping-for the first time-the exper- tise necessary for Congress to formulate and enact legislative standards to govern intelligence activity. I might also add that I think a strong oversight committee will result in more cooperation and better coordination be- tween Congress and the intelligence com- munity than 'heretofore. The Church committee found, on the one hand, that in the past there had been an attitude on the part of intelligence agencies that Congress could not be trusted to keep its secrets, and an attitude, on the other hand, that Congress really could not understand all of the ramifications which the agency considered in decid- ing to undertake this or that action. So Congress was not informed, unless, on occasion, the plans of the agency went awry, in. which case Congress was presented with a fait accompli. I see a centralized oversight committee as changing all this. First, I think the concept of a single committee with in- telligence responsibility is appealing from a security point of view, the intelligence community would not be forced to spread classified information over a multitude of congressional committees. Moreover, the committee itself would be in a better position than committees with other- than-intelligence jurisdiction to adopt stringent security procedures. I note in the resolution currently pending that certain security restrictions are placed on both members and staff, and that there is a formal procedure to be fol- lowed prior to the public disclosure of any classified information. Such meas- ures would go far, to insure that security considerations do not, in the future, pre- vent the intelligence -community from dealing frankly with the Congress. Second, I think that Congress would be in a position for the first time, to exer- cise its own independent judgment with respect to intelligence operations. With a membership and a staff devoted solely to intelligence needs and problems, the ernment off the backs of people. One way to insure that this is done, is for Congress to "get on the backs" of those agencies whose activities threaten our exert a gentle, but unrelenting, pressure, which lets them know that we are there and cannot be taken for granted. And so, Mr. President, I urge my col- leagues to support the substitution offered by Senator CANNON. In my opin- ion, this measure would create the strong oversight committee which I think the experience of the past 40 years cries out for. To do any less would be worse than doing nothing. Effective oversight over any governmental activity is dependent upon the ease of access which a com- mittee has to records and personnel in- volved in that activity. It has been my experience that unless a congressional committee has legislative or monetary clout, its inquiries are largely ignored. It is politely strung along, but it is not effective. It - is for this reason that I think it essential that any committee we create have the authority to report legislation and the authority to authorize appro- priations. To establish an oversight com- mittee without the power needed to ob- tain access and cooperation from the intelligence community would be worse than doing nothing at all-it.would only camouflage the reality of the situation. Mr. President, if we pass up this op- portunity to create such a committee, it very well may be another 50 years before the abuses of such agencies again will be disclosed to the public and the suppor0 found that is necessary to enact suck legislation. Mr. HRUSKA. Mr. President, the dis- cussion before us sharply raises the ques- tion of how the Senate should best exer- cise its oversight authority over govern- mental intelligence programs. I have long been concerned with such intelligence activities having been deeply involved in this area by virtue of my membership on the Appropriations and Judiciary Committees. Today I wish to address my remarks chiefly to that aspect of congressional oversight pertaining to the Department of Justice. In March, the Judiciary Committee was referred Senate Resolution 400 committee would be in a position to which sought to create a new permanent understand and evaluate the decisions- committee with exclusive jurisdiction made by the intelligence community as no congressional committee has ever done before. My conversations with peo- ple in the intelligence community lead me to believe that this change would be welcomed by the intelligence community. They want to have the approval of the Congress, and they would 'like it to shoulder some of the responsibility for the tough decisions which must be made. And well it should. Too long have we abdicated our role in these matters, and too often has our neglect resulted in erosions of individual rights going un- checked and unrepaired. Justice Douglas once wrote that the Bill of Rights was written to keep gov- over all aspects of the intelligence func- tion of the executive branch. Following he$ings and much deliberation amongst can rnittee members, the Judiciary Com- tion the grant of jurisdiction to the pro- posed Committee on Intelligence Ac- tivities over the intelligence activities of the Department of Justice, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The amendments would retain in the Judiciary Committee its historic juris- diction over the Department of Justice and the FBI. The present exercise of jurisdiction over these activities is in accord with the purpose and spirit of thqft Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 12, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL, RECORD- SENATE S 7095 Senate Report No. 1400, 79th Congress, Mr. President, we have heard much In Mr. President, for these reasons I am 2d session, Legislative Reorganization recent years that the FBI should be more opposed to the creation of a permanent Act of 1946-May 31, 1946-set forth accountable to the Department of Justice 'Senate Intelligence Committee with -*ae Wstandards controlling committee and the Attorney General. It should be jurisdiction, whether exclusive or con- sdiction, page 2: viewed as an integral part of the Depart- current, over the intelligence aspects of he bill) would replace our jerry-built ment of Justice-not as a separate law the Department of Justice. committee structure with a simplified system enforcement or intelligence agency. The It is my understanding that some of standing committees corresponding with effect of splitting of the intelligence over- Members may attempt to revive such a the major areas of public policy and admin- sight of the Bureau -and vesting it with a version of. Senate Resolution 400 as was istration . . . and the coordination of the separate committee would tend to create reported committee system with the ported by the Government Operations pattern of the administrative branch of the the impression that it is somehow di- Committee. While I do oppose such an National Government would improve the vorced from the rest of the law enforce- approach, I am not wedded in opposition performance by Congress of its legislative ment branch of the Federal Government. to the version of Senate Resolution 400 and supervisory functions. We should remember, Mr. President, as it was reported by Chairman CANNON Following this continuing guideline, that the Bureau is under the supervision from the Rules Committee. the Judiciary'Committee possesses over- bf the Attorney General, the principal The Rules Committee version of Sen- sight jurisdiction over the Department law enforcement office in the Federal ate Resolution 400 would in effect con- of Justice and its bureaus including the Government, a subject over which the tinue the work of the present Select Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Judiciary Committee has long exercised Committee. The temporary committee full committee and at least three sub- jurisdiction. which is proposed would be granted gen- committees exercise jurisdiction over the As stated by Director Kelley:, eral oversight of all intelligence activity Bureau and its functions, the Subcom- While the FBI has many duties concerning rather than exclusive jurisdiction, leg- mittee on Administrative Practice and the internal security of our country, it is islative or authorization wise, which some Procedure, the Subcommittee on Con- not alone in this responsibility. The entire are promoting. It would have an oppor- criminal justice system is involved. Obser- tunity -to review this subject area with stitutional Rights and the Subcommittee vance of the law and the preservation of on Criminal Laws. public order are the foundations for this some objectivity now that the emotion The difficulty with Senate Resolution country's domestic security. Without ade- charged revelations of the past year have 400, prior to its being amended, is that quate and equitable enforcement of the become public. it proposed to split, the oversight juris- law, whatever the source or circumstance of In summary, Mr. President, it is my diction of the FBI between the Judiciary its violation, a democratic society cannot firmest belief that the granting of legis- Committee and the proposed new Intelli- enjoy the stability it requires. lative oversight of FBI intelligence to a gence Committee, with the new commit- Stripping the Judiciary Committee of new committee will cause not only con- tee to have jurisdiction over intelligence jurisdiction over law enforcement in the fusion as to congressional direction to activities of the Bureau and the Judi- area of internal security while leaving the Department of Justice in its law ciary Committee to retain jurisdiction it with general jurisdiction over the re- enforcement investigatory function but over nonintelligence aspects of this mainder would be to create a hybrid will also create much costly duplication agency. wherein necessary general oversight in request for materials and information Those who have studied the FBI's or- over law enforcement would be annulled being sought by the various Senate com- ganization and mode of operation are and essential-perspective destroyed. es so authorized to oversee this ell aware that its intelligence activities The Judiciary Committee is at this Department. intertwined with its law enforcement moment considering the revision of title The most important reason against ction. For the most part its intelli- 18 of the United States Code, the crimi- splitting jurisdiction, however, Mr. Pres- gence activities are an investigatory tool nal laws including the provisions on ident is that mentioned by Attorney Gen- used in detecting crime. espionage. Should.it report a bill with eral Levi in testimony before both the There is a real potential that a split- amended espionage provisions subject to Judiciary and Government Operations ting of the oversight jurisdiction of in- future amendment by the Intelligence Committees. telligence and nonintelligence aspects of . Committee? Should it report.a bill with Mr. Levi strongly stressed the necessity the FBI may create much confusion and no change in the existing provisions on of continuing and strengthening the con- result in conflicting congressional guid- espionage with the expectation that the cept that the intelligence activity of the ance to that agency. It should be noted bill will be rereferred to the Intelligence FBI is part and parcel of the law en- that the FBI, unlike other intelligence committee? Should the lengthy study forcement mission of the Department of collecting agencies affected by Senate that has gone into the espionage provi- Justice. I do not wish to aid those who Resolution 400, is a law enforcement sions be put aside? would, however inadvertently, separate agency. The intelligence activity of the A further consideration which I be- these two functions. FBI is simply a means by which it detects lieve should be borne in mind is that a I wish to state again, Mr. President, and investigates violations of Federal separation of intelligence oversight from that I fully oppose the creation of a per- criminal laws. Because this activity is so the traditional law enforcement aspect manent Senate Intelligence Committee integrally related to the criminal inves- of the Deparmtent and the Bureau with jurisdiction, concurrent or exclu- tigatory function of the FBI and the De- would very likely result that no one sive, over the intelligence activities of partment of Justice, it is our belief that Senate committee would have a general the FBI both in an oversight and legis- oversight of the FBI should be continued overview and knowledge of all the activi- lative nature. to be dealt with as a unit. ties of the Department of Justice. This As I have. indicated, such a move would Mr. President, during the hearings be- could result in some information as to give strength to the concept that the fore the Judiciary Committee on Senate its operations to "fall between the intelligence activity of the FBI was sep- Resolution .400, both Attorney General cracks" and become known to no com- arate from the law enforcement function Levi and FBI Director Kelley testified. mittee. of the -Department of Justice where it Both stated that vigorous oversight of The Senate Rules Committee, to necessarily and properly rests. Such a the Department of Justice and the FBI which Senate Resolution 400 was subse- move, further could easily result in long was healthy and productive In the better- quently referred, concurred with the range confusion and conflict of congres- ment of the system. Both urged that this Judiciary Committee position on this sional directives to the FBI not to men- function could be best served by retain- subject, noting in part in its report tion the costly and duplicative requests ing oversight in a single committee. that- Mr. Levi well for material and information being pointed out- The intelligence activity of the FBI is a sought by the various committees in- That intelligence activities of . the FBI means by which it detects and investigates volved. should be closely tied to the criminal law. violaions of federal criminal laws. Because I believe also, that I would be remiss And that- this activity is so integrally related to the in not adding that a sharing of access criminal investigatory function of the FBI ngr spessional oversight arrangements that and the Department of Justice, it is the be- to intelligence material provides a d lit off the Intelligence functions from lief of the Committee that all legislative au- greater possibility of unauthorized dis- ore ordinary law enforcement functions thority should be continued to. be dealt with closure of matter which the Department of the Bureau would tend force of this to diminish the as a unit within the jurisdiction of the Com- of Justice understandably needs to safe- perception. mittee on the Judiciary. guard in order to protect its sources and Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7096 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976 techniques of investigating criminal vio- lations. For these reasons, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to reject any meas- ures which grant any proposed standing committee the jurisdiction over the in- telligence activities of the Department of Justice. Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, The U.S. Senate could play a major role in improving the image and the creditabil- ity of the American intelligence com- munity if it adopts the proposed substi- tute to Senate Resoluton 400 to be offered by Senators MANSFIELD, CANNON, RIBI- coFF, and others. I am pleased to join my colleagues in cosponsoring this measure. As the Members of the Senate know, this substitute would establish a Select Committee on -Intelligence Activities with both legislative and budgetary au- thority over the CIA and other intelli- gence agencies. If adopted, this measure would centralize, for the first time, the Senate's oversight of the American in- telligence community. At the same time, it would permit other committees of the Senate the continued opportunity to re- view and oversee the work of the DIA, FBI, and the National Security Agency. For over 15 months, the Church com- mittee has conducted a thorough and an exhaustive study and investigation of the practices and policies of the CIA, FBI, NSA, and the D4A. While none of us are proud of the past abuses of power which have taken place in these agencies, we all know of the important role these organizations play in the overall security of our country. Mr. President, many of us believe and feel that the responsibility for these abuses, as reported by the Church com- mittee, must not only be placed upon the executive branch, but the legislative branch as well. Had the Congress exer- cised the proper oversight of these agen- cies for the past 25 years, quite possibly many of the abuses would never have occurred. It is true that the political climate of the times did not require nor did it ex- pect the Congress to play an active over- sight role. But, the present times are such that the American people are demanding that we, in the Congress, assume our re- sponsibility, and begin to exercise an active interest in the affairs of the Amer- ican intelligence community. - The*adoption of this measure will be a signal to the American people that the Congress is not only intent upon disclosing illegal practices, but is intent' upon preventing similar practices from taking place in the future. Mr. President, I urge the early, adop- tion of this substitute. To do otherwise will be a message to the American people that their elected representatives are not interested in seeing to it that all aspects of intelligence work are done in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of this Nation. WATERGATE REORGANIZATION AND REFORM ACT OF 1976 Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Watergate Reorganization and Reform Act of 1976, S. 495, as amended, which I reported to- day, be referred, at the request of the Committee on the Judiciary, to the Com- mittee on the Judiciary, with instructions to report not later than June 11, 1976. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I have a parliamentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will state it. Mr. RIBICOFF. My understanding is that we have satisfied section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by, re- porting S. 495 from the Committee on Government Operations by May 15, even though the bill, at the request of the Committee on the Judiciary, will be re- ferred to the Committee on the Judiciary. If one committee reports a bill by May 15 and after the bill is reported, another committee requests the bill to be referred to it for a limited period of time, which will. result in that second committee completing work on the bill after May 15, have the requirements of section 402 of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 been met? - The PRESIDING OFFICER. They have been net. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. EXECUTIVE SESSION Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD,. Mr. President, I understand that there are two nomina- tions at the desk which were reported earlier today by the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare. I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into execu-' tive session to consider those nomina- tions. There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of execu- tive business. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The nom- inations will be stated. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Michael H. Moskow, of New Jersey, to be Under Secretary of Labor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed. The assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of John Conyers Read, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Labor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed. _ LEGISLATIVE SESSION Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Sen- ate resume the consideration of legis tive business. There being no objection, the Sena resumed the consideration of legislative business. ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN- ATOR PROXMIRE ON MONDAY NEXT Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Mon- day next, after the two leaders or their designees have been recognized under the standing order, Mr. PROXMIRE be rec- ognized for not to exceed 15 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER.,Without objection, it is so ordered. ORDERS FOR RECOGNITION OF MR. MONDALE AND FOR ROUTINE MORNING BUSINESS ON TOMOR- ROW; ORDER FOR CONSIDERA- TION OF UNFINISHED BUSINESS Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after Mr. PROXMIRE and Mr. GOLDWATER have been recognized on tomorrow, under the order previously entered, Mr. MONDALE be re- cognized for not to exceed 15 minutes, after which there be a period for the transaction of routine morning business, with statements therein limited to 5 min- utes each, such period not to extend beyond 1 p.m.; that at 1 p.m., the Senate resume consideration of the unfinish business. The PRESIDING OFFICER. With objection, it is so ordered. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quroum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. - Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I was very struck with Senator MORGAN'$ statement when he said that 50 years ago, we had a previous scandal that needed cleaning up and rectification. It seems odd that in our country's history, every 50 years something of this sort arises. We had the grant scandals of the 1870's, the Teapot Dome scandal of the 1920's, then we had the Watergate and,CIA problems in the 1970's. Let us hope that in the 2020's we do not go through the same cycle again. Mr. President, I commend the Mem- bers of this body who have cooperat so effectively and wisely in aevelopi the compromise amendment on intel gence oversight which has been proposed by the distinguished Senator from Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 12, 1976- CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 7097 Nevada. A strong intelligence oversight implications, rather than intelligence Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague very committee will be established if this implications, would continue to go to the much for these answers, which will be an amendment to Senate Resolution 400 is Foreign Relations Committee, with the important part of the recommended ac- opted? right of the new committee to ask for a tion on this amendment. I look forward strong and effective Senate Over- sequential referral, to supporting the Senator. ht Committee with legislative author- Mr. PELL. I thank my colleague. In Mr. `RIBICOFF. I thank the Senator ity is required in order to insure that the. section 3, paragraph (b) of the amend- very much. intelligence activities of the United ment it is stated that "any legislation Mr. President, I suggest the absence of States directly support American secu- reported by the select committee, except a quorum. rity interests, are conducted under clear any legislation involving matters spe- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk legal authority, and do not violate the cified in clause (1) "-that is, the CIA-or will call the roll. civil rights of American citizens. The (4) (A) -CIA budget-"of subsection (a), The assistant legislative clerk pro- S.,lect Committee headed by the distin- containing any matter otherwise within ceeded to call the roll. guished Senator from Idaho has done an the jurisdiction of any standing ;com- Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask excellent job in studying all facets of the mittee shall, at the request of the chair- unanimous consent that the order for activities of the intelligence community man of such standing committe, be re- the quorum call be rescinded. and in making recommendations for leg- ferred to such standing committee -for The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without islative action. But it is now essential its consideration." objection, it is so ordered. that legislation be developed and acted Does that mean that any legislation Mr. MATHIAS. Mr. President, first, I upon. That is why I support the creation developed by the proposed intelligence congratulate the distinguished Senator of the kind of intelligence committee committee relating to. CIA activities from Connecticut (Mr. RIBICOFF) and proposed in the amendment before us. having foreign policy implications would the distinguished Senator- from Illinois Although I support this amendment, be referred upon request to the Foreign (Mr. PERCY) on the remarkable job I do have some questions relating to the Relations Committee? they have done in taking ideas contrib- effect of the amendment on the jurisdic- Mr. RIBICOFF. If the legislation re- uted by many Members of .the Senate, tion and activities of other interested ported by the Select Committee has Sig- melding them with their own very im- committees, particularly the Foreign Re- nificant foreign policy implications, the portant views, and then bringing them lations Committee, of which I am a mem- Committee on Foreign Relations would here in the form of a legislative proposal ber. I would therefore appreciate it if the be able to ask for a sequential referral that I think is going to pass. I believe it distinguished Senator from Connecticut of the legislation. should pass. I take this time simply to who has done such a fine 'job in develop- Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator. Later express my views and my appreciation ing this compromise as the floor manager on in that same paragraph, it is stated to them. of Senate Resolution 400, would be so that- Mr. President, we are finally approach- kind as to respond to the following Any proposed legislation reported by any ing the climax of a year and a half of an questions: committee, other than the select committee, unprecedented investigation into the The Committee on Rules, in its report, which contains any matter within the juris- raised the possibility that the Hughes- diction of the select committee shall, at the world of intelligence. When the major- Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assist- request of the chairman of the select com- ity leader and I introduced the resolution Act, which provides for Presidential mittee, be referred to the select committee in October 1974 that led to the creation ante reports to four monde s cnmmiiden of for its consideration: of the Select Committee on Intelligence, ma "-- charges of domestic spying by the intei- ersede-d if an intelligence committee Foreign Relations could initiate legisla- foreign policy implications as long as such legislation is referred subsequently to the Proposed Intelligence Committee? . Mr. RIBICOFF. That is correct As I said in response to your second question , . feet the Hughes-Ryan amendment, but i such legislation would be sequentially re- do believe that it would be useful to f d to the Intelligence committee. clarify the matter in light of what has Mr. PELL. Finally, section 3, Para been said by the Rules Committee. Jgraphs (c) and (d), state that other Mr. RIBICOFF. May I ' respond this committees may "study and review any way to the Senator from Rhode Island, intelligence activity to the extent that who was deeply involved in the Commit- such activity directly affects a matter tee on Rules hearings on these proposals: otherwise within the jurisdiction of such Senate Resolution 400 does not repeal committee" and that such committees the Hughes-Ryan Act. As a resolution, would "obtain full and prompt access to it could not do so. Accordingly, crea- the product of the intelligence activities tion of a new committee will not repeal of any department or agency of the gov- the requirement of the CIA to brief the ernment relevant to a matter otherwise Committee on Foreign Relations. within the jurisdiction of such commit- Mr. PELL. I thank the Senator. tee." Do these provisions mean that the administration the granting of exclusive juris- vide all of lthe would information, which cohich the the diction to the proposed intelligence Committee on Foreign Relations re- committee over the CIA mean that quires, except of course raw data? I re- paragraph 1(i) (1) of Senate rule XXV, call in this regard that, when I was con- which states that the Committee on ducting hearings several years ago on Foreign Relations hasp jurisdiction over weather modification activities in South- "relations of the United States with for- east Asia, I was denied information on eign nations generally," should be taken the grounds that the "appropriate" com- to exclude jurisdiction over CIA activi- mittee-in this case, Armed Services- ties which have foreign relations impli- had been notified. cations? Mr. RIBICOFF. That is correct. Crea- Mr. RIBICOFF. The jurisdiction of tion of the new committee should not be the Committee on Foreign Relations used by the intelligence agencies to deny ift legislation affecting the CIA is not the standing committee any information ged b S t y ena e Resolution 400. Leg-1 on any matter with which the committee uommittee on Foreign Relations be- cause of its predominant foreign policy is concerned, such as an investigation described by section 3(c) of the proposed substitute to Senate Resolution 400. The investigations and exposures of the past year have revealed another type of intelligence failure-this time not a failure of military preparedness but of adherence to the Constitution and the law. The resolution before us today-a product of a bipartisan effort to achieve agreement on essentials-is a significant breakthrough in the effort to remedy the intelligence failure we have recently experienced. The resolution deserves our maximum support. Today we see presidential hopefuls re- ceiving standing ovations for telling audiences "I promise I will never lie to you." In a democratic society, when a line like that brings people to their feet applauding, you have really hit bottom. .Government rests on the confidence of the people. This resolution is designed to restore the confidence of the people in the intelligence agencies. The way to bring the intelligence community out of its present disarray and the drumfire of criticism is,-to assure the American people that Congress is meeting its con- stitutional responsibilities to oversee in- telligence operations. - Only then will the clamor of attack and attention re- cede. _ In this, our Bicentennial Year, the enate has a special opportunity to re- ew the values of those who founded this country. Seventeen months ago, on Jan- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 7098 - S7098- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 12, 1976 nary 21, 1975, the Senate established the select committee to examine the opera- tions of the Government's intelligence agencies. The results of that examina- tion are now before the Senate and the American people. They are profoundly disturbing to the cause of democratic government. For they detail in unmis- takable terms the consequences of de- parting from the constitutional plan drawn by the Founders. Those who won our independence 200 years ago recognized the necessity to place governmental power under the rule of law. They understood that power carried with it the seed of abuse, and that the exercise of unchecked power is the path to tyranny. That is why we have a government of checks and bal- ances and a written Bill of Rights. As set out in over 1,000 pages of the select committee's final report, the intelligence operations of the Govern- ment have been the exclusive prerogative of the executive branch. For nearly 40 years, Congress has abdicated its consti- tutional responsibilities to oversee and check the conduct of intelligence operations by the executive. In the re- sulting vacuum, great damage has been done to our system of government and to the rights of the American people. to a state of war, the Executive has used the intelligence agencies to launch major military actions, such as the abortive in- vasion of Cuba at the Bay of Pigs, with- out so much as informing Congress. In requiring that . the new committee must be informed about "any signifi- cant anticipated activities," the resolu- tion makes clear that the committee must be provided advance notice about significant intelligence activities. This will avoid such incidents as occurred in April 1961 when the Congress-possessed of the exclusive constitutional power to decide if the Nation shall go to war-had no advance knowledge that a military in- vasion of Cuba was to be carried out by the executive branch as an "intelligence covert action." These are merely the surface points of the intelligence iceberg that has been cutting under and around the Constitu- tion over the past generation. Today we begin the historic task of restoring the Framers' plan for a system of effective checks on governmental power. The American people expect the Congress-to discharge its constitutional responsibili- ties. The time is over when Congress can creak along, looking the other way while intelligence operations go unexamined and unchallenged. The Senate can truly celebrate the Bicentennial by renewing the values of our forebears. The creation of a ' new intelligence oversight structure will re- affirm the principles that are at the cen- ter of our democracy. ' The work of the select committee over the past year and a half has opened the way. We need only have the courage to keep to the course. By bringing the in- telligence arm of the Government within our constitutional system, we will enable the proper range of intelligence activity to go forward under law in the service of the country. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I wish to respond to the distinguished Senator from Maryland for his gracious com- ments about my colleague, Senator PERCY, and myself. It should be pointed out that through- out this matter, Senator MATIIIAS made At 1 o'clock p.m., the Senate will re- sume consideration of the unfinished business, Senate Resolution 400. The pending question at that time will be o the adoption of the Cannon substitute the committee substitute to Senate Re olution 400. Rollcall votes may occur to- morrow on amendments or motions in relation to any of the foregoing. Other matters may come before the Senate. Conference reports may be called up. Rollcall votes may occur thereon. ADJOURNMENT Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I move that the Senate stand in adjournment until 12 noon tomorrow. The motion was agreed to; and at 5:54 p.m. the Senate adjourned until Thurs- day, May 13, 1976, at 12 noon. NOMINATIONS Executive nominations received by the Senate May 12, 1976: DEPARTMENT OF STATE Philip C. Habib, of California, a Foreign Service officer of the class of career minister, to be Under Secretary of Slate for Political Affairs. William D. Rogers, of Virginia, to be Un- der Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. Arthur W. Hummel, Jr., of Maryland, a Foreign Service officer of the class of career minister, to be an Assistant Secretary of State. Harry W. Shlaudeman, of California, a For- eign Service officer of class 1, to be an As- sistant Secretary of State. Phillip V. Sanchez, of California, to be bassador Extraordinary and Plenipotenti of the United States of America to Colomb Virron P. Vaky, of Texas, a Foreign Service officer of the class of career minister, to be 'Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipoten- tiary of. the United States of America to Venezuela. Robert V. Keeley, of Florida, a - Foreign Service officer of class 1, to be Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America to Mauritius. IN THE NAVY Rear Adm. William 0. Miller, Judge Ad- vocate General's Corps, U.S. Navy, to be Judge Advocate General of the Navy with the rank of rear admiral, for a term of 4 years. The record before us is clear, and it. cannot now be ignored or covered up. If we are to profit from history and ex- perience, we must do more than avert our eyes and return to business as usual. In the face of the following facts, sure- ly it is time to reorder our procedures for meeting our constitutional responsi- bilities: First. Presidents and other high offi- cials in every administration from Franklin Roosevelt to Richard Nixon have used the intelligence agencies to serve their political and personal objec- tives. The Huston plan-a noxious laun- dry list of official criminality-was the ultimate fruit of unchecked bureaucratic and Presidential power. Second. In the pursuit of "domestic in- telligence," large numbers of law-abid- groups ranging across the political spec- great contributions, and all of us who trum from conservative to liberal . have worked on this legislation could not have been subjected to extensive investigation achieved the results without his magna- - and surveillance. Vicious tactics-violat- ficent contributions. tog due process of law and fundamental Mr. MATHIAS. I thank the Senator. human decency-have been used to de- grade and discredit those marked out as targets for domestic intelligence investi- gation. Third. The law has been systematically ignored in the conduct of intelligence op- erations. In but one example of many uncovered by the select committee, more than a quarter of a million first-class letters were opened and photographed in the United States by the CIA and FBI between 1940 and 1973-in direct viola- tion of the fourth amendment, Supreme Court decisions, and statutory law. Fourth. In foreign affairs, where the Constitution gives the Congress the ex- clusive power to determine whether the Nation shall move from a state of peace CONFIRMATIONS Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate May 12, 1976: . DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE Bruce R. Montgomery, of Tennessee, to be U.S. marshal for the eastern district of Ten- nessee for the term of 4 years. James R. Cooper, of Georgia, to be a mem- ber of the Board of Parole for the remainder of the term expiring September 30, 1978. PROGRAM Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate will convene at 12 noon to- morrow. After the two leaders or their designees have been recognized under the standing order, Mr. PROXMIRE will be recognized for not to exceed 15 min- utes, Mr. GOLDWATER will be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes, and Mr. MONDALE will be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes. There will then be a period for the transaction of routine morning business not to extend beyond the hour of 1 o'clock p.m., with Senators permitted to speak not in excess of 5 minutes each. Michael H. Moskow, of New Jersey, to be Under secretary of labor. John Conyers Read, of Virginia, to be an Assistant Secretary of Labor. The above nominations were approved subject to the nominees' commitment to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly- constituted committee of the Senate. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7254 Approved For se12004/05/13SC: P l35R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976 Congress to take its procurement decision before those tests are complete is to violate the separation between R & D and purchase on which recent Secretaries of Defense have rightly insisted. The central difficulty with the B-i is its traordinarily high cost. The performance andards originally set for it have proved unattainable, and its history, in conse- quence, has been a familiar one: con- sistently reduced performance specifications and constantly growing real cost. The 244 bombers the Air Force wants will now cost $20 to $25 billion, at best, and the pro- curement and operation of the full system will cost many tens of billions more. Yet it remains undemonstrated, after a decade of debate, that there is any long-term strategic value In what may be the most costly single element in the B-1 system-its supersonic capability. We sometimes hear that the B-i has been studied enough. A recent statement by an officer of Rockwell International refers In this vein to scrutiny by "seven Secretaries of Defense." But the truth is that the six Secretaries we have had in the last 15 years appear to be divided in their views of the B-i. Robert McNamara is necessarily silent on the matter, but there is little reason to suppose that his views of high-cost pene- tration bombers have changed in the 14 years since he successfully opposed the un- lamented B-70. Clark Clifford strongly op- poses the B-1. Melvin Laird and Elliot Rich- ardson favored development but faced no decision on procurement. James Schlesinger, while he believes in the long-run need for a new bomber of some sort, did not press for the B-1 while in office, placing his main budgetary emphasis on conventional needs. He has said that a final decision on this system should await the completion of its technical tests and a demonstration that its costs are under clear control; it seems rea- sonable that the Senate should adopt at least as strong a standard for Itself. It is true that Donald Rumsfeld appears to be n enthusiast, but his experience with pro- curement pressures Is not long. Far from proving that the matter has been settled by earlier studies, the varied judgments of the Secretaries of Defense of the last 15 years constitute a powerful argu- ment for the Senate to require a hard new look before it acts on procurement. My own strong impression is that among disinter- ested military and civilian experts no major new weapons system has ever had such feeble support. An additional and powerful argument for delay is the emergence of at least one inter- esting alternative to the B-1. The manned bomber, once the dominant element of our strategic deterrent, now necessarily has a very different role. Today it is a supplemen- tary guarantee against the madness of an attempted surprise attack, a diversifier that helps frustrate any Strangelove among Soviet planners. It is far from clear that the current design of the B-1, which would be the most expensive single weapons system ever deployed, properly reflects this more limited role. There is impressive testimony. that stand-off bombers with cruise missiles may be cheaper, more stabilizing and easier to protect. Without a fresh, thorough, and comparative review, in which Air Force and industrial pressures are firmly subordinated to the national interest, it will be impos- sible for the Congress and the public to have confidence that this high-cost trip Is necessary. It is natural, in a time when there is legi- timate concern about the military balance between ourselves and the Soviet Union, that a new and undeniably astonishing weapons system should seem attractive to many. But where is the evidence that throw- ing this enormous amount of money at this one relatively narrow problem will be good for our side of the balance? The likeliest danger of the next five years Is weakness in our conventional capabilities, especially in relation to Europe, the Middle East. and the oceans. The B-1 is not going to help us in these areas or in this time-span. The bil_ lions we might save by a less expensive choice could help us very much indeed. It seems especially unwise to make a pro- curement decision of this kind, with tests incomplete and costs not clear, in the heat of an election campaign. History suggests that our judgment on these complex choices has not been at its best in election years. There was no great hurry about H-bomb tests in 1952, and no )nissile gap in 1960. There is no bomber gap today. Obviously the administration is preoccu- pied with politics and worried about its right-wing critics. But is it not the consti- tutional role of the Senate, at such a mo- ment, to assert the claims of the long-run. national interest, and to insist on its right and duty to get all the evidence before it acts? CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. is there further morning business? If not, morning business is closed. ROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Under the previous order, the hour of 1 p.m. having arrived, the Senate will now resume consideration of the unfin- ished, business, Senate Resolution 400, The report of the Church committee has since documented abuses and viola- tions of law and the constitutional rights of.citizens committed by virtually every agency in our intelligence community. Together, the reports of these two select committees, and the report of the House Intelligence. Committee, contain a com- posite history of national shame. Over and over again, the record has established with facts governmental abuse of our laws, systems, and ideals. Three years of fact upon fact upon fact-the Watergate Committee, Church committee, House Judiciary Committee, Special Prosecutors, House Intelligence Committee, grand juries, trials, press in- vestigations, revelations, the Rockefeller Commission, Schlesinger report, and so on. What did we learn from all of this? How did it happen? cause among other things nobody was looking, When I'say nobody, I mean particu- larly those of us in this Chamber and our compatriots across the way. Nobody in the Congress was looking. Finger-pointing time is over insofar as it concerns people standing on this floor, looking down at Pennsylvania Avenue or at the agencies are concerned. The time has come to look at ourselves. There were plots to assassinate foreign leaders attempts to bu what , y were sup- which the clerk will report. posed to be democratic elections in Italy, The assistant legislative clerk read ass--weapons provided to 'aid the Kurdish follows:. ti..i.+ f,. Calendar No. 728, a resolution (S. .Res. 400) to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. 'President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem.- pore. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Barbara Clarke be granted privilege of the floor. The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tem- pore. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, as we proceed with consideration of Senate Resolution 400, let us not lose sight of why it is that we have again come so far, what it is we seek to accomplish by our actions; and what it is we will lose should we fail to act responsibly. Neither "Watergate" nor the subse- quent investigation of our intelligence community was an aberration. In my .own individual views in the Senate Wa- tergate report. I explained that Water- gate was a "documented, proven attack on laws, institutions, and principles." The report enumerated 189 separate viola- tions of the Constitution. Every major substantive part of the Constitution was violated, abused, and undermined dur- ing the Watergate period, and, indeed, subsequent to it. paigns launched to threaten, discredit, and harass Dr. Martin Luther King and other American citizens, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. The CIA alone was not at fault. The FBI and IRS, a tax collection agency, joined in the act. One fact emerges clearly from this record. Call it'what you will, we do not have oversight. We have had weak sight, we have had blind sight, we have had hindsight, we have had shortsight, but we have not had oversight. I think it is time to draw the line. Three years of factflnding have given us all the investigations, revelations, and studies necessary to act on the creation of real oversight in the Senate and move on to legislative reform. Meaningful oversight has constancy, power, and legislative purpose. Intelli- gence is too important to our national interests and has been proven too dan- gerous to our individual freedoms to be relegated to an impotent, investigatory committee. Even greater is the potential for abuse when a committee investigates without legislative purpose. Currently, oversight over the intelli- gence community is concentrated in no less than four standing committees. At 'best intelligence oversight is a collateral function, a secondary function, of these committees. At worst, it is an ignored responsibility. None is authorized to legislate for the intelligence community as the consolidated package we know it has become. Yet, if we leave their jurisdictions in- tact, we would continue to receive a frag- mented picture of intelligence opera- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 18, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE organized and get down to Washington to present Us special problems to the Congress. What are lems? sae of, these special prob- A forms which out these days tainly highest for small busi often these forms, and the right out of business. If the Selec mittee on Small Business, the Business Administration, and the gional small business organizations band together to accomplish just o thing-the education of the Congress to the differences between small business and big business-they will surely have justified the time and effort that has gone into their creation. Another problem facing small business is access to credit. By publicizing the horrible. impact on small business. of the effects of a credit crunch, brought on by either excessive inflation or Govern- ment attempts to borrow far more than it. should ever reasonably have to do, these organizations can perform a great service by helping to .persuade the Gov- ernment to conduct its fiscal and mone- tary affairs in a responsible fashion. I should like again to congratulate Mr. Alexander and to express my hope that this awards program, and the activities of State and regional small business or- ganizations throughout the country, will encourage widespread interest in the success and encouragement of small busi- As part of its observance of Small Busi- ness Week, the Small Business Adminis- tration has selected a small business person of the year from each of the 50 States. In Rhode Island, the person selected for this honor is Mr. Dwight W. Harry, president of the Life Cap Tire Service, Inc., of, Providence. Mr. Harry, after 20 years as an employee and man- ager of Life Cap Tire Service, 6 years ago became the owner and president. In his initiative, self-reliance and spirit of independence, Mr. Harry is rep- resentative of thousands of other small business proprietors in Rhode Island who are the very foundation of the economy of our State. I congratulate Mr. Harry on his well-deserved honor and extend to him my best wishes for continued success in the future. Small Business Week is a time not only to recognize the achievements and con- le that confront the small business co unity. I s pleased this week to attend a prese tion by the Small Business As- sociati of New England and three other r 'onal small business associa- tions of eir legislative proposals de- S 7253 per year to its current level-of more than $2 million annually. Wulfsberg maxkets . their products worldwide through more than 150 distributors and was recently selected as the Aircraft Electronics Assoc ciation manufacturer of the Year. At the ninth annual Small Busine. Subcontractor Conference and awards banquet held yesterday, Blanchat Ma- chine Co., of Wichita, Kans., was selected as the SBA region VII winner. Blanchat Machine Co. was nominated by the' Wichita division of the Boeing Co. for its outstanding subcontract work. Mr. and Mrs. Calvin Ross and Mr. and Mrs. Wayne, both of Wichita, accepted the award for the Blanchat Machine Co. and its president, Dudley Bramblett. It is an honor for these businesses to have been selected from the more than 133,000 smal: businesses in Kansas. My congratulations go out to them and to the award winners from the other 49 States, and I join with my colleagues in recognizing their accomplishments and outstanding contributions of small busi- nesses nationwide. THE B-1: A LONG LOOK BEFORE Mr. CULVER. Mr. President, Mc- George Bundy, whose service as Special Assistant for National Security Affairs under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson has made him intimately familiar with defense issues, has urged deferral of the decision to procure the B-1 bomber. Writ- ing in today's Washington Post, Mr. Bundy calls the billion-dollar request for procurement authorization "prematur and unnecessary," and one which eou>~ be delayed with "no danger." Rather than acting in the heat of an election campaign, Mr. Bundy urges the Senate to assert the claims of the long- run national interest, and to insist on its right and duty to get all the evidence before it acts. signed to small businesses a fair and equitable c ce to grow and to prosper. I believe of the proposals offered by the small ess associations to re- lieve small b esses of unnecessary federal governni paperwork,. to pro- vide more equita tax treatment, and eliminate unfair petitive practices, are sound and wel ' nceived. I hope very much that pro confronting small businesses will given the at- tention they deserve d the coming - The small businesses of .erica are far too important to the Homy of nesses everywhere. This is the sector of our economy which is the key to upward mobility for our population, and to the competition which is so badly needed to keep our economy running efficiently and In the best Interests of the American consumer. It deserves all of the support and attention that we can muster. our Nation to be neglected. CELEBRATING SMALL BUS Mr. President, I consider Mr. Bundy's WEEK article a most valuable contribution to our consideration of the B-i program, Mr. DOLE. Mr. President, In hon f and I ask unanimous consent that it be National Small Business Week, the S printed in the RECORD. Business Administration hosted a serf There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, SMALL BUSINESS WEEK of events in Washington to honor out Mr. PELL. Mr. President, by Procla-, standing members of the small business follows: mation of the President of the United community from across the country. THE B-1: A LONG Loom BEFORE BIIYiNG States, this week is Small Business Week. From the more than 13 million small (By McGeorge Bundy) It is a time when we give recognition to business operations across the country. etime this month the senate will de- the immense contributions made to the State, and Nation, small business award ba defense bill that contains a billion- doll life of our Nation by millions winners were selected and invited to dolls uthorization for the actual procure- of small businesses and businessmen. Washington to events which focus atten- _ ment the B-1 bomber. This premature and I am delighted to join this tribute. All tion on the importance of small business unnec ry propcsal, heavily pressed by the too often tend to view ourselves as ecthe my. Small business award winners should deferred Runt We ~therecant be as a nation of f giant corporations and big outs cre- business, perhaps because e it is the names were nominated by SBA district offices athorou ted by an , i cti n year. There issno danger of those giant corporations that become across the country on the nbrnd of time. in such a y, and there could be great familiar to us tnrougu uuaomv ?~=~~,a-~?' its impact on the job market, continued advertising. There is no ger in delay because there But the average American's daily con- growth, and improved financial position, is clear agreem that the B-&2 strategic tacts with business.are not with giant its response to adverse conditions, and system can be re on.with confidence for corporations, but with the small busi- personal characteristics of the nominees at least a decade, come.. The B-52 has nesses that provide jobs, manufacture such as entrepreneurial ability and com- proved to be one ur most durable and goods and provide services in his neigh- munity service efforts. improvable- aircraft. Ls not any present need but an intense d' e to get the matter boyhood and community. The Kansas small business award settled their way that oving the military Indeed, small business establishments winner is Mr. Paul G. Wulfsberg, presi and industrial advocates.4X the. B1. provide 58 percent of business employ- dent of Wulfsberg Electronics, Inc., in But precisely when .theta- is that sort o ment in the United States. We are in- Overland Park, Kans. Wulfsberg Elec- pressure for a decision not yet needed, th deed a nation of small independent busi- tronics was formed in 1970 and increased senate should be wary. The B-1 bas not messes. its business by an unbelievable 40 percent completed its technical tests, and to ask Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 lem of the affect of Approved For.Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE tions and would be handicapped in de- veloping legitimate legislative remedies. For all too long this vital sector of our Government has gone unchecked and un- one congressional committee had ex- amined either the propriety or effects of this departure from the norm. I think the time has come to, say it again and again, Mr. President: We are a Government of laws. It is not enough to say we remember these things and so they will not happen again. We are not a Government of memories, we are a Gov- ernment of laws. It is not enough to get up after the abuses have taken place and say, "I apologize". We are a Government of laws, not a Government of apologies.. It is not enough to go a-head and issue an executive order. Here today, gone to- morrow. We are a Government of laws, not a Government of executive orders. The examination of agency charters, the establishment of a statutory founda- tion for agencies like the National Se- curity Agency, the efficiency and effec- tiveness of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the legislative recommenda- tions of the Church committee- are func- tions which must be assumed by a new, permanent intelligence committee. The proposal for strengthened intelli- gence oversight Is neither new nor unique. More than 20 years ago the dis- tinguished majority leader introduced similar legislation. Since 1948 nearly 200 bills have been introduced in both houses. Three commissions-beginning with the er Commission in 1955-endorsed sals calling for more effective oversight. I would like to use this particular mo- ment in my speech, Mr. President, to pay particular compliments to the ma- jority leader (Mr. MANSFIELD) and to the chairman of the Senate Committee on Government Operations (Mr. RrBicoFF). Were it not for these two men, I have no doubt that Senate Resolution 400 would, not be on the floor today. The Senate majority leader, who is not a Johnny-come-lately, is not riding a bandwagon, but, rather, foresaw the dan- followed, there would have been no ne- cessity for the rather sensationalavela- tions of the past few years. As he retires from a fruitful and a very positive career in public service, I want to pay the credit that is due. Should this pass and this idea become law, then, in- deed, it should be dedicated to this- man, because nobody has been further out front on the issue than. MixE 'MANSFIELD and my colleague from the State of Connecticut. This particular idea was one of several right after the Watergate. Over the course of 3 years I have seen those ideas of Watergate reform, tax privacy, intel- ligence oversight, nibbled to death by the power structure, either in the Congress or the executive or the bureaucracy. The nibbling finally came to an end two of these important measures. e Into the hands of the senior Sena- to . from Connecticut (Mr. RrsicoFF). S 7255 He used that knowledge gained over. people, if the President has a job to con- many years of public service, and that form the agencies to the Constitution, ability which he has demonstrated over then the people of this country have a the years, to insist that these measures job, and it is specifically to get,the best no longer be nibbled to death or fade men and women to serve. away into the mist, but, rather, become There will be no greater ethics or ex- the law of the land. Were it not for the cellence on the floor of the Senate or in hard-nosed position which he has taken the White House, or anywhere in our over the past several months, I know Government, than in the voting booths of that these measures would not be before this country. So the finger-pointing us for consideration by the Senate. cannot only stop from us on the Hill, but Mr. RIBICOFF. Will my distinguished - it can. also stop from the American peo- colleague yield? pie until they themselves become active Mr. WEICKER. I yield. participants in this constitutional Mr. RIBICOFF. I appreciate the democracy. gracious comments of my colleague from Today we are here to regain that au- Connecticut, but I believe the record thority and start exercising it. When we should be clear that no other Member vote in a few days, we will see whether a of this body in many, many years has majority of Members of this body are shown such a continued dedication to the willing to assume the responsibilities be- preservation of. individual rights and stowed upon them by their constituents. liberties. It has been the consistent policy The Senate must decide if the preserva- and philosophy of my junior colleague tion of the status quo is more important from the State of Connecticut. When the than the resurrection of constitutional history of this era is written, there will accountability. be a special place accorded to the junior Let me state clearly, there is no reason Senator from Connecticut for his con- for anybody in. this country to have to tinued advocacy and fight in this cause. choose between effective law enforce- Mr. WEICKER. I thank my friend and ment and effective intelligence and con- colleague from the bottom of my heart. stitutionality. One can go along with the The crux of this issue is accountability other. I am particularly appalled by of Government to the people-constitu- those who would make the American tional accountability. In the past, Mem- people choose, and say, "You have to bers of this body have chosen not to choose one or the other." No, you can know because -there were things which have both. gentlemen ought not to know. Well, it is There is not one man on the Govern- our responsibility to assure that those ment Operations Committee or in any things which gentlemen ought not to other committee 'which discussed this know, never reoccur. matter on which I have been privileged to We can no longer pass off illegal activi- sit who does not believe in having an ef- ties as the work of the White House, fective CIA and an effective FBI. They because we have learned the hard way are clearly necessary to the security of that even the White House must be con- the Nation. But there is no reason why, trolled. That was precisely what was in the achieving of that effectiveness, the intended by our forefathers when 200 Constitution has to be left in'the dust. years ago when they established a sys- No way. I tem of checks and balances to govern Sure, it is going to have to change this Nation. . from the old system, from the old prac- It is not a system of checks and bal- tices. Democracy, which we say is exer- ances which excluded the CIA, the FBI, .cased by 100 Senators, is going to have to the IRS, and the various intelligence- be exercised by 10 Senators, not 2, 3, law enforcement agencies, but a system or 4. of accountability for-all the Government, Democracy and the Constitution. for all the people. It Is not a system which which we talk about as belonging to all was intended to have Senators, Presi- Americans, are going to have to belong dents, or corporate executives at one to all Americans, not just a.few. Con- for all the people. Through the past failure of Congress to demand to know about the activities of intelligence agencies-the people, through the fault of their elected repre- sentatives lost a constitutional power- to control the excesses of the executive. Plainly and simply, the elected repre- sentatives abbrogated their constitu- tional responsibility. And, Mr. President, if I have been hardnosed insofar as our colleagues in the executive are concerned, I think the record should also show something else. At a time when we celebrate a Bicenten- nial In the middle of an election year, I see from the statistics fewer and fewer Americans participating In their demo- cratic processes. I hear the comment from too many, "I am turned off by those politics." Let us make it clear. If we have a job of oversight as representatives of the cerning the scare tactic and the scare talk that if we have accountability, if we have oversight, we will lose our Intel- ligence or law enforcement effectiveness,, how effective is it to be investigating Americans rather than conveying intel- ligence about our enemies abroad? How effective is it to have these agen- cies involved in politics, on the domestic side, rather than intelligence gathering? I remember that one very small in- stance of military intelligence in West Berlin which arose during the Watergate hearings where military intelligence was .breaking into the rooms of American citizens in West Berlin and coming out with autographed pictures of GEORGE McGOVERN-that was what we were pay- ing for as taxpayers-rather than giv- ing us the intelligence which obviously we needed to know: what the Russians were doing on the other side of the wall. That Is what I want to know. I do not want to know what somebody else's po-' Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 8 7256 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 13, 1976 litical beliefs are or for whom they are going to vote. Have no fear as far as this country is concerned should this oversight and ac-, countability come into being. Then we are going to have them do the job which is intended, which is intelligence gather- ing, which is law enforcement, rather than a political hatchet job willy-nilly across the world and in this country. We have before us a compromise which the members of the Rules Committee, the Government Operations Committee, and the Church committee labored dili- gently to provide this body. This com- promise sets up the framework for effec- tive oversight by giving a new commit- tee strong authority and the muscle to back up its actions. By requiring rotat- ing membership, we will avoid making the new committee a handmaiden of the agencies it is supposed to oversee. In essence the compromise substitute offers the Senate an opportunity for meaningful oversight-oversight with authority and constancy. And most importantly, it offers to the United States of America a return to its Constitution. I received a notification the other day from some organization that felt that patriotism could best be served by hav- ing Senators re-sign the Declaration of Independence. How Insulting. I think the time has come ,for every Senator tore- live the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, and the Constitution. Never mind the business of signing, never mind the business of buying, but to live it, to live it legislatively here; for all Americans to live it in their lives out there on the streets, when it comes to these great concepts of equality for all Americans, due process for all Ameri- cans, privacy for all Americans, freedom of speech and assembly and dissent for all Americans. What we do on this Senate floor here in the next several days will not cost the taxpayers a nickel and it will give the greatest possible value to the celebra- tion of our Bicentennial. I yield the figor. Mr. GOLDWATER. Mr. President, the conduct of America's foreign policy relies heavily upon accurate and timely intelli- gence. Since the enactment of the Na- tional Security Acts of 1947 and 1949, an intelligence community has been created which is second to none. While there have been errors over the years, in my opinion, the overall per- formance of the intelligence services has been outstanding. There is an old saying among Intelli- gence officers: The safest operation is where nothing happens. Once you go from doing nothing to doing something, the risk of failure or disclosure must be accepted. Vital to the performance of our in- telligence services is a cloak of secrecy. Without that cloak of secrecy, sources of information disappear and those persons and organizations who would cooperate with us fall away under the glare of publicity. One of the most controversial items that the Select Committee on Intelligence had to deal with is the subject of covert action. I believe the President must have the ability to carry out covert actions, because they provide methods short of war to defend America's interests. In other words, the President should not be limited to diplomatic representa- tion or economic sanctions on the one hand and the choice of outright war on the other hand. Covert action offers a range of options between these two choices. The Hughes-Ryan amendment which requires six committees of the Congress to receive notification of covert action has all but destroyed this capability. Under its provisions nearly 50 Senators, over 120 Congressmen, and numerous staff receive this highly sensitive infor- mation. Disclosure to the press is the inevitable result. If the Congress wants to create a new committee to,have legislative and budg- etary authority over the intelligence community, I submit that should be a joint committee of the Congress pat- terned along the lines of the Joint Com- mittee on Atomic Energy. A joint committee combined with a re- peal of the Hughes-Ryan amendment could be an attractive proposition. Al- though the House of Representatives has taken a dim view of the-creation of joint committees over the past 15 years or so, there is reason to believe that the House may be willing to make an exception where intelligence jurisdiction is con- cerned. Last Friday, one of our most distin- guished colleagues in the House, Repre- sentative ELFRED A. CEDERBERG of Michi- gan, introduced a joint resolution to pro- vide for the establishment of a joint committee on Intelligence. Joining him were the distinguished Minority Leader of the House, Representative JOHN R. RHODES and Representative DELBERT L. LATTA of the House Rules Committee. It is my understanding that Representative -CEDERBERG is seeking bipartisan support for his joint resolution. I ask unanimous consent that Mr. CEDERBERG'S resolution be printed at this point in the RECORD. There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: JOINT RESOLUTION Joint resolution to provide for the establish- ment of a Joint Committee on Intelligence Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep- resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, ESTABLISHMENT SECTION 1. There is hereby established a Joint Committee on Intelligence (herein- after in this joint resolution referred to as the "joint committee"). MEMBERSHIP SEC. 2. (a) The joint committee shall be composed of nine Members of the Senate and nine Members of the House of Representa- tives to be appointed as follows: (1) five Members of the Senate from the majority party and four Members of the Sen- ate from the minority party, appointed by the President of the Senate, including at lease one but not more than two members from each of the following committees: the Committee on Appropriations; the Commit- tee on Armed Services; and the Committee on Foreign Relations; and (2) five Members of the House of Repre- sentatives from the majority party and four Members 'of the House from the minority party, appointed by the Speaker of the House, including at least one but not more than two Members from each of the following (b) Vacancies in the-membership of the joint committee shall not affect the power of the remaining members to execute the functions of the joint committee and shall be filled in the same manner as in the case of the original appointment. . (c) (1) The joint committee shall select a chairman and a vice chairman from among its members at the beginning of each session of a Congress. The vice chairman shall act in the place and stead of the chairman in the absence of the chairman. (2) The chairmanship and the vice chair- manship of the joint committee shall alter- nate between the Senate and the House of Representatives with each session of a con- gress. The chairman during each even-num- bered year shall be selected by the Mem- bers of the House of Representatives on the joint committee from among their num- ber and the chairman during each odd- numbered year shall be selected by the Members of the Senate on the joint com- mittee from among their number. The vice chairman during each session of a Congress shall be chosen in the same manner frolq that House of Congress other than the House of Congress of which the chairman is a Member. DUTIES SEC. 3. (a) The joint committee shall exer- cise exclusive legislative jurisdiction with respect to any intelligence activity conducted by any agency or department of the Federal Government and the authorization of funds in 'connection with any such activity con- ducted by- (1) the Central Intelligence Agency; (2) the National Security Agency; (4) special offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance pro- grams; (5) intelligence elements of the military services, not including tactical intelligence; and (b) The Joint Committee shall review and study on a continuing basis any intelligence activity conducted by any agency or depart- ment of the Federal Government, including any agency or department described in para- graph (1) through paragraph (6) of sub- section (a). (c) The provisions of clause 2 of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives shall apply to the joint committee. POWERS SEC. 4. (a) The joint committee, or any duly authorized subcommittee thereof, is authorized to sit and act at such places and times during the sessions, recesses, and ad- journed periods of the Congress, to require by subpena or otherwise the attendance of such witinesses and the production of such books, papers, and documents, to administer such oaths and affirmations, to take such testimony, to procure such printing and bind- ing, and to make such expenditures, as it considers advisable. (b) The joint committee may make such rules respecting its organization and pro- cedures as it considers necessary, except that no recommendation shall be reported from the joint committee unless a majority of the joint committee assent. (c) Subpenas may be issued over the signa- ture of the chairman of the joint -ItAdim, or of any member designated by him o the joint committee, and may be served Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE any person designated by such chairman or member. (:d) The chairman of the joint committee or any member thereof may administer oaths or a'mations to witnesses. Ir ual designated by the President as a li to the joint committee to attend any meeting of the joint committee which is closed to the public. INFORMATION FROM FEDERAL AGENCIES AND DEPARTMENTS SEC. 5. Any agency' or department of the Federal Government described in section 3(a)(1) through section 3(a) (6) and any other agency or department of the Federal Government conducting any intelligence ac- tivity, shall keep the joint committee fully and currently informed with respect to any such activity. Any such agency or depart- ment shall furnish any periodic reports re- quested by the joint committee with respect to any such activity. REPORTS SEC. 6. The members of the joint committee who are Members of the Senate shall from time to time (but at least annually) report to the Senate, and the members of the joint committee who are Members of the House of Representatives shall from time to time (but at least annually) report to the House of Representatives, by bill or otherwise, their recommendations with respect to matters withim the jurisdiction of their respective Houses which are referred to the joint- com- mittee or otherwise within the jurisdiction of the joint committee. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION SEC. 7. The joint committee shall classify information originating within the joint committee, and the records of the joint com- mittee, in accordance with standards used generally by the executive branch of the Federal Government for the classification of information. The joint committee shall es- and (3) made available to any Member of the Congress who requests such information or records and has an appropriate security clearance, as determined by the joint com- mittee. RECORDS SEC. 8. The joint committee shall keep a complete record of an joint committee ac- tions, including a record of the votes on any question on which a record vote is demanded. All records, data, charts, and files of the joint committee shall be the property of the joint committee and shall be kept in the office of the joint committee or such other places as the joint committee may direct. UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION SEC. 9. (a) The joint committee shall establish and carry out such rules and pro- cedures as it considers necessary to prevent- (1) the disclosure, outside the joint com- mittee, of any information which (A) relates to any intelligence activity which is con- ducted by any agency or department of the Federal Government; (B) is obtained by the joint committee; and (C) is not authorized by the joint committee to be disclosed; and (2) the disclosure, outside the joint com- mittee, of any information which would ad- versely affect the carrying out of any intelligence activity by any agency or depart- ment of the Federal Government. (b) No employee of the joint committee or any person engaged by contract or other- wise to perform services for the joint com- mittee shall be given access to any classified information by the joint committee unless such employee or person has received an ap- riate security clearance as determined by joint committee. The type of security ante to be required in the case of any such employee or person shall, within the determination of the joint committee, be commensurate with the sensitivity of the classified information to which such em- ployee or person will be given access by the joint committee. (c) (1) The joint committee may take ap- propriate action against any member of the joint committee, or any person serving on the staff of the joint committee, who violates any provision of this section or any provision of section 7. (2) In the case of a member of the joint committee, such action may include (A) the censure of such member by the joint com- mittee; (B) the expulsion of such member from the joint committee, unless such ex- pulsion is objected to by a majority vote in the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be; and (C) recommendation to the Senate or the House of Representa- tives, as the case may be, by the Senate or the House of Representatives. (3) In the case of a person serving on the staff of the joint committee, such action may include the immediate dismissal of such per- son. The joint committee shall report to the Attorney General of the United States any apparent violation of any Federal criminal law committed by any such person in con- nection with a violation of any provision of this section or any provision of section 7. The Attorney General; upon receiving any such report, shall take such action as he consid- ers necessary or appropriate. STAFF SEC. 10. (a) In carrying out its functions under this joint resolution, the joint com- mittee may, by record vote of a majority of the members of the joint committee- (1) appoint, on a permanent basis, with- out regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of fitness to perform their duties, not more than twenty-four professional staff members and not more than sixteen clerical staff members; (2) prescribe their duties and responsi- bilities; (3) fix their pay at respective per annum gross rates not In excess of the rate of basic pay, as in effect from time to time, for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule of section 5332(a) of title 5, United States Code; (4) terminate their employment as the joint committee may consider appropriate; and (5) require, at the time of appointment, all staff persons to acknowledge their uncon- ditional adherance to the policy of the joint committee governing the disclosure of classi- fied Information. (b) In carrying out any of its functions under this joint resolution, the joint com- mittee may utilize the services, information, facilities, and personnel of any agency or de-' partment of the Federal Government, and may procure the temporary (not to exceed one year) or intermittent services of experts or consultants or organizations thereof by contract at-rates of pay not in excess of the per diem equivalent of the rate of basic pay, as in effect from time to time, for grade GS-18 of the General Schedule of section 5332(a) of title 5, United States Code, includ- ing payment of such rates for necessary traveltime. EXPENSES SEC. 11. The expenses of the joint commit- tee shall be paid from the contingent fund of the House of Representatives, from funds appropriated for the joint committee, upon vouchers approved by the chairman of the joint committee. DEFINITION SEC. 12, For purposes of this joint resolu- tion, the term "intelligence activities" means- (1) the collection, analysis, production, dis- semination, or use of foreign intelligence, which means information, other than foreign _ S 7257 counterintelligence, on the capabilities, in- tentions and activities of foreign powers, or- ganizations, or their agents; or foreign coun- terintelligence, which means activities con- ducted to protect A he United States and United States citizens from foreign espio- nage, sabotage, subversion, assassination, or terrorism; (2) any action or activity which is under- taken in support of any activity described in paragraph (1); (3) any covert or clandestine activity af- fecting the relations of the United States with the government of any foreign country er with any political group, party, military force, or other association in a foreign coun- try; (4) any covert or clandestine activity un- dertaken against any person described in paragraph (4); but such term does not include any tactical military intelligence activity which is un- dertaken in a foreign country and which Is not related to any policymaking function of the United States.- AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES SEC. 13. (a) Clause l(c)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by inserting immediately before the period at the end thereof the following: " except for matters exclusively within the leg- islative jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on Intelligence". - (b) Clause 1(C)(2) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by inserting immediately before the period at the end thereof the following: ", except for matters exclusively within the legislative jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on In- telligence". (c) Clause 1(c)(10) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives is amended by inserting immediately before the period at the end thereof the following: ", except for matters exclusively within the legislative jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on In- telligence". (d) Clause 1(k)(1) of rule X of the Rules of the House of Representatives Is amended by inserting immediately before the period at the end thereof the following: ", except for matters exclusively within the legislative jurisdiction of the Joint Committee on Intel- ligence". CONFORMING AMENDMENT Sac. 14. Section 662(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2420(a)) is amended by striking out "the 'appropriate committees of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United States House ,of Representatives" and inserting in lieu thereof "the Joint Committee on Intelligence and the Committees on Appropriations." Mr. GOLDWATER. If the Senate adopts S. Res. 400 as reported by the Rules Committee, it will enable us to have immediate oversight of the intelligence community. More importantly, it will give the House and the Senate time to work out mutually acceptable ways of handling intelligence jurisdiction. I oppose S. Res. 400 as reported by the Government Operations Committee for two main reasons: 1. The Senate has created, under S. Res. 109, a committee on committees to go into the whole question of Senate ju- risdiction. 2. There is no provision for a parallel organization in the House of Representa- tives. . Above all, the disclosure provisions of S. Res. 400 as reported by the Govern- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 8 7258 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976- ment Operations Committee are so loose on Government Operations under the were only a part of a wider program of that they would make the functioning of chairmanship of the distinguished floor covert operations abroad. The select com- the intelligence community almost im- manager (Mr. RIBICOFF) and that of the mittee found that these operations, in the possible. Committee on Rules and Administration long run, often proved marginal or self- I would like to draw my colleagues' at- under the chairmanship of the Senator defeating, and when exposed, extrenaly tention to Sec. 7(c) (2) which states: from Nevada (Mr. CANNON). damaging to our Nation's interna 1 The Committee on Intelligence Activities, I believe the present resolution is a reputation. or any member of such committee, may, un- well-drafted, carefully prepared, and Covert action was once an extraor- der such regulations as the committee shall practical document, which gives this dinary measure resorted to by our coun- prescribe to protect the confidentiality of committee the authority it must have. It try in order to combat the covert opera- such information, make any information de- scribed provides a membership that is represent- tions of international communism. But it other com in mittee ttee r ( available to any ative of the Senate. It provides guaran- went beyond that and took on bureau- e on on of the Intel- tees that secrets will be kept and, in ef- cratic momentum, and ultimately became theny other Committee mit Member Senate. Whenever any ligence Activities, or any member of such feet, meets the problem that has been a routine part of how our Government committee, makes such information avail- -unmet, although discussed for years, does business. able, the committee shall keep a written rec- namely, of creating a requirement of ac- We have paid an enormous price for ord showing, in the case of any particular countability to Congress over the Intel- excessive use of covert action. America is information, which committee or which ligence activities of the whole range of now blamed, often falsely, for every ad- mbers infor- Mat on. of the ber of the Senate received such who, and who, and intelligence agencies. verse development in the world-from no committee, Member which, , receives any y informa- I think the bottom line of this issue is the war in Lebanon to the assassination no c tion under this subsection, shall make the very simple and yet very profound. If of King Faisal. information available to any other person, ex- there is one lesson that our committee At home, our committee found that we cept that a Senator may make such informa- felt above all must be learned from- our came perilously close to a police state: tion available either in a closed session of the study of the abuses which have been Telephones were tapped at will, with- Senate, or to another Member of the Senate; reported, it has been the crucial necessity out a warrant, and with little or no au- inform r, a Senator who communicates such of establishing a system of congressional - thority. information to another Senator not a mem- oversight. Mail was opened in knowing violation ber of the committee shall promptly inform the Committee on Intelligence Activities. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY OVERSIGHT of law: no one was safe from having The Senate confronts today what can their mail opened, not even Richard I cannot imagine any If this la agree- only be called a historic challenge: Nixon, not Frank Church, not Leonard ing we to adopted, language. If this Lang ewhether our unique system of constitu- Bernstein, not Arthur Burns. Every one to we a were adopted, I Constitutional believe confrontation would which -lead tional checks and balances, the hallmark of them had their mail opened by agen- law, Govoveernrnmenant they in knew a viola- would be contrary to the interests of both of American Government, will be applied ticies es of of a the clear Federal the President and the Congress. to a crucial area of Government activ- In fact this language reminds me of ity-the conduct of intelligence opera- be in place. People whom the FBI or the White Pogo's tions at home and abroad. This is a vital one of famous quotes: House did not like could be put under the i mppororttanntt, uas as surveillance, their friends turned into We have ve met the enemy; and they is us.ityarea: of the Nation intelligence .affects y informers. They could find themselves While I believe the Senate should defer we found, it can affect our fundamental bugged and tapped, and indn he subject es action concerning intelligence jurisdic- constitutional rights-the rights that covert action. tion until the Committee on Committees make Americans unique among the peo- Their families were disrupted, has had a chance to act, I am fully aware ples of the world. The question is Their repuiaion were ruined, , that there are members of this body who whether the Senate will at last establish their jobs were taken away #rtsm disagree. I am willing to accept as a com- effective legislative oversight over the them, and all beyond the d process promise S. Res. 400 as reported by the multibillion-dollar U.S. intelligence them, and l the law. And a proses inevitably, Committee on Rules and Administration. community. these programs were not enough, This would be a logical step pending some Some have predicted that the Senate when these pr to incite violence between form of agreement between the -House will fail to do so. I cannot agree. I be- e rival groups. And if that led c killings, and the Senate as to how intelligence lieve there is strong support for a new triva pss. A was that led to those matters are to be handled in the future. and effective intelligence legislative that apparently was a ceptable to t the Mr. President, I intend to oppose any oversight committee. There is no better public m we entrus order. amendments or substitutes that would gift- we could give this country on its these were not confer legislative or budgetary jurisdic- 200th anniversary than to insure that I isolated emphasize instances thhaat t were major pro- tion over the intelligence community to the basic principles of American con- ms; they were systematic; they lasted a new committee of the Senate at the stitutional Government apply to the grams; s; and even decades. They ted e t, of thousand, decades. They - present time. powerful secret intelligence activities of for years,' Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, a par- our Nation. volved tens of tho hudrea I liamentary inquiry. Why do we need a committee in the thousands thm usas s, that, icans intocenof any -as The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Senate that centralizes' legislative au- unmr. No one was safe. GLENN). The Senator will state it. thority and oversight of the intelligence Let cite a classic example to convey Mr. MONDALE. Are we on controlled community? I believe the reasons are how far some in the FBI, in example instance, time? several, and they are very clear. were prepared s mthe B in one out secret The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is First, such a committee is necessary e activities to to carry our demo- Mr. controlled time. in order to help safeguard against the political cratic system of government. I o- Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I would kind of abuses and excesses uncovered is the case of government. Martin Luther like to speak briefly on behalf of the by the select committee. The intelligence course, atic s King. We are all of Dr. familiar with pending resolution to create a perms- community has been extremely impor- the outlines of what htpenedi But I with Went committee on oversight with the tant- to American security. But ,on oc- not tutnk anyone what app bed. But fully authority necessary to assure that that casion it also has operated beyond the familiar wit how fns the FBI was pre- formation would be privy to crucial in- law and outside the constitutional sys- pared to it to gain control over re- formation it must have, and so it would tern of public accountability. We are all ivil rights movement. have the authority to influence policy in familiar with the results. secret where, as is often the case, it can Under several administrations, Dem- They They bugged d and ndtroy his tapped D Dr. King. gonly be handled responsibly in that ocratic and Republican alike, the CIA after his death. environment. was a party to assassination plots. There even This resolution is the result of 15 are disturbing questions as to whether They sent a letter which some inter- months' work of the Select Committee there may be some connection. between preted as a suggestion that he commit on intelligence, and it is the result of our own Government sponsoring assas- suicide. several weeks of negotiations and serious sination and our Nation having become a But that was not the end of it. Some discussion on the part of the Committee victim of it. These assassination efforts the bureau not only wanted to dest Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE S 7259 Martin Luther King as a leader, but the Congress, serious, risks have been run Left to themselves, the intelligence committee found clear evidence that because of practices and policies in those agencies could not make the changes some even wanted to create a new Black agencies that left us defenseless when necessary to overcome these breakdowns. leader in his place-a Black leader they we needed a defense. I believe in a strong Counterespionage was isolated, compart- co consider safe and reliable to head intelligence community. I believe in a mented, and the effectiveness of our ef- a or social and political movement strong FBI, and I believe in a strong forts declined to the point where Amer- in s country. CIA. We must have them. I believe, also, ica was, for too long a time, dangerously How far we have come from the prin- that it is necessary to conduct clandes- exposed to the enemy. Indeed, we may ciples of American Government estab- tine intelligence activities in order to not know for many years in the future lished 200 years ago. But how wise the protect this Nation from external ene- just how exposed we were. founding fathers were to know that this mies. Unfortunately, we do not live in The field of foreign intelligence collec- could happen without a system of checks the most perfect of all worlds, and it is tion provides another example. For more and balances. The one thing above all necessary from time to time, I deeply than a decade we concentrated top intel- that the constitutional framers feared regret to say, to resort to covert activi- ligence priority on the backwaters of the was abuse of governmental power and ties. world while giving lesser priority to our secret police. They did not anticipate I believe it is necessary to carry out major adversaries. This misallocation of that risks to freedom came from the peo- undercover investigations, both to en- effort not only led us into trouble In many ple. The Founding Fathers, above all, force the law and, in certain selective corners of the world, it got us nowhere feared that it was the government that cases, to protect our country from ter- with our main enemy. would subvert and undermine our sys- rorism and from foreign spying. But I do At home, our effort against foreign in- terns of leadership. not believe that these activities can exist telligence services has taken a back seat That is the thing they were afraid of outside the law and without accountabil- to domestic snooping. Indeed, even our beyond all others. ity to Congress and the people. I do not law enforcement efforts have suffered So, as we consider this question of accept the idea that a strong intelligence by comparison to our domestic intelli- whether there will be strong oversight, I effort requires a weak Congress. The rec- Bence operations. The FBI has, spent think we must be very clear about what ord shows that with weak oversight, twice as much on domestic intelligence we are dealing with. Because the record some of our most vital intelligence has informants than it has on organized shows that contrary to the constitution, not been as effective as It should be. crime informants. And for all this do- contrary to the laws, contrary to the au- The Senate Select Committee found mestic intelligence effort, there is so little thority of Congress, for many years and several extremely important instances in positive to show for it. Few acts of vio- in many different ways, our Intelligence which the intelligence community has lence can legitimately be said to have agencies In the foreign field started wars fallen down on the job. These failures been prevented. The number of arrests without our knowledge and without au- would not, in my opinion, have taken and convictions is paltry. thority, and subverted foreign govern- place if, there had been an instrument Our task in the Senate Is not to create ments without our knowledge, for effective legislative oversight. Let me an oversight committee to punish the Indeed, there is evidence that they cite a few examples. intelligence agencies, or to prevent them decided to assassinate foreign leaders For many years, our counterespionage from doing the job they have to do. To without our knowledge and without our effort was in a shambles. Now, we can- the contrary, we want to create a legis- approval-and, indeed, in some in- not do without counterespionage-it Is lative oversight body that will make it stances, without the knowledge of some the crucial minimum-we must know possible for the Intelligence community people high in Government. what our enemies are trying to do to us. to do a better job; because they need to e intelligence agencies pursued a But for years, the counterespionage ef- do a better Sob. to foreign policy often based on fort was lost in the past. It ignored the These, then, are the reasons for a vio ence without the authority or knowl- present. It was paranoid about the ex- strong legislative oversight committee. edge of the Congress. ploitation of important leads. And the In devising the appropriate kind of Similarly, at home, there has been a crucial task of coordination of counter- committee, we must begin-by recognizing pattern of conduct by our intelligence espionage activities between the FBI and two major points: agencies who illegally and, often uncon- the CIA broke down. It simply did not First, intelligence is a unique form of stitutionally, infringed upon the rights exist for several years. governmental action: of the American people. Once again, Many important leads were not fol- Because of the need for secret opera- without the knowledge of the Congress lowed up because there was a paranoid tions; and, also, without the knowledge of per- view that they were all plants and were Because of the potential for abuse; sons higher up in the executive. set up by opposing powers. Because of its importance to the secu- If that can happen, then it seems to me The second point. That is the crucial rity of this country; and that we have fundamentally undermined task of coordination of counterespionage Because of the fact that the various the accountability provisions of the Con- activities between the FBI and CIA forms of intelligence activity blend from stitution. If uncorrected, then we will broke down. one to another regardless of the agency have conceded a vast area of authority to been abhorrent to the framers of our personal reasons, the FBI and the CIA Second, we now have the worst pos- Constitution. That is the first and fore- had no relationship whatsoever. They re- sible system for congressional oversight most issue we face. fused to talk to each other. There was no of intelligence. Responsibility 'and au- Mr. President, the second major reason communication between our two crucial thority are fragmented in several com- for a strong to protect us in the counterin- mittees; It is impossible to look at intelli- oversight corn- for mittee trong legislative t d major telligence field. That is absolutely crucial, gence as a whole; because authority more effective, will Induce a stronger, because spies and counterintelligence and responsibility are not welded activities do not know political bound- together, we are incapable of dealing I underscore the second point, because aries. They flow in and out of countries; with problems privately, and there is the practically all the dialog and discussions and sometimes a person we are interested inevitable temptation to deal with them that have occurred to date in the public in will be overseas and sometimes he will through leaks. And finally, the commit- has been that we need this oversight be at home, in the United States. You tees that currently examine the intelli- committee to try to prevent abuses. But must follow them if you are going to pro- gence agencies do so as an adjunct to the truth of it is that there is an equal, tect this Nation. However, for several their principal business. though sometimes ignored, argument years, as I say, for silly, personal reasons, Mr. President, let me elaborate a little that we need this oversight committee the two agencies had no communication on these points. To say that the present to make certain that those agencies are whatsoever. I believe that an effective system of oversight is inadequate is not fully protecting us from dangers abroad oversight committee would have per- aimed at criticizing the existing com- and at home, which was the reason, In ceived that and would have done some- mittees with jurisdiction in this area. first place, for their creation. thing about it and put us in a better These committees have enormous re- shall cite some specific examples :that position to defend ourselves than 'that in sponsibilities-the Armed Services Com- s w that during history, unknown to which we found ourselves. mittee deals with our $100 billion Mill- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R0002001&0001-5 eral Government. tarily proffered. It is often embarrassing, ness of America's intelligence co - It is no wonder that these committees and it is the sort of information that we nity depends on vigorous congressional do not have the time to go into the can expect they will be reluctant to offer. oversight. He sees that the time has necessary detail which is essential for So there must be the kind of control over come. Now the question is: Do we? real intelligence oversight, because it is budgets that requires these agencies to Mr. President, I am convinced that we the details that count. It is in the details provide the information. do. I believe the compromise resolution that intelligence operations go awry, be- Information that is inconvenient, em- introduced yesterday meets that test. I come an embarrassment or an abuse. barrassing, or relates to something that participated in developing that compro- Moreover, each of the standing com- the executive branch simply does not anise, and I support it. mittees only has a piece of the puzzle. want to give Congress is not shared will- I wish to close with one final obser- Yet, we have found, it is how these ingly. Without some control over the vation: One cannot have spent the last agencies interact that is often the crucial budget of these agencies, I believe they 15 months, as many of us have-and I problem, both from the standpoint of will simply not respond. Subpenas are no see the chairman of the committee (Mr. $ ith t -4- ) th S7260 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13; 1976 tary Establishment; the Judiciary Com- as enhance the effectiveness of Amer- Congress had a strong and responsible mittee must oversee our extremely com- lea's intelligence operations. hand in intelligence matters. plicated judicial and legal system, plus First, I believe we must have some The former director of the CIA, Wil- a host of other matters; the Appropria- control over the budgets of the intelli- liam Colby, who did so much to clear up tions Committee has responsibility for gene agencies to get information. abuses within that agency, made jx- if we are able to consider the crucial in- Bear in mind that the intelligence operate in secret. But it is a grevious con- teraction between the agencies of our agencies have learned the lessons of the cession for a democracy to make. We lose tiveness.. Second, the power of the budget is Mr. President, I believe we must estab- needed in order to take action and take lish a single committee with primary such action in private. legislative jurisdiction over all national When we are dealing with secret prob- intelligence: the CIA, the FBI, the DIA, lems, the power of disclosure is empty the NSA. It should have exclusive author- and possibly even an irresponsible ave- ity over the CIA for legislation and an- nue of action. Let me take one example: nual authorization. I the problem of providing better cover It should also have the power to au- to our secret agents overseas. The Select thorize appropriations for all national Committee wanted to find better ways intelligence activities. On this and other to give better cover to our agents. We legislative matters, there should be con- current jurisdiction shared with the Commitees on 'the Judiciary, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations. They have a legitimate and real interest in many of these activities. and it is not desirable, in my view, to screen them off from it. What we want to achieve is a centralization of' basic legislative au- thority and oversight. balanced -against the continuing needs of- the standing committees. - Congress has only two types of power: the power to disclose and the power to control money. For intelligence, disclo- sure canot be the primary - remedy. An- nual budget authorization is crucial to effective oversight for two reasons. - For example, the CIA Operation Chaos was done in the name of domestic coun- terintelligence, ordinarily the FBI's re- sponsibility. On the other hand, many FBI burglaries were conducted for the National Security Agency and other for- eign intelligence agencies. The National Security Agency watch lists'for selecting cable traffic derived mainly from FBI requirements and those of other domes- tic intelligence agencies. The IRS was used by the FBI. The post office was used by the CIA in support of the FBI, in violation of the law. Indeed. it Is not nossible.to_investigate first cause the Government to govern the governed, and then in the second in- stance, how you cause the government to govern itself. Madison concluded that the only way you could do that is through auxiliary controls, as he put it-outside eqntyols would not be judged alone by their own version, their own appraisals of the law- fulness and appropriateness of their ac- tion, but that, instead, their behavior and their performance would be judged by outsiders. . I am convinced that the lesson that we have learned here and the lesson of Watergate, the lesson of so much in gov- ernment,- brings us right back to Mad= ison's point: We always hope for the best in human nature, and it is our prayer. That is why we go to church. We are always happy when human nature ac- cords with the highest ends. But surely human history, surely the history of this country, has established beyond any doubt that if we are going to say, "Now, just trust us, we have a better bunch of people than those who preceded us," it is a bad bet; it will not work. We have to go back to the genius of. the Founding without delving into another. For exam- day. Authority and the dissemination of Fathers to see that the way to make cer- ple, the Select Committee has recently crucial information would be more di- tain that government works legally and found new files on foreign assassinations vided and, fragmented. Moreover, the accountably is to make it accountable to in the FBI which were apparently with- agencies would no longer know to whom outsiders, someone else must judge, not held either wittingly or unwittingly, they were responsible. Indeed, they just those who are operating those agen- from the committee despite a request of might be tempted to pick and choose cies. That becomes especially crucial over a year's standing for all such among the committees, depending on when the agency, by definition, must be materials. the issue. The result, I believe, would secret. It is my firm conviction that only if be even less oversight than we have to I am willing to grant that the CIA has we. can deal across agency lines, only day. to operate in secret, that the FBI has to .nd our international reputation, as-well realize that they would be better off if done. But when we do it let us hav9' a Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 e oor-w ou co g on CHURCH away with some conclusions, perhaps not very flattering, about how human na- ture works when it is given this power and it is permitted to exercise it in secret. James Madison, in Federalist Paper 51, made some conclusions about human nature' that I think made up the genius of our Constitution. He said if angels were governed by angels, we would not need a government, and if men were found that this cover was quite poor; governed by angels, we would not need that there is a real problem here. But -much government. But the problem the more we talk about it in public, the 'comes when men govern men, how you less cover there would be. And, since our committee only had the power of disclo- sure, we were caught in a very clear di- lemma-how do we encourage more ef- fective action on the part of the CIA and the other agencies of Government with- out helping-the enemy? I am firmly convinced that authority to authorize appropriations is crucial and this is the only way we can use our representative institutions to insure ef- fective oversight. Some say it is not practical, but I dis- agree, I, personally, have looked into. the case of the FBI. It is practical, even easy, to sort out the budget of the domes- tic intelligence division. As for foreign intelligence, the executive branch itself is putting together a national foreign intelligence budget. That was the point of the President's new Executive order- to make the Director of Central Intel- ligence responsible for developing such a budget. The President recognized the importance of centralizing this authority within the executive branch. I believe it is no less important ? to centralize that authority within the Senate. A simple oversight committee, with only the power to subpena, would be Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE system in secret of accountability to Con- gress. If we do not do that, I think we have said, it is over; we have had this study. ndWtablish accountability in the Con- gress, we will see it happen again for sure. And next time, we may not have somebody find that piece of tape on the Watergate door. I thank the Chair. PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that William N. Rai- ford of the Library of Congress and staff members Irene Margolis and Linda Jacobson be accorded the privilege of the floor during-consideration and voting on this matter. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.' - Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, may I add to that, I ask unanimous consent that Tom Susman of the Committee on Judiciary, and David Aaron of my staff be accorded the privilege of the floor during the consideration of this measure. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. BROOKE addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Unless the Senator is going to make a unani-. mous-consent request, the Chair was going to recognize the Senator from Idaho next. The Senator from Idaho is recognized. Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent' that the following members of the staff of the Select Com- duration of the floor debate and during any votes on Senate Resolution 400: William G. Miller, Elliot Maxwell, Rick Inderfurth, Michael Madigan, Michael Epstein, Charles Kirbow, Martha Talley, Mark Gitenstein, and Robert Kelley. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it Is so ordered. Mr. LEAHY.. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a unanimous-consent request? Mr. CHURCH. I yield. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Paul Bruhn and Herbert Jolovitz, of my staff, be allowed floor privileges during discussions and vote on Senate Resolution 400. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. . Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, will the Sen- ator yield for a unanimous-consent re- quest? Mr. CHURCH. Yes. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unan- imous consent that Mr. Robert Hunter of my staff have the privilege of the floor during the debate and Doting on this measure. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it Is so ordered. . Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. CHURCH. I yield. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unan- consent that a statement by the Wlus inguished Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER) be printed in the RECORD at - this point. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. STATEMENT BY SENATOR BAKER I wish to add a few brief remarks to my ear- lier statement in support of S. Res. 400-the Resolution which will create a permanent Se- lect Committee on Intelligence Activities. The amendment in the nature of a substi- tute to S. Res. 400, which has been proposed today by my colleague, Senator Cannon, and which I was privileged to cosponsor, repre- sents a compromise agreement which was ar- rived at through a lengthy bi-partisan effort. I am pleased that this version of S. Res. 400 enjoys a wide bi-partisan cosponsorship, including the distinguished Majority Leader, Senator Mansfield, and the distinguished Minority Leader, Senator Scott. I would like to take this opportunity to put in the Record my congratulations to all the Senators who worked so long and so diligently to arrive at an agreed-upon resolu- tion which will create what I feel is so vitally necessary-a single secure Senate committee to oversee our intelligence community. I ap- plaud the bi-partisan spirit which existed throughout the sometimes delicate negotia- tions which resulted in the drafting of -an oversight resolution which could be sup- ported by the vast majority of the Senate. Thus, we have avoided a divisive floor battle which would not have enhanced the reputa- tion of the Senate. At this time, I would like to comment upon some of the provisions contained in to- day's S. Res. 400 amendment in the nature of a. substitute. The compromise version which was introduced today and - which I fully support contains all of the essential ele- ments for a strong permanent oversight. com- ? mittee. It contains legislative and authoriza- tion authority; a strong disclosure provision; and access to all the information necessary to complete its tasks: It should be noted that while the Committee is a large one with seventeen members, it does- have a lengthy agenda of business which must be accom- plished. It is required to report back to the Senate no later than July 1, 1977 with rec- ommendations for legislative or other actions. In particular, it is charged with studying the organization of the intelligence community, the desirability of developing charters for each intelligence agency, the desirability of the Select Committee merging into a joint committee with the House of Representatives, with recommending whether there should be public disclosure of any budget figures. This is indeed an ambitious and heavy schedule. I am confident that the new Committee will soon demonstrate that it will be able to ful- fill all of these tasks both thoroughly and responsibly. - There are two additional- sections of the resolution to which I would like to address additional comment. First, with respect to section 8 of the Resolution I would have preferred not to have included within that section the debate limitation contained in subsection (c). Section 8(c) limits debate to nine days on the question. of whether clas- sified information should be released to the public by the Senate over the objection of the President. As my colleagues know, the Resolution as written was the result of a compromise effort. Thus, I would have pre- ferred to have the disclosure section provide that once the matter was referred to the Senate it would be acted upon by the Senate in accord with its normal procedure. I believe that in a matter as serious as the United States Senate releasing classified information over the objection of the President of the United States that the Senate should have the full and complete opportunity to debate such a weighty decision. - I 'would not have provided a specific limi- S 7261 tation upon the, debate of this serious ques- tion within the Senate and would have al- lowed the standard cloture rules to apply. Nevertheless, I am pleased that the section provides that if the oversight committee does not agree with the President with regard to the release of the classified information the matter must come to and be voted upon by the Senate as a whole. This is the provision which I have long urged be placed in the oversight resolution because I think It Is ter- ribly important that if there is going to be a disagreement between two branches of our government, that that disagreement be de- cided upon by the Senate as -a whole and not by a mere committee of the Senate. Secondly, with regard to section 11 of the Resolution, - I would have preferred the language to read: It is the sense of the Senate that the head of each department and agency of the United States should keep the Select Corn- mittee fully and currently informed with respect to intelligence activities which are the responsibility or engaged in by such department or agency. As I have stated on many occasions in the past, it was my preference to use the "fully and currently informed" language which has served us so well in the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. "Fully and currently In- formed "'carries with it a body of established precedent as to exactly what it means; As part of the compromise agreement, however, I am supporting section 11 as written which requires the intelligence community to keep the Select Committee "fully and currently, informed with respect to Intelligence activ- ities, including any significant anticipated activities." . The present section 11, however, also con- tains the following language: Provided, That this does not constitute a condition precedent to the implementation of any anticipated intelligence activity. .- I would like the Record to reflect that I re- quested this language be added' to section 11 to make absolutely clear that the inclusion of the words "including any significant an- ticipated activities" did not constitute a re- quiremnt that the Select Committee either give its consent or approval before any covert action or intelligence activity could be im- plemented by the Executive branch. Rather, the intent of section l1 as written in the present resolution is to require prior consul- tation between the Committee and the in- telligence community but not prior consent or approval. I am adding these remarks with regard to section 11 to insure that our legis- lative history clarifies any doubt with respect to the meaning of the present language of section 11. i note that others during the debate have similarly described section 11 and I am confident that there will be no doubt remaining as to its exact meaning. .With these brief comments, I am pleased to once again announce my unequivocal sup- port for the present resolution creating a single permanent oversight committee in the Senate. I am happy that today the Senate has acted, it has acted responsibly and it has fulfilled its commitment to the American people to do its share in the critical area of the conduct of our intelligence activities. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I wish simply to reiterate again my. commen- dation to Senator BAKER and to the dis- tinguished Senator from Idaho (Mr. CHURCH), whose name was mentioned briefly yesterday during his absence, for the distinguished leadership they have provided in this area, which really has been the forerunner of the legislation- before us today. Mr. CHURCH. I thank the Senator very much. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 ' S 7262 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE May 13, 1976 In this Bicentennial Year, we, have celebrated the durability of our system of government and quality of strength of the Constitution. Part of that endur- ing strength is based upon the ability to make changes when we have to of a pragmatic nature, while remaining within our basic principles of law and procedure. The experience of secret government activities over the past 30 years argues indisputably for changes to be made in both the legislative and executive branches if we are to preserve our con- stitutional system of government. Over the past 15 months, the Select _ Committee on Intelligence Activities has carefully examined the intelligence structure of the United States. Consid- erable time and effort have been devoted in order to understand what has been done by the U.S. Government in secrecy 'during the 30-year period since the end of World War II. It is clear to the com- mittee that there are many necessary and proper governmental activities that must be conducted in secrecy. Some of these activities affect the security and the very existence of the Nation. It is `also clear from the committe's inquiry that intelligence activities con- ducted outside the framework of the Constitution and statutes can under- mine the treasured values guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. Further, if the in- telligence agencies act in ways inimical to declared national purposes, they dam- age the reputation, power, and influence of the United States abroad. The Select Committee's investigation has documented that a number of ac- tions committed in the name of "na- tional security" were inconsistent with declared policy and the law. It is clear that a primary task for the oversight committee, and the Congress as a whole, will be to frame basic statutes necessary under the Constitution within which the intelligence agencies of the United States can function efficiently under clear guidelines. Charters de- lineating the missions, authorities, and limitations for some of the most impor- tant intelligence agencies do not exist. For example, there is no statutory au- thority for the NSA's intelligence ac- tivities. Where statutes do exist, as with the CIA, they are vague and have failed to provide the necessary guidelines. The committee's investigation has demonstrated, moreover, that the lack of legislation has had the effect of limiting public debate upon some important na- tional issues. The CIA's broad statutory charter, the 1947 National Security Act, makes no specific mention of covert action. The CIA's former General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, who was deeply involved in drafting the 1947 act, wrote in Septem- ber 1947- We do not believe that there was any thought in the minds of Congress that the CIA under [the authority of the National Security Act] would take positive action for subversion and sabotage. Yet, a few months after enactment of the 1947 legislation, the National Se- curity Council authorized the CIA to en- gage in covert action programs. The pro- vision of the Act often cited as author- izing CIA covert activities provides' for e Agent * * * "to perform such other functions and duties related to intelli- gence affecting 'the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." Secret executive orders issued by the NSC to carry out covert action programs were not subject to congressional review. Indeed,' until recent years, except for a, few Members, Congress was not even aware of the existence of the so-called secret charter for intelligence activities. Those Members who did know had no institutional means for discussing their knowledge with their colleagues. The problem of how the Congress can effec- tively use secret knowledge in its legis- lative processes remains to be resolved. It is the Select Committee's view that a strong and effective oversight commit- tee is an essential first step that must be taken to resolve this fundamental issue. Since World War II, with steadily escalating consequences, many decisions of national importance have been made in secrecy, often by the executive branch alone. These decisions are frequently basesd on information -obtained by clan- destine means and available only to the executive branch. Until very recently, the Congress has not shared in this process. The cautions expressed by the Founding Fathers and the constitutional checks designed to assure that policymaking not become the proviince of a few men have been circumvented through the use of secrecy. John Adams expressed his concerned about the dangers of arbitrary power 200 years ago: Whenever we leave principles and clear positive laws we are soon lost in the wild regions of imagination and possibility where arbitrary power sits upon her brazen throne and governs with an iron scepter. Recent Presidents have justified this secrecy on the basis of "national secu- rity," "the - requirements of national defense," or "the confidentiality re- quired by sensitive, ongoing negotiations or operations." These justifications were generally accepted at face value. The Bay of Pigs fiasco, the secret war in Laos, the secret bombing of Cambodia, the anti-Allende activities , in Chile, the Watergate affair, were all instances of the use of power cloaked in secrecy which, when revealed, provoked wide- spread popular disapproval. This series of events has ended, for the time being at least, passive and uncritical accept- ance by the Congress of Executive de- cisions in the areas of foreign policy, national security and intelligence activi- ties. If Congress had met its oversight responsibilities through the years, some of these excesses might have been averted. The worth of the work done by the Select Committee on Intelligence Activi- ties over the past 15 months will be judged by the outcome of the resolution now under consideration. A strong and effective oversight committee of the kind set forth in the resolution now under consideration is required to carry out the necessary reforms contained in the Select Committee's final report. In order to restore legitimacy to what are agreed to be the necessary activities of the intelligence community, a strong oversight committee with -a well-trained vealed enough evidence of the dalWr9 of permitting the intelligence agencies of the United States to undertake their necessary activities without the kind of legislative oversight contemplated by the Constitution. It is quite clear that the concerns expressed over 20 years ago by Senator MANSFIELD have proven to be correct. There have been over 200 proposals to establish an oversight committee since Senator MANSFIELD introduced his reso- lution over two decades ago. Surely, we 'do not need further evidence of the necessity for' an oversight committee with the powers required to do the job. It is quite clear that the oversight struc- tures we have designed in the past have proven inadequate. The creation of a new permanent in- telligence oversight committee is an abso- lutely necessary first step toward estab- lishing an agreed-upon procedure by which problems of national importance that are necessarily secret in character can be addressed within the constitu- tional framework. The jurisdiction of an effective com- mittee must include oversight over what is known as the "national intelligence community." Because of the limitations of present committee jurisdictions, no committee presently is able to exercise oversight over national intelligence. At intelligence community. No committee has had the scope to look at national in- telligence as a whole. The resolution now before the Senate provides that the oversight committee would have sole jurisdiction over the CIA, and concurrent jurisdiction over the NSA, the DIA, the "national intelligence" com- ponents in the Department of Defense budget, and the intelligence portions of the FBI. The Select Committee, over the past 15 months, has found that these agencies have worked so closely together, that unless there is the clear ability. to look at all of them, oversight cannot be effectively carried out. The pending reso- lution would not exclude committees with existing jurisdictions over particular ele- ments of the intelligence community that fall within their larger oversight duties. Obviously, it is necessary for the Armed Services Committee to know the require- ments and, to some extent, the activities of the NSA- and the DIA to be sure that the Department of Defense's activities are of a piece. On the other hand, the bulk of activities of the CIA, a civilian agency, are not concerned with military matters and require a different oversight focus than is now the case. For a variety of reasons, the counterintelligence activ- ities of the FBI have not been the subject of adequate oversight, in the past. The new oversight committee would treat new jurisdiction, which would bring gether all these disparate elements Approved For-Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R0002001-80001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE the national intelligence community which are now scattered among several Senate committees and some functions which are not covered by any committee. le analysis, production, and dissem- in and use of political, military, and economic information affecting the rela- tions of the U.S. with foreign govern- ments, and other activity which is in sup- port of or supported by a collection, analysis, production, dissemination and use of such information. National intel- ligence also includes, but is not limited to clandestine activities such as covert action and some activities that take place within the United States such as coun- terintelligence. In general, these are the activities that would be supervised. The main legislative tool required to effectively carry -out oversight is annual authorization authority for the CIA, and the national intelligence portions of. the NSA, DIA, the counterintelligence por- tion of the FBI, and some other national intelligence groups found in various de- partments and agencies. The power of the purse is the most effective means that the Legislature can have to assure that the will of Congress is observed. There has never been an annual author- ization of the intelligence community budget. The proposed oversight commit- tee, for the first time, under appropriate security safeguards, would be able to consider all budgetary requests of the national intelligence community on an annual basis. The second legislative power required by an oversight committee to function ef- pertaining to its jurisdiction. The exec- utive branch should also be obligated to answer any requests made by the Com- mittee for information within its juris- diction. In my view, the right to infor- mation provisions of the resolution which are based upon the existing language of the Atomic Energy Act, section 202(d), have served Congress well for more than a quarter century. The resolution has added a provision that, consistent with the intent of section 202 (d) of the Atomic Energy Act, the oversight committee should also have the power to require in- formation concerning activities of the intelligence community that the commit- tee believes it should be informed of prior to the initiation of any such activity. The effect of such a provision would be to require prior legislative authoriza- tion of intelligence activities in the nor- mal way. This authority lies at the heart of vigilant legislative oversight. It is the power of the purse operating in full con- formity with the Constitution. Without full knowledge obtained in sufficient time, meaningful oversight can- not be exercised. It is clear from present concerns and recent history that the country would have been well-served had a committee of the Congress known in advance of certain actions, so that the advice of the Congress might have been yen, and foolish, costly, ,and. harmful courses of action might have been avert- ed. . Another important provision in the pending resolution Is the procedure which should be followed in the event that the committee wishes to disclose information obtained from the executive branch which the President wishes to keep concealed. The Select Committee has been involved' in a number of in- stances over the past year in which there has been a dispute between the commit- tee and the executive branch. Almost all of these points of disagree- ments were resolved in a manner agree- able to both sides. However, there were a few instances in which agreement coula not be reached. One such example was the question of the release of the assas- sination report. But in working toward the creation of a constitutional procedure for dealing with issues of a secret char- acter, the larger question of the proper role secrecy should play in our demo- cratic society must be carefully ad- dressed. The constitutional system of the United States is ? best suited to make national decisions through open discus- sion, debate and the airing of different points of view. Those who advocate that a particular secret must be kept should have the burden of proof placed upon --them. They must show why a secret should be -ithheld from public scrutiny. Inevitably, there will be differences be- tween the Executive and the Legislature as to whether the national interest is served by maintaining secrecy in par- ticular cases or whether the usual consti- tutional process of open debate and pub- lic scrutiny should prevail. It is my view that important questions of this kind should be brought to the full Senate for decision. The resolution now before the Senate prescribes the following procedure: If the oversight committee decided that it would be in the national interest to dis- close some information received from the executive branch, it would be required to inform the executive branch of its intention. It would then be required to enter into a full and considered consul- tation concernig the problems raised by disclosure. If, after such full and consid- ered consultation, the oversight commit- tee decided to disclose any information requested to be kept confidential by the President, the committee would be re- quired to notify the President of that decision. The committee could then, after 5 days, disclose the information unless the President, in writing, informed the Senate through the committee that he opposed such disclosure and gave his views why he opposed the disclosure of such information. The oversight commit- tee, after receiving the President's objec- tions, and if it decided that the Presi- dent's reasons did not outweigh the reasons for disclosure, may refer the question to the full Senate in closed session for a decision. In my view, once the Senate accepts the kind of process set forth in this reso- tion, it would respect the injunction of secrecy. We must recognize that at this time there is no agreement as to what S 7263 a valid national security secret is, and that the Senate does not now have the procedural means to make decisions con- cerning matters classified secret by the executive branch. One further step is set forth in this resolution-sanctions for improper dis- closure. In my view, if any member of the Senate or staff disclosed sensitive infor- mation of the committee outside of the committee, except in closed session of the Senate, such disclosure should be re- ferred to the. Committee on Standards and Conduct to investigate and recom- mend appropriate action including, but not limited to, censure or removal from office. The Senate has never addressed this issue squarely. It is my firm belief that it should do so now. Once the Senate comes to agreement as to how secret ma- terial should be handled, it should also impose upon itself rules to assure that improper disclosure, as defined by the Senate, will be properly dealt with. We have learned enough from the past 30 years of secret Government activity to realize that our legislative structures and procedures are inadequate for the task. We cannot shy away from the nec- essity to develop effective procedures to make legislative decisions concerning necessarily secret activities of the United States, but such decisions must be done in ways consistent with the Constitution. The history of the past 30 years and the revelations of the past 2 years are proof that we have much work to do. Let us equip ourselves in the Senate to do our part of the job in the most effective way. We need an oversight committee to oversee the activities of the entire intel- ligence community with the power, knowledge, and staff required. The need to bring secret Government activities under constitutional control is clear, the means to do so are contained in the resolution now before the Senate. We have had 30 years of experience and 15 months of intensive inquiry. What further proof do we need? Finally, I want to express my gratitude to the majority leader, MIKE MANSFIELD, who has done so much to bring the prob- lems created by secret activities of our Government to the attention of the Sen- ate and the Nation. His leadership in this and other vital national issues is one of the brightest chapters in the history of the Senate. I also want to thank the chairman of the Government Operations Committee, ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, his- able colleagues Senators PERCY, :1AVITS, WEICKER, and all the members of the Government Opera- tions Committee, who, through their hearings and rigorous legislative efforts have done so much to advance the pro- posal under consideration today. The compromise resolution now before us is also the result of the dedicated and conscientious work done by the Rules Committee, under the leadership of its chairman, Senator CANNON; the majority whip, Senator BYRD, and Senators HAT- FIELD, PELL, CLARK and WILLIAMS. In working out this compromise, I am grate- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 8 7264 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 13, 1976 ful for the efforts made by Senator ALAN CRANSTON. I particularly want to thank the mem- bers of the Select Committee on Intelli- gence Activities, of which I am honored to be chairman, for their devoted and able efforts over the past 15 months to come to grips with a most serious na- tional problem-of how to bring the in- telligence agencies of the United States under constitutional government. The recommendations of the Select Commit- tee, contained in its final report, are in essence an agenda for action by the over- sight committee now under considera- tion. I especially want to thank Senators MONDALE and HUDDLESTON for the fine work they have done in heading the Select Committee's two subcommittees on Foreign and Domestic Intelligence. The work of Senators PHIL HART, GARY HART, and ROBERT MORGAN, and the able vice chairman, Senator TOWER, Senator BAKER, Senator GOLDWATER, Senators, MATHIAS and SCHWEIKER, has shaped the nature of the committee's important findings and recommendations. Finally, I want to express my thanks for the work done by our staff, whose ability, loyalty and devotion throughout 15 difficult months has been a worthy service to the Senate and the Nation. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. HATFIELD). The Senator from New York. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I rise in support of this compromise measure. First, I think 'it is rather a triumph of the wisdom and willingness to see the other fellow's point of view of the Mem- bers of the Senate, particularly the prin- cipal negotiators in respect to this par- ticular compromise. I refer specifically to Senator CANNON, who felt very, very deeply about the substitute which the Rules Committee recommended, but in that spirit of knowing that we had to do something and do something effectively in this particular field yielding many of the things he thought he would never yield in order to gain the greater ob- jective, which is to bring about a strong congressional, capability to deal with the intelligence community. It is so easy to run down the Senate and other leg- islative bodies. It is refreshing when we show we can really fashion a strong compromise out of so many different views in order to accomplish a great public result. Mr. President, as we begin this impor- tant debate on Senate Resolution 400, I believe that there is one fundamental issue before us. It is whether the busi- ness of intelligence shall continue to be the exclusive preserve of the executive branch, or whether Congress shall finally also assume its constitutional responsi- bilities in this field. For the past 6 weeks since Senate Res- olution 400 was reported by the Commit- tee on Government Operations, it has been debated and discussed formally and informally in three other committees and in public media throughout the Nation. All who have examined this issue agree that any oversight proposal-if it is to be worth anything-must contribute sig- nificantly and constructively to the task of assuring that the operations of our intelligence agencies do not exceed laws and that they do not violate the rights of our citizens. The de facto immunity from account- ability granted for years to the CIA and the FBI must now cease and never again recur. This will be the case only if Con- gress recognizes that it has failed to take seriously its responsibility to over- see and check these operations. The Sen- ate now has the opportunity to write strong and meaningful oversight legis- lation. And it can do so without impair- ing the capacity of the President to ful- fill his own constitutional responsibilities in the areas of foreign policy and de- fense. Mr. President, the late Chief Justice Earl Warren once said that if each of the three branches of the Federal Gov- ernment pursued its constitutional powers to the end of the trail, then our Government simply could not work. In recent years, we have been engaged in several major separation of powers questions with the Executive. War Powers, impoundment, budget control and now intelligence oversight. In re- solving all,of these challenges to our con- stitutional system, I believe both branches have understood and heeded the implicit constitutional mandate for cooperation and compromise among the? three branches. In developing this legislation, the Committee on Government Operations and Committee on Rules and Adminis- tration have made every effort to make their decision on the issue of oversight legislation with a keen sensitivity to the delicate balance which must resolve every serious separation of powers issue. I believe that the Committees on For- eign Relations, the Armed Services, and the Judiciary-each of whom has major substantive responsibilities in this field- aproached the issue with the same sensi- tivity. The substitute'?submitted by Senator CANNON, which I strongly endorse, is the product of a long process of consultation and compromise involving many Sena- tors who have supported the establish- ment of the strongest possible oversight committee. It represents a genuine effort to reach an accommodation on very difficult is- sues. Its adoption by the Senate would constitute a clear and impressive signal to the American people that the United States will have a strong, effective and viable intelligence-gathering apparatus together with a congressional structure to assure its effectiveness and also its lawfulness. It is designed to offer the Senate a middle-ground choice between the Gov- ernment Operations resolution and a substitute version introduced by Senator CANNON and reported by the Committee on Rules and Administration. in my judgment, adoption of the un- finished Cannon substitute would fall far short of doing what is even mini- mally necessary to resolve this issue. During the past 35 years there have been over 200 proposals introduced in both Houses which -would have estab- lished a congressional oversight commit- tee in the field of intelligence. Our dis- tinguished majority leader has long been a principal champion of this idea. While he has long sought to bring this idea into reality, the need for an effective oversight mechanism has become more dents, placed informants within domes- tic political groups, opened the mail of U.S. citizens, and assembled secret files on more than 10,000 American citizens, this issue reached a new height of im- portance. The acknowledgment and apology by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation last Saturday that his agency had committed thousands of illegal burglaries in its COINTELPRO program constitutes an unprecedented challenge to the Congress to reverse dec- ades of neglect and irresponsibility re- specting the operation of -the FBI. Armed with the principal legislative tool required to carry out effective over- sight-annual authorization authority- the committee can meet the responsibil- ity which has been so long neglected. It can do so without jeopardizing the au- thority of other standing committees with existing responsibilities in this field. Mr. President, a great deal of effort has been made over the weekend and throughout yesterday to bring together a coalition of Senators who supported this legislation with those members of the Rules Committee who had reserva- tions about provisions, in our version. Both sides have made significant con- cessions. I strongly applaud these efforts and compliment Senators RIBICOFF and mittee, and Senators MONDALE, CHIIR, BAKER, and CRANSTON who also contrib- uted their energy and talents to working out differences on Senate Resolution 400. Although there are some provisions of the new substitute resolution that I am not altogether happy with-particularly in section 9 dealing with the procedure incident to the disclosure of sensitive in- formation and sanctions against Mem- bers, officers, and employees of the Sen- ate-it nevertheless does contain the essential elements of strong and mean- ingful oversight legislation. It would give the new committee budget authority, in- cluding exclusive jurisdiction over the CIA, reasonable legislative authority, and access to information from the agencies themselves. Also, the committee would be established on a permanent basis and its, members would be appointed on a rotat- ing basis. I urge the Senate to meet its consti- tutional responsibility for supervision of the intelligence community. Only after we meet that test by establishing a strong committee can the agencies themselves recover the .confidence and trust of the American people. In the long run, such a committee can and will make an essen- tial contribution of its own to the strengthening of our national security. Mr. President, as important as is the creation of this committee, we cannot which have been cataloged and dod mented during the past several years. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE These abuses constituted clear and present dangers to the freedom of the American people. Yet the problem of limiting those dan- geramost difficult and complex one, for seldom easy to separate legiti- ma om illegitimate investigations or to enforce constitutional standards. Nevertheless, it is critically important for the administration and the Congress to formulate the clearest possible guide- lines governing "national security" in- vestigations and related operations. In- dividual charters must be developed for the agencies within the intelligence com- munity. While it is necessary for our Govern- ment to undertake some of its activities in secret, it is incumbent upon the Con- gress to participate in the development of policies which will allow the constitu- tional processes to be preserved, even though certain underlying operations must remain confidential. The enact- ment of Senate Resolution 400 is only the first step in assuring a new degree of accountability for the necessary intel- ligence activities in the United States. Mr. President, I participated in the hearings which helped to fashion the resolution which was reported out of the Committee on Government Operations, and I feel I can assure our colleagues that we have brought together the essentials for congressional oversight of the in- telligence community. To paraphrase Benjamin Franklin's aphorism, we will have the ability at long last to see that the gathering of intelligence by the CIA, the FBI, and other agencies is not made a cover or an excuse for unlawfulness, to e that power does not intoxicate JEWnen who use it and whom we em- er to use it, and that it is not im- provident in terms of the cost, or that it is ineffective. All of these things I think now come within our control, and this is all for the good after some 35 years without over- sight. It is also refreshing that a new at- mosphere of openness and disclosure concerning what has gone on has devel- oped. Mr. President, the point that I wish to emphasize again, because I really am very deeply concerned with it myself, is our responsibility in the Senate. When this is passed, we will be entrusted, on a continuing basis in a unique way, which has hardly happened before, except in very sporadic instances such as the Man- hattan project and a few others with highly sensitive information of high im- portance to the security of the United States and, indeed, to the security of the world. Mr. President, we must ask ourselves the question: Will we be trustworthy and will we be honorable trustees of this tre- mendous responsibility which we are asking for. We have tried to fashion a system, a methodology, by which there shall be ac- countability by individual Members. We have tried to fashion that through the use of our constitutional power, which is awesome, to discipline or remove a Mem- er, a power which we have, which is not bject to the speech and debate clause. The job which has been done in our committee and in the Committee on Rules and Administration has been to balance effectively these two congres- sional responsibilities, on the one hand, to respect the integrity of intelligence on the part of our Members in the House of Representatives and Senate and, on the other hand, to give freedom to, the in- dividual Member to express himself, without fear, as to how he feels about great public questions. It is yet to be seen how this is going to work out. We could easily retrograde and abuse the powers, which we are now seeking to avert, and contribute to a cli- mate of dictatorship in this country if we abuse what we are here acquiring in the way of privileges and power. Mr. President, I believe, as I have con- cerned myself deeply with this, that we have fashioned an effective means for control and discipline in this resolution, and we fashioned it without being invidi- ous to any Member, without undertak- ing proceedings of a mandated character which could be embarrassing and difficult for Members, but at the same time doing our utmost to keep honest and truthful to what I consider to be a sacred oath when we pass this resolution, that we are going to respect what we learn and act with the appropriate wisdom and discretion, and we are going to make it our duty to see that other Members respect it as well. Mr. President, the resolution has been very thoroughly analyzed. I have given all credit to those who have been con- cerned in fashioning it, but this is going to be the acid test. And I hope very much that we will pass the legislation as is, so as to preserve the machinery which we think is very, specially and effectively adapted to this purpose, and that we are true to our trust. If we do that; I think we will not only benefit our people in the way of effective intelligence over- sight, but also in preserving fundamental. freedoms in this country. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. JAVITS. Iyield. Mr. CANNON. First, I thank the Sena- tor for his kind remarks on behalf of the committee and myself, and, second, I think he has put the finger on a very important point. This was one of the problems that we found with the initial Senate Resolution 400 when it came to the Committee on Rules and Adminis- tration. That is the necessity for absolute secrecy in relation to some of the activi- ties that are carried out. We do have a responsibility among ourselves to be sure that information that should be kept classified is kept classified, so, in the Committee on Rules and Administration, we wrote, as the Senator knows,.a provision that, as the Senator has suggested to the Members, if they abide by those guidelines that are set out we can preserve the secrecy where it need be preserved, and we will have the authority to declassify where the Senate feels that it is a matter that should be declassified and should be made public; but we have to keep in mind that we do have to look after and protect the security of this country. I thank the Senator for making that point. . S 7265 Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I am very grateful to our colleague. I 'wish to point out another accom- plishment-of this resolution which ought to be especially dear to the Committee on Rules and Administration. It estab- lishes the absolute paramountcy of the Senate, that every committee is an agent of the Senate, and that every individual Senator is a Member of the Senate. I thank our colleague very much, and I yield the floor. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, in the kind of world we live in, good intelligence in- formation is essential to sound foreign, defense, and arms control policies. I be- lieve that Senate Resolution 400 will help strengthen the ability of our in- telligence agencies to perform their very important tasks. The investigations have been made and abuses have been found. It is our pur- pose now to help these agencies get on with their jobs and insure that further abuses do not reoccur. I believe that a strong oversight committee with legis- lative authority is needed to change the atmosphere, dispel the doubts, give the public confidence in Congress' oversight job, and thus help the CIA and other in- telligence agencies get on with their work. I am pleased that Senate Resolution 400 incorporates the proposals which Senator HUDDLESTON and I offered to protect intelligence secrets and also my amendment requiring the new commit- tee to look into a number of neglected areas vital to effective intelligence, in- cluding the morale of intelligence per- sonnel, the analytical quality of our in- telligence, and duplication within the in- telligence community. I hope this legislation will be viewed in retrospect as having ushered in a new era of responsibility in the intelligence field-responsibility in the intelligence agencies and responsibility in the Con- gress. Mr. EASTLAND. Mr. President, the Senate has before it today measures which would greatly alter its institutional structures for the oversight of the intel- ligence gathering activities of the execu- tive branch. The basic object of these proposals is to incorporate into the jurisdiction of one new Senate committee all this intelli- gence activity, regardless of its nature, including that conducted for the purpose of foreign intelligence, military security, and for domestic law enforcement. This Senator favors strong and effec- tive oversight of the intelligence activi- ties of the Government. The Judiciary Committee has historically exercised oversight of the Department of Justice and its bureaus including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The full com- mittee and at least three of its subcom- mittees now exercise jurisdiction over the Bureau and its functions. A number of the recent "revelations" of the FBI's activities, it should be noted, had come to the attention of the com- mitte and its subcommittees. Prior to the creation of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Judiciary Committee learned of the FBI's cointelpro program. At that time the Department of Justice Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7266 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976 commenced the drafting of guidelines which would prohibit the abuses of this program. Under the direction of Attorney General Levi such guidelines have been formulated and are being implemented. A number of other activities - which. have been revealed in?the past year have been brought out in an emotion packed atmosphere. Some of these issued needed a public airing and debate. Most of them, however, have been the subject of con- structive reform and have been covered by Mr. Levi's- guidelines. We are at the point today where the airing of these matters has already oc- curred and strong measures have been implemented by the Department of Jus- tice to correct past abuses. The question is now how do we best continue Senate oversight of the intelligence activities of the FBI. Mr. President, I strongly suggest that the best approach is not by including the activities of the FBI with that of the CIA and the Defense Department. In March, the JlLidiciary Committee held hearings on the question of the. creation of a new Senate Intelligence Committee. Throughout these hearings one theme ran strongly and consistently. That was that the FBI, unlike other in- telligence gathering bodies is a law en- forcement agency. The FBI's intelligence activity is basically in furtherance of the prosecution of Federal crimes. Those who have studied the FBI's or- ganization and operations are aware that that its intelligence activities are closely related to its law enforcement function. Because this activity is so inte- grally - related to the criminal investi- gatory function of the FBI and the De- partment of Justice, it is my firmest be- lief that oversight of the FBI should be continued to be dealt with as a unit. Far to long there was a public per- ception, which was perhaps even shared by some within the FBI, that the FBI and its intelligence activity was in some way separate from the Department of Justice. But thanks to the direction and management of Attorney General Levi, with the outstanding cooperation of Director Clarence -Kelley;- this is no longer the case in appearance or in fact. The splitting of th.es Jurisdiction of the Bureau's nonintelligence activities and its intelligence operations between two Senate-committees, would, however, give renewed credence to this outmoded notion. As Attorney General Levi, testifying before the Judiciary Committee, well put it: The Bureau's discipline of perceiving its intelligence functions as closely connected to the federal criminal law is important in that it is a reminder of the need-so clearly seen in ordinary criminal cases because of the ultimate scruriity of the courts-carefully to protect individual rights. Congressional oversight arrangements that would split off the intelligence functions from the more ordinary law enforcement functions of the Bureau would tend to diminish the force of this perception. The. Attorney General and Director Kelley, testifying before the Senate Ju- diciary and Government Operations Committee, both emphasized the need for vigorous oversight of the Department of Justice and the FBI. Both, however, urged that such function could be best served by retaining oversight in a single committee. Mr. Levi noted that the domestic se- curity investigations of the FBI should be tied closely with the enforcement of criminal law. The guidelines which he issued seek to achieve this objective by authorizing domestic security investiga- tions only into ,conduct which will in- volve violence and the violation of Fed- eral law. In the area of foreign intelligence, the FBI's role 'has been a derivative one. With the approval of the Attorney Gen-? eral, the FBI at the request of other in- telligence agencies does. collect useful in- formation regarding foreign powers. Be- cause this activity is at the request of other agencies, it would, of course, be within the jurisdiction of any present or new committee established with over- sight of the requesting agency. Unlike agencies such as the CIA, whose mission is the collection and eval- uation of intelligence, the FBI is first and foremost a law-enforcement agency. Its primary duty is the detection and in- vestigation of violation of Federal crimi- nal laws. The gathering of intelligence is one of the basic tools it employs in its law-enforcement function. The de- tection of many crimes often requires knowledge of their background. This is especially true in organized crime and in domestic security investigation. This connection between investigation and the criminal statute cannot be ignored. Those of us who have studied the De- partment of Justice realize that the FBI is utilized by the operating divisiosn of the Department as their sole agent in gathering evidence for such diversep- crimes as bank robbery and civil rights. The intelligence activities of the FBI are in a true sense interrelated with the activities of the other parts of the De- partment. For effective oversight it is ? required that a full understanding be had of the entire Department of Justice. It is my belief, and One which-is shared by a number of my colleagues, that over- sight which is directed solely at the in- telligence activities of the FBI, as sepa- rate from its other functions and those of the Department as an entity, would create the very real likelihood of con- flicting and confusing congressional guidance. I am a firm believer in Senate over- sight of the FBI. This is a matter which neither I nor the Judiciary committee takes lightly. Serious deliberation was given this matter by the fulfil commit- tee following its hearings on Senate Res- olution 400. After those deliberations the commit- tee voted to amend Senate Resouution 400 to delete from it the grant of jurisdiction to the proposed Committee on Intelli- gence Activities over the intelligence ac- tivities of the Department of Justice, in- cluding the FBI. The effect of these amendments would retain in the Judici- ary Committee such jurisdiction. . The report of the Rules Committee, to which the resolution was then referred contained the following language: Committee on the Judiciary.-For similar reansons the Committee on Rules and Ad- ministration believes that legislative author- ity over the functions of the Justice Depart- ment, including those of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, should remain with. the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commi on the Judiciary. The Committee believes that the in elli- gence activities of the Department of Justice are so intertwined with its law enforcement function that a splitting of, congressional jurisdiction over these activities between the Committee on the Judiciary and the pro- posed Standing Committee on Intelligence Activities would create confusing and con- flicting congressional guidance to the agency. Unlike other intelligence gathering agen- cies, the FBI is primarily a law enforcement agency. The intelligence activity of the FBI is a means by which it detects and investi- gates violations of federal criminal laws. Because this activity is so integrally related to the criminal investigatory function of the FBI and the Department of Justice, it is the belief of the Committee that all legis- lative authority should be continued to be dealt with as a unit within the jurisdiction of the Committee on the Judiciary. Mr. President, Senate Resolution 400 as reported by Chairman CANNON from the Rules Committee would in effect con- tinue the work of the present select com- mittee. Although I believe that task, of the present select committee, has run its course; I am not unalterably opposed to the proposal in this amended version of Senate Resolution 400. The temporary committee which is envisioned would be granted general oversight of all intel- ligence activity. It would have an op- portunity to review this subject area with some detachment and without the highly charged atmosphere which has surrounded this matter for the past v and a half. I wish to state again, however, President, that I strongly oppose the creation of a permanent Senate Intel- ligence Committee with both oversight and legislative jurisdiction, concurrent or exclusive, over the intelligence activities of the FBI. Such a move would give strength to the concept that the intelligence activity of the FBI is separate from the law-en- forcement function of the Department of Justice where it necessarily and properly rests. Such a move could easily result in long-range confusion and conflict of con- gressional directives to the FBI. A sharing of access to intelligence material also provides a much greater possibility of the unauthorized disclosure of matter which the Department of Justice understandably needs to safe- guard in order to protect its sources and techniques in investigating criminal violations. For these reasons, Mr. President, I urge my colleagues to reject any measures which grant any proposed standing com- mittee the jurisdiction over the intel- ligence activities of the Department of Justice. Mr. BUCKLEY. Mr. President, for the past several - 'months, the Congress through the Select House and Senate Committees on Intelligence Operations have been reviewing the entire scope o domestic and foreign American ante gence operations. One of the conseaw. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE quences of this effort has been to rec- ommend the establishment of a congres- sional oversight committee to monitor the operation of existing U.S. Intelli- of all activities of the Federal Govern- ment including domestic and foreign in- telligence is an essential obligation of the Congress, I believe that the proposed oversight committee as recommended by the Senate Select Committee on In- telligence Operations will gravely weaken our intelligence services rather than strengthen them. I believe this is so for several reasons. First, are the inherent dangers in the centralization of an oversight function. We know from experience dating back to Pearl Harbor, where a failure of our intelligence services formed the basis upon which we initiated a major reform of the intelligence structure of the United States under the National Secu- rity Act of 1947 what the consequences of a failure of intelligence means. The centralization of intelligence, whether of collection, analysis, or congressional re- view, is almost certain to exacerbate some of the most dangerous failings of any intelligence agency. The propensity of in- telligence services from time to time to overestimate or underestimate the inten- tions of an adversary or in some other way to analyze objective intelligence in- formation-through the filter of parochial biases and current political fashions will be exaggerated by centralizing the over- sight function which is now diffused through several congressional commit- cond, the removal of primary over- sig t responsibility from the traditional intelligence committees, especially those in the Armed Services and Appropria- tions Committees, will inevitably weaken our ability, to collect sensitive foreign in- telligence, because of the fact that a much larger group of individuals may have access to some of the most sensi- tive intelligence information relating to intelligence sources and methods. Wil- lingness of a potential intelligence oper- ative to risk his life when facing the KGB is serious enough; to add the higher probability of indiscretion or leaks as a consequence of intelligence information being placed in the hands of a much larger group of congressional Members and staff can only add to the already severe burdens the prolonged congressional intelligence investigations have imposed upon our national secu- rity. The intelligence services of the United States are an essential ingredient in our ability to guarantee the security of the citizens of the United States, both as against domestic and foreign adversar- ies. Because of the extremely sensitive circumstances within which intelligence services must operate, the institutional arrangements made for the operation and review of intelligence service activi- ties must be much more carefully drawn than those which have emerged from the enate-Select Committee on Intelligence Aerations of the Cannon substitute. e procedures and character of the proposed Congressional Oversight Com- mittee on Intelligence are most likely to hamper the collection of domestic and foreign intelligence information essen- tial to the future security of the United States. There are other ways we can as- sure proper oversight within the current committee structure that do not invite the dangers of the current proposal. I, therefore, strongly urge that the present proposal be rejected. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I rise -to support this resolution. I support the establishment of a new select committee of the Senate for the purpose of oversee- ing the intelligence activities and pro- grams of our Government and submit- ting to the Senate authorized budgets and appropriate legislation relating to all the intelligence agencies. In establishing this new committee, the Senate is thoroughly consistent with the Constitution's system of checks and balances under the separation of pow- ers doctrine; This pattern of checks and balances is reflected in the constitutional provisions with respect to foreign affairs and national defense. Aside from specific ,delegations of power to Congress and the President in articles I and II, the Consti- tution states in the last paragraph of article I, section 8, that Congress shall have-the power "to make all laws neces- sary and proper for carrying into execu- tion" not only its own powrers but also "all other powers vested by this Consti- tution in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof." Moreover, in both foreign affairs and national defense, ,while the President makes executive decisions, it is Congress with. its exclusive power over the purse -that is charged with authority to deter- mine whether, or to what extent, Gov- ernment activities in these areas shall be funded. So, Mr. President, there is a solid con- stitutional base for what we are under- taking. As one who has long sought more vigilant congressional oversight over the CIA and other intelligence agencies, I am glad to cosponsor the. substitute resolu- tion establishing a strong intelligence oversight committee. Before reviewing the key provisions of the legislation before us, I wish to ex- press my appreciation for the work of so many of my Senate colleagues for bringing us this far. This country owes a permanent debt to the members of the Senate Select Committee to Study Gov- ernmental Operation With Respect to In- telligence Activities for the largely pri- vate labor-labor, Mr. President-they performed in exposing dangers to our system. These Senators were: CHURCH, chairman; PHILIP HART, MONDALE, HUD- DLESTON, MORGAN, GARY HART, TOWER, vice chairman; BAKER, GOLDWATER, MA- THIAS, and SCHWEIKER. Once the Church committee had reported its recommenda- tions, the task of reform fell to the mem- bers of the Government Operations and Rules Committees, and both committees held hearings and reported recommen- dations. Prominent roles were played by Senators RIBICOFF, PERCY, and GLENN on Government Operations, and by Sena- tors CANNON, BYRD, HATFIELD, and CLARK S 7267 on Rules 'among others. And, in the end, Mr. President, it remained for the fine art of compromise to be practiced by several Senators in order for the logjam to be broken and the Senate to fulfill its charge in this matter. Statesmanlike service was rendered by Senators MANS- FIELD, BYRD, RIBICOFF, and CANNON-tQ list a few. We have come a long way, and we are proving.that we can act as a team. in the public interest. -There are several major provisions of this resolution which I particularly support. First of all, as to the nature of the committee, the intelligence committee would have the power and authority of a standing committee, including sub- pena authority and all administrative and personnel powers necessary to carry out its responsibilities. Of course, it will be up to the members of the committee to-exercise the prerogatives this resolu- tion grants. There will be 15 Senators on the Intelligence Committee, with eight chosen from the majority party and seven chosen from the minority party. It is my hope that the leadership of both parties will favor the less senior Members of the Senate in choosing' who will serve, on a rotating basis, on the committee. Since no Senator may serve longer than 9 consecutive years, and because this is an "add-on" commit- tee with no Senator having to give up membership on another committee in order to serve, it will be possible to reg- ularly invigorate the intelligence over- sight body with new blood. This should insure the vigilance the Senate has failed to exercise in the past. Second, the new committee's jurisdic- tion will extend throughout the national intelligence community. It will have leg- islative and budgetary authority over the Government's intelligence activities including the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Most importantly, the resolution anticipates that there will be an annual authoriza- tion of funds for the different parts of the intelligence community. This will help the Senate to better perform its fiscal and oversight responsibilities, and make the intelligence agencies accounta- ble in ways they have not been hereto- fore. A more coherent approach in the legislative branch should also facilitate better fiscal and organizational plan- ning in the'executive branch. An important compromise in the res- olution, that may stimulate other com- mittees to examine the intelligence-ac- tivities of a department or agency in relation to other functions, is the pro- vision for sequential referral. Any in- telligence legislation considered by the new committee that affects the activities of such departments as Defense, State, or Justice, will, upon request, be referred to the committee responsible for general oversight of these departments. There is one important exception to this provision for sequential referral. All legislation, including authorization mat- ters, involving the CIA alone will be re- ferred to one committee, the new Intelli- gence Committee. There is no sound Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 8 7268 Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE May. 13, 19.76 argument for placing jurisdiction over the only independent, civilian-run for- eign intelligency agency-the CIA-in the Armed Services Committees of Con- gress. At long last this practice will end in the Senate. There are other important jurisdic- tional provisions in the substitute resolu- tion. Any other. committee of the Senate has the right to conl;inue to obtain direct access to the product of intelligence it may need in order to carry out its legis- lative and oversight responsibilities. Fur- ther, there is specific provision for the right of any other committee to study and review the. activities of the intelli- gence agencies when they directly affect matters otherwise within the committee's jurisdiction. Third, in listing major sections of the resolution that I support, I draw atten- tion to those dealing with access to, and treatment of, sensitive information. It is stated to be the sense of the Senate that the intelligence agencies should keep the Intelligence Committee "fully and cur- rently informed with respect to intelli- gence activities." The importance of this proviso cannot be overestimated, Mr. President. The new committee is to have access to any information within the possession of the agencies relating to any matter within the committee's jurisdic- tion. Further, the new committee is to be fully and currently informed with respect to "any significant anticipated activi- ties." This, of course, refers to covert op- erations. While this does not constitute a condition precedent to "the implemen- tation of any such anticipated intelli- gence activity," the Intelligence Commit- tee would be informed about covert op- erations and could consider whether or not to bring these to the attention of the Senate in closed session. . When seen in combination with the 1974 Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act-which provided that no funds might be expended by the CIA for operations -not intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, in the absence of a Presidential finding that the operation is important to the na- tional security of the United States, and a timely report to six committees of Con- gress-this access to information by the Intelligence Committee should provide a meaningful check on clandestine opera- tions abroad without congressional knowledge, advice, or consent. And it will still be possible for the Senate and Congress as a whole to bar funds for covert operations in a particu- lar part of the world--as we did in Angola under the Tunney amendment last De- cember. Finally, on this point, I draw attention to the final section of the substitute reso- lution: Nothing in this resolution shall be con- strued as constituting acquiescence by the Senate in any practice, or in the conduct of any activity, not otherwise authorized by law. This is to prevent the CIA or other in- telligence' agencies from citing Senate Resolution 400 as authority to conduct covert operations. In regard to the treatment of sensi- tive information, the new committee would not be allowed to disclose on its own any classified information obtained from the executive branch if the Presi- dent objected to disclosure. But the com- mittee could take the matter to the Sen- ate, which could approve or disapprove disclosure. The final decision would rest with this body. Any person engaging in unauthorized disclosure would be liable to sanctions imposed by the Senate after an investigation by the Select Commit- tee on Standards and Conduct. This leads me to some elements in the substitute about which I wish to express. some reservations, Mr. President. . Senate Resolution 400 would estab- lish a rather elaborate procedure to per- mit the President to review and object to every Intelligence Committee decision to disclose classified information ob- tained from the executive branch. This would permit an unprecedented involve- ment by another branch of Government in the operations of a congressional committee. There would be established a formal procedure for Presidential review of committee action, thereby injecting the President into the operations of the committee. There is a separate section in the reso- lution authorizing the Intelligence Com- mittee to permit, under rules established by the committee, a personal represent- ative of the President to attend closed meetings of the committee. This provi- sion is totally unnecessary, Mr. Presi- dent. Any committee can invite such a representative at any time, in its dis- cretion. By formalizing the process, however, I fear that the are establishin& a bad precedent that reflects adversely on the independence of the Senate. Members of Congress are not invited to sit on the National Security Council, or with the U.S. Intelligence Board-for example. I note the wording of the Government Operations Committee report on Senate Resolution 400 in respect to'this matter, and I urge other Senators to heed the interpretation contained therein. The provision for permitting a Presidential representative to attend Intelligence Committee meetings "does not require the new committee to invite a represent- ative of the executive branch to attend closed meetings or establish a presump- tion that the committee will do so. It merely makes exp]1 it the power that any committee has to invite a Presiden- tial representative to attend committee deliberations if the committee finds such representation helpful in conducting its duties." As a member of the Budget Committee, I urged, in the work of the compromis- ing negotiations which led to introduction of the pending bill, that the new Intelli- gence Committee be required to submit- on or before March 15 of each year-the views and estimates described in section 301(c) of the Budget Act regarding mat- ters within its jurisdiction. This require- ment must be met by all the standing committees. Observance of it by the in- telligence Committee will push. along the. goal of making the Intelligence agencies fiscally accountable, and I am glad that an appropriate provision is included in the bill. I also note that the new committee is to study the question of whether or-'qt it is in the public interest to diselo ny aspect of intelligence budgets. ad hoped that this resolution would require public disclosure of the annual lump sum budget figure for each of the intelligence agencies. When testifying before the Sen- ate Government Operations Committee on Senate Resolution 400, I proposed an amendment that would have required than the annual overall budget figure for each agency be made public. I remind Senators that article I, section 9, clause 7 of the Constitution states: No money shall be drawn from the Treas- ury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time. , It is now my understanding that the issue of making public the overall figures for the budget of the intelligence agen- cies will be brought to the floor by the Church committee before its expiration. I hope the Senate will decide that issue affirmatively, and thus set a precedent for the public release of annual figures for each agency by the new committee.. In conclusion, Mr. President, let us re- mind ourselves of the mountain of reve- lations required to bring us to this mo- ment of reform. The Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, in seven volumes of hearings, numerous staff re- ports, and two books of final reports- "Foreign and 14ilitary Intelligence" "Intelligence Activities and the Righ Americans"-has revealed two great da gers to the functioning of a free demo=cratic system: First, the apparatus. fora covert foreign policy not subject to con- gressional controls and, on occasion, not accountable to higher authority in the executive branch; and second, the trap- pings and practices of a totalitarian "Big Brother" regime capable of snooping into the lives and violating the rights of -mil- lions of American citizens. I urge all Americans to read carefully the final reports of the Church commit- tee, so as to find. out how close we have come to a repudiation in practice of the ideals we preach in regard to how we of our democracy should conduct ourselves at home and abroad. But nothing in the revelations warrants doing away with our intelligence system in our dangerous world. Rather, the ques- tion is how best to achieve an effective and accountable system..In,the words of Senator MATHIAS, who served on the Select Committee: The answer is for Congress to give the in- telligence agencies the legal. charters and careful oversight that we all know are the best guardians against inefficiency and abuse of power. Congress, in accepting its constitu- tional responsibilities- can, assist the in- telligence community in emerging from its present state with the renewed confl- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 7269 tle uneasy with a large secret establish- ment operating at home and abroad. We accept its necessity, but we must watch it vigilantly. M / SCHWEIKER. Mr. President, Con- a heavy responsibility for the pa buses by America's intelligence ' b" community. For 20 years, since Senator MANSFIELD and others first introduced proposals to establish a new Intelligence Committee, Congress has failed to act positively to improve oversight in this vital area. During that -time the CIA opened hundreds of thousands of first- class letters. During that time the Na- tional Security Agency targeted Amer- icans whose international communica- tions would be read. During that time the FBI sent scurrilous anonymous letters designed to break up marriages, encour- aged gang warfare, passed along political and personal gossip to feed the White House's insatiable appetite and tried again and again to discredit Dr. Martin Luther King. The FBI continued these attempts even after Dr. King was killed. Congress bears some responsibility for all of this. But the failure of Congress to oversee effectively U.S. Intelligence agencies did not result only in the derogation of the rights of Americans. Another result was less efficient and effective operations by the intelligence agencies which are vital to the national security. Congressional oversight might well have helped to elim- inate wasteful duplication. Congres- sional oversight might have prevented the breakdown in FBI-CIA liaison on counterintelligence and might have, made VIKess vulnerable to the activities of le foreign intelligence agencies orating in the country. Congressional oversight might have meant not only "more bang for our buck" but "more know for our dough." The abuses have been detailed. The wastefulness has been described. If Con- gress does not set up an effective over- sight committee now it will be inviting further abuse, further inefficiences, and further weakening of our national se- curity. The resolution which a number of other Senators and I have submitted would set up a permanent select com- mittee with legislative authority over America's national intelligence activities. It would have the power to authorize the budget for these activities. Unless the committee has these powers it will face the same problems faced by the Senate select committee. Its only power would be the power to disclose. It might be tempted to disclose when that would be inappropriate. Without legislative and authorization power, the committee could hardly overcome the intelligence agencies' reluctance to provide certain kinds of information. It would have to confront without real weapons the. in- telligence agencies' unwillingness to publicly disclose almost any information at all. Power to authorize the budgets for American intelligence agencies must lie Aftth the new committee. If it has this qp1wer it will carefully scrutinize the whole range of intelligence activities making choices on the basis of economy and efficiency, no committee has had the authority to do this. If it has the power to authorize the national intelligence budget it will be able to make public, with the consent of the Senate, the lump sum expended for national intelligence and finally bring our practices into line with the Constitution which requires that the people be told how much of their money is being spent and for what pur- poses. Crucial to the new committee is access to information. The resolution expresses the sense of the Senate that the com- mittee must be kept "fully and currently informed" about intelligence activities. This language, suggested by Senator BAxER was drawn from the Joint Com- mittee on Atomic Energy where it has proven effective in guaranteeing the Con- gress access to necessary information. The resolution also notes that the com- mittee should be informed about "any significant anticipated activities." While the committee's consent would not be required before covert actions could be implemented, 'it is clear that the com- mittee must be provided advance notice about significant activities. As the Gov- ernment Operations Committee wrote: It would be in the interest of sound na- tioiiai policy for the President to be apprised in advance if the committee is strongly op- posed to any particular proposed activity. At the same time the resolution pro- vides for access to information, it re- quires the committee to draw up pro- cedures designed to insure the security of. information provided to it. This was done by the Senate select committee. As a result, there was no leak of national security material from our committee. The resolution also calls for the dis- ciplining of individuals who leak infor- mation. , Finally, the resolution sets out a method by which struggles over the pub- lic disclosure of classified information can be resolved. If the President objects to public disclosure and the committee persists the Senate as a whole would have to resolve the. dispute. This recog- nizes the importance of the Presidential decision. It also recognizes that the public has a right to know as much as possible about intelligence without the national security being jeopardized. It should be remembered that the President objected to disclosure of information on attempted assassinations of foreign leaders and dis- closure of NSA's access to millions of American telegrams. This resolution is the product of 15- months' work by the hardest working committee on which I have been priv- ileged to serve. It reflects extensive hear- ings by the Government Operations Com- mittee and the Rules Committee. Based upon my experience on the Armed Serv- ices Committee and the Senate select committee I know this resolution is urg- ently needed and readily workable. The President, DCI Bush, and former DCI's Helms, McCone, and Colby all have called for effective oversight. This meas- ure would provide it. This resolution should be adopted now. Mr. President, I particularly thank the chairmen of the respective committees who played a critical role in bringing this resolution to the floor of the Senate and in the American constitutional sys- tem. I thank Senator CHURCH, the chair- man of our Select Committee, for the yeoman job he did and for the great amount of energy he expended as leader and member of our Intelligence Com- mittee. I thank and commend the chairman of the Committee on Government Oper- ations, Senator. RISICOFF, and the rank- ing member of that committee, Senator PERCY, for the great work they did in evaluating and perfecting the resolu- tion proposed. I thank Senator CANNON, chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administra- tion, for the job that he and the members of the committee, including the assist- ant majority leader, did in working out the compromise proposal which is be- fore the Senate today and in resolving some honest and real differences that the diverse members of the Senate had with respect to this problem. I think that when this chapter in American history is written, it will show that this was one of the most important things we have done in this Congress and several Congresses. The extent to which all these chairmen and their respective committees * played a part in a very con- structive role in that dialog is a real credit to the Senate of the United States. - The resolution which is before the Senate today, for action by this body, is a- giant step forward for the American people. The PRESIDING ? OFFICER (Mr. CURTIS). What is the will of the Senate? Mr. DOMENICI. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Joseph Trujillo, of my staff, be granted the privilege of the floor during the remainder of the debate on this measure. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ' Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that Fred Ruth, a member of my staff, have the privilege of the floor during the consideration of this bill and votes'thereon. The PRESIDING OFFICER, Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. GARY HART. Mr. President, 3 weeks after I arrived in the U.S. Senate, I had the honor of being appointed to serve on the Select Committee on Intel- ligence. As others have indicated, the work that committee has dope over the past 15 months has been more than sim- ply normal, routine legislative business. We have been confronted with perhaps one of the most serious problems that has faced this republic in its existence. It seems to me that tod.- y's resolution of that problem should represent to the American people a sense of restoring their confidence in the system and how it works. If we have done anything, I think it is to show that one house of the legislature of this country can assume responsibility for a very difficult task, approach that task, solve it, and move on. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7270 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE May 13, 1976 The fact that those who had serious lestions and doubts about this resolu- ion have been able to-see their way to support it is a credit not only to them but also to the institution itself. As a member of the committee, I be- lieve it is not unwarranted to say that we have approached our task hopefully and in a thoughtful, intelligent, and re- sponsible way-the way in which the Founding Fathers intended the Consti- tution to work. What we have done, in my judgment, is to strengthen our intelligence capa- bilities, not weaken them; and I believe that is the judgment of most intelligence professionals in our country. What we are accomplishing here today is to share the responsibility for one of the most difficult tasks that any nation may en- counter-certainly, any democracy-and that is to gather information on an hourly basis around the world and base our policies upon that information, and not jeopardize or threaten the constitu- tional rights of our citizens or the rights of other people around the world. The intelligence oversight resolution currently before us is unclear on one very important point. It does not contain un- ambiguous language with respect to prior notification by the Executive to the Senate Oversight Committee of signifi- cant CIA covert operations. Section 11(a) of the resolution states: It is the sense of the Senate that the head of each Department and Agency of the United States should keep the select committee fully and currently Informed with respect to Intel- ligence activities, including any significant anticipated activities, which are the respon- sibility of or engaged in by such department or agency: Provided, That this does not con- stitute a condition precedent to the imple- mentation of any such anticipated Intelli- gence activity. It is my understanding that the intent of this language, offered by Senator BAKER, is to preclude prior consent or approval of CIA covert operations by the Senate oversight committee, not to pre- clude prior notification. Given this .in- tent, the wording of section 11(a) is ambiguous. Congressional intent is un- clear. I propose that we make it clear today just what our intent is with respect to prior notification. First, let me trace the legislative history of the prior notice provision. Over 3 months ago, on January 29, the chairman of 'the Senate Select Com- mittee on Intelligence, Senator CHURCH, introduced the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1976. That bill, S. 2893, was the com- mittee's best judgment as to the respon- sibilities and authority of a new stand- ing Senate intelligence oversight com- mittee. It was cosponsored by 8 of the 11 members of the committee, including myself. Section 13(c) of S. 2893 called for the Executive to notify the Senate Oversight Committee of "significant" co- vert operations-prior to their imple- mentation. I ask unanimous consent that S. 2893 be included in the RECORD fol- lowing my remarks.. In S. 2893, the select committee did not call for prior approval of CIA covert operations, only prior notice. It did not call upon the Executive to notify the committee of all CIA covert activities, only "significant" ones. In short, section 13(c) was not drawn to infringe upon the Executive's constitutional duties or responsibilities, or to hamper the effec- tiveness of the CIA. The sole intent of section 13(c) was to allow Congress to advise the Executive before significant CIA covert operations are begun. - The committee chose the word "sig- nificant" carefully. During the course of the select committee's investigation, we found that, since 1961, the CIA has con- -ducted some 900 major or sensitive covert action projects and several thou- sand smaller ones. Most of the CIA's covert action projects are approved in- ternally. Those that are considered po- litically risky or involve large sums of money go to a National Security Council Subcommittee, known until recently as. the 40 Committee, for review and policy approval. As a general rule, the 40 Com- mittee reviewed political and propaganda programs, including support for political parties, groups, or specific political or military leaders; economic action pro- grams; paramilitary operations; and counterinsurgency programs. These are "significant" covert activities. They are the type that go to the NSC Subcommit- tee for policy approval. They are the type that would require prior notice to the Senate oversight committee. The Government Operations Commit- tee,. to which the select committee's oversight proposal was referred, also en- dorsed the concept of prior notification. Section 10(a) of the committee's over- sight proposal, Senate Resolution 400, stated that the new Intelligence Over- sight Committee should be kept "fully and currently informed with respect to intelligence activities, including any sig- nificant anticipated activities." I ask unanimous consent that Senate Resolu- tion 400, as reported out by the Govern- ment Operations Committee, be included at the end of my remarks. The Government Operations Commit- tee defined "any significant anticipated activities" as those activities which are "particularly costly financially" and those which have "any potential for af- fecting this country's diplomatic, . po- litical, or military relations wtih other countries or groups." In short, the Gov- ernment Operations Committee defined significant activities as those which have policy implications. In its report on Senate Resolution 400, the Government Operations Committee explained that advance notice of "sig- nificant anticipated activities" was not equivalent to a veto of these activities. According to the committee report: The committee will not be able formally to "veto" by a veto of its members any pro- posed significant activity it learns about in advance. As a number of present and former Government officials point out, however, including Secretary Kissinger, Mr. Rusk, Mr. Phillips, Mr. Colby, Mr. McCone, Mr. Clif- ford, and Mr. Helms, it would be in the in- terest of sound national policy for the President to be appraised in advance if the' committee is strongly opposed to any par- ticular proposed activity. In making his final decision, the President should have the benefit of knowing the view of the, com- mittee on such Important matters. Neither the original language of Sen- ate Resolution 400, as ? offered by the Government Operations Committee, nor the language contained in the coinpro mise resolution before us today would legally bind the Executive to notify the oversight committee in advance: of a- presses the "sense of the Senate." The Select Committee on Intelligence took this into account when it issued its for- eign intelligence final report on April 26. In that report, the committee recom- mended that, by statute, the Director of Central Intelligence keep the new intelligence oversight committee fully informed of each covert action prior to its initation. The only statute we now have relating to notification of Congress by the Execu- tive of covert operations is the Hughes- Ryan amendment to the 1974 Foreign Assistance Act. That amendment re- quires the President to certify that co- vert operations in foreign countries, other than those intended solely for ob- taining necessary intelligence, are "im- portant to the national security of the United States" and to report, "in a timely fashion," a description and scope of these operations to the appropriate com- mittees of Congress. This has meant, in practice, reporting to the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and Appropriations Committees of both Houses as well as two select intelligence committees. The Senate select commit- tee recommended that the Hughes-Ryan amendment be amended, once the Sen- ate established an intelligence oversight committee with authorization authority, to provide that the covert action notifi tions and Presidential certifications the Senate be consolidated in the Zi oversight committee. I support this rec- ommendation, although I will propose that prior notification be a part of any amendment to Hughes-Ryan. The Senate must have prior notifica- tion of significant CIA covert operations. The Senate must know about and be able to advise the President if he intends to. mount a paramilitary operation-such as in the Congo, Laos, or Angola, promote a military coup-as in Chile between September 15 and October 24, 1970, or wage economic warfare such as opera- tion mongoose, directed against Cuba. Covert activities are too dangerous-and too controversial-to be a tool used by the President without congressional con- sultation. Prior notification is essential for an- other reason. The select committee found that the secrecy and compartmen- tation which surrounds covert operations contributes to a temptation on the part of the Executive to resort to covert op- erations to avoid bureaucratic, congres- sional, and public debate. The select committee found that the Executive has used the CIA to conduct covert opera- tions because it is less accountable than other government agencies. Further, the committee found that the temptation of the Executive to use covert action as a "convenience" and as a substitute for publicly accountable policies has been Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE to alleviate, if not solve, many of these problems. The select committee and the Gov- ernment Operations Committee have not bee lone in calling for prior notifica- tiopr example, former Secretary of De a Clarkin lark Clifford told the select committee: With reference to covert activities, I be- lieve it would be appropriate for this com- mittee to be informed in advance by the executive branch of the Government before a covert project is launched. The committee should be briefed and, if it approves, then the activity can go forward. If the commit- tee disapproves, it should inform the Presi- dent of its disapproval so that he will have the benefit of the Joint Committee's reaction. If necessary, the President and the commit- tee can confer, after which the President may decide to abandon the project or possibly modify it. If he persists in going ahead despite the committee's disapproval, then the committee might wish to withhold funds necessary to finance the activity in question. It is my feeling that the impor- tance of the decisionmaking process in this very delicate field is such that there should be a joint effort by the executive and legis- lative branches. Cyrus Vance, a former Deputy Secre- tary of Defense and a member of the predecessor to the 40 Committee-the 303 Committee-had this to say about prior notice: I would recommend that the President be required to give his approval in writing, certifying that he believes the proposed [covert] action is essential to the national security. After the President's approval, I would suggest' that a full and complete description of the proposed action be com-. municated immediately to a joint congres- siQQ&S~al oversight committee .. , I believe u, ,h a step would then put the com- i e or any of its members in a position to express their disapproval or concerns about the proposed action, and communicate them to the President of the United-States. I am not suggesting that the committee should have a veto. I do not believe that is necessary. I am suggesting that the com- mittee or its individual members would be able to communicate with the President, thus giving him the benefit of the commit- tee's advice or of the advice of individual members. Finally, former CIA Director Richard Helms has also come out in support of prior notice. In an exchange with Sen- ator RlslcoFF of the Government Opera- tions Committee, Mr. HELMS stated: Senator RiBIcorF. At what stage should an oversight committee be brought into the covert activity, or the covert plannin which should be the relationship been the Intelligence Agency and the Oversight Committee? Mr. HELMS. It seems to me that on this question of oversight, one should be able to come to the committee and sit down and discuss a proposed operation to find out whether or not this was something that was going to.be supported by the committee. I say this for a very simple and prac- tical reason. That is, if you are going to embark on some covert action which in- volves money, relationships, assets and all the rest of it, it seems hardly sensible to embark on some ambitious program like that, if your leg is going to be cut out from under you two or three months later when you are in mid-stream. Therefore, if there Is going to be congres- nal oversight and the Congress is going work with the executive branch in these titters, then it seems to me that it has to go along hand in hand, for practical, if not legal, reasons. Mr. HELMS concluded by saying that as a practical matter, "if there is going to be an Oversight Committee I think they ought to be in on the takeoff." The Senate must have prior notifica- tion of significant CIA covert operations. The resolution before us does not state that explicitly. Although the resolution, if passed, will not bind the Executive, I believe it is important to place the Ex- ecutive on notice that it is the clear in- tent of the Senate that it be given ad- vance notice of approved CIA covert operations before'they are implemented. In closing, I quote from the select committee's final report on foreign in- telligence: - The committee's review of covert action has underscored the necessity for a thorough- going strengthening of the Executive's in- ternal review process for covert action and for the establishment of a realistic system of accountability, both within the Executive, and to Congress and to the American people. The requirement for a rigorous and credible system of control and accountability is com- plicated, however, by the shield of secrecy which must necessarily be imposed on any covert activity if it is to remain covert. The challenge is to find a substitute for the pub- lic scrutiny through congressional debate and press action that normally attends Govern- ment decisions: I believe this challenge can be met. But Congress and the Executive must work together. It is for this reason that I be- lieve prior notification is essential. I think the feeling on the part of the members of the Select Committee is that those who will have the responsibility of watchdogging intelligence gathering through agencies of our Government should have cooperation and timely no- tice of the activities being undertaken by those agencies on behalf of the American people. X join my colleagues in congratulating not only the leadership of the various committees, but Members of the Senate who have seen fit to support this measure as a sound, reasonable, thoughtful, and intelligent approach ' to this kind of pe-. culiar problem in this country. I think that history will have to judge whether we have, done the right thing or the wrong thing, but I believe that the facts speak for themselves: that we have taken the steps that have to be taken to pre- serve and protect our own liberties and safeguard the future of this country. I thank the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. What is the pleasure of the Senate? Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I send to the desk an unprinted amendment and ask for its immediate consideration. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The legislative clerk read as follows:. The Senator from Illinois.(Mr. PEacY) pro- poses an amendment on page 3, line 24, strike "nine" and insert "eight". Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the amendment would simply do this: Under the agreement that had been reached in the compromise amendment, every mem- ber assigned to this committee would serve for a term of no longer than 9 years. Members of the staff pointed out S 7271 to the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administra- tion that a 9-year maximum term would require the interruption of a Congress and that it would be better to have an even number of years. Therefore, the purpose of the present amendment is to reduce the maximum number of years that any Senator can serve on the Intel- ligence Oversight Committee from 9 to 8 years. Obviously, it could be 10. The Sen- ator from Illinois prefers 8. I so offer this amendment. I understand that it has the accept- ance of the chairman of the Committee on Government Operations, the manager of the bill, and that the distinguished Senator from Nevada, the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administra- tion, may wish to comment on it. It was the impression of the Senator from Illi- nois that he concurred, as I do, with 8 of 10 years. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I have no problem with the proposal. I do think it is better to have 8 or 10 than it is the 9- year period of limitation, because it would coincide with terms of Congress. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ac- cept the amendment of the Senator from Illinois as the manager of the bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER, The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Are there further amendments? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr, President, I ask that all those who have amendments-I understand there are one or two on the Republican side and one on this side- come to the floor, because there is a rea- sonable chance that we can finish this bill today if the Members are ere and we dig in. If we cannot do it by' 6:30, we shall go over until tomorrow. If we can finish it by 6:30, we shall go over at the end of business today to Monday. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The -clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER, Without objection, it is so ordered. SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION 196- PERTAINING TO THE ESTABLISH- MENT OF THE SMITHSONIAN IN- STITUTION Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I send to the desk a joint resolution on behalf of my- self, Mr. Hugh Scott, and Mr. Jackson and ask for its immediate consideration. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The joint resolution will be stated by title. The legislative clerk read as follows: A joint resolution (S. J. Res. 196) providing for the expression to Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II, of the appreciation of the peo- ple of the United States for the bequest of James Smithson to the United States, en- abling the establishment of the Smithsonian Institution. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to its immediate consideration? The Chair hears none, and it is so Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7272 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976 ordered. Without objection, the joint re- solution will be considered as having been read the second time at length. Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, this is sim- ply an expression of Congress to be pre- sented to the Queen when she appears here on the 8th of June, of appreciation for the bequest of James Smithson, who founded the Smithsonian Institution, in which we express gratitude that Mr. Smithson, a British subject, did that for the United States. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on the engrossment and third reading of the joint resolution. The joint resolution was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading read the third time, and passed. The preamble was agreed to. The joint resolution (S.J. Res. 196), with its preamble, reads as follows: S.J. REs. 196 Joint resolution providing for the expression to Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II, of the appreciation of the people of the United States for the bequest of James Smithson to the United States, enabling the estab- lishment of the Smithsonian Institution Whereas James Smithson, British subject, scholar and scientist, bequeathed his entire estate to the United States of America "to found at Washington under the name of the Smithsonian Institution an establishment for the increase and diffusion of Knowledge among men;" and - Whereas the Congress of the United States in 1836 accepted the bequest and pledged the faith of this nation to the execution of this trust, and in 1846 provided for the establish- ment of the Smithsonian Institution; and Whereas the Smithsonian Institution, since the time of its founding, has been mindful of the charge stated in the will of James Smithson and has, through research and pub- lication, through the collecting of natural history specimens and objects of art, culture, history and technology, and through the creation of museums for the display and in- terpretation of these collections, been privi- leged to share its resources, not only with the people of the United States, but with the world community, for purposes of education, enlightenment, and betterment; and Whereas the generous and inspiring be- quest of James Smithson continues to en- rich the lives of citizens of every nation: .Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Rep- resentatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That on the occasion of the visit of Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II, during this year of the Bicentennial of the United States, the people of this nation make known their appreciation and gratitude for the gift of James Smithson, a gift whose significance grows with the passage of time and remains a lasting symbol of the indi- visible cultural bonds which link Great Britain and the United States of America. Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. PHILIP A. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. PHILIP A. HART. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during fur- ther consideration of Senate Resolution 400, Burton Wides of my staff be Per- mitted access to the floor. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. PHILIP A. HART. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ORDER DISCHARGING COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF S. 2715 Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Government Operations be discharged from further consideration of S. 2715, and that the Committee on the Judiciary be authorized to report the bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, yester- day the Senate Committee on the Judi- ciary ordered reported S. 2715, a bill to amend the Administrative Procedure Act to permit awards of reasonable attorney fees and other expenses of participation in proceedings before Federal regulatory agencies and on judicial review of agency actions. This bill was introduced Novem- ber 20, 1975, by Senator KENNEDY, and I was pleased to join him as cosponsor of this important measure. At the time the bill was introduced, unanimous consent was obtained to. have the bill referred to both the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on Government Opera- tions, with instructions that either com- mittee report within 30 days of the other committee. With the agreement of the ranking minority member of the Committee- on Government Operations, Senator PERCY, I have requested unanimous consent to- day that our committee be discharged from further consideration of S. 2715. I have done so in light of the requirements under the Senate's new, budget process that each bill authorizing the expendi- ture of Federal funds be reported to the floor by May 15, 1976. I had hoped that the Committee on Government Opera- tions would have had the opportunity to consider fully S. 2715 before Senate ac- tion, but the present workload of the committee makes it impossible for us to consider the bill formally by the time deadline. However, I believe that this bill would provide such significant and neces- sary assistance to both the public and the agencies that any delay in passage is highly undesirable. I certainly do not want our heavy agenda to impede in any way the chances for obtaining appro- priations under- this legislation for fiscal year 1977. The Committee-on Government opera- tions has a direct and strong interest in the subject matter of this bill. Providing support for citizen involvement in our agency processes is an integral element of strengthening the institutions of govern- ment. It is a matter which our special study on regulatory reform is addressing. It is consistent with and complementary to the institutional advocacy of consumer interests in Government proceedings that would be afforded by the Agency for Con- sumer Advocacy, which our com ttee developed anc_ which would be esta cd by a bill that has passed both these and Senate earlier in this Congress. Furthermore, in the 93d Congress, the Government Operations Committee re- ported out the legislation which estab- lished the Energy Research and Develop- ment Administration and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The bill which passed the Senate contained a provision similar to S. 2715 which would have pro- vided financial assistance to intervenors in NRC proceedings. While that provision was subsequently deleted in the con- ference, the Government Operations Committee had and continues to have a great interest in the concepts em- bodied in S. 2715. While I believe that the bill ordered reported by the Committee on the Judi- ciary contains substantial improvements and useful clarifications as amended by that committee, I doubt that the 3-year authorization imposed, by that com- mittee will give the legislation enough time to have the fullest possible impact. This may not be an adequate amount of time for Congress to evaluate adequately the success of the program, and I hope this matter can be addressed when the bill comes up for deliberation on the floor. I also want to commend Senator Kennedy, the Committee on the Judi- ciary, and its Subcommittee on Admin- istrative Practice and Procedure r their efforts which led to the repo of this important bill. The Committee on Government Opera- tions, while being discharged from formal consideration of S. 2715, will certainly continue to examine both the specific provisions of the bill and the general principles it embodies, so that we con- tinue to make our own contributions to the development of legislation in this area. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. - The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. - Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, I ask. animous consent that the order for thec forum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes. Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, on behalf of Senator Roris, Senator JAVITS, and myself, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consid- eration. The PRESIDING OFFICER. A amendment will be stated. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP 0- R000200180001-5 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- 13 M , ay The assistant legislative clerk read as I consider this, as Senator CANNON follows: said, a key element-perhaps the key The senator from Kentucky (Mr. HUDDLE- element-in the bill. Are we worthy of sToN) for himself and Mr. ROTH and Mr. this trust? JAVITS proposes an amendment: _ I am deeply indebted to both my col- mitte'e on Standards and Conduct to investi- gate any unauthorized disclosure of intelli- gence information by a Member, officer or employee of the Senate in violation of sub- section (c) and to report to the Senate con- cerning any allegation which it finds to be substantiated. Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, one of the major concerns of many of us interested in developing an oversight committee for our intelligence operations has been that such a committee be responsible in its handling of secret and sensitive information. Many of us felt from the beginning that the Senate should be willing to impose upon itself a certain restraint- a certain discpline-with regard to the manner in which such information is handled. This particular section of the sub- stitute represents an effort to set out a procedure for handling any unauthorized disclosure of information that the com- mittee had determined should not be disclosed. That procedure envisions an investigation by the. Select Committee on standards and conduct and recom- mendations from that Committee in cases where the allegation is sub- stantiated. The amendment that is before the Senate at this time is designed to clarify section (d), which is found on page 15 also to provide flexibility so that unsub- stantiated or frivolous matters would not have to be reported back to the Senate. The other sections of the so-called sanctions provision which are not being modified seek to delinate what informa- tion is to be protected and to suggest procedures which should be followed when an investigation is pursued. it is my judgment that the amend- ment I have, just offered does clarify this matter and does provide a viable and workable procedure whereby we can exercise the proper discipline and the proper restraint upon Members of the Senate, members of the Select Commit- tee on Intelligence, and staff so that the new committee can enjoy the confidence that will be necessary if it is to carry out its duties in a responsible way. I move that the amendment be adopted, and I yield to the Senator from New York. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from New York. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, this is a subject in which I am deeply interested myself. I was a party to the proceedings before the Government Operations Com- mittee respecting it. I worked out the amendment. _ I felt, Mr. President, just to present my remarks of record, that if we could- I emphasize this-if we could, we should avoid any appearance of pitting Mem- ber against Member or of any appear- ance of indictment. I believe that what we have worked out admirably does this. I hope very much that the managers of the bill will agree. Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, I am pleased to join the two Senators in spon- soring this compromise. I would like to point out that in the Government Opera- tions Committee I was particularly con- cerned about assuring that sensitive in- formation supplied to the oversight com- mittee would be held in confidence and, in the event of any violation of that con- fidence, the Senate would discipline any Member of the Senate or any employee according to its own rules. I think the only way we can be certain that the Oversight Committee is going to secure the information from the ex- ecutive branch that it needs to provide effective oversight is to make certain- that the executive branch believe that we will exercise the self-discipline that is necessary. I am pleased that the com promise legislation essentially adopts the language that I sponsored in the Gov- ernment Operations Committee. I think the final proposal that Senator HUDDLESTON just suggested is a reason- able compromise as to how we initiate action to require an investigation of un- authorized disclosures. We want to assure that the Ethics Committee will take action any time a serious charge is made. I find in my home State that many people are concerned whether. or not Congress is exercising the same disci- pline on itself that it expects from the private sector and executive branch. For this reason, I think it is very important that we show that we are deadly serious that the Senate and its Members, like everyone else, must abide by any secrecy that we have ourselves established on this information. For that reason, I- am happy to join in sponsoring the com- promise. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I commend Senator HUDDLESTON, Senator JAVITS and Senator ROTH for this amendment. I ask unanimous consent that I be added as a cosponsor of the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. PEARSON). Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. PERCY. I think the heart of a cooperative relationship between the in- telligence community in the executive branch of Government and the Congress is a feeling of confidence on the part of the intelligence community that infor- provision which is now in the bill. mation transmitted to the Congress and I share completely the sentiments and its appropriate committees will be treat- disquiets voiced by my colleague from ed in confidence. There can be no rela- ntucky and my colleague from Dela- tionship of mutual confidence estab- e. - lished if there is a feeling that what- S 7273 ever is given in classified form is going to be dispersed without adequate check- ing procedure, and that if any member does breach confidentiality no action would be taken. There is a cynical feeling that the Congress is reluctant to discipline its own membership, that it is a sort of in- side club where sometimes indiscretions are overlooked. This amendment specifically addresses itself to the fact that it is the 'duty of the Committee on Ethics and Conduct to investigate, look into, and take action with respect to a breach of confidential- ity in intelligence matters. I believe the amendment is sound. It not only is needed and necessary, but it will help establish the kind of a rela- tionship which can, should, and must exist between the executive branch of Government and Congress, if the Con- gress is to fulfill and carry out its duties and obligations. It will be reassuring in that respect. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I find no difficulty with the amendment as pro- posed. I would say to my colleague from Il- linois, however, when he pointed out it would be the duty of the committee to investigate, we have rules within the committee which we have defined to say when we will investigate matters and when we will not, so that we do not go on witch hunts into unsubstantiated infor- mation. I want to make it clear to the Sen- ator that, as chairman of the commit- tee, if I am still chairman, we would consider it our duty but we would still require that any allegation comply with the rules the committee has adopted, so that we would not necessarily be investi- gating on the basis of anonymous com- plaints or a statement someone has made, and things of that sort, without having some kind of substantiation. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. CANNON. Yes. Mr. PERCY. As a further clarifying comment, as I read the amendment which has been worked out now and agreed to by the authors, a duty is im- posed upon the Select Committee on Standards and Conduct to make an in- vestigation of any unauthorized dis- closure of intelligence information. In conversations about this, there was a proposal, and it was discussed at great length in the Government Operations Committee, as to whether it would be necessary before an investigation was made for any Member of the Senate or a group of Members of the Senate to actually make charges and request that such an investigation be made. It was felt, and I believe very wisely so, by the distinguished Senator from New York (Mr. JAVITS), that that might, in itself, almost constitute, an indictment. If the committee had that duty, and it is the duty of the committee to make such an investigation, it is up to it to determine whether, in fact, there has been an unauthorized disclosure of in- telligence information. Then it automat- ically is their duty to follow through. No other Member of -the Senate need Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7274 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976 take' action other than the members of that committee. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me so the intent will be clear? Mr. CANNON. Certainly. Mr. JAVITS. There is nothing in here which interferes with the internal ad- ministration of the committee and its rulings. In short, it is like an appellate court, which might meet in confidence on a particular decision. The committee will decide whether it is frivolous, whether it is unauthorized, and an ad- ditional factor, whether it is substanti- ated. Then they are required to report to the Senate. The responsibility is in their hands but we give them the guide- lines. As to how they discharge that re- sponsibility is internal to the committee. Mr. CANNON. I thank the Senator. Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield at that point? Mr. CANNON. I yield. Mr. HUDDLESTON. I wanted to con- firm the position taken by the distin- guished-Senator from New York. I point out that one of the important aspects of the responsibility of the Select Com- mittee on Standards and Conduct would be to eliminate- frivolous charges which might be made. I believe we ought to be aware that one way to harass the com- mittee in the -performance of its duty, regardless of what the source might be, whether it be an agency downtown, the White House, the press, or Members of the Senate, would be a series of charges regarding release of information which should not be disclosed. This does impose on the Select Com- mittee on Standards and Conduct a con- siderable responsibility in reviewing these charges, of examining the infor- mation which comes to them,. and re- porting back to the Senate on those which seem to be substantiated. But, it also seeks to make it clear that the com- mittee is to have the flexibility, the dis- cretion, to dismiss frivolous and unwar- ranted allegations. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, this is an excellent amendment, and as man- ager of the bill I find it acceptable. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment. The amendment was agreed to. Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amend- ment was agreed to. Mr. RIBICOFF. I move to lay that motion on the table. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Mr. CANNON, Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) proposes an amendment. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows: On page 2, line 19, strike out "seventeen" and insert "fifteen"; on page 3, line 3, strike out lines 3 through 5 inclusive and insert in lieu thereof "seven members to be ap- pointed from the Senate at large." On page 3, line 12, strike out "five" and insert "four"; on page 3, line 15, strike out "four" and insert "three." Mr. CANNON. What this amendment does is change the membership of the committee from 17 to 15. It leaves the basic appointments the same: two mem- bers from the Committee on Appropria- tions, two members from the Commit- tee on Armed Services, two members from the Committee from the Commit- tee on the Judiciary. Then it says that the remaining seven members shall be appointed from the Senate at large. The manner of appointment is the same, four appointed under the clause E by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon recommendations of the majority leader, and three by the President pro tempore upon recommendations of the minority leader. Mr. President, first with respect to the size of the committee: The Select Com- mittee on Intelligence, which did such a fine job for us, was composed of 11 members, and they were able to do their job very well. This amendment would re- duce the proposal from 17 to 15. Mr. President, I offer this amendment because it proposes to create a select committee composed of Senators selected on a basis that would not give due repre- sentation to the Senators who make up the standing committees on Appropria- tions, Armed Services, Foreign Relations, and the Judiciary. The formula as pro- posed in the amendment would allow only 8 Senators to represent the members- ship on those 4 committees which now have jurisdiction over the intelligence activities of our Government which num- ber 61 of the total 100 Senators while 9 would be appointed from among the other 39 Senators. It should be emphasized that a mem- bership of 17 tends to maize a somewhat unwieldy committee. Compare this with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, for example, the most comparable situa- tion that we now have. That committee has only 18 members consisting of 9 from each House. In the case of the Select Committee on Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, it had only a membership of 11; only 3 of that 1l were not members of the 4 standing commit- tees enumerated above. What we propose in the pending substitute would prohibit .the Senate from appointing all of those illustrious Senators who made up the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities which did a job which was so highly commended by the Senate. There- fore, it would appear to me that we should look at this situation very seriously with a. view that with a smaller membership the committe could work more efficiently and reduce the possibility of sensitive or secret information from being improper- ly disclosed at the same time give the four standing committees concerned and the other Members of the Senate not on those committees a more equally bal- anced representation. I point out that even the Joint Com- mittee on Atomic Energy, which is the joint committee going into investigative matters, is composed of only 18 members, 9 from the Senate and 9 from the House of Representatives. With respect to the other 1' provisions that we had in the #ion nal resolution, it was drafted so that only eight members of the committee could be from the four committees enumerated and nine members would be from the re- mainder of the Senate, exclusive of those four committees, which meant there were 59 Members of the Senate who are members of those four committees, so 59 percent of the Members of the Sen- ate would make up eight members of the - committee and 41 percent of the Senate would make up nine members of the committee. This gives a more equitable balance, but if the leadership in its wis- dom should happen to select a Senator for that committee who happened to be a third person on one of the other commit- tees, the leadership would not be pre- cluded by law from so doing. I point out to the Senate that under the original language in the substitute, as it now exists, there are two members of the present Select Committee To Study Governmental Operation With Respect to Intelligence Activities who could not serve or be reappointed to the new com- mittee under that type of a ground rule. I think we have reliance on our major- ity and minority leaders; and the amendment would remove the prohibi- tion, so we would not be in- a position that we could not appoint, if the leader- ship so desired; three members from the who served so well on this commie, simply because they were the third person. I have cleared this amendment with Senator PERCY, Senator RiBICOFF, and Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the amendment is acceptable to me. I have talked with Senator MANSFIELD, Senator PERCY, and Senator CANNON, and it is ac- ceptable to them as well. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment. Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, I desire to be heard on this amendment. While I first heard about this proposed amendment only a few moments ago, it strikes me as an extremely dangerous amendment for the effectiveness of the resolution. I do not wish to be the only Senator to object, but I feel strongly about this situation. I agree with the distinguished Senator from Nevada that a committee of 17 members is rather large, and while we were trying to reach some understanding with regard to the resolution I express my concern about, this amendment, but I thought, in order to go along with the resolution and to have a resolution con- sidered and agreed to, it would be better to proceed, accomplish that, and have it over with. But it seems to me that what we i doing now is we are giving control Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE this new committee, that is being created for the purpose of oversight of intelli- gence agencies, back to the same commit- tees that have had the oversight of these into ence agencies during the period of when so many of these abuses too ce. , One of the compelling arguments for the creation of this, committee was the fact that these very committees from which we are now proposing to select the majority, the Committees on Appro- priations, Armed Services, Foreign Af- fairs, and the Judiciary, carry the heavi- est load in the Senate, and one of the reasons that was given for the creation of a special committee was to create a com- mittee that would have adequate time to devote to the oversight functions of the committee. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. MORGAN. I yield. Mr. CANNON. Was the Senator aware of the fact that the Intelligence Commit- tee itself, made up of 11 members, was composed of 8 members from those 41 committees? Mr. MORGAN. I am very well aware of that fact. But the committee was created for a special purpose with an extremely large staff, a much larger staff than we are ever going to have, I certainly hope, in this oversight committee, but as it now is set up we would have a majority of Senators from these same four com- mittees, that day after day, week after week, month after month, and year after year are going to have the responsibility for proposing legislation concerning the AU&ed Forces and the foreign affairs of t nited States, and the apropriations, TAW affect every espect of Government, including the judiciary, and the affairs of this country. This, does not strike me as being in the best interests of the Oversight Committee. 7f we are going to place all the re- sponsibility right back in the. hands of those where it has been through all the period of time when the abuses took place, I am not, sure we will have accomplished very much. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, there is objection. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. The call of the roll was continued. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER . (Mr. TAFT). Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, r modify my amendment by the addition of the- owing: Wn page 3, line 11, strike commencing with the word "after" to and including the word "member" on line 12. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified. Will the Senator send the modification to the desk? The modification is as follows: On page 3, lines 11 and 12, strike the fol- lowing "after consultation with their chair- man and ranking minority member." Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, the part I have just stricken removes the pro- vision limiting the appointment by the majority leader and the appointment by the President pro tempore upon recom- mendation of the majority and minority leaders, to after consultation with the chairmen and ranking minority mem- bers of the four committees concerned. This,gave some members a problem. However, I want to make it clear that we would certainly expect that the majority and minority leaders would consult the chairmen of the respective committees involved before naming Senators to the membership of the committee. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. CANNON. I yield. Mr. PERCY. The Senator from Illi- nois addresses this question to the chair- man of the Committee on Rules and Administration and to the distinguished majority and minority leaders. It is the understanding of the Sena- tor from Illinois that it would be the in- tention of the majority and minority leaders, in the case of membership to be drawn from these four named commit- tees, to-consult the chairman and the ranking minority member-not be bound by their judgment, but certainly discuss the issue with them. In the selection of the at-large members, they would make their selection, and then the entire slate would be submitted to the caucus, for the reaction of the caucus, on both the majority and minority sides. The Senator from Illinois would ap- preciate a clarification as to how the ma- jority and minority leaders would in- tend to act under the provisions of this particular section. Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield, that would run counter to the rules of the Senate and the provision of the law, which require that when appointments are made by the majority and minority leaders, or by the President pro tempore on the recom- mendation of the majority and minority leaders, that is the way it is done. There-, fore, it could not be further limited as the Senator from Illinois suggests. Mr. CANNON. In other words, those appointments are subject to the ap= proval of the Senate as a whole but not required to be approved by the caucus, and there is no provision written into the law with respect to the caucus. Mr. PERCY. Could you clarify as to how the procedure actually is carried out? Mr. CANNON. I would have to yield to the majority and minority leaders to explain their position on that. .. Mr. HUGH SCOTT. If I may speak for the time I have remaining in this body, it would be obvious, I think, that the minority leader always consults with the ranking minority member. I cannot imagine a future minority leader putting at risk the further hazards of his job by S 7275 doing otherwise, and I am sure the ma- jority leader has the same opinion. Mr. PERCY: With respect to those to be drawn at large- Mr. HUGH SCOTT. I am speaking of those to be drawn at large. Mr. PERCY. Then there would be pres- entation of those names to the- Mr. MANSFIELD. To the full Senate. Mr. HUGH SCOTT. That is in accord- ance with law. ? Mr. RIBICOFF. Will the Senator yield? Mr. CANNON.'Yes, I yield. Mr. RIBICOFF. It is my understand- ing and has been my understanding throughout these discussions that the appointing authority ultimately and ab- solutely rests with the majority and minority leaders. Is that not correct? Mr. CANNON. That is correct. Mr. RIBICOFF. It is expected, as a basis of comity, ? that the majority and minority leaders will discuss the ap- pointments with the chairmen and rank- ing minority members of these four com- mittees. Is that not correct? Mr. CANNON. The Senator is correct. Mr. RIBICOFF. But is it not also true that there is no obligation on the part of the majority and minority leaders to take the recommendations of the chair- men and ranking minority members? Mr. CANNON. The Senator is correct. Mr. RIBICOFF. During all these dis- cussions and at the hearings, and, as a matter of fact, questioning Senator MANSFIELD when he appeared before the Committee on Government operations as to the makeup, Senator MANSFIELD- speaking for himself, of course, and not for Senator ScoTT-pointed out,-that in making these appointments, he would take into account the makeup of the entire Senate to reflect, for example, the sectional diversity of the Senate,.the dif- ferences in seniority, and age, and the like. I have the utmost confidence in the appointing discretion of Senator MANS- FIELD and his wisdom and judgment. No matter what we write in as formula, I am confident that Senator MANSFIELD and Senator ScoTT on this first committee will see to it that the first appointments to the committeee reflect the composi- tion and the philosophy of the entire Senate. ?I am sure that whether this committee will be a success or a failure will depend upon the 15 Members chosen by the ma- jority and minority leadership. I am also confident that they will exercise this re- sponsibility to make sure that the Intelli- gence Committee will do the job it has been intended to do by the legislation before us. Mr. CANNON. I agree completely with the Senator. I yield to the Senator from North Carolina. Mr. MORGAN. Mr. President, I would have, of course, preferred that the com- -mittee remain as it was constituted be- fore, but I do think that the Senator's modification of the amendment makes it more acceptable. It may appear to some to be just a question, of semantics, and I certainly agree that no majority leader would make an appointment to this committee from any given one of the four committees without first conferring Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S7276 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE with the chairman or the ranking mi- nority member. But it seems to me that when we write it into the statute or into the resolution, it carries an implication that could be drawn from it that it would be mandatory. You and I know that that is not what the language says. What gives me some concern is that, years down the road, after some of us are gone, or most of us are gone, it could be in- terpreted that way. So with the modifi- cation, Mr. President, I think the amendment, as I say, is more acceptable, and I shall vote for Win the interest of trying' to get this resolution through, but, I would have to say reluctantly. Mr.- WEICKER, Mr. President, I rise to oppose the amendment. I think it is a bad amendment. I think it is- a bad amendment in view of the history that we have before us. When the compromise was worked out, I think it should be clearly stated that it was between those of us who felt there should be no designation at all from any committee and those who. wanted to have a membership which was very heavily from the existing oversight com- mittees. The compromise that was ar- rived at provided that - those existing committees can still be represented- in large measure, but there would be a ma- jority in the hands of "outside mem- bers." - - - I do not see where the track record is deserving of any vote -of confidence by this body in the existing committees. I am -laying it right on the -line. The job of oversight has always been within our powers as a body. We have failed to ex- ercise those powers through the various committees responsible for oversight: We are all human and finite. Nobody wants to say that those committees should not be entrusted with that re- sponsibility, but I see no reason why they, once again, should be put in the driver's seat. They have been in the driver's seat and the track record is an unmitigated disaster. . I could probably guess, from those who are agreeing to this amendment, that it will pass, but I want to voice very strong- ly my objections to it. I think the initial compromise was a good one for all hands and, yes, I think there ought to be a com- mittee which is controlled, in the main, by those who have not participated pre- viously in the oversight process, but still having the expertise and the knowledge that can be afforded by our colleagues who have been dealing with these sub- jects over a long period of time. I do not know if the yeas and nays have been requested on this amendment, but I feel so strongly on this point, that it goes to the essence of this whole matter before the Senate-I must *con- fess I am quite surprised at having to rush in here and find that such a vital point, which is a key part of the negotia- tion, has just been blithely dealt off. Mr. President,-I ask for the yeas and nays on this matter. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Vote. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Nevada, as modified. On this question, the yeas and nays have been ordered. The clerk will call the roll. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Arkan- sas (Mr. MCCLELLAN), and the Senator from California (Mr. TU GeEY) are nec- essarily absent. - I further announce that the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. DURKIN) is absent on official business. Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), and the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG) are necessarily absent. I also announce that the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA) is absent on official business. The result was announced-yeas 75, nays 17, as follows: [Rolloall No. 176 Leg.] YEAS-75 Allen Hansen Nunn Bartlett Hart, Gary Packwood Bayh Hart, Philip A. Pastore Bellmon Hartke - Pell Bentsen Hatfield Percy Brock Helms Proxmire Buckley Hollings Randolph Burdick Huddleston Ribicoff Byrd, Humphrey Roth Harry F., Jr. Jackson Scott, Hugh Byrd, Robert C. Javits - Scott, Cannon Johnston William L. Case Leahy Sparkman Chiles - Long Stafford Church Magnuson Stennis -Curtis Mansfield Stevens Dole McClure Stevenson Domenici McGee Stone Eastland McGovern Symington Fannin McIntyre Taft Ford Metcalf Talmadge Garn - Mondale Thurmond Glenn Montoya Tower Goldwater Morgan Williams Gravel Moss Young Griffin Muskie NAYS-17 Abourezk Cranston Mathias Beall Culver Nelson Biden Haskell Pearson Brooke Hathaway Schweiker Bumpers Kennedy Weicker Clark Laxalt NOT VOTING-8 Baker Fong McClellan Durkin Hruska Tunney Eaglet-on Inouye ' So Mr. CANNON'S amendment, as modi- fied,-was agreed to. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was agreed to. Mr. TALMADGt. I move to lay that motion on the table. ' The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. Several Senators addressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. BUCKLEY). The Senator from Iowa. Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I. rise in support of Senate Resolution 400; but not without reservation. My colleagues have spoken very clearly and convincingly about the need to es= tablish a permanent, strong, and effec- tive Senate committee with authority over the entire U.S. Intelligence commu- nity. I will not repeat their arguments. Rather, I wish to speak-ever so briefly-about what.this resolution does not do. As a strong supporter of- Senate - Resolution 400, perhaps I am entitled to discuss its omissions; that is, those issues which are not dealt with in this resolution. Mr. President, it has been diffic Lt even to keep track of the recent revel of frightening abuses committed b in- transgressions brought to light through the outstanding efforts of the Church committee need no further documenta- tion from me. The sheer magnitude of abuse has left many of us numb. I hope it has not left us blind. I hope nobody is suffering from the misconception that any action we take on Senate Resolution 400 will, by itself, bring a halt to the appalling activities in which the intelligence community has engaged. I hope nobody believes that Senate Reso- lution 400 really addresses the most diffi- cult and controversial issue we face; that is, what are the limits of intelligence ac- tivity in a free and democratic society? I want just to touch on one aspect of that central issue with which Ijsave some familiarity: the use of covert action as a primary tool in the execution of Ameri- can foreign policy. The final report of the Church commit- tee documents the fact that CIA con- duct of covert operations may well have eclipsed the primary purpose for which the agency was established; namely, foreign intelligence gathering. The sheer volume of covert operations has been staggering-at least 900 major covert ac- tion projects, plus several thousand smaller operations, in the last 15 years, an average of -more than 1 a week. lation of the affairs of other nations. . Are we going to allow that kind of activity to continue? Is it wise for the United States to have an avowed policy of violating the laws of other nations whenever we think it appropriate? Should we continue to contend that we somehow have the right to intervene se- cretly in the free eletcions of other na- tions, as we have done in Chile and Italy and Portugal? Do we want to assert, as a principle of our foreign policy, that we may assassinate heads of state, finance military invasions, or provide military training and equipment to political fac- tions whenever and wherever it is deemed to be in our own national interest? None of these abuses are halted by this reso- lution; that is not the purpose of -the resolution. Do we want the United States to stand for such principles of international i1= legality and unrestrained foreign inter- vention? Is that the role we choose to play in the community of nations? Must we continue our heavy reliance on covert action in order to survive? Must we adopt the tactics of the enemy? Must we play by their rules? And if we do, and if we should prevail, what will we have gained? What kind of nation will we'be if, in order to survive, we have cast-aside the basic principles on which our Nation was founded? If we become the same as our adversaries, what differences Will winning have made?- - Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7277 PW1 ii. y 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE t d - I believe we must face up to these ques- tions, . and simply forming a new com- mittee is not enough. I believe we must chart a new course for our intelligence comma ity, and for our foreign relations. I ho at creation of the right kind of Intel ce committee, with the right kinds o powers, at least can help chart that course. I yield to the Senator from South Da- kota. Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I send an amendment to the desk and ask for its immediate consideration. The . PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from South Dakota (Mr. ABOUREZK) proposes an amendment. Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows: On page 12, lines 10 and 16 strike sections 8(b) 3 and 4 and, insert the following: "8(b) (3) If the President notifies the Select Committee of his objections to the disclosure of such information as provided in para- graph (2), such committee may decide, by majority vote, to disclose such information or not to disclose such information. If within 3 days of the committee vote, 5 or more members of the Select Committee file a re- quest with the chairman that the decision be referred to the Senate for consideration, such information shall not thereafter be ev actions. This, I believe, is the mos astating provision of the resolution. We abdicate our legislative responsibilities and destroy the doctrine of separation of powers if we permit the President to control decisions that are properly with- in the scope of. the legislative function. Do we wish to establish such a precedent, one which robs the Senate of its freedom to operate, through this unprecedented involvement by the President in the day-, to-day operations of a Senate commit- tee? Suppose, for example, that Presi- dent Nixon had had such a power over the Watergate committee. Would we ever have learned what was discovered through that committee's inquiries? Should we ever permit a President to hold such power? And is it not an uncon- stitutional delegation of authority, for us to legislate such a usurpation of power. There is absolutely no need to institute a provision like this. The two branches of Government ought to be able to ac- commodate conflicting policies through cooperative negotiation. The Church committee itself is a fine example of how the executive and legislative branches can come to a solution if each side respects and trusts the legitimate demands of the other. Why should we establish -formal procedures that abolish proper Senate prerogatives when we are able to operate effectively with our own procedures? Rather than fostering cooperation, in- stitution of such a formal procedure would provide. incentive for the President not to negotiate with the committee. Simply by making the required certifica- tion. he removes the decision from the committee and moves the controversy to the Senate. I can only presume that the drafters of the compromise have more confidence in the judgment of the Presi- dent than they do in the judgment of their own colleagues who will serve on the new committee. I would have thought that a hard-working committee that is well acquainted with the issues before it could be trusted to make responsible decisions as to what information could be disclosed without endangering the Nation. Instead, the new committee will be saddled with formal procedures for declassifying information buttressed by sanctions in contrast to the President who is free to declassify in an ad. hoc manner as it suits his political needs. While I recognize the concerns which lead to the inclusion of this provision, this procedure is the wrong remedy. The procedure is ostensibly directed to the publicly disclosed without leave of the Sen- ate new intelligence committee, what will "(4), whenever the Select Committee refers prevent the President from requiring the matter to the Senate under paragraph that every Senate committee adopt the sional prerogatives and skew the balance Seventy-five percent of classified docu- tion by senate committees, but the real of powers. This amendment corrects this meats should never have been classified in imbalance in favor of the Executive by the first place, another 15 percent quickly concern behind it is the leaking of sensi- - permitting the committee, by majority outlive the need for secrecy; and only about tive information by individual members. vote, to disclose or to keep confidential, 10 percent genuinely require restricted access Therefore, a procedure to preclude the information to whose disclosure the over any significant period of time. committee's release of information is President objects. Once the committee Do we want to ratify this system inad- simply not a remedy for the problem that makes its decision, five or more members vertently, without devoting to it the at- prompts it. of the committee may appeal the vote, tention it deserves? The distinguished What is more, it is not clear that the by directing the chairman to refer the senior Senator from Maine (Mr. MusictE) problem of leaking of sensitive infor- question of disclosure to the full Senate has already devoted considerable time to- mation by individual members is really for resolution. remedying the problem of executive over- the pernicious problem it is made out to Section 8(b) (3) provides that if the classification. We should not undercut be. The administration has engineered President properly notifies the committee his efforts by acting hastily today. a public relations campaign designed to of his objections to the disclosure of in-. Second, one reading of the ambiguous show that sensitive information in pos- ation, the committee "may, by ma- provision would establish a formal pro- session of the executive branch is always y vote, refer the question of the dis- cedure for Presidential veto of committee protected, but always leaks in the hands filedreport the matter to the Senate for its lure,-we might never have known the consideration." contents of the Sinai accords that were Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I ask published by the committee over execu- for the yeas and nays. tive protest. Are the members-of commit- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a tees, such as Foreign Relations, Appro- sufficient second? There is a sufficient priations, and Armed Services prepared second. to, sacrifice to Presidential Prerogative The yeas and nays were ordered. the independence they have to negotiate Mr. ABOUREZK. This amendment questions of disclosure of sensitive infor- would modify section 8 of Senate Resolu- mation? Are the Members aware of the tion 400 so that the new Intelligence precedent that- this procedure sets for Committee would have greater discretion every committee of Congress? over the release of sensitive information. The classification system is both May we have order in the Chamber, abused and overused. It is estimated that Mr. President? there are well over 100 million pages of The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- classified records and that over 3,000 of- ate will be in order. ficials have top secret classification au- Mr. ABOUREZK. Section 8, as it now thority. Former Supreme Court Justice stands, would encroach upon congres- Arthur Goldberg has said: Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 closure of such information to the Sen- ate-for consideration." if the question is referred, the information may not be publicly disclosed without leave of the Senate. The principal problem with this provision is that it is ambiguous: it pro- vides that the committee "may" refer the question to the Senate. What hap- pens if it does not? May it decide on its own, by majority vote, to disclose infor- mation? Is referral to_ the Senate the only procedure bywhich information can be disclosed, or is it only the procedure to be followed when the committee feels that the issue is so controversial that it requires consideration by the full body? I fear that the reading intended by the drafters is that referral to the Senate is the only procedure by which information can be disclosed. If that is so, adoption of the provision will have momentous consequences. Do we even know what those consequences are? I think we will be creating two dangerous precedents. For the first time the executive branch classification system will be applied to Congress. The classification system was not established by an act of Congress. It was promulgated without consultation with, or approval of, Congress by a series of Presidents in executive orders that properly apply to members of the execu- tive branch. My enacting legislation that recognizes the application of the classi- fication system to Congress, we could sur- render our independent power to classify or declassify sensitive information. And opted f fho _._ __ ad or Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7278 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976 of Congress. This campaign has met with I think that I should explain the sit- Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. success primarily because leaks by the uation to the Senate so that it is aware Mr. CANNON. The amendment that executive branch go by different names: of the situation which confronts us at is now pending is obviously a very con- written leaks are "declassifications," ver- this time. - troversial amendment. This relates' to bal leaks are "blackgrounders." The Senator from Mississippi and his! the question of secrecy and whet we Examples of self-serving executive de- associates are in the process of preparing are going to disclose secrets th ay partmerlt leaks abound. It is well known an amendment-perhaps they have done best be kept undisclosed in the rest that Pentagon officials reveal classified so already-which, if I understand it of the United States. information about new weapons systems, correctly, seeks to keep all the segments We will have considerable discussion particularly at budget time, in order to of the military intelligence community on this amendment, and if at the conclu= obtain public and congressional support within the Committee on Armed Services, lion my motion to table is not agreed to, for them. And a few months ago it was I had hoped that we could finish this then I would not be in a position to agree revealed that the Henry Kissinger who resolution tonight, but because of the to any unanimous consent request with excoriated the Pike committee for leak- amendment offered by- the distinguished respect to this particular amendment. ing information unflattering to himself Senator from South Dakota, which might I have no problem with the remainder was the source of the classified informa- take some time and which, in my opinion, of the provisions. tion Edward R. F. Sheehan used in an goes contrary to the compromise, and the Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will article in Foreign Policy that was compli- amendment which will be suggested by the Senator yield? mentary to the Secretary of State. the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STEx- Mr. CANNON. I yield. The Senate mivqf n.l.- fnn- 0- 4-- xrs7 and h' rs whether as a policy matter it wants the full body continually to turn its attention to the daily affairs of the committee. Such a situation necessarily envisions the prospect of the full Senate making decisions about matters on which it is not informed because of the difficulty of keeping the full body apprised of the de- tails of the issues, and because of the re- strictions that section 8(c) (2) of the compromise imposes upon communica- tion between Members of the Senate. Under that provision no Member of the Senate who is In receipt of sensitive in- formation from a -member of the com- mittee is permitted to communicate the Information to a fellow Members. This restriction can only have a chilling effect on full and robust discussion of pro- foundly important issues. Aside from the constitutional considerations, we should be reluctant to place obligations upon the full Senate that it is prevented from ful- filling in a responsible fashion. Moreover, this continual resort to the full Senate for decision on matters for- merly reserved for committee determina- tion undercuts the entire committee sys- tem. It is only the first assault upon the integrity of Senate committees when we suggest that they are not to be entrusted to carry out fully the duties that we have delegated to them. I reserve the remainder of my time.. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, Is there a copy of the amendment at the desk we could have? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will be supplied with a copy of the amendment. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. 'UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I un- derstand that a request has been made by Senators SYMmGZON and STEmus, and other Senators that no time limitation be placed on the present bill. assocates, that will not be Mr. MANSFIELD. It is my intention possible. to support the Senator's motion to table, However, in talking to the Senator because I do not think that this amend- from Mississippi earlier, he indicated ment has any place in this compromise, that it might be possible to vote on his which a lot of us worked awfully hard amendment Monday or Tuesday, because to achieve and to bring about the great- he needs time to develop some of the est degree of unanimity therein. intricacies connected with the amend- So I wish to assure the Senator and ment itself. the Senate that I will vote in support of So, in spite of the suggestion which the Senator's motion to table because was conveyed to me by the ranking we have other things to do, and I want Member of the Committee on Rules and to see something done which will bring Administration, I am going to make a about a change in the situation affecting unanimous-consent request at this time, the intelligence community which has because time is running out on this body. been ignored by too many in this Cham- There will be an awful lot of legislation ber for too long. on the caleirdar next Monday because of Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, will the the budget set Ma 15 dat Th y e. ere will majority leader yield? be a convention for which the Democrats M M r, ANSFIELD. I yield. will take off about 3 weeks In July, In- Mr. RIBICOFF. The amendment by eluding the Fourth of July, to attend. the distinguished Senator from South There will be a 2-week convention for Dakota is taken . practically verbatim the Republicans in August Thera will b e September, and there will be an election one of on the main ain a items e was. I in November. In the meantime, if the one of ems s that that was rove ed Senate does not complete its work by Oc- sthe of the Committee out by rverrn- tober 2, we will stay in at least until Oc- ment sentatives hs and d the Committee C - tober 10, and if we cannot complete it Rules Rent and- Administration. Aand on dmWe do be- then, we will go out and come back, after lieve that we have protected the rights the election, to finish the peoples' bust- of the Senate by assuring that rule ness. XXXV still will be applicable so that So I am not trying to scare anyone, but. any two Senators would have the oppor- I am trying to lay out exactly what we tunity of bringing to a closed session of have before us and will have in the way the Senate any differences with the of legislative responsibility. President of the United States over the We have nothing we can take up, if disclosure of information. The Senate we do not continue with this resolution then in closed session would have an op- today, tomorrow, or Monday. portunity of making its will known. So, Mr. President, it is my Intention Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will to go over until Monday at the conclu- the Senator yield right there? sign of business today, but in order to M R r. IBICOFF. I am pleased to yield give some assurance to the Senate that to the majority leader. this matter will not be summarily thrown, Mr. MANSFIELD. And that was dis- aside, but that we will face up to our cussed by the combination that consid- responsibilities within a reasonable ered the substitute offered by the Senator length of time-I think it is unreason- from Nevada which is now before us. able to be honest about it-1 ask unani- Mr. RIBICOFF. That is absolutely rnous consent that debate on Senate correct. It was cleared with, we thought, Resolution 400 be limited as follows: Six almost every element involved in this en- hours on the resolution, 1 hour on each tire problem, including Senator CHURCH, amendment, and 4 hours on the Stennis with whom I was in constant contact -amendment, with time to be equally di- during his absence from the Senate. vided and controlled in the usual man- I would be reluctant to see the Cannon rier; that the vote on final passage occur substitute In Jeopardy. I would oppose not later than 5 p.m. on Tuesday next; the distinguished Senator from Missis- and that this request be made under the sippi, because that, too, would invade the usual rule. compromise. Consequently, I will support Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, reserv- the distinguished Senator from Nevad ing the right to object and I shall object and vote with him to table the Abour subject to the following conditions- amendment. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7279 Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the I was in the executive branch, working haven. if it were not unjustly accused, Senator yield? with Secretary Forrestal and the Presi- then an explanation would be forth- Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. dent's counsel, Clark Clifford, when this coming. Mr. PERCY. I have a similar comment, act was written. Secretary Forrestal him- I believe that the way we have been for tl1*\ identical reasons, but also be- self stated-and he was very friendly to operating has been a crying shame. Here. taus think the amendment of the the military-that the reason for the for the first time, we have a chance to Senrom South Dakota would really CIA was to provide the people of the do something constructive. There have destroy the relationship of cooperation United States a brake on the military been 15 months of hearings. What do that must be established between the description of the threat. That Agency they mean to Senators? Have Senators intelligence community and Congress. I should always remain independent of read the reports? Have they even read certainly would support the tabling mo.- the military. the newspapers? Are they going to al- tion of the Senator from Nevada. Some kind of reorganization is going low this lack of supervision to continue? Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will on in the executive branch today which I hope not. the Senator yield? worries me, because it seems they are be- I yield to the Senator from South Da- Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. ginning to pull the CIA somewhat closer kota, briefly. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I to the military. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, a parlia- have not taken part in this debate, but Ninety-five' percent of the work of the mentary inquiry. What is the pending many years ago we had the Kennedy let- Central Intelligence Agency today has item? ter. The reason for the Kennedy letter, to do with countries with which we are The PRESIDING OFFICER. A unan- to the best of my knowledge, was that not at war. Think of that. All over the imous-consent request is outstanding, the Central Intelligence Agency was by- world, we have agents who are reporting proposed by the distinguished majority passing the Ambassador. That situation to the ambassadors. When they report to leader. was corrected by the Director of the Cen- the ambassadors, the ambassadors report Is there objection to the unanimous- tral Intelligence Agency at the time, Mr. to the State Department. When they consent request? John McCone. come back here with the reports, they Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, reserving Then we had the extraordinary situa- do not go to the Committee on Foreign the right to object- tion in which the Kennedy letter resulted Relations; they go to the Committee on Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, re- in an ambassador directing a war; he Armed Services, which knows little, if serving the right to object, I do not want would call up Saigon to tell them what anything, about the conditions of the to let 2 or 3 minutes pass without ob- to bomb and what not to bomb, and he country in question. jection to the announcement by the dis- did it through the Central Intelligence I ask Senators whether they know of a tinguished majority leader, the distin- Agency. more absurd setup from the standpoint guished chairman of the Committee on I have been the only Member of the of structure and function. And unfor- Rules and Administration, and the dis- Senate for some 16 years who has been tunately it has resulted in the loss of a tinguished Senator from Illinois that the a member of both the Committee on great deal of money and in the loss of Abourezk amendment is outside some Armed Services and the Committee on many lives. I can say that without res- compromise that a great many Members Foreign Relations. For years I have ervation, as a member of both those com- of the Senate, including myself, did not urged that the Committee on Foreign mittees and as a member of the Com- sit in on. Relations have some representation on mittee on Appropriations, where as an Mr. MANSFIELD. There were many the committee responsible. for Central ad hoc member I see what they want me other Members who did not sit in on it, Intelligence Agency oversight. However, to see; but I am not allowed to look at but we could not bring in all 100, so do ers of intellige been senio eAge ll -__,,. r ....,.... have -?, w~cazscve a the Committee on Appropriations; there- This setup, Mr. President, is no good. leader to imply that there is some unani- fore, to the best of my knowledge there We should have the same type of con- mous-consent agreement not to accept never has been any real supervision of gressional supervision of this agency as any amendments in order to defeat this the Central Intelligence Agency, we have of every other agency. Here the amendment. I want to respond very It was Senator Fulbright, - I believe, President asks one Member of the Sen- briefly, if I may, Mr. President. who on the floor of the Senate asked the ate or one Member of the House to come Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator may, distinguished chairman of the Commit- up to the. White House, and then says but the Senator has misquoted me. tee on Appropriations, one who presum- to the press, "I have discussed this mat- Mr. ABOUREZK. I shall be happy to ably knew all about the Central Intelli- ter with Congress." It does not add up; correct that misquote. gence Agency, "Do you know what they and that is the reason why, in my opin- Mr. MANSFIELD. Well, the record will do with the money?" His answer was, ion, we are in this trouble today. speak for itself. I did not say that there "No, and I don't want to." .One final point the Central Intelli- should be no amendments offered, be- That is not how to oversee this Gov- gence Agency. oversight subcommittee of cause amendments have been offered and ernment agency. the Committee on Armed Services, on have been accepted. Many suggestions have been made. In which I have had the privilege to serve Mr. ABOUREZK. At any rate, the im- my opinion there should be a joint com- for many years, in a recent year did not pression was given by the majority leader mittee composed of members of the Com- meet even once. How can we supervise that this amendment was outside of some mittee on Foreign Relations and the anything if we never meet? strange agreement that a lot of us did Committee on Armed Services, with Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, will not sit in on, including myself. alternating chairmen every few years, so the Senator yield? Mr. President, this particular section that if one chairman would not want to Mr. SYMINGTON. I yield. of the bill, compromise or no compro- look at a situation, presumbaly the other Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I mise, does one thing. That is, it com- would. have the floor. I will yield to the Senator promises the power of the U.S. Senate This is the only case I know of in from South Dakota next. to the President. If there was one thing which the Committee on Appropriations It has been all shadow so far as the that the 18 months of hearings brought does everything. It regulates, it decides, oversight of the CIA has been concerned, out, it was that the anger of the coun- it appropriates, and it says, in effect, "It Mr. SYMINGTON. That is right. try is directed toward Congress, and to- is none of your business what we are do- Mr. MANSFIELD. There has been no ward Washington in general, because, ing with the taxpayers' money." I do not substance. over all of those months and the years go for that. There are members of the I came to the Senate with the Sena- preceding them, we did not fulfill our re- Committee on Armed Services who know tor from Missouri in 1953. We are going sponsibility to the people who elected us at least as much, if not more, about in- out together next year. When I was in to the U.S. Senate..Instead we handed telligence than do the members of the the House before that, I tried to bring over too much of our power to the Presi- Appropriations Committee. about, through legislation,, the establish- dent, especially 'to President Nixon. .is o, this is not a military agency. Pea- ment of a joint committee to oversee We are seeking by voluntary action to seem to forget that fact. This is a the CIA. Why? To protect the CIA. If it do the same thing today, by giving the lian agency. were unjustly accused, it would have a President the power to regulate our Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE schedule, our agenda, and to regulate what is to be disclosed and not disclosed. Mr. President, if I may, I want to read the existing language of section 8(b) (3) : If the President notifies the select com- mittee of his objections to the disclosure of such information as provided in paragraph (2), such committee may, by majority vote, refer the question of the disclosure of such information to the Senate for,consideration. Such information shall not thereafter be publicly disclosed without leave of the Senate. The folly of this language can be il- lustrated by the example of the Pike committee report. The Pike committee itself, which knew the contents of that report, voted to disclose the report pub- licly. By a parliamentary maneuver, it was brought to the floor of the House, and the Members who had not read the report and did not know the contents of it, voted, under pressure by the Executive to withhold the report from the public. The amendment that I am offering pre- cisely addresses this problem. It will al- low the Intelligence Committee, which ought to know its ? business and ought to know the contents of the information and ought to know what is In the interest of the United States, to vote one way or the other, to disclose or withhold. There Is a procedure in the amendment to al- low any five members of the commit- tee to refer the vote in the committee, whichever way It goes, to the full body of the Senate. That means that the Sen- ate Itself decides what its schedule will be and what its agenda will be, and not the President of the United States. How many times have we seen the President exerting pressure upon Con- gress to withhold information? How many times has. the executive put out news stories and wrongly attacked Con- gress for leaks and unauthorized dis- closures of Information? How much longer are we going to stand for it? This is the question I am asking. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me? Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, I yield. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, reserv- ing the right to object, and I shall object In a moment and make a motion to table the Abourezk amendment, I say to the majority leader that if the motion to lay on the table carries, I shall then have no objection to proceeding. Mr. President, I object. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. .Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I move to table the Abourezk amendment. Mr. ABOUREZK. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? W. ABOUREZK. A parliamentary in- quiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will state the Inquiry. Mr. ABOUREZK. Is there a time agreement on this amendment? The PRESIDING OFFICER. There is not. And the motion to table shuts off debate. Is there a sufficient second for the yeas and nays? There ? is a sufficient second. The yeas and nays were ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the motion to lay on the table the amendment of the Senator from South Dakota. The yeas and nays have been ordered, and the clerk will call the roll. The legislative clerk called the roll. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. I announce that the Senator from Missouri (Mr. EAGLETON), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Ar- kansas (Mr. MCCLELLAN), the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY), the Sen- ator from South Dakota (Mr. McGov- ERN), and the Senator from New Mexico (Mr. MONTOYA) are necessarily absent. I further announce that the Senator from New Hampshire (Mr. DURKIN) is absent on official business. Mr. GRIFFITH. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), and the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. FONG) are necessarily absent. I also announce that the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. $RUSKA) Is absent on official business. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Nebraska (Mr. HRUSKA), would vote yea. The result was announced-yeas 77, nays 13, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 177 Leg.] YEAS-77 Allen Griffin Pastore Bartlett Hansen Pearson Beals Hart , Gary Pell Bellmon Hartke Percy Bentsen Haskell Randolph Biden Hatfield Ribicoff Brock Hathaway Roth Buckley Helms Schweiker Bumpers Hollings Scott, Hugh Burdick Huddleston Scott, Byrd, Humphrey William L. Harry F., Jr. Jackson Sparkman Byrd, Robert C. Javits Stafford Cannon Johnston Stennis Chiles Laxalt Stevens Church Long Stevenson Cranston Magnuson Stone Curtis Mansfield Symington Dole Mathias Taft Domenici McClure Talmadge Eastland McGee Thurmond Fannin McIntyre Tower Ford Mondale Weicker Garn Morgan Williams Glenn Moss Young Goldwater Nunn Gravel Packwood NAYS-13 Abouaresk Culver Muskie -Bayh Hart, Philip A. Nelson Brooke Kennedy Proxmire Case Leahy Clark Metcalf NOT VOTING-10 Baker Hruska Montoya Durkin Inouye Tunney Eagleton McClellan Fong McGovern So the motion to lay on the table was agreed to. UNANIMOUS-CONSENT REQUEST Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent again that debate on Senate Resolution 400 be limited as fol- lows: 6 hours on the resolution, 1 hour on each amendment, 4 hours on the Tower amendment,, time equally divided- and controlled in the usual manner and un- der the usual rule; and that the vote on passage occur not later than 5 p.m. on Tuesday next. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, I do not know of any- thing that has got the people in my State more upset than this entire intelligence matter, and I firmly believe we nee? some legislation on it. At the time of the Angola affaii ent into this in some detail to find what ac- tually had gone an so far as consultation with regard to providing of funds for that particular operation. Frankly, I was unable to find out any- thing other than the fact that there is statutory authority for making it, but as to who was consulted, or whether any- body was, or, really, any procedures for consultation, I do not know. Before the Armed Services Committee this morning, I asked Deputy Secretary Robert Ellsworth if he knew of any pro- cedure for consultation anywhere In the Senate resolution or my any written document anywhere. He assured me he did not. So it is very apparent we do need some institutionalization on this problem. At the same time, I must say I feel that it would be a great mistake for the Sen- ate at this point to go ahead and agree to the manner of handling this particu- Iar bill next week without at least taking the weekend to think about it. I call to the attention of the Senate that this is the final action we will be taking to vote on this bill. There is no matter of this bill going to the House to be acted upon. There is no conference committee. There is no. referral to the White House. There Is no time to cor- rect any mistakes we might make. There- fore, I think it calls for a degree of cau- tion on our part in acting upon thi ticular legislation. I have reviewed the legislation in at detail. One thing that many Members of the Senate do not know, for Instance, is that Deputy Secretary of Defense Ells- worth appeared before the Armed Serv- ices Committee this morning and testi- fied in a closed session. I have asked to make his testimony public. The chair- man has agreed, as I understand It, that it will be made public. It goes directly and vitally to some of the Issues before us. I think the Senate, before it agrees to act on this measure, or agrees as to how long it will take to act on it, should have the benefit of that testimony, which I hope to get approved by Mr. Ellsworth to make sure there is not anything classi- fied in it, and get it into the RECORD for the benefit of the Members of the Senate. This is the first time I have seen this compromise measure, which is quite dif- ferent from some of the other proposals that have been considered, and I have been keeping upon the matter. I testified before the Rules Committee with regard to the proposals before it. The first time I saw this proposal was when I read it in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD delivered to my house early this morning. I do not think the Senate has had sufficient time to look at the many items involved in this particular piece of leg- islation. Some members of the commit- tee may feel that they do, in tl confidence, but I cannot say I' To. I not wish to see myself, or any of , _ Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 200 1 P9 7 000200180001-5 May 13, 1,976 CONGRESSIO - A Senators who might feel the same way, tied in a straitjacket procedure by enter- ing into a unanimous-consent agreement at this time and, for that reason, I ob- before the Armed Services Committee and other committees would be made public. The more I -see of how things operate around this Chamber the more I become enamored of. the Chiles-Stone sunshine bill. I would hope that rather than have these subterfuges of executive hearings, and I have attended more than my share of them at which very little of any importance is really discussed or dis- closed, we would have more open hear- ings. I would hope also that in that re- spect there would be more consideration given to proposals seeking to achieve that end. I yield to the Senator from Mississippi. Will the Senator yield first? Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Mr. MANSFIELD. I would repeat my request just for the record and make It the same except that the vote on final passage occur not later than 5 p.m. on Wednesday next. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, for the same reasons I have indicated, I would feel constrained to object, if that were In- sisted upon. I would withhold objecting If- other Members wish to be heard. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Objection is heard. Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator objects. I yield to the Senator from Mississippi. STENNIS. Mr. President, if the to will indulge me just a very few m cites since discussion has been had about diligence, let me assure the mem- bership that just as soon as we knew the final form of what is now called the Cannon compromise, or the compro- mise-and Senator CANNON was very kind to give me a copy of it as early as he could-we had just finished up a mili- tary authorization bill with our sessions continuing over several weeks. I immedi- ately started a staff study of the Cannon compromise that day. That was Yester- day. We had a meeting this morning of our committee. We went into this matter as much as we could. I do not want to cause undue delay, or any kind of delay, but I have felt compelled, along with the Senator from Texas, who is a member of the commit- tee, to offer some amendments to get into the very heart of this discussion. My ex- perience makes me believe that any kind of an effort, so broad and so far-reaching as this matter, will have to have the co- ordination and participation of the House of Representatives. Having been to many, many conferences on money matters. I know it is just absolutely im- possible to have an effective way of going Into these vast problems-and they are great-without participation by the House of Representatives. I am afraid otherwise this effort will fall on its face omewhere during the first year. I want t least debate that point. The requirement in the compromise for an authorization for all intelligence is something that I believe every Mem- ber of the Senate ought to be fairly cer- tain he fully understands, with the com- plications and the chance that we would be taking. To really have the Senate en- act an authorization bill through the ordinary processes, with the chances for disclosure-not just the leaks but also the inferences that will be built up from year to year by these foreign intel- ligence agents who are very perceptive- I think would be very, very harmful to our security. I want a chance to tell Sen- ators that. This amendment I have prepared, which will, be presented by the Senator from Texas, does not attempt to touch the CIA. It does not attempt to touch it. This amendment is going .to put squarely In issue the matter of jurisdiction over military intelligence. CIA is partly mili- tary. But the amendment will refer to those things which are primarily and fundamentally military. This amend- ment draws a line and presents to the Senate the chance to pass on that mat- ter. I do not want to speak at length, but I wanted to say those things. Criticism has been made, and I do not blame any- one. I thought we could get through this thing by Tuesday, but there is no com- mittee report on the resolution as it is now. The chairman and the committee have done fine work, as they always do, on the subject matter. The interpretation of a great deal of this is difficult. The idea of trying to operate by amending the Senate rules but saying we are not amending the Sen- ate rules is beyond my conception. That is what this proposal does, with all due respect. I thought we could debate those points by Tuesday, but others do not believe so. We will find a way. This bill will be disposed of. Mr. HUDDLESTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. I will yield in a mo- ment. I do not think anyone is trying td get by with something. There are other views to be expressed here which have not been expressed. I would yield to the Senator from Kentucky, but I do not have the floor. The Senator from Montana has it. Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. Mr. HUDDLESTON. I want to make one comment. The amendment which the Senator will introduce will be dis- cussed at length at the appropriate time. But I wanted to refer to one comment the Senator from Mississippi made re- garding his concern about this new com- mittee taking jurisdiction away from the Committee on Armed Services relating to. tactical military intelligence. I recog- nize that some of the language in the resolution is broad, but on page 21 of the substitute there is a definition which indicates that intelligence activities as used in the resolution does not include tactical foreign military intelligence serving no national policymaking func- tion. Military intelligence is that intel- ligence used by military commanders. S 7281 That intelligence, under the Department of Defense, relating to military affairs, is not national intelligence, in the sense we were addressing. So I simply make that point at this time and, of course, as I say, we will address the total amendment when it is -presented. Mr. STENNIS. We can turn to that. If I may respond briefly, Mr. President, we find here the words "authorizations for appropriations both direct and indi- rect"-I do not know what an "indirect appropriation" is. But It Is for the fol- lowing, "Defense Intelligence Agency," the "National Security Agency," and so forth. There are also others that are con- nected with the Department of Defense. So there is that kind of evidence there. I do not see how we can draw a clear line between the different kinds, but it is as to that that the amendment seeks to draw the issue. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. STENNIS. I yield to the Senator from Missouri. Mr. SYMINGTON. I will ask my able chairman: What in your view is the dif- ference between the intelligence of Cen- tral Intelligence Agency and military intelligence? Mr. STENNIS. Central Intelligence is the broader activity, I say to the Senator. A great deal of its activity is concerned with military matters. But it is a purely civilian agency, and it has a great many activities, as the Senator knows. But we are not invading that field, simply for practical reasons, in this amendment. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, let me note that it was Secretary Forrestal who, back in 1947, felt that there would be no limit to the military budget if the threat was described solely -by the mili- tary to Congress and the people; and to me the Central Intelligence Agency has always acted as a brake on the things that were needed by the three services and their advocates. If we get the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency over on one side and military intelligence on the other, I think we defeat the very purpose of having the Central Intelligence Agency as a civilian agency to balance the mili- tary. I do not see how we possibly can split the all-civilian intelligence review from the military, and vice versa. What I would hope we could do before we get through is to have the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on Armed Services jointly review na- tional intelligence in all its ramifications. I hope we would end up by doing that because, if we give the military military intelligence, that, would include the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Na- tional Security Agency, the Office of Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence, Air Force Intelligence, and other agencies; and they are the ones that receive billions of dollars more than the Central Intelligence Agency; and because of their parochial appeal to various segments of the economy have tremen- dous pull when they come up to obtain their money. I think what we have to do, as I have Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7282 Approved For CORelease NGRESSIONAL RECORD 90SENATE000200180001-May 13,-1976 mentioned, is have the Committee on Foreign Relations join with the Com- mittee on Armed Services in looking into the whole question of intelligence, par- ticularly inasmuch as 95 percent of our intelligence in peacetime has to do with foreign relations as against military operations. So, I would hope that we do not separate these functions into two dif- ferent committees and two different cate- gories. It is all related intelligence for the same country. I feel very strongly about this, having been involved in it for 31 years. - Mr. THURMOND and Mr. TOWER addressed the Chair. Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Sen- ator from Texas. Mr. TOWER. I defer to the ranking minority member of the committee. Mr. MANSFIELD. I have the floor. Does the Senator want me to yield to him or the Senator from South Carolina? Mr. TOWER. Yield to him instead of me. Mr. THURMOND. I thank the Senator very much. I was going to inquire of the Senator from Missouri. Through his long and capable experience as Secretary of the Air Force, as a member of both the Com- mittee on Armed' Services for many years and of the Committee on Foreign Relations, from this broad experience that he has had, is it his thinking that it might be preferable to consider a small committee, maybe, and have representa- tives from the Committee on Armed Services, say, from the majority and minority, to have the same number from the Committee on Foreign Relations, from the majority and the minority, have the same number from the Com- mittee on the Judiciary, from the ma- jority and the minority? That is six members. And then possibly have the majority leader and the minority leader. That ?n'akes eight members. Then in order not to have an even number, have the President pro tempore of the Senate. Would the Senator view a committee with that composition' as possibly being in line with his thinking? Mr. SYMINGTON. I will answer my able friend from South Carolina this way: That is far closer than anything else that has been suggested up to this time in this Chamber about what we do with our future intelligence. I presume that, when you suggest the addition of members of the Committee on the Judiciary, the -premise is that the FBI setup would be under the committee in question as well as the Central Intel- ligence Agency. Am I correct on that? Mr. THURMOND. That is correct. Mr. SYMINGTON. I would have no objection to that, and I would hope that we could work something out because, as is known, up until now we have not had an adequate review of our intelligence, and that is why we are in this jam today. I would hope that the committee would be held to the lowest possible number commensurate with what is essential to do the job. Mr. THURMOND. Is it not true that the more exposure we have the greater the jeopardy to the national security? Mr. SYMINGTON. I would say that the American people have the right to be informed, and we have the duty to so inform them, on many matters relating to our country's security. Many national security matters must of course be protected. On the other hand, there has been less disclosure about intelligence activities in the Senate than any other activities about which I know. At one time, by request of Senator Russell, we had members of the Commit- tee on Foreign Relations meeting with the Committee on Armed Services. I think that should now be made statu- tory; and I am confident that the mem- bers of the Committee on Foreign Rela- tions will have the same high regard for the importance of not divulging secrets as do members. of the Committee on Armed Services. I do feel, however, that one of the rea- sons we have gotten into trouble in this area is that we have been so secret that the only people who really knew any- thing about the Central Intelligence Agency over a long period of years were the five senior members of a committee that is not a legislative committee, name- ly, the Committee on Appropriations. Mr. THURMOND. Under this proposal that we have just discussed, where we would have a broad base of the Senate, we would have the majority and minor- ity leader, and in addition, representa- tives from the three main committees affected. Mr. PERCY. Four committees, Mr. THURMOND. Not under the pro- posal that the Senator from Missouri was discussing. And does the Senator from Missouri feel that that would be fair, practical, and a wise way to handle it, rather than have a committee composed of 17 or more members? Mr. SYMINGTON. I could not agree more with the able Senator. I think that committee is much too large. We would go from 5 to 17 overnight. Mr. THURMOND. I thank the able Senator from Missouri. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I point out that the Senate this afternoon reduced the number to 15 from 17. In talking about numbers, there are more than five on the Appropriations Commit- tee and three to five on the Armed Serv- ices Committee, and one or two on the Committee on Foreign Relations. But this new way will be more democratic, more widespread, and I think more representa- tive of the Senate. It certainly will give the younger Members a chance which they have not had up to this time. Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield. . Mr. SYMINGTON. Will the Senator agree that the chairmanship of this sub- committee should alternate and there should be relative equality among the committees? Ninety-five percent of the work that is done in peacetime intelli- gence has to do with the Committee on Foreign Relations. Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes, I agree. That could be up to the committee itself. Mr. SYMINGTON. That is right. Mr. MANSFIELD. But it could rotate, just as the members are going to have to rotate, because I believe the Senate this afternoon agreed to an 8-year term. Mr. SYMINGTON. I appreciate thatI ask it because with respect to the. int gence budget, the Central Intellig Agency receives between 17 and 20 cent of the total intelligence budget. o whatever we do with respect to the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, there will be a tremendous amount more money spent on the military on this, regardless. On the other hand, I would like to see the Committee on Foreign Relations, based-- on my experience, have a position equal with that of any other committee when it comes to intelligence in peacetime. Mr. MANSFIELD. It does, under this substitute. Mr. SYMINGTON. I thank the major- ity leader. . Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield to the Senator from Texas. Mr. TOWER. I thank the majority leader for yielding to me. Mr. President, I think what we have done in Senate Resolution 400 is to over- react to the fact that we have discovered abuses in the activities principally of the CIA and the FBI. I am afraid that in so overreacting, we have created a Frankenstein monster that will come back to haunt us. The abuses can be dealt with, without proliferating day-to-day access to sensi- tive information and activities. I believe that ultimately the result of the estab- lishment of this committee, rather than working through the normal committee process, is going to be more inhibition on intelligence-gathering capability, more revelations of matters that for disclos are inimical to the security of the Uni States; and this so-called comprom comes to us without any report, without any hearings, with very little chance for input on the part of those who have serious reservations about the concept of an omnibus oversight committee in the Senate. The Committee on Armed Services, with as much dispatch as possible, has taken a look at this, and we find that there are serious objections to be raised. At least, some members of the committee find that serious objections can be raised to certain aspects of this resolution. We do not seek to gut the jurisdiction of the committee. We seek only to retain that which is essentially defense-related and defense-managed in the Armed Services Committee. I am aware that the distinguished ma- jority leader desires to act with dispatch on this measure, but there are those of us who feel strongly about it. The matter is so important that some time and ef- fort'should be given to considering the merits of what the distinguished chair- man of the Armed Services Committee and the distinguished ranking minority member and some other members feel is a matter that should be given very careful consideration, indeed. -- It is not our desire to delay, and I would be prepared to agree to a vote at a time certain. I do feel that the Senator from Ohi made a very good point in raising Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 13, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE objection. But all I ask for is careful con- sideration of what we are doing. I honestly feel that the Defense De- partment would be somewhat hamstrung in be conduct of its business if this oversight committee and di- rom the committee of primary authorization and jurisdiction on defense matters, the Committee on Armed Services. I hope that Members of the Senate will reflect carefully on what we have proposed here and that we can have statesmanlike debate on the matter when we return next week. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ap- preciate the remarks of the distinguished Senator from Texas. I think they are moderate in vein and tone and worth every consideration. I am only unhappy that we have not been able to achieve a figure was subject to a number of qualifi- cations described in chapter 5 of the annual report. On May 3, Senators KENNEDY and HASKELL released a study by the Library of Congress which concluded that "the repeal of DISC does not appear to have major implications for either exports or the level of domestic employment." In their press release the Senators stated their belief that the Treasury's 1974 an- nual report was "a grossly misleading presentation of the economic data on DISC." The Treasury Department has responded with a memorandum of its own which challenges the methods and assumptions used by the Congressional Research Service in its critique of the Treasury study. I ask unanimous con- sent that the Treasury response to the Library of Congress study on DISC be incorporated in the RECORD after my re- at a time certain on final passage. The Senate should be notified that. the appears in the RECORD of May 3 at page S6323.) The Treasury Department feels that its analysis of the export effects of DISC, which was carefully qualified in its report, is based on a sounder aproach than that of the Library of Congress. The Congressional Research Service adopted what economists call "price elasticity" approach in estimating the effects of pending business, Senate Resolution 400, will" remain the pending business until Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until 12 o'clock noon on Monday next. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. CLOTURE MOTION MANSFIELD. Mr. President, .1 se cloture motion to the desk, and I do so reluctantly. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clo- ture motion having been presented under rule XXII, the Chair, without objection, directs the clerk to read the motion. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: CLOTURE MOTION We, the undersigned Senators, in accord- ance with the provisions of Rule XXII of the Standing Rules of the Senate, hereby move to close debate on the pending substitute amendment to S. Res. 400, a resolution to establish a Standing Committee of the Sen- ate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes: Robert C. Byrd, Walter F. Mondale,-Mike Gravel, Claiborne Pell, Lowell P. Weicker, Jr., Abraham Ribicoff, Charles H. Percy, Jacob K. Javits, mark 0. Hatfield, William D. Hathaway, Lee Metcalf, Mike Mansfield, Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Edward -M. Kennedy, Stuart Symington, Hubert H. Hum- phrey, Frank, E. Moss, Dale Bumpers, Gaylord Nelson, Gary Hart, Walter D. Huddleston, Wendell H. Ford, Alan Cranston, Clifford P. Case, Hugh Scott, John C. Culver, Thomas J. McIntyre, and Patrick J. Leahy. TREASURY REPORT ON THE DISC Mr. LONG. Mr. President, on April 13, the Secretary of the Treasury transmited to Congress a study on Domestic Inter- national Sales Corporations, DISC, which sted that DISC stimulated U.S. ex- by about $4,6 billion in 1974. That DICS on employment and exports.- That approach requires a great many assumptions about the function- ing of international economics and key economic parameters, including price changes. There is a tendency on the parts of economists to assume an aura . of scientific exactitude in their estimating. The area of price elasticities is so com- plex that the variety of estimates is only exceeded by the numer of scholars making them. In commenting on the use of estimates of demand elasticities, Pro- fessors Cave and Jones, the authors of a well-known text book on international economics, have this to say: Iii proceeding from the theoretical elastici- ties to real-world measurements, the econ- omist runs into many difficulties, which we can only hint at ... How- can the influence ? of changes In the terms of trade be filtered out when imports are affected by many' dis- turbances, such as changes in employment levels and tariff rates? How does one allow for the varying periods of time people re- quire to adjust their plans and purchases when the relative price of imports changes? Because of these and other problems, econ- omists are reluctant to-bet heavily on the -predictive accuracy of the elasticities they have estimated. - As Treasury points out- Despite these difficulties, the Congressional Research Service did no original research on the appropriate elasticity value, and instead considered only two "widely quoted" elastic- ity estimates, a low value of 1.51 and a high value of 2.85. The Congressional Research Service was apparently unaware that elasticity estimates as high as five are also widely quoted. The Congressional Research Service's "best- case" estimated that DISC generated $1.35 billion in addition- al exports. The Treasury further states that- The large downward biases inherent in the Congressional Research Service's best case parameters dramatically reduce the "best S 7283 case" export estimate. Using reasonable "best case" parameters within the framework of its approach, the Congressional Research Serv- ice should have reached a "best case" esti- mate of the DISC effect of $8.5 billion rather than $1.35 billion for DISC year 1974. The $8.5 billion "best case" figure would be cal- culated as follows: [Billions of dollars] Actual total exports in DISC year . 1974 ------------------- ----------- $73.2 Estimated total U.S. exports in DISC year 1974 wiihout DISC ------------ 64.7 Estimated "best case" DISC effect____ 8.5 In short, -proper application of the Con- gressional _Research Service methodology would lead to estimates of the 1974 DISC year impact ranging between zero in the "worst case" and $8.5 billion in the "best case". Treasury questions the validity gf the price elasticities. appraoch for analyzing DISC. Equally important, the Treasury doubts that the Congressional Research Serv- ice "worst case"-"best case" approach, which does no more than suggest a range of estimates between zero and $8.5 billion, sig- nificantly contributes to the public debate on DISC. Some of the misunderstanding of the impact of DISC may stem from a mis- conception of how DISC stimulates exports. Price is only one element in making U.S. exports more competitive. Proponents of DISC do not claim that it reduces prices. Export trade involves added expenses in selling and marketing abroad. DISC offsets some of these added expenses; enables U.S. exporters to ex- tend better credit terms to foreign buyers; compensates for greater finan- cial risks; provides positive cash flows and greater liquidity for financing sales; and furnishes funds for plant and equip- ment modernization and expansion. Perhaps, most importantly DISC in- duces exporters to locate. plants and facilities in the United States that would otherwise be established abroad. The original purpose of the DISC was to neutralize tax and foreign incentives too locate plants abroad. Testimony offered during the Senate Finance Committee hearings attested to the success of that purpose. Robert Malott, for example, stated: For FMC, DISC has also meant increasing investment in the U.S. in plants producing -for exports. It was a major factor in our recent decision to invest in the U.S., rather than off-shore, about $100 million in three plants that we hope will export more than 50% of their production. In our special report on DISC you will find the comments that we received from the men on the front line of our export activity. I submit that their com- ments are persuasive testimony to the key role of DISC as an inducement to invest in America rather than go abroad. It is this effect of DISC which most troubles our trading partners. Congress- man JOSEPH KARTH, upon completion of his-study of EC complaints on DISC at the GATT convention found: That what the EC members and presum- ably other countries are worried about, is that the future of DISC hold such promise, that U.S. businesses will greatly increase their efforts to export more and more of their production . rather than our jobs. . This would, of course, result in U.S. multi- nationals providing fewer jobs in those coun- tries than they desire or expect. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7284 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 13, 1976 Mr. President, I have concluded that the Congressional Research Service's study is not as scientific and accurate as its authors pretend. In fact, I think it is downright misleading. Like anything else, the conclusions of "the science of economics" are only,as good as the as- sumptions. One can go around and around juggling revenue loss figures with changes in the exports, in the way that both the Treasury. and CRS studies do, without ever coming home to the heart of the matter. The option for a corpora- tion which considers selling products to a foreign country is to either manufac- ture them in the United States or to manufacture them abroad. To the extent that DISC results in a higher rate of return for a corporation to manufacture domestically rather than abroad, its ef- fect is to increase production, and, there- fore, employment, at home. The Con- gressional Research Service, although it does not come to grips with this proposi- tion, realizes that "DISC and their re- lated suppliers typically earn a relatively higher profit margin on sales. The com- bin,ed profit margin of about 17.3 percent apparently earned by DISC's is much higher than the combined profit margin of 8.4 percent estimated for manufactur- ing and distribution of goods in the domestic economy." It is this difference in rates of return which causes com- panies to concentrate on exporting from the United States. We have had some interesting history with regard to Congressional Research Service's objective analyses. When the Finance Committee reported out a wind- fall profits tax in July of 1975 which was designed to meet the imminent prospect of oil decontrol, the Congressional Re- search Service, under the same lead author who wrote the DISC study, issued a widely publicized study of the impact of oil price decontrol on the consumer. The original study concluded that the first full year of price decontrol would involve a $26.7 billion cost to the con- sumer. Because the Finance Committee had doubts about the assumptions used in the windfall profits study, it asked the Congressional Research Service to re- calculate its figures. Unfortunately, the revision by the Congressional Research Service was not widely circulated or pub- licized. However, it indicated that by using different assumptions which, in the words of CRS, were considered more reasonable, the cost of decontrol was $7.85 billion-not $26.7 billion. A comparison of the original. Congres- sional Research Service analysis and its revision are shown below. [In billions] - August 6 analysis Revision Crude oil----------------- $16.3 $6.0 Natural gas--------------- 3.9 .6 Coal --------------------- 3.6 .6 NGL --------------------- 2.9 .65 Total --------------- 26.7 7.85 The Congressional Research Service explained the difference in results as follows: These amounts are the annual cost of fuel increases to consumers in 1976, the first full year in which all decontrol impacts are felt. Quite obviously, removal of the $2.00 tariff effect on exports of between zero al3W8.5 billion. This range is. so large that the estimates can serve little useful purpose in a public debate over DISC. Moreover, as the memorandum points out, the price elastici- ties approach analyzes the DISC export ef- fect solely in terms of an effect on prices. DISC was never intended to operate by lowering prices. There is no quantitative evidence that DISC has affected export prices. The purpose of DISC-is to focus the attention of U.S. firms on exports and to provide a tax deferred source of capital for use in the export business. The Treasury analysis of the export effect of DISC is based on a careful comparison of the actual export experience of firms with DICSs and firms without DISC's. This ap- proach suggests that DISC stimulated U.S. exports by about $4.6 billion in DISC year 1974, subject to the qualifications stressed in Chapter 5 of the Report. The Congression- al Research Service has challenged certain statistical procedures used by the Treasury. While reasonable analysts might differ on some of the procedures, the Treasury believes that its methods are defensible for the reasons explained in the enclosed memoran- dum. I believe that a careful reading of the enclosed memorandum will further demon- strate that the repeal or reduction lof DISC benefits would adversely affect exports and export-related jobs. I am sending a similar letter to Senator Curtis, with copies to Senators Kennedy and Haskell. Sincerely yours, CHARLES M. WALKER, Assistant Secret ar CONGRESS STUDY OF Disc - Senators Kennedy and Haskell recently re- leased a Library of Congress study of DISC.' In their accompanying press release, the Senators accuse the Treasury's 1974 Annual Report 2 of containing a "grossly misleading presentation of the economic data on DISC." In other ways, the Senators impugn the credibility of the Treasury and its profes- sional staff. These accustations have no basis in fact, and do not serve the cause of rational public debate. The Treasury Department be- lieves that its Report clearly and accurately sets forth the data. The Treasury further believes that its analysis of the export effect of DISC, which was carefully qualified in the Report, is based on a sounder approach than that adopted by the Library of Congress. When DISC. was enacted in 1971, Congress's directed the Treasury to prepare an annual report on its operation and effect. In fulfill- ing this request, the Treasury has prepared three annual reports. The Treasury has de- voted more effort to these annual reports than to any other evaluation of a special purpose tax measure. The 1974 Annual Re- port is a carefully prepared study which re- presents months of statistical tabulation and analysis. The Report is authored by experi- enced international tax economists and law- 'Library of Congress, Congressional Re- search Service, The Domestic International Sales. Corporation (DISC) Provision and Its Effect and Unemployment: A Background Report, May 3, 1976. 2 Department of the Treasury, The Opera- Approved For Release 2004105/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5, and more reasonable assumptions as to im- pact of crude oil price increases on prices of related products results in a much more limited impact of decontrol. As shown under paragraph 5.1, there is an increase of 7.1 cents per gallon of typical refined product upon decontrol, using the assumptions of the Library of Congress CongressionalRe- search Service in the August 6th analysis, and only a 2.6 cents a gallon increase in refined products under the assumptions in the Revision. (Calculations by Library of Congress CRS in both cases.) The revised study spoke for itself: The assumptions of an economic study deter- mine the conclusions; more reasonable assumptions result in more reasonable conclusions. I hope that before we get into the debate on DISC the Senators will have a chance to examine for them- selves the objectivity of the various stud- ies made on the impact on unemploy- ment. Mr. President, I ask unanimous con- sent to have printed in the RECORD a Treasury response to the study. There being no objection, the mate- rial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, Washington, D.C., May 7, 1976. Hon. RUSSELL B. LOgG, Chairman, Finance Committee, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C. DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: On Monday, May 3, 1976, there appeared in the Congressional Record, at S. 6323, a joint statement of Sen- ators Kennedy and Haskell releasing a Li- brary of Congress study of the DISC provi- sions of the Internal Revenue Code. I am deeply concerned with this statement be- cause it accuses the Treasury Department of a "grossly misleading presentation of the economic data on DISC" in its 1974 Annual Report, and impugns the credibility of the Treasury,and its professional staff. These ac- cusations have no basis in fact, and do not serve the cause of rational public debate. The 1974 Annual Report clearly and accu- rately presents the data which will make possible a rational debate on the merits of the DISC provisions. The major purpose of the Report is to provide data which will en- able readers to make their own determina- tions concerning the merits of DISC. Most of the Report presents statistical tables and background explanation. Chapter 5 of the Report represents an at- tempt by the Treasury Department to ana- lyze the impact of DISC on exports and em- ployment. This analysis was made in response to inquiries from members of the Senate and the House. Chapter 5 contains a clear state- ment that the estimates must be viewed with extreme caution. The statistical procedures are spelled out in the text and tables, and Chapter 5 emphasizes that other statistical methods and assumptions might produce dif- ferent estimates. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress has relied on the statis- tics, the analysis, and the qualifications of the Treasury Report in preparing it own study. The Congressional Research Service employed different methods and assumptions to estimate the impact of DISC. on exports. It is therefore not surprising that the Con- gressional Researce Service reached different results than the Treasury. What is surpris- ing is the unsupported assertion of the Con- gressional Research Service that the Treasury estimates "cannot be viewed as a measure of the impact of the DISC provision on the total value of U.S. exports." Even more sur- prising is the Congressional Researce Serv- ice's embrace of an estimating approach which, in the Service's own words, depends on "extremely uncertain" parameters. There is enclosed for your information a Treasury staff memorandum contrasting the approaches used by the Congressional Re- search Service and the Treasury. The Con- gressional Research Service analysis relies C Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, .1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE ferred to the Committee on Interior and true in the past, which is, I think, a very Insular Affairs. Serious question. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without I also believe there are very serious s(3~ction, it is so ordered. questions relating to the provisions of ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on intelligence activities, and for other purposes. AMENDMENT NO. 1647, AS MODIFIED Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, ,I call up my amendment No. 1647, and I send a modi- fication to the desk. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment, as modified, will be stated. The legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Ohio (Nir. TAFT) pro- poses an amendment (No. 1647), as modified. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that further reading of the .amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment, as modified, is as fol- lows : On page 8, lines 13 and 14, delete the term for public dissemination". On page 8, line 17, delete all after the ,period and delete all of line 18. On page 8, line 22, before the period insert 'or the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated for intelligence activities." The PRESIDING OFFICER. May the Chair ask the Senator, is this the amend- ment which has the time limitation of 2 hours? TAFT. Mr. President, this is not amendment that I referred to in the ent agreement for 2 hours. It is .r. merely a 1-hour amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I yield my- self such time as I may consume. Mr. President, first of all, let me say ? with regard to this entire measure that I have very serious reservations about, it. I am glad that we are going to dispose of it. In delaying action on it last week, I did so because I thought that while the Senate ought to act on it, while I think we need some type of an institu- tionalization of the reporting process of our intelligence agencies, the one we have today being either nonexistent or at least wholly inadequate in my opinion, never- theless the approach that was taken by the substitute which is before us at this time, amendment No. 1643, should be of great concern to all Members of the Sen- ate. I am not sure whether I am going to vote for it or not. I am going to listen to the debate with interest and observe what happens with regard to the amend- ments before making up my mind whether I will support it or not. I think it raises questions as to our security insofar as intelligence operations are concerned which give me serious pause. The fact that we are going to have 15 Members of the Senate, and still the same reporting or some other reporting this bill which go toward the reports that the select committee is directed to make. In that regard, I want to go over some of the specific provisions in the substitute amendment with the Senate. I am certain that there is no Senator who wants to see abuses of power or authority in or by any arm of the Gov- ernment, and the control of abuse in intelligence matters is properly a func- tion of the Congress which we should not avoid. But we must exercise control in a careful and deliberate manner to insure that our oversight activities do not undermine effective intelligence op- erations, to the advantage of our adver- saries. - We have seen around the world too many cases where national security is used as a justification for domestic re- pression. Equally, we see cases where for- eign intelligence services of various States, especially the Soviet Union, en- gage in practices on foreign soil that violate the rights and sovereignty of other States. We cannot and should not view any of these practices with equa- nimity or approval. At the same time, I would hope that there is no member of this body who is not aware of the vital national need for adequate and accurate foreign intelli- gence. Our international opponents, par- ticularly the Soviet Union, are closed societies. They do not publicize their capabilities or their intentions. I think the question of intentions is particularly acute for this country. We know that the ideology of the Soviet Union calls for the spread of communism worldwide. What we do not know is how seriously that ideology is taken, in terms of policy plans. We cannot obtain such knowl- edge without using covert intelligence collection; yet without it, how can we establish a policy toward the Soviet Union other than one based on general mistrust and suspicion of Soviet in- tentions? This is, of ,course, only one example of the need for intelligence, but at a time when we are hotly debating the merits of detente, it is a timely example. There are, Mr. President, many aspects to the problem of how to exercise ade- quate oversight over the intelligence community so as to prevent potential abuses, while at the same time not im- paring our vital intelligence gathering capability. In this respect, I see a number of ways in which amendment No. 1643 to Senate Resolution 400 may be improved. My amendment No. 1647 seeks- to avoid one of the potential problems created by the resolution by prohibiting the public dis- semination of annual reports required under section 4(B) of the substitute amendment. My colleagues will recall that the section 4(B) presently reads: (B) The Select,Conimittee shall obtain an annual report from the director of the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the re ti Director of the Federal B f I u ga a o nves i7'rivy to the information than has been shall review the intelligence activities+of the S 7349 Agency or Department concerned and the intelligence activities of foreign countries directed at the United States or its interests. An unclassified version of each report shall be made available to the public by the Select Committee. Nothing herin shall be construed as requiring the disclosure in such reports of the names of individuals engaged in Intel- ligence activities for the United States or, the sources of information on which such reports are based. Mr. President, last week after this sub- stitute had appeared on the scene, the ? Armed Services Committee, under Chair- man STENNIS, called the Deputy Secre- tary of Defense, Mr. Robert Ellsworth, before that committee to testify on this subject. Secretary Ellsworth's testimony is now printed and available for study and we are making oppies available to any Senators here today who would like to read that testimony. I was concerned in this hearing about the effects of section 4(b) on foreign intelligence sources because of the re- quirement of annual public disclosure. In response to my questions about the effects of the section, Mr. Ellsworth had a good deal to say. I want to read spe- cifically from some of his testimony be- fore the committee just last week with reference to this particular section, sec- tion 4 (b), appearing on page 8 of the bill. Mr. President, at that time, I asked as follows: Senator TAFT. I would like to ask Secretary Ellsworth, in section 4(b) is a provision that: "The select committee shall obtain an an- nual report from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and-the Director of the Federal Bureau of investigation for pub- lic dissemination. Such reports shall review the intelligence activities of the agehcy or department concerned and the intelligence activities of foreign countries directed at the United States or its interests. An unclassified version of each report shall be made avail- able to the public by the select committee. Nothing herein shall be construed as requir- ing the disclosure in such reports of the names of individuals engaged in intelligence activities for the United States or the sources of information." And so forth. What in your opinion would be the effects on foreign intelligence sources to us of it being known that there will annually be such a report made public? Mr. ELLSWORTH. I think that the effect of that report would be to apprise foreign na- tions of the extent of our familiarity with their operations against us, and would assist them in perfecting and strengthening their operations against us. That appears on page 11 of the tran- script. On page 13, a question was-asked by Senator STENNIS, the chairman of the committee: Now, Mr. Secretary, are there any other points that you can think of? And I want you to answer questions here by our Chief of Staff, too. But make your points further. Mr. ELLSWORTH. The only other point. Mr. Chairman, is a personal point that-comes out of what some of my friends, for example, in the academic community have been saying for a couple of years, before I came into the Defense Department, to the effect that it is logical, if we are going to spend that amount of money on intelligence, to have a coherent, unitary budget for that, and logical there- fore to give the jurisdiction for authorizing that budget and for overseeing its perform-, ante, and so forth and so on, into a separate Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7350 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD.- SENATE May 17, 1976 committee in the Congress. They use words like logical and coherent. But I want to stress again that notwithstanding the appeal of logic and coherence, the fact of the matter is that in real life this is going to give us tremendous problems in our responsibilities as far as the Defense Department is con- cerned, first of all, because naturally when you get things into a coherent, unitary pic- ture in the intelligence field, foreign intelli- gence specialists and ,analysis-the analysts who work for foreign powers-are not so dumb that they can't figure out on the basis of a year-to-year comparison basis what is going on in our intelligence collection effort on more effective and efficient basis than they are today. The CHAIRMAN. YOU mean intelligence from foreign nations? Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is right. A foreign analyst analyzing our program is going to have a tremendous edge when he can look at our unitary defense overall intelligence budget and compare it from year to year and put it together*with other bits of informa- tion that he has assembled on the worldwide basis. It is going to be a tremendous help to him with "his problem, figuring out what we are doing and how he can counter it. That is one problem. Another problem is a reflection of the point you yourself made, Mr. Chairman, and that is if the Senate has this process, it is just going to mean double accounting, it is going to mean double automation, and dou- ble staffing as far as we are concerned in presenting our budget to the two bodies. So those are our points. Senator THURMOND then asked the following question: I might ask you this. Have you any thoughts or recommendations on the way you think intelligence might be handled by the Congress to provide the greatest protec- tion to the Government? Mr:'ELLSWORTH. Well, I would think-and speaking again for Secretary Rumsfeld-that it would be desirable as well as-it certainly would be desirable from the standpoint of the public confidence and support in in- telligence operations, and completely accept- able to us, there could be either in the one body, or in the other, or both, or on a joint basis, an oversight committee which would have an exercise a rigorous oversight function over the various intelligence activities of the Government, which would not imply involv- ing itself in these other problems which I have mentioned; that is to say, the admin- istrative problems and the unitary budget presentaiton problem which I have men- tioned. something that could be and would be Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, before we beneficial to- everybody in the Government into a quorum Call, I should like to and to everybody in the intelligence com- ga munity, because of the fact that it would im- respond. prove and increase, presumably, the public's The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the and therefore support, for"neces- Senator from Connecticut withdraw his confidence , sary information-gathering functions. request? Secretary of State, and the Director of Then, continuing on, Senator TiruR- Mr.RIBICOFF. I withdraw my request. the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It MOND asked the following question: Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I would provides also that: I believe Mr. Colby said he would welcome like to reserve final judgment until Sen- Nothing herein shall be construed as re- a small joint committee on the matter of sur- ator BROCK has taken the floor, but my quiring the disclosure in such reports of the veillance. There would be no objection to initial reaction to the amendment of the names of individuals engaged in intelligence that, as I see it. As the chairman mentioned, a Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) is a favor- activities for the United States or the sources joint committee would save intelligence of- of information on which such reports are ficials from making so many appearances. able one. I really cannot imagine what based. They have to appear before the Armed Serv- value a, report for public dissemination ices and Appropriations Committees of the would really have. I am concerned that The language of the resolution does Senate, and the Armed Services. and Appro- it might actually.be misleading. not cover the leaving of inthe telligence priations Committees of the House. If you Certainly to have a report from the in- the matter of divulging . naa a Jul- telilgence Culnmuluby w ~..~ .................. could make one appearance instead of four. on its activities would be.highly valuable. Without an amendment, it could be be 4.1, + at could all t d And so forth. But I think the general im- . It would be comprehensive in scope, and co rsstf e would be t n reDort the d bl ro __ _ -- -- - - e w worth makes it perfectly clear that there the committee has availa is a real danger, even on an unclassified cedures, as provided for in the resolution, lution, that is, that the report did not basis, in making these annual reports to for public dissemination of such infor- the public, reports that the committee is mation in that report as it feels is desira- ing or not. terests of the intelligence communitin tided it wanted-to do so in the public But it does seem to me there is value in interest, but it would be mandated by the the amendment being offered. I would language of this section 4(b) to go ahead like to wait to hear a final argument by annually with an unclassified version of the author of this particular section, the report, and it would be required also Senator BROCK, because I feel he should to have this report, and I think to have have that privilege; but my initial re- it become public property, in effect, un- action to the amendment is favorable. less some matter in it were specifically Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President' I sug- classified; and I question whether it gest the absence of a quorum, and ask would be possible to segregate out the unanimous consent that the time con- unclassified portion and have the report sumed by the quorum call not be charged mean. anything so far as the public is to either -side. concerned; or, on the other hand, not The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without face the alternative Secretary Ellsworth objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will talked of, of providing a pattern of in- call the roll. formation as to how our intelligence The second assistant legislative clerk gathering is proceeding and what kind of proceeded to call the roll. authorization we are giving to it. Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask My amendment would take out the re- unanimous consent that the order for the quirement that such reports be made quorum call be rescinded. public, and take out the requirement that The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without the unclassified version be made avail- objection, it is so ordered. able to the public by the select commit- Mr. ALLEN., Mr. President, -I ask tee, and this modification, which - was unanimous consent that the pending added today, would also add at the end amendment may be set aside tempo- of section 4(b) the words "or the amount rarily in order that I might call up an of funds authorized to be appropriated amendment which the managers of the for intelligence activities," which is an bill have agreed to accept, and which I attempt to help meet the last objection of believe we can dispose of in about a which Secretary Ellsworth was speaking. . minute. - Mr. President, I urge the passage of The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there the amendment, and reserve the .remain- objection? Without objection, it is so or- der of my time. dered. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who Mr. ALLEN. I call up my amender" yields time? - which is at the desk, and ask for its_ Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, let me mediate consideration. respond briefly to the distinguished Sen- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ator from Ohio: amendment will be stated. The part of the section that the Sen- The second assistant legislative clerk ator seeks to have stricken was put in read as follows: the bill by the Senator from Tennessee The Senator from Alabama (Mr. ALLEN), (Mr. BROCK). We have sent for Mr. from himself, Mr. PERCY, and MT. CANNON, BROCK, and would like to have him here proposes an amendment to amendment No. before we take.further action. 1643, as follows: - Mr. President, I suggest the absence on page 8, line 21 between the words "or" of a quorum, and ask unanimous consent and "the" add the following: "the divulging_ that the time for the quorum call not of intelligence methods employed or" be charged to either side. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I yield my- self such time as I may use. Mr. President, the resolution calls for the select committee to obtain an annual report from the Director of Central In- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, 1976 , CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7351 have to include the names of the indi- The additional clause that would be Mr. TAFT. I yield 5 minutes to the viduals engaged in intelligence activi- added at the end of that sentence on line distinguised Senator from Alabama. ties for the United States, or the sources 22 would still be governed entirely by Mr. ALLEN. I thank the Senator. rmation on which such reports are the language in line 19. The language in Mr. President, I support the amend- f info line 19 says that "nothing herein shall be ment offered by the distinguished Sen- ls amendment would add a third bit construed as requiring the disclosure in ator from Ohio. o information that would not have to such reports of * * *" and then referring The resolution calls for the annual be disclosed, and that would be the in- to the language I added, "the amount of report that the committee obtains from telligence methods employed by the funds authorized to be appropriated for the intelligence agencies to be obtained agencies. Otherwise, if they were re- intelligence activities." In other words, for public dissemination and would seem quired to disclose the intelligence meth- it would relate only to a requirement to contemplate that possiblyit could be ods employed, the methods, of course, that it be disclosed. If the committee de- classified and unclassified information, would be made available to adversaries cided it wanted to disclose it, or if the from the language of the resolution; be- and would become common knowledge. Senate overruling the committee decided cause farther down in the section it says All the amendment does is to provide it wanted to disclose the amount of funds that an unclassified version of each re- that, in addition to not disclosing the authorized to be appropriated, it could port shall be made available to the. public names-of the individuals carrying on in- do so and there would be nothing in the by the select committee. telligence activities, or the sources of language that would prevent it. I would Obviously, there is no need, then, for information, they should not be required like to go on to say, however, that this the first phrase that the distinguished to give information as to their methods is the very point on which Secretary Senator from Ohio is seeking to strike, of operation. Ellsworth was, I ,think, abundantly clear. to eliminate the "for public dissemina- So the manager of the bill, the dis- He made the point that the disclosure of tion" of the annual report. tinguished Senator from Illinois' (Mr. the authorization of appropriations was So the report can be obtained; but PERCY), and the distinguished chairman very likely to be helpful to possible ad- what the first `phase of the Senator's of the Committee on Rules and Admin- versaries in interpreting our intelligence amendment does is to eliminate the "for istration (Mr. CANNON) have approved activities. public dissemination." That would the amendment,. and I hope that the . So I think a specific indication that leave, then, the unclassified version be- Senate will accept the amendment. there is no authorization or no require- ing made available to the public by the I reserve the remainder of my time. ment that,, such "a disclosure be made select committee. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who would be desirable at this point. It is The second phase of the amendment yields time? only that. would strike that out, because the com- Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, as the MT. RIBICQF'F. Will the-Senator agree mitte.e has authority, under other sec- manager of the bill, the amendment of- that it is not his intention, and he does tions, to divulge information, if it sees fered by the. distinguished Senator from not interpret the language to foreclose, fit to do so, subject to an appeal to the Alabama. is acceptable. the Senate after meeting in executive Senate. So a method is provided, with- Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, speaking session. to vote by majority vote to dis- out this sentence, for this disclosure of on behalf of the minority I know of no close the amount of authorization? information. objection on this side and certainly the . Mr. TAFT. I certainly take that inter- Further, the sentence which the Sena- amendment is acceptable to the Senator 'pretation,, again saying I would hope, if tor seeks to delete provides that it shall from Illinois. Just looking at a tech- the Seflate ever gets to that point, it be made available, which is directory E. cal point- would take a very careful look at it be- and mandatory; and by eliminating this r. ALLEN. I wish to touch that. cause of the danger I have just outlined. sentence, it would be discretionary with r. PERCY. Have the two "ors" been . Mr. RIBICOFF. But we do have to the committee to take the necessary eliminated?. have faith and trust in the Senate as a steps to divulge the information. So that Mr. ALLEN. Yes.. whole to make the decision and not to sentence is not needed. Mr. PERCY. Fine. foreclose the Senate from making it. Also, the third phase of the amend- I have no further comment. Mr. TAFT. There is no question about ment provides that this section shall not The PRESIDING OFFICER. The it. As .I indicated, I do not think the be construed as requiring. a report on amendment was agreed to. language forecloses the committee from the amount of the appropriation to the Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, May I making the disclosure if it decided it intelligence agency. Obviously, a dis- have the attention of the distinguished wanted to do so. I think it would be closure of the amount of the appropria- Senator. from Ohio? unwise to do so, but if it wanted to do tion would give much valuable informa- I have just noted that the distin- so, it could do so under the language of tion to adversaries as to. the extent of guished Senator from Ohio.changed the - the amendment. our intelligence activities. printed amendment 1647: Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I sug- The colloquy that just occurred be- On page 8, line 22, before the period, in- gest the absence of a quorum, and ask tween the distinguished Senator from sert the following: "or the amount of funds unanimous consent that the time allotted Connecticut (Mr. RisicoFF) and the dis- authorized to be appropriated for intelii- to the quorum call not be charged to tinguished Senator from Ohio (Mr. Bence activities." either side. TAFT) indicates that if the committee What concerns me is that, while it is The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without wished to divulge this information, it not the intention of the resolution to re- objection, it is so ordered. The clerk will could do so if it were allowed to do so quire that the amounts appropriated be call the roll. by the Senate. made public, yet there is provision in the The assistant legislative clerk pro- So the amendment in all three of its legislation providing that, under rule ceeded to call the roll. aspects, it seems to me, is a constructive XXXV, any two Senators in a closed ses- Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, I ask amendment, and I hope it will be agreed sion, could debate the question of the unanimous consent that the order for the to by the Senate. amount of funds. The Senate then by quorum call be rescinded. I yield back the remainder of the time majority vote could make the decision to The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. allotted to me. make public the amount appropriated. BEALL). Without objection, it Is so The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who This would be the Senate's decision in ordered. yields time? that case. What concerns me is that the Mr. ALLEN. Mr. President, will the additional language might foreclose the Senator from Ohio yield me about 5 min- Mr. the absence RIBICOFF. a Mr. quorum, President, I I sug-and Senate Senate itself by majority vote in making utes on the amendment? unanimous e absence of that the time cask public the amount of the appropriation. Mr. TAFT. How much time do I have the quorum not be charged t- This is what concerns me. - remaining on the amendment, Mr. either side. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, if the Sen- President? ING OFFICER. Without atorr will yield on that point, I do not The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- The Objection. PRESit is IDING ordered. ink the Senator's fears would be justi- ator from Ohio has 15 minutes remain- IWd here. ing. The clerk will call the roll. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7352 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 17, 1976 The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING' OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield such time as he may require to the dis- tinguished Senator from Tennessee. Mr. BROCK. I thank the Senator from Connecticut. Mr., President, I should like to dis- cuss the proposed amendment with the Senator from Ohio and be sure that we are on the same track. I wish to explain, first of all, the pur- pose of the language as it was inserted by me in the committee. What we hoped to obtain by this language was at least, on an annual basis, some sort of gen- eral overview of our intelligence opera- tions to be made available to the Amer- ican people so that they could under- stand the need for maintenance of a basic intelligence capability. I understand what the Senator is try- ing to do. I just want to be certain that it leaves us the opportunity to present to the American people, in a completely unclassified sense, a report on why we need an FBI, a CIA, and so forth. I think most people know, but I am not sure that we are reminded of it in a tangible fashion, on a regular basis. Those two agencies particularly have come under massive assault in recent months-for some valid reasons on oc- casion, but generally the assault has ex- ceeded the crime, in my opinion. I think we have done -a great deal of damage to our capacity for national se= curity. In that sense,. then, I was hop- ing that this 'report would afford the agencies an opportunity to present their side of the case to the American people and to justify the foundation for their actions, not only with regard to their basic intelligence activities, but with re- gard to the intelligence activities di- rected against the interest of this coun- try and its people. That was the purpose of the language. I am not so sure that the language is perfect. I certainly have no pride of authorship in it. But I do think it is im- portant that we provide an opportunity for the American people to see just what threats are being raised against this country and what we are trying to do to deal with those threats. Mr. TAFT. I yield myself 2 minutes. Mr. President, I appreciate the posi- tion taken by the Senator from Tennes- see. Basically, I do not think I have any real disagreement with him. It does seem to me that the public should have from the select committee and from Congress a. general indication as to the need for our intelligence activities. The difficulty I have is in going into a formal report of them and setting, out exactly what we are doing anywhere. As- Secretary Ells- worth pointed out in the testimony I re- ferred to earlier, there- is a substantial danger that adversaries, looking at that information, maybe able to detect major intelligence activities. I did go on and read another part of this report of the same hearings before the Committee on Armed Services. I shall ask unanimous consent that it be printed in the RECORD at the conclusion of my remarks. I cite the question raised by-Senator Nuwrr, to which Secretary Eflswortli re- plied later by a letter at the end of the testimony. Senator Nvs w pointed out that, for instance, with the Glomar Ex- plorer, the U-2, and other similar situa- tions, the nature and size of those very activities could show a bulge in intelli- gence activities that might be of some use to those who are making a constant analysis of any information they can get as to what we are doing in the intelli- gence agencies. I do not disagree with the Senator at all. The committee, if it decides to do so, can make available gen- eral information if it becomes convinced that it is -not going to be detrimental from the point of view I am concerned with. I tell the Senator one thing: The American people are deeply concerned with the whole problem of intelligence. They are deeply concerned with the abuses that have been described by the committee that the Senator from Minne- sota was talking about earlier. They are even more concerned about the possibil- ity that some of this information that is classified or information that can be of use to those who are our adversaries in the international intelligence community might become available to them. The American people are in an uproar about that. Everywhere I. go, people are con- cerned about it. They want to see Con- gress do something to try to tighten up this entire area. I hope the legislation that we pass eventually will have that effect. I do not want anything counter- productive to that in the language here. I had the feeling, reading this language in the bill, that it might be so inter- preted. Mr. BROCK. The President has ex- pressed a concern, and I share it. I am disgusted, frankly, with some of the ma- chinations with regard to this Investiga- tion. There clearly were abuses; they must be cleared up, But, there clearly have been excesses in reporting those abuses. I think that is a tragedy for Congress and for the American people. I want no part of that kind of action. What I am reaching for, and may be the Senator can help me find a better way to do it, is an opportunity for these agen- cies to demonstrate to the American people in some. fashion why we need an intelligence capability. I should like for them to have an opportunity to present their side of the case. That is all I am reaching for. If the Senator finds the words, "for public dissemination" on line 13 excessive or unnecessary, then, that is fine to strike that. I am not trying to give the committee an opportunity to make a report on why we: need an agency; I am trying to get the agencies a chance to present their case. What I am asking is that the com- mittee get. the full report and that. an unclassified. summary or synopsis be made available so that we can at -least make, some judgment as to protecting that national interest. Maybe that is not necessary, but I do not know how else to do it, I say to my colleague from Ohio. I know that he and I seek exactly the same objectives with regard to this total bill. We are not in disagreement. Mr. TAFT. I reply to the Senator i_b, under which reports would be made by the various agencies involved and going for a review of the intelligence activities or department concerned and intelli- gence activities of foreign countries di- rected at the United States. It would take out "for public dissemination" and would leave that entirely up to the com- mittee or the Senate. As I discussed earlier with the dis- tinguished chairman of the committee, the Senator from Connecticut, there is nothing in the language of the amend- ment that would prevent the committee or prevent the Senate, either with the committee or without the committee, from going ahead and making public such aspects of any reports from the var- ious departments that they think it is de- sirable to make public. I do not intend to cut off that right at all. In fact, I think it would be a mistake to cut it off. Mr. BROCK. But by striking the lan- guage, I think-let us just talk about some future Senate with some future, different composition. Reading the legis- lative history in which we simply strike the language on lines 17 and 18, the sec- ond part of the amendment, it would read that the committee could write its own report or could not issue any report at all. I almost would rather, if the Senator wants to allow them the privi- lege of passing on this report-because. I think this is a passthrough thing. I d not want it completely rewritten turned around by the committee. I th the agencies ought to have the right to present their own case. I wonder if the Senator would allow me to keep lines 17 and 18 and, instead of the word "shall," write "may." That would allow the committee to release it, but that still leaves the decision with the committee. It still implies that they are releasing a report which came to them and not writing their own. Mr. TAFT. I do not think I would have any objection to that. I think that would leave it optional ' to the committee still and not mandatory. I must say, however, that I would rather expect, from any knowledge I have of the intelligence agencies- Involved, that the last thing in the world they are going to want done is to have a copy of their reports made public. Mr. BROCK. It may be. It is quite pos- sible that the committee would agree with that and say no report at all. You see, there is not any reason for this whole paragraph on page 8, subpara- graph b, without the report, though, be- cause the rest of the bill deals with re- quiring the CIA and the FBI to come be- fore the committee and testify as to what they are doing and why. We might be better off just to eliminate. the whole par- agraph, because that annual report is part and parcel: of the whole bill. If the Senator wants to do that, fine. Alternatively, we could strike the wo "shall" and substitute "may" and leave. 'to the discretion of the committee. I think the Senator can see what I Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE am reaching for. I am a little reluctant to deny these agencies an opportunity for presentation of their own case to the American people at large without-- r. TAFT. I can understand the Sena- feeling. The only thing I would say ut t it is if there is a report of that kind made, I think it ought to come from the President of the United States to the peo- ple of the United States, anyway. Mr. RIBICOFF. Will the Senator yield? Mr. TAFT. Yes. Mr. RIBICOFF. I wonder if we could reconcile the differences in emphasis here? If on line 17, we struck the word "shall" and substituted "may" and on line 18, after the word "public," "at the discretion of" the select committee, would that satisfy the Senator from Tennessee and the Senator from Ohio? Mr. BROCK. It would be all right with me. Mr. TAFT. I think that would satisfy our need in what we have here. Mr. President, I move to modify the amend- ment by deleting lines 3 and 4 of the amendment and on page 8, line 17 that the word "shall" be stricken, and that the word "may" be substituted for it; and in line 18 after the word "public" strike the word "by" and insert the words "at the discretion of." The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the amendment is so modi- fied. Mr. RIBICOFF. Another question arises, if I may have the attention of the distinguished Senator from Ohio, on line 19, page 8, after the word "the" and the word "disclosure" insert the word Mstion blic" because we have now added the of methods of gathering infor- tion and the amount of authorization. While this information should not be 'made public by Senate Resolution 400, we should not deprive the select com- mittee of the information. Mr. TAFT. I think that suggestion is proper, and I agree to that modification. Mr. RIBICOFF. I wonder if the Sen- ator would modify it to insert the word "public" at that point? Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I--move to modify the amendment to insert the word "public" in line 19 before the word "disclosure." The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified. The modifications are as follows: Delete lines 3 and 4 of the amendment (No. 1647). On page 8, line 17 strike "shall" and in- sert in lieu thereof "may". On page 8, line 18 strike "by" and insert in lieu thereof "at the discretion of". On page 8, line 19, after "the" insert "public". Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, under these circumstances the amendment of the distinguished Senator from Ohio, as modified, is acceptable by the manager of the bill. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I should like to commend both the Senator from Ohio and the Senator from Tennessee, who originally wrote this section, for fur- ther clarification of its intent and pur- pose. e senator from Illinois is delighted earn the objective is exactly the same, and I think the compromise language that has been worked out with the many ager of the bill is entirely acceptable. Mr. BROCK. Mr. President, may I say that I too appreciate the efforts of the Senator from Ohio. I think we have an absolutely common purpose in this de- bate, and I appreciate his pointing out the possible dangers as the wording was originally. I could not more thoroughly agree with his concern about the releas- ing of any classified material that would damage our security and our intelligence activities. I appreciate the fact that he brought it up, and I shall support the amendment, as modified. Mr. TAFT. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I am ready to yield back the remainder of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all time yielded back? Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield back the re- mainder of our time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from Ohio. The amendment, as modified, was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. RIBICOFF. I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. TAFT and Mr. THURMOND ad- dressed the Chair. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from South Carolina is recognized. W. THURMOND. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to Senate Resolution The PRESIDING OFFICER.' Who yields time--to the Senator from South Carolina? Mr. RIBICOFF. The Senator is in op- position. Mr. THURMOND. I yield myself 10 minutes. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time being under the control of the minority leader or his designee, the Senator from South Carolina is recognized for 10 min- utes. Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise in opposition to Senate Resolution 400 and the proposed substitute amendment which would establish a committee of 15 members plus the minority and ma- jority leaders. Mr. President, my opposition to this substitute revolves around a number of issues. As each member of this body re- alises, this substitute constitutes an en- tirely new bill and poses far-reaching ramifications. This legislation was not written in the Government Operations Committee and has not had the benefit of hearings. Once again we are witnessing an effort to push through the Senate highly sig- nificant legislation without the benefit of the views of the executive departments involved, or the President of the United States. While this bill deals with the re- sponsibilities of the Senate, it impacts S7353 on the, responsibility of the President, who is charged with management of the intelligence agencies. Obviously, the Senators who wrote this legislation are attempting to do what they' consider best for this country. But I feel if other Senators were brought into the legislative process in the-calm of a committee hearing and markup, we could come up with better legislation. Therefore, it would be my hope the Senate would recommit Senate Resolu- tion 400, as amended, to the Govern- ment Operations Committee with the requirement it come back to the floor in about 30 days. Otherwise, we will be asked to approve.a very important bill which most of us had not even seen be= fore last Thursday. Now moving to the issue of the Select Committee on Intelligence Activities, I would like to make three, or four points: First, it is my view this step by the Senate will result in disclosure of sensi- tive information relative to our intelli- gence activities. This may not come as a result of disclosure by any particular Senator, but when highly sensitive in- telligence is handled by such a large committee and responsibility is shared with many other committees, it is much more difficult to protect classified data. Furthermore, if this bill is adopted I would estimate 50 to 60 staff people will be privy to the most sensitive matters of our Goverment. The Soviets must be laughing at us and the rest of theworld looking on with shocked amazement. The Senate must realize that by pass- age of the proposed substitute we are moving toward a vast proliferation of sensitive data. In my opinion, it will lead to our Nation becoming No. 2 as to the effectiveness of its intelligence gathering apparatus. As presently written, the substitute amendment requires notification prior to any significant activities. This obviously refers to covert operations. If this had been in effect during the Vietnam war it would have required notification to the Senate of highly sensitive military in- telligence operations such as the mining of Haiphong Harbor, the Son Tay Prison raid, and the Mayaguez rescue effort, prior to execution. Any leak, however in- advertent or unintended, would endanger the lives of the personnel carrying out such operations. Our foreign intelligence agents are al- ready shaken by the murder in Athens, Greece, of an agent whose name was published by enemies of the Central In- telligence Agency. Furthermore, by putting intelligence funds under the authority of a large select committee, the size of our intelli- gence budget will become public knowl- edge as the annual authorization of the budget proceeds through the legislative process. This means our enemies will be able to assess our intelligence efforts by evaluating changes in increases and de- creases of funding for our intelligence agencies. Finally, on the subject of disclosures, this committee will be vested with the authority to reveal to the public, after a vote of the full Senate, the most sensi- tive information provided by the Director Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7354 of Central gressional be so power an arm of of the Com Another i vision provi committee mittee any committee proliferatio Th whereas th, oversight i membershi Mr. Presi be that se oversight f will weaker as the subject I af First. DeJ on. foreign forces- axe threat. The the intellig Second. I by the exa ai military sions. Third. T fense Comm properly fo: the respom, In conch favor stren permanent, qualified st mittees. if it is t] any such p tee, we sho. sent to hav Ing, before Services. There be was ordere as follows: STATEMENT PARLIAM Mr. RIDDI have Chang from what t mittee did, mation is co Ing the App to salvage 3 12, which re "Subject a t ate, no fun fiscal year" Said. But th ing Rules o it exists ric Committee 4 ution, or ax motion, whi the Approl brought up a new item item above mittee now, ing authori So you reta to a point oJ for any pur in to the Appropriations Com- if this is retained as is, the exist- in funds ty it has now to bring pose ndt authorized, not subject Intelligence. This means con- control over the Agency will, f it would virtually become ul Congress-rather than an arm mander -in-Chief. des authorization des to the select to reveal to any other com- . the select matter which determines requires such at- isis approach is a step toward n of vital information, n a smaller portion of the p, such as a subcommittee. paration of the intelligence rom the defense committees . On this defense committees. ter the following points: hened oversight through gt a subcommittee with highly affs- in the four defense com- he uld at least hold . roposal e printed in the RE( 6 of testimony from the Committee c of military pilots flying mple rcraft on intelligence mis- arings on ing no objection, thi d to be printed.in t1 OF FLOYD U. RIDDIC NTARZAN OF THM U.S. OK. Mr. Chairman, I ed the resolution c Opera h e Government as far as protection ncerned, and also as s It had previously. W ds as follows: o the Standing Rules d cetera, just as M s shall be appropriats clause, "Subject to et i f the Senate " retains think we onsiderably tions Com- of infor - far as giv- ed for any r. Braswell Stand- the rule 16 as Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 roga-tives of the Senate to organize its vari- ous committees and their jurisdictions in whatever way the Senate sees fit. But this proposal to create authorization, for appropriations jurisdiction in a new Sen- ate committee does give the Secretary me some concern as far as our ability to charge our responsibilities in the Defense - partment is concerned. And principally those concerns are two as far as we are. concerned. We operate our intelligence- responsibility in a somewhat different world- from the CIA or the F51. We operate in an extremely, high- ly technological world, which with our facili- ties, is very sensitive and very delicate: And that is the basis for our first concern from the standpoint of maintaining the. overall confidentiality of our sensitive and expensive military and defense intelligence- sources and methods-and you. know what I 'mean, par- ticularly our most modern collection sys- tems-the visibility that is created by a sep- arate budget formulation process would en- tail, as we see it, grave risks. That is our first concern about the creation of a committee with the authorization for appropriations jurisdiction over these matters. And then in addition, our Department would still be required, should the Senate create this new committee, to maintain a budget. formulation process for the House of Representatives which would- continue to conform to, an appropriation account. And those two separate processes would require double accounting, and would require addi- tional expense, and additional staff, and addi- tional automation equipment. So that we would hope that the Senate in its wisdom would not create this additional committee having additional authorization for appropri- ations jurisdiction over these intelligence matters. Senator HART. Mr. Chairman, Is the Secre- tary going to come back and tell us what these grave risks are? He just leaves the phrase hanging there and I wonder if he is- prepared to tell us what these -risks are? The CHAIRMAN. I do not know. We can it up *ith him a little later. I invited to come here just to put before the -commit- tee whatever he saw in this matter and what problems would be created. Senator HART. I.think- the committee ought. to know what the grave risks are, instead of just floating a phrase like that. The CHAIRMAN. You will certainly have a chance to question him on it. senator TOWER. I might say.that this is extremely sensitive, Mr. Chairman. I know what the risks are. It is extremely sensitive. The. CHAIRMAN. For the time being, as I understand it, we will pass it over and give you a right to examine him. All right, Mr. Ambassador, go ahead. Mr. ELLSWORTH. Those are my two points, Mr. Chairman, the points of the Secretary of Defense and myself. The CHAIRMAN. When you refer to the budget of the Defense Intelligence Agency- you are talking about military intelligence? Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is right. The CHArssAN. That Is the DIA? Mr. ELLSWORTH. The DIA and the NSA and those are the principal subject matters. The CHAIRMAN. And those are the concerns that you carry primarily? Mr. ELLSWoRTH. That is correct. The CHAIRMAN. And you are not thinking in terms of the CIA as such? Mr. ELLSWORTH. No. Senator SYMINGTON. If the Chair will yield. The CHAIRMAN. I will yield to you, Senator. Senator SYMINGTON. I would like you to ex- plain to us, if you will, Mr. Secretary-you say exclusively CIA. As I understand, there is now an effort to put the CIA in as a part of the military intelligence setup, or as an equal member of it, perhaps a sent, member of it. I have always been very st picious after General Graham's speech as just what the military thought about the position of the CIA. And you have talked a CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE , May 17, 1976 - I think that is- a very significant point. For example, if you wanted to hire- a group to do some spy work in Cuba and- there, was no legislative authorization. foF It, and you wanted them to go in on a submarine, you could just put an item for an intelligence activity in South America, for $500 millten or whatever you wanted, and no authorizer tion would be necessary under this proviso. Senator SYMINGTON. But then you bypass the supervisory commtlee, the regulatory committee. Mr. Rwnxcxi. Senator, that is not the in- tent of this appropriation. Senator SYMINGTON. I know it is not the intent, but. it is what has been going on for 25 years, and it is one. of the chief reasons we are in this mess. Mr, RIBDICK. What the Authorization Com- mittee can do is to come in with legislation that. would say, no funds shall be spent, which would give them authority that we now have under this legislative authorization authority. The only thing is, as the confer- ence was agreed upon, if this committee acted to take negative action against a cer- tain activity, it certainly would not be ex- pected that the Appropriations Committee would come in unless there was an extreme crisis, and define what the legislative au- thorization committee had done. The CHAIRMAN. Let me ask a question right there. If you had this, proposal for this activity in South America, you would have to dis- close it right there if you have the authori- zation, you might say, from the floor in the method. thatyou describe? Mr. RmDrcx. That is true. But there are other aspects in there, Senator, that are go- ing to be more exposing than this. For exam- ple, the proviso which reads here: "On or before March 15 of each year, the select committee shall submit to the Corn mittee on the Budget of the Senate the views and estimates described in section 301(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, regard- ing matters within the jurisdiction of the se- lect committee." So the select committee has to submit its information to the Budget Committee just like any other committee, which, if they want to, can expose the details of what they are proposing. The CHAIRMAN. Yes. But that increases rather than takes care of the problem as some of us see it at least about unnecessary or undue disclosure. Mr. RI)DICK. The way this substitute tight- ens up on the flow of information is that it prohibits any member of the select commit- tee from exposing any of the information submitted to the select committee until the committee votes. Now, if it is lawfully classified information, then they must, before the information can be released, submit a report to the Senate in closed session, which the Senate will debate in closed session, as opposed to the way this committee decides whether information of that nature is to be exposed. And if the Sen- ate says yes, it. will be exposed, and if the Senate says no, it will not be exposed. The CHAIRMAN. We especially appreciate your being here. I will now call on Mr. Ellsworth to discuss further some matters already touched on. Now, the general situation. Mr. Ellsworth, is that we want to know your analysis. You represent the executive branch that is go- ing to have to deal with whatever is done. I am glad you arrived Senator Hart.) We are just having a roundrobin table discussion on this whole matter. STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT ELLSWORTH, DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE Mr. ELLSWORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I do speak for the Secretary on this matter. First of all, he understands, and so do T. and fully respect the responsibilities and pre- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL ,RECORD - SENATE little at- length about this with Director tee to perform the jurisdictional responsi- Bush. Now, Director Bush has a political bility that it already at this moment has, base, and he has trenmedous popularity and try that system for a while. I believe among the people and the Congress, and he that this oversight committee is going to strong man. But the way he explained the result in a proliferation of disclosures of plans that he had for an overall com- sensitive information. And I think the po- tee on intelligence, it seems to me that a tential is very much there. I think that we normal man in that position could be have typically overreacted in the Congress drowned by military intelligence people. The to things that have been said in the press. whole idea of setting up the CIA was to Now, the press may have often reflected have a brake against the estimate of the public sentiment. In this particular in- threat by the militarry. He assured me that he stance, I don't believe that the press does. did not have that appehensiOn. But I can- The overriding concern of the constituents not get it out of my mind. I would like to that I have heard 'from on this matter is ask you, what is the revised plan that you that we disclose too much, not too little. plan to have from the executive aspect as Most Americans, I think, want an effective against what we are discussing here from a intelligence-gathering capability, and do not legislative aspect? insist on the disclosure of smoking tidbits of Mr. ELLSWORTH. Well, I have not heard classified information to get their kicks. I about any plan to swallow the CIA up into think, too, that these kinds of disclosures military intelligence. Of course, for a num- taken out of context very often create distor- ber of years, as I understand it, the CIA tion in the popular mind of what our for- program has been presented to the Congress eign policy is or should be, and where the as a part of what is called the consolidated national interest lies. I see the potential for this committee ief f defense intelligence program. Senator SYMINGTON. Ism talking about the new structure you plan. Mr. ELLSWORTH. The new structure which the President established in his Executive order of February 18, 1976, simply creates a national Committee on Foreign Intelligence, of which Mr. Bush as the DCI is the Chair- man. And I, as Deputy Secretary of Defense, am one of the members. The other member is Mr. William Hyland, who is Deputy Assist- ant to the President for National. Security Affairs. And our charge is to see that a na-, tional perspective is imposed on the devel- opment of the planning, the programing, and -the budgeting of all of the intelligence activities of the various branches of the Federal Government, so that there is a re- source allocation process that insures that the President's perspective is brought to bear In connection with it. But there is certainly thing in that about the military intelli- ce swallowing up he CIA, or dominating CIA, or even getting involved in the CIA estimating. Senator SYMINGTON. One more question. listening to it-and I did it with complete sympathy-in fact, it seemed to me that there was a meshing of the CIA into the military intelligence apparatus. If that is going to be the executive branch, then I would lean toward something of the Church recommendation, because if you are going to have an overall setup, including all in- telligence, then you might as well have an overall setup from a regulatory standpoint that includes all intelligence. For example, under the Kennedy letter, the Ambassador in a foreign country had complete supervi- sion of the Central Intelligence 'Agency man. But when it got back to Washington, the Foreign Relations Committee was cut out of it entirely, and the Armed Services Com- mittee took it over. There never could have been any original chart that explained that absurd situation. And it cost us.-a lot of and it cost us a lot of lives, in my money , opinion. And I was on both sides of the fence. Haiphong Harbor, the Son Tay Prison raid, So what I am saying is that before we adopt and the Mayaguez rescue effort prior to exe- any committee, whether it be Rules, Govern- cution. Any leak, however inadvertent, would ment Operations, the Church committee, or endanger the lives of the personnel carrying this committee, we ought to know what the out these orders. plan is in the executive branch that you In addition to the fact that it will lead to have for reorganizing intelligence in the the disclosure to our enemies of classified executive branch. I think we ought to base information, separation of intelligence over- a lot of our committee decision on that sight from the Defense committees will weak- decision. an the intelligence agencies, as well as the The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. Defense committees. Defense and intelligence Senator TowER. I call you on for questions are inseparable. Actions taken on the part and comment. You are a member of the of Defense depends upon intelligence. De- Intelligence Committee. fense decisions are predicated on foreign Senator TOWER. Mr. Chairman, for the rea- intelligence. ons stated by Mr. Ellsworth and-for others, - The level of our intelligence activities can oppose the creation of this committee. be known to Members of Congress, but fund- approach would be that we should bring ing levels should be hidden within defense propriate resolution, a permanent sub- programs, as is now the custom in the De- committee of the Armed Services Commit- fense committees. That is, the two Armed S 7355 Services and the Appropriations Defense Sub- committees. The House has decided not to add another layer of supervision, but un- doubtedly will strengthen present oversight. In conclusion, I would merely say this. The new committee may lead to placing the Unit-. - ed States in the No. 2 or No. 3 position in the world when it comes to the effectiveness of -our intelligence activities. I want to re= peat that. This new committee may lead to placing the United States in the No. 2 or No. 3 position in the world when it comes to the effectiveness of our intelligence activ- ities. Next the Mansfield substitute does not offer any means of improving our system of capabilities. It merely changes present over- sight and increases the numbers of managers in the Congress of intelligence activities. And for those reasons, Mr. Chairman, I am very strongly opposed to the establishment of this Select Committee. The CHAIRMAN\, All right, Senator, thank you very much. Senator Hart, that brings us to you. Right now we are questioning Secretary Ellsworth. Senator HART. It sounds more like stating our position, so I will state mine. Much of what we have heard Here this morning is what we heard when we established the Sen- ate Select Committee on Intelligence 15 months ago. The committee was going to be a big sieve, 11 Senators and 100 staff mem- bers could not keep secrets, and Members of Congress did not have a right to know what was going on in this country, and on and on. And some of us have been directly the victims of administration leaks. I do not know why it is we have 'that double standard. Members of Congress and their staffs cannot keep secrets, but the admin- istration is leakproof. Well, the administra- tion under all Presidents and both parties have leaked like sieves when they want to. And, as I said, I have been a victim of that, so I know how it works. Senator Tower knows as well as I that we have operated for 15 months with 11 Senators-and over 100 staff members and have had no leaks. So this business about you can't have a congressional committee temporary or permanent without leaks is just preposterous. The record shows other- wise. And who is to say that because you wear an armed services hat that you are more leakproof than if you wear some other hat? I don't, like the size of the proposed com- mittee. I would prefer that it be nine. But it is 17 members because of the compromise to accommodate those who oppose this to to begin with. The people who proposed this committee and support it don't want 17 members. I would not have 17 if it were my choice. Every living CIA Director has, on the record, supported this committee. The ad- ministration indicates that a single oversight committee is much better than the present confused situation. I would, as I said before, be extremely in- terested in hearing from the Secretary rather than all of us just rehashing what our positions are on this, as we have been all along, particularly in the area where he talks about serious threats. If we have to empty the room to do it, I think we ought to hear it. Because that is what he is here for. The CHAIRMAN. I do not try to control any Senator. I think we can have either com- ments or questions during this first round. Senator Taft. Senator TAFT. I must say I share some of the serious doubts about this already ex- pressed by my colleagues, Senator Tower and Senator Thurmond. There are some practical things I would like to ask. Maybe Dr. Rid- dick or Mr. Ellsworth can comment on them. But the question I have is that under the procedures involved, as I read them, the Armed Services Committee would be en- titled to ask for a referral of a particular Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 . or all kinds of misch And therefore I oppose its creation. Those are my sentiments. The CHAIRMAN. All right, do you have any questions for Secretary Ellsworth? Senator TOWER. I have no particular ques- tions for him, Mr. Chairman. The CHAIRMAN. We will continue, Senator Jackson. Senator JACKSON. I will defer for now. The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond. Senator THURMOND. I am very strongly op- posed to this Select Intelligence Committee. In the first place, I think it will lead to the disclosure to our enemies of vital informa- tion relative to our intelligence activities. I think it will do that in these ways. The size of the committee, with 19 members, plus a staff of 25 to 30, presents problems in pro- tecting information. I don't believe you can keep information confidential when you have 19 Senators and 25 to 30 staff members deal- ing with it. I have been around here for 22 years. And I have seen information released when the Senate was cautioned that it would be improper and illegal to disclose informa- tion, but it got out. The newspapers, specif- ically the New York Times and the Wash- ington Post, managed to get it some way. A separate committee means a separate budget for intelligence, and thus public dis- closure. If you are going to have a separate budget, people are going to inquire as to where this money goes and how it is author- ized. - Next, the proposal requires the President to advise the committee in advance of any covert operations. I think that is ridiculous. The President of the United States has got to have some flexibility in when to move. This information is highly confidential, and the lives of those carrying out such opera- tion'; could be subject, I think, to undue hazards. I will give you an example. For instance, future Presidents will have to notify the Sen- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7356 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE matter to the Armed Services Committee for a period of time, is that correct? Mr. RmmrcK, For 30 days. It goes two ways, it is sequential concurrent referral, except for CIA. Now, the CIA project does not come to any committee except to the Select Com- mittee. Senator TAFT. There is also in the bill a ban on the disclosure of information by any member of the committee to any other Sen- ator outside of the committee of the classi- fled information. Mr. RIDDICK. There are two aspects in there. One is, until the committee has acted, you may not. After the committee has acted to divulge under certain circumstances, after this has been submitted to the Senate, they can pass it onto a committee or to a Sen- ator. But the staffs are pretty well- Senator TAFT. Only after the committee has acted and there has been an appeal to the President and so forth. Mr. RmnzcK. That is correct. Senator TAFT. The question that comes up to me, substantively, then is, how is the Armed Services Committee going to have enough jurisdiction? Mr. RmDICx. The Armed Services Commit- tee also has a right to make investigations. The resolution specifically states that noth- ing given to the select committee shall pro- hibit any standing committee from making investigations- within their respective juris- dictions that they already have. Senator TAFT. But in order to find this out they are going'to have to call in the various intelligence agencies, they can't go to the select committee and ask for it? Mr. Rmnrcx. This is a part of that compro- mise that Senator Hart was talking about there. Senator TAFT. -How are they going to know, unless they- have an independent investiga- tion? I do not know how they are going to know that they are going to get juris- diction? Mr. RmnIci . That is what I was going to explain. Part of the reason that the com- mittee got so large is the fact that they wanted two representatives from each of these committees. Senator TAFT. But the ban on disclosure of information that is presently In the bill as I read it would apply even to a disclosure of information by the ex officio Armed Serv- ibes Committee member to the chairman of the Armed Services Committee, if he is not a member: Senator HART. If the Senator will yield, I think a portion of the bill may touch on that. Section 4(a) states: "The select committee, for the purposes of accountability to the Senate, shall make reg- ular and periodic reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the intelligence activities of the various departments and agencies of the United States. Such commit- tee shall promptly call to the attention of the Senate or to any other appropriate com- mittee or committees of the Senate any mat- ters-deemed by the select committee to re- quire the immediate attention of the Senate or such other committee or committees." Senator TAFT. Would that apply to classi- lied information? Senator HART. That Is what it does apply to. Senator TAFT. But the same question would remain, I think, because the judgment would then be made by the Armed Services Committee unless the select committee de- cided to turn the matter over to the Armed Services Committee; the Armed Services Committee would have no way to know whether or not there would be a referral. Senator HART. I think it is mandatory lan- guage. They don't have a choice. Senator TAFT. It says deem, and deem to me confers a choice. They have to make a judgment, the legislative committee makes a judgment as to whether they think the Armed Services Committee ought to have this. If they decide that, then they have to defer it. Senator HART. It is.not an arbitrary kind of power that they have to decide whether to turn something over to the Armed Serv- ices Committee or not. If it is a defense-re- lated matter, they have to. That is the, way I read this language. Senator TAFT. I don't read it that way, Senator. I think that is something that ought to be cleared up. I am thinking about an amendment, is why I am. asking these ques- tions along this line. Senator HART. And you do have two mem- bers of the Armed Services Committee on this 17-member committee. - Senator TAFT. I understand that. I might comment that the 8 and 9 setup that you are advocating is that the 8 members involved are represening 61 Senators and with 9 Sen- ators representing 39 Senators who aren't on the committee. It doesn't seem to me it be a very equalized situation. It seems to me that there ought to be an amendment saying that not more than two, because I don't ban the other members of the committee from serving on the Intelligence Committee. Mr. Rmnrcx. Here is another point on that: "The select committee under such regula- tions as the committee may prescribe to pro- tect the confidentiality of such information, make any information described in para- graph. (1) available to any other committee or any other Member of the Senate." Senator TAFT. Again, this is a judgment of the select committee, not of the various other respective committees involved? Mr. Rmnrcx. That is correct. Senator HART. Would the Senator yield again? - One other section is 3(c) on page 4: "Nothing in this resolution shall be con- strued as prohibiting or otherwise restricting the authority of any other committee to sudy and review any intelligence activity to the extent that such activity directly affects a matter otherwise within the jurisdiction. of such- committee." Senator TAFT. This is a separate investiga- tion such as we mentioned earlier? Senator HART. That is right. Senator TAFT. I would like to ask Secretary Ellsworth, in section 4(b) is a provision that: "The select committee shall obtain an an- nual report from the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State, and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for pub- lic dissemination. Such reports shall review the intelligence. activities; of the agency or department concerned and the intelligence activities of foreign countries directed at the United States or its interests. An unclassified version of each report shall be made available to the public by the select committee. Noth- ing herein shall be construed as requiring the disclosure in such reports of the names of individuals engaged in intelligence activities for the United States." And so forth. What in your opinion would be the effects on foreign intelligence sources to us of it being known that there will annually be such a report made public? Mr. ELLSWORTH. I think that the effect of that report would be to apprise foreign na- tions of the extent of our familiarity with their operations against us, and would assist thejn in perfecting and strengthening their operations. against us. Senator.TAFT. Thank you. That is. all the questions I have. Mr. REMICK. The purpose of that com- promise, Senator, was to not prevent the select committee from collecting sensitive in- formation, but then the next paragraph, an unclassified report is, after they sift it out they should make that public. But it was to May 17, 1976 get all such information they wanted, and then make unclassified reports pursuant to the information they obtained. Senator TAFT. Mr. Riddick, you are our Parliamentarian, and I always though very good one, for many years. Doesn't subsitute amendment really involve a cha in the Senate rules? Mr. Rmnrcx. Not directly. It is sort of like the concept that you may not put legislation in an appropriations bill. But by the use of a limitation you can prohibit the operation of existing law which does not amend that law, and therefore is not subject to a point of order. There was one thing in here, the reason for-and I wish Senator Symington was still here, because he was disturbed about this particular point-on section 12, getting back again. to the phrase "subject to the Standing Rules of the Senate," when you begin to adopt this as proposed to a provision in the law, you are beginning to adopt orders for the Senate. And when you adopt an order for the Senate, you. are subjecting anything to the contrary of this resolution to a point of order, whereas if you write, as you did In your law'or procurement, that no appropria- tion should be made unless they are author- ized, that presents a different problem, be- cause the Chair is not called upon to inter- pret the law. And it would not subject that to a point of order. If you put this in one single man, not the Senate, can make a-point of order and knock the thing out. Whereas if you leave this language in there, "Subject to the Standing Rules of the Senate," you do not throw everything subject to a point of order and let one man kill it, it' becomes a vote of the majority of the Senate. That Is the main purpose of this proviso here- as designed. Senator STENNIS. Yes, let me say a few words here, with as much emphasis as I can. Of course the membership is not- as numer- ous as it was a minute ago. - Based on any experience as a Member the Congress, the legislative body, any le lation or activity as broad and as far-reach- ing as this that is not done in conjunction with the House of Representatives .is going to fame; it doesn't make any. difference what kind of a. rule we. adopt. It encircles the globe; it goes to the Innermost. Operations of the Government, it, goes to every diplomatic post that we have arourfd the world, the sub- ject matter of this legislation. And also, to the very heart of the operations of our Gov- ernment, far beyond the military, to the op- eration of any major enterprise in the United States and foreign countries that is involved in all the matters that come Into these ap- propriation bills and the other legislation. . I am not talking about surveillance now, I am talking about legislation.. And to try to have anything that is as involved as that controlled by the Senate that is also not binding on the House of Representatives is just not going to go in my opinion. Imagine the Appropriations Committee of the House- sitting around their table and be- ing bound by a Senate rule. They would look upon it as being ridiculous. And I say that with all respect to the author of this meas- ure. They are trying to meet a problem, that is what they are doing, the Senators on the Church committee, the Rules Committee and the others, they are trying to meet a prob- lem. But to those of us who have been here for years; and have-been in these conferences meeting with the very fine Members of the House, we know that they will snort at these limitations that you put on the Senate. I said way back there that I would favor, if it is worked out, very carefully, a- joint committee on intelligence. I think the prob- lenr has grown, and everything, and r think perhaps that is the best way to handle I Butanything that concerns majorlegislati is just not going to make a go of it with- tHouse Armed Services Committee and tlrl ' House Appropriations Committee if they are Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 7357 not included in the guidelines, the legisla- The CHAIRMAN. You mean intelligence from Senate could cite another Senator for con- tion, or whatever you may call it. foreign nations? tempt. Certainly they could apply- So, I emphasize with all deference to every- Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is right. A foreign Senator TAFT. Not under this rule they one that a plan that doesn't include them analyst analyzing our program is going to couldn't. They can cite employees for con- is going to prove unworthy. have a tremendous ed e when h l k g e can oo tempt, but they can't cite Members for con- we have to remember too that this at our unitary defense overall intelligence tempt. m of getting up an authorization bill budget and compare it from dear to year and ization bill now that goes into the matters Lion that he has assembled on the worldwide constitutional power-that is the only place here that are necessary-you can figure out basis. It is going to be a tremendous help to that the rules provide as the basis on which p we have censured anyhow, under the power something on paper, but an authorization him with his problem, figuring out what we of the Senate to censure its Members. bill or a budget, or whatever you may call are doing and how he can counter it. ' Senator TAFT. Let's go to another point on this intelligence operation that will be passed That is one problem. the same question. Isn't it true that the rules on and adopted at some point by the entire Another problem is a reflection of the currently set the jurisdiction of the various Senate, and then be the controlling guideline point yourself made, Mr. Chairman, and committees? for the appropriation bill of the Senate and that is if the Senate has this process, it is Mr. RIDDICK. Yes. And his is a question that not the House that is something. The under- just going to mean double accounting, it is I raised, Senator. When they are. talking taking itself, dealing wtih those annual au- going to mean double automation, and dou- about giving the exclusive jurisdiction to this thorizations, and then the other phases of ble staffing as far as we are concerned in pre- committee. And I don't know how you are legislation, is just a monumental under- senting our budget to the two bodies, going to get a ruling to that extent, unless taking. And I don't think it can be done as So those are our points. somebody later on makes a ruling, I mean, well and as thoroughly as required by this The CHAIRMAN. Senator Thurmond. focuses a point of order to the question. And resolution, and it is impractical to start with. Senator THURMOND. I might ask you this. that is it. If you go back to rule 25 and look But I felt like Senator Hart wanted to go Have you any thoughts or recommendations at the jurisdiction set forth to the various further in cross-examining the Deputy Sec- on the way you think intelligence might be committees there, you won't find anywhere retary here that he is entitled to. handled by the Congress to provide the great- that it specifically says that the Armed Serv- But, it is sensitive that we would have to est protection to the Government? ices Committee shall have jurisdiction over .largely clear the room, because I don't want Mr. ELLSWORTH. Well, I would think-and CIA. to take all that responsibility. speaking again for Secretary Rumsfeld-that Now, this proviso here merely says that But I can illustrate here something that it would be desirable as well as-it certainly there shall be referred to this committee has come out. Now, there has been a project would be desirable from the standpoint of these following suggestions, and there it that went on for years which was finally dis- the public confidence and support in Intel- stops. covered, this Russian submarine that we un- ligence operations, and completely acceptable Senator TAFT. The rules set up what the dertook to surface. to us, there could be either In the one body, committees are; doesn't it? That went through many appropriation or in the other, or both, or on a joint basis, an Mr. RiDnicir. Yes. bills, and so forth. oversight committee which would have and Senator TAFT. Isn't that a permanent Finally, the cable broke, we actually had exercise a rigorous oversight function over change in the rules to set up a new commit- It fastened, and almost to'the surface. the various intelligence activities of the Gov- tee? I know what all they went through. It was eriiment, which would not imply involving Mr. RIDDICK. That doesn't block the Sen- ~ just impossible for all that to have gone itself in these other problems which I have ate-just like we did in the Small Business through all those processes that we discussed mentioned; that Is to say, the administrative Committee, in my opinion-that doesn't this morning without that having been?dis- Problems and the unitary budget presenta- block the Senate from giving limited jurisdic- closed. And of course, first, it didn't have tion problem which I have mentioned. tion to the Select Committee on Small Busi- to be disclosed to become worthless,. once it And it seems to me that that would be ness. was suspected that we were trying to do something that could be and would be bene- However, if there was something, say, for something with that submarine we were out ficial to everybody in the Government and example -and I am not sure, I have not in- ofness, and everything was lost. to everybody in the intelligence community, -vestigated all aspects of it-as I said to the they illustrations could be given that because of the fact that it would improve i comm ttee when they were talking about haltW't become known yet. and increase, presumably, the public's con- this, if you try to take something away-from So, I don't see how any President of the fidence, and therefore support, for necessary a committee that was specifically set forth in United States can be held accountable for information-gathering functions. -rule 25, giving that committee specifle juris- the security of this Nation, or the Congress Senator THURMOND. I believe Mr. Colby said diction over it-say, for example, It did say either, unless we can work out some system he would welcome a small joint committee on in rule 25 that the CIA shall go to the Armed that is simpler than this. It may have its the matter of surveillance. There would be Services Committee-then to do this- defects and it will. Our present system has no objection to that, as I see it. As the chair- Senator TAPT. The CIA is a part of the its defect, and plenty of them. man mentioned, a joint committee would Armed Services and the Rules; the committee So, I have to oppose that general concept. save intelligence officials from making so should have jurisdiction over the Armed Now, Mr. Secretary, are there any other many appearances. They have to appear be- Services. points that you can think of? And I want you fore the Armed Services and Appropriations Now, it has taken that way. to astha gousc nt here our Chief of Committees of the Senate, and the Armed Mr. RmDicit. I know what you are saying. Staff, too. But coons your by oints further. Services and Appropriations Committees of But the point is, you have got to get a ruling Mr. too.sBu m The only other fuint, r. the. House. If you had a joint committee of from the Chair. on it. And I would say that Chairman, is a e he of Mr- both Houses, they could make one appear- if the proviso in rule 25 gave the Armed p point that comes ance instead of four. Services Committee specifically the CIA, and out of what some of my friends, for example, I often thought that if we could save the somebody should introduce a bill, and you in the academic community have been say- time of these officials in the executive branch could ask the Chair where he was going to Ing for a couple of years, before I came Into that have to come up here before the Con- refer it, and he said to the Select Committee the Defense Department, to the effect that gress, it would mean a it is logical, if we are going to spend that great del. on intelligence, why you could make a point amount of money on intelligence, to have a Sr, a joint committee is not would appear to be of order, Mr. Chairman, that rule 25 provides coherent, unitary budget for that, and to cal all right if it is not too large; wouldn't tr the reference of the CIA to the Armed therefore to give the jurisdiction for author- A joint t committee of both Houses, possibly? it? for Services Committee. And then the Chair Izing that budget and for overseein its er- WouMr. ld that be your H. would have to rule, and you could t take l- formance, and so forth and so on, in to a That hat would certainly be in appeal, and the Chair would submit the a it the the right ht direction. e i use eparateds like itteec In anthe d ongresss They Senator THURMOND. These are all the ques- .is sf ent a de it doesn'tispecify$intthe rules want want to stress, again that notwithstanding tions I have. that some of these things go- appeal of logic'and coherence, the fact The CHAIRMAN. NOW, Senator Taft, do you Senator TAFT. It does specify the Armed of the matter is that in real life this is going have any questions? Services as to the DIA. The DIA is part of the to give us tremendous problems in our re- Senator TAFT. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Armed Services. sponsibilities as far as the Defense Depart- Mr. Riddick, going back to the rules ues- The CHmR"co Will you yield to what ment is concerned, first of all, because natu- tion, isn't ' it true that this resolution In. The eerctmmon defense" is what is in rally when you get things into a coherent, volvs changes in - the provisions relating the rule, isn't it? unitary picture in the intelligence field, for- to disciplining of members? -common def n: I think that is it exactly, se, eign intelligence specialists and analysis-the Mr. RiDDics. Well, I don't know of any rules .T The CHAIRMAN. Y Yes; ; common.defense. analysts who work for foreign powers-are in the standing rules except rules 35 and 36 Senator TAFT. I won't belabor this point, not so dumb that they can't figure out on ti}e and 37 of the executive operations of the Sen- Mr. Chairman. It is obviously one that is go- basis of a year-to-year comparison basis what ate that in any way penalize. Of course, we ing to be brought up. is g f ion in our intelligence collection ef- have got In the constitution the power to For my own Information, however, I would ilore effective and efficient basis than expel them, and we have got the practice of like to ask Dr. Riddick to describe as he un- t re today. censuring them. And I would assume that the . derstands it the current situation with re- Approved For Release 2004/05/13.: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7358 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 17, 1976 gard to the finance backing, whatever the I asked Senator Cannon to come, but he Mr. BRASWELL. Everything requires an ap procedure might be, of the CIA. could not. He suggested Dr. Riddick, and I propriation. In other words, I understand there is a was glad to invite him. Senator NuNN. So, everything right now for code section which permits transfer of funds The Deputy Secretary of Defense for in- intelligence has to be appropriated every to the CIA from other areas, it does nothing telligence, Mr. Ellsworth, was invited to come year? through authorization committees today, it here to give us what he saw in this matter. Mr. BRASWELL. Yes, sir. goes through the Appropriations Committee. I called on W. Braswell to state what he Senator NUNN. And it is all in the .- And there is some kind of an information saw in it. priations bill in the DOD budget? procedure. Is that information procedure to All who have been here have not only Mr. BRASWELL. Yes, sir. And so has been various committee chairmen, and so forth, impressed the Members, but have also asked authorized- in writing? What is its history, and where do questions of Mr. Ellsworth and Dr. Riddick. Senator NBNN. It could be in the DOD we stand today? What is the current proce- So, I call on you gentlemen now. under . authorization, in procurement, in dure? I don't really understand that. I tried Senator Nunn, I call on you. manpower or O. & M. to find out about it 'at the time of Angola, Senator NUNN. I am taking up where Sen- Mr. BRASWELL. Half and half. But this is and I couldn't get any help; I couldn't find ator Taft left off. I don't know what has been totally different here, in having by rule a bill uch anything in writing as to the current pro- talked out before he started because I wasn't coming or out sayin g, That so is m the for nttIllig Mr. ence. cedure. here. Mr. RIDDICK. I am in your predicament, The thing that bothers me, that I have get to. In the Cannon substitute, as I under- too. I know in the appropriations bill they the most questions about,. is how'the budg- stand it, would say that all the authorization did provide for the transaction not to exceed etary part of this is going to work. I am like for all the intelligence community would a certain amount for certain purposes. Senator Taft, I am not sure what the status come in this one bill? Senator TArr. There is a code authoriza- quo Is now. I don't know how it is working Mr. BRASWELL. It says you shall not appro- tion for the transfer, I understand that. But now. I am not on the Committee that deals priate after September 30, 1977, unless such as to what checking is done and why the with it. So let me start there. funds have been previously authorized by a checking is done, is there anything in writ- Is there an authorization process for the bill or joint resolution passed by the Senate ing at all? CIA budget? Is there an authorization proc- during the same or preceding year. That. Mr. RIDDICx. That is kind of a legal ques- ess at the present time? raises the whole issue of disclosure, and tion that gets a little out of my field. I will call on Mr. Braswell. these are for designating the activities of Senator TAPr. I don't think it is legal. Mr. BRASWELL. Senator Nunn, in the basic CIA, DIA, NSA, and so forth. There isn't anything in the Senate rules that law there is a provision that gives CIA au- Senator NUNN. My next question is, how you know of that relates to this consultation thorization, but I do not have the annual do you have an authorizing bill that comes process, is there? process required by law. out of the Senate if you don't have the same Mr. RIDDICK. I don't know of anything Moving to the appropriation process, they thing coming out of the House? that would prohibit it in the rules. obviously get annual money every year, and Mr. BRASWELL. That is the issue, it will be Senator TAFT. Can you tell us what the then that becomes a question of in what ac- controlling on the Senate appropriation, practice has been? This goes directly to '- is counts the money will be placed. Part of that which the House does not control. subcommittee question. intelligence money, in order to spread it The CHAIRMAN. That is the point I made; Mr. RIDDICx. The practice has been that around, and to require the least amount of there is no such legislative channels that I when the budget comes up for estimate on disclosure, is in the authorization bill. All ever heard of, an authorization bill or a joint the various purposes, even though they the CIA money is in defense appropriations. resolution passed only by the Senate. might be silent and give it in a lump sum, So then, the question is, what portion do Senator NUNN. We are going to get up on we refer the whole thing to the Appropria- you want authorized which covers procure- the-floor and have an authorization bill on tions Committee. merit, R. & D., but not O. & M. in support? the intelligence budget, and are we going to Senator TAFT. If there is a desire to get an Now, for the CIA alone, that is not car- debate that authorization bill separately appropriation after the bill is passed, and a ried in the authorization. So, technically it from everything, is that right? desire to transfer for.a new project of the is not authorized in the sense that it is cov- The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. Dr. Rid- CIA, some money from another department, ered in the military authorization bill on the dick. what happens? floor, it is covered in other elements of the Mr. RmDlcx. That is what the rul Mr. Rmnlcx. I don't think it is spelled out DOD appropriation. There are other large vide. any. more, Senator. elements of the intelligence activities of de- Senator NUNN. I don't see how that is pos- Senator TAFT. Do you know as a matter%f fense that are authorized, and some of them sible. practice what happens? Because I got the are split, some in one side and some in the The CHAIRMAN. That is what the argument same kind of answers from where I asked. other. But then that is a division of how you is about, Senator. And I think it does show the need for some are going to cover it. Mr. RIDDICK. If we should pass the billand institutionalization here. Senator NUNN. I am not sure i understand send it over to the House, they would do Mr. RIDDICK. I would assume that it is ad- now. You are saying that none of the CIA something with It. ministrative action pursuant to that transfer -budget is authorized in our military bill The CHAIRMAN. I know what they would of power. . now? ' do( with it. They would laugh at it. Senator TAP-i. Purely the matter of CIA Mr. BRASWELL. It could be, as a cover. ' BRASWELL. They cannot do aoming to various Members of Congress of . Senator NuNN. If it has got a permanent Mr. in the House, because there is do anything nyt require- ment ng their choice or understanding and telling authorization anyway, why would you need for authorization within the House them about it, is that right? to reauthorize it? House rules. Mr. RIDDICK. After consultation, I assume, Mr. BRASWELL. It is not a question that under The the theeHouse I made the point, Senator with certain Senators who have been doing you do not have to, but it is a question of Nunn, if you will yield the of Wien all to me, some oversight in that area. when you want to hide the money, put it in deference to every Senator, ,and ecoral Senator TAFT. There is nothing in writing two places. It does not have to be locally. defe defe mittee, and the author to and bill, every a plan that requires in any way that they consult Senator NUNN. You are saying that part of cannot be successful if it does not iacplan with the chairman of the Armed Services the intelligence budget now is authorized. can of be a fIf ve plan. Committee or the chairman of the Foreign Mr. BRASWELL. Yes. Relations Committee or the chairman of the The CHAIRMAN. And the DIA budget? R Ssa OrTNUN N. I ittee rlec bmeh Y before the Appropriations Committee, or the ranking Mr. BRASWELL. Some. membership. - Senator NUNN. I can't judge this proposal . it and rejected it-I recommended that the Mr. RIDDICK. Not that I know of. until I, know what the situation is. I don't oversight committee-maybe Senator Culver Senator TAFT. Thank you. That is my un- know how much you want to go into. It is and Senator Taft could listen to it-that the derstanding, but I am amazed by it. Every- impossible for me to judge a new proposal. I oversight committee, if there is going to be thing I understood was to the contrary until know where we are, now. And I don't have aa annonosve sghtof mmitte , behgivin the re- this came up. Everybody thinks that there is any idea. g bud et. And then making a recommendation a definite procedure, but there isn't any. Mr. BRASWELL. The big distinction as to on that i And igence budget to ohm endation The CHAIRMAN. We will come back to that. this proposal and the way it is done now ng committee, which would be Armed chance to ask questions. This isna general bill to authorize any intelligence activity, Services Committee, and then have it built ion have discussion and inquiry about the pending it is, hidden entirely in the appropriations ninto ow, h is am author noo be that t e floor so we would resolution being debated on the floor now. without authorization, or it is hidden under k We went into the version known as -the Can- missiles or something else in the defense, but debating practicalthe Individual Iit ems thi 'ti think non amendment, that was filed yesterday; it is never surfaced as an intelligence func- tpossibly work. it goes back to the resolution by the Rules tion. Committee, and also Government Operations Senator NUNN. Let's put it this way. If you Senator TAFT. I agree with you totally. if that co Committee. Dr. Riddick has been with them do. have. part of the DIA budgetit on authorized adds, . And if authors ymit ee had then theft r eco en- during the course of the proposals so I in- thou?still requires an app oP built into our budget. vited him to be here. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE S 7359 Mr. BRASWELL. But that is not what this Senator NUNN. This is such an important The CHAIRMAN. Senator Taft. provides. point .that it seems to me that it is a very Senator TAFT. I would like to ask Mr. Ells- Senator NuNN. I know it. I don't -see- bad situation we are in. I am sure that most worth one thing. Do you have any comment maybe-Dr. Riddick can explain to me how of the people that are for ;thin substitute, on what the effects would be of the pro- this oing. to work as a practical matter. probably part of their premise of being for it posed changes insofar as the commitments Wo we, be involved in a detailed de- would be that they think there is going to in time of the executive branch versus con- - bathe intelligence budget on the floor be an annual authorization bill. And most tern with intelligence might turn out to be? of the Senate every year? of the people who are opposed to it are wor- Mr. ELLSWORTH. Yes, If this were to be Mr. RIDDICx. That Is If the Select Com- ried about that particular point for the adopted by the Senate, then it would mean, mittee on Intelligence reported such a bill. same reason as those with opposite opin- as far as our time is concerned in the Penta- Senator NUNN. You meant, no, they don't Ions. And what we are realy finding out with ? gon, in the preparation of our budget, and th have? it is that it is strictly up to the commit- justification of it in detail, that we would Mr. RIDDICx. It says matters coming up tee as to whether there is going to be an have to have, because of the necessity to go here for reference. If we have got a perma- annual authorization bill or not. ahead and follow the regular procedures, or nent authorization for the CIA, we 'could Mr. RIDDICK. The presumption is that the the existing procedures, I should say, that go ahead and appropriate without provid- committee would report something prema- would continue in the House, that we would ing the legislation if. the select committee ture to their assignment. under this resolu- have to have double accounting, probably not did not report the legislation. tion. double staffing, but we would have to have a Senator NUNN. They don't have to do it, Senator NuNN. And if they do, we are considerable increase in our staff, and a con- then, under this. going to be in the business of reporting on siderable increase in our automatic data Mr. RIDDlcx. If any requests for it come the floor of the Senate at the authorization processing machinery equipment and capa- up, it would be referred under this resolu- debate containing the whole intelligence bility, and It would be a very considerable tion to the Select Committee on Intelligence. budget. And there would be no way to get add-on. Senator NuNN. Where is this permanent into a breakdown, would there? Senator TAFr. I was thinking about the authorization in the law? Is it in the law Mr. BRASWELL. Let me interject that the time of the Secretary and various others un- there? CIA is only one of five activities which must der the Secretary testifying on the Hill as Mr. RIDDICK. I am starting from what be authorized for appropriation, and the well. Mr. Braswell just gave us. DIA as such has no permanent language. Mr. ELLSWORTH. Of course, there would be Senator NUxN. You are saying that that Senator NuNN. You mean if the committee that addition also. permanent authorization Is continuing on did want to authorize that- Senator TAFT. I would like to raise a point' the books in law now? Mr. Bmsws .L. They have got to authorize at this time, Mr. Chairman. Mr. RIDDICx. I'es. We have got--as I under- for the rest. The CHAIRMAN. All right, Senator. stand it, I am citing from experience-we Senator NuNN. This was the main question Senator TAFT. I think the Secretary's testi- have got a few legislative authorization pro- I had. I really think there ought to be at mony has been extremely interesting, and I visions that dates back clear to 1789, we still least an effort to amend that part of this think very relevant, and should be available appropriate every year. Where there is no bill by this committee. And my suggestion Is to Members of the Senate during the debate annual appropriation required, or where a that we consider and let counsel consider on this measure. And I wonder what would legislative authorization bill does not put having a committee with the duty to review be the disposition of the chairman or the a limitation on the years, it becomes a the overall intelligence budget, or whatever committee with regard to making the testi- permanent authorization. they have under that jurisdiction, and make mony of the Secretary public after this meet- Senator NUNN. Where is that provision in a recommendation to the authorizing com.- lug and making it available, and the debate. law? Have you cited that, on the CIA? mittees as to what that budget should be, And I would particularly like to ask the Sec- Mr. Rmnzcx. Mr. Braswell has it. and then let the authorizing committees retary if there is anything that he has gone Senator NuNN. I think Ed Braswell doesn't make the final'decision. ' into here that is so sensitive that it should agree completely with this. The CHAIRMAN. All right. not be discussed or included in any such dis 1 f HAIRMAN. Would you like to ask him May I ask one question gentlemen? Fol- closure of information? or- th a questionf now? This is purely an in- lowing Senator Nunn's questions, directing Mr. ELLSWORTH. Not that I can think of. meeting. It is a key question, and your attention to what you said this morn- But if the committee wants to do that I there is some dispute about it. ing about the perceptiveness of foreign Intel- would like to have an opportunity to review Senator NUNN. Yes. ligence analysts and how they watch our it, if I could get it quickly, I will review it Mr. BRASWELL. I would be the last one expenditure. Let me re-ask that question immediately, i don't think I have anything, to argue with Mr. Riddick on parliamentary now, with reference to the budget that he but I would like to have that opportunity. law. This is a new Senate rule which says brought up. The CHAIRMAN. Subject to review, the that no funds shall be appropriated for any ' Mr. ELLSWORTH. The point was that even if chairman would be glad to release it. fiscal year. I realize this is subject to the the Senate didn't get into the details of Senator THuzMoNn. I think it would be a old standing rule. But this amends it unless what was In a national intelligence budget, good idea to have his testimony available to such funds have been previously authorized the fact of the matter is that by watching show just how the burden is going to be in- by a bill of joint resolution by the Senate changes in the size of the budget from year creased on the Defense Department, their during the same preceding year to carry out to year, if a coherent, unitary intelligence time, and their efforts, and additional per- such activity for such fiscal year. budget was offered publicly and discussed sonnel, and so forth. And if this could be The CHAIRMAN. What are you reading publicly, putting that together with other made available, I think that would be help- from? pieces of intelligence information gathered ful. Mr. BRASWELL. This is the Cannon substi- over a period of years and all around the Senator NtNN. If the, Senator will yield .tute. world, foreign intelligence analysts, that is just a moment for one point here, I had con- Mr. Rmnzcx. But you didn't read the open- to say the intelligence analysts. in foreign , versations with Bill Tobey, and he gave me ing phrase, "Subject to the Standing Rules capitals could very quickly, flesh out the a concrete example. Sometimes I think they of the Senate." intimate details of all of our intelligence pro- Mr. BRASWELL. You are reading to get in a grams and their capabilities and it would be are necessary when you are talking about point of order issue there. The question is, quite a revelation to them, and quite an ad- debate. what does this really mean then if you adopt dition to their overall capability. For instance, the Glomar Explorer-is that this as a rule, then you do not have an an- The CHAIRMAN. Let me say here, gentle- the name of the ship that they sent out? The nual appropriation or authorization. Are you men, in the time I have been into this work, funding on that, if it has been disclosed, the saying that you do not really have to do I have been tempted many times to make total budget, there would have been a bulk it? more disclosures as to the money part. It in the intelligence budget for 'certain years Mr. Rmnzcx. My point is, under this as it has always been embarrassing to me-I mean, while that was being built, and then inevi- Is written, if there were no additional au- disclosures to my colleagues about the money tably the foreign agent would have been able thorization, and the appropriations commit- . part. If it comes up, we can debate it on to tell there was something up, and they tee recommended funds for said purposes, it the floor many times.' But I am always re- would have sent it in and probably found would not ha -hi-4. +? the Senate fl A oor. nd therefore the Senate nately or even moderately because of the Now, is there any way without breaching could go ahead and pass that appropria- point that the Secretary has made. Foreign confidence that you can be more specific and tion bill, including those funds. Intelligence analysts have the capacity to give us, at least for the record, to be used in Mr. BRASWELL. I guess the issue that Mr. Interpret, directly and Indirectly, and put debate, some examples that occurred in the Riddick is making -is that if the new select things together as they watch you from year years Past that would have led to disclosure? committee chose not to carry out this man- to year. The more I got Into it, the more I We have to talk In the abstract so much date under the rule in the form of an an- am convinced that it just has to be kept about this thing so that nobody-can appreci- nual authorization, 'the action of the Ap- under the h t t l a o a arge degree. ate the reality of it. pr tions Committee, the funds would not Senator Thurmond, do you have any ques-. Mr. ELLSWORTH. Let me do the best I can. I beect to a point of order. tions? will draw on that example, and see if I can mDICK. That is right. Senator THURMOND. I don't have any other find some others, Senator. I will be glad, to The CHAIRMAN. I think that clears it up. questions, try. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7360 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May -17, 1976 Senator THURMOND. That would be help- rectly-would be damaging In that they THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ful. would force the presentation in public, of a Washington, D.C., May 14, 1976. Mr. ELLSWORTH. I will have to go back into unitary, coherent budget for intelligence Hon. JbHN C. STENNIS, history. operations and organizations. Chairman, Armed Services Committee; U.S. efec+ Senate Washington th t dama in D.C. -- - - - - ------ ? a g g , nd -dent? I tninx if you could show us would have happened under this procedure. would have to be disclosed? testimony of yesterday and would HMW no if it had existed at certain points in our Mr. ELLSWORTH. That is correct. problem with its being released. history about certain intelligence informa- Mr. BRASWELL. Dr. Riddick, would you be You will recill that Senator Hart indicated tion,. it would be very useful. But if we have able to shed any light on what was intended he would like to know "what the grave risks to just talk in' abstractions about what we under this 11(b) when It says, "It is .the are" which I had mentioned in setting forth fear may happen, I don't think it is going to sense of the Senate that the head of any Department of Defense concerns with regard convince many people. department or'agency involved in any intel- to the visibility that would be created by a The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, is there ligence activity should furnish any informs- separate budget information process. Inas- something else you want to say? tion or document in the possession, custody, much as the Committee did not have the op- Mr. ELLSWORTH. No. or control of the following agencies," et portunity at yesterday's meeting to return to The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Riddick? cetera. Now, that has no limitations on it in that question, I thought it might be helped Mr. RIDDICK. No, sir. terms of words. Was it intended that this if I were to spell out in a little bit more de- The CHAIRMAN. We thank both of you very would be no limitation? Could the commit- tail what I had in mind. much for coming. tee put a demand on all our agents in foreign As you know, the Department of Defense Senator NUNN. May I ask Dr. Riddick one nations to furnish this to that committee? Plans, programs, budgets and operates several question. What would be wrong with having Mr. RiDDICK. That sense of the Senate very expensive high technology collection sys- the Select Committee on Intelligence mak- doesn't give the committee' any additional tems, which collect foreign intelligence fin- ing a budget recommendation that would Power, in my opinion. formation not only for the Department of then be built into the authorizing legisla- Mr. BRASWELL. What was the sense of those Defense but also for the Department of State, tion of existing committees? words as far as furnishing documents? for the Central Intelligence Agency, for the Mr. RIDDICx. We have got a proviso in the Mr. RIDDICK. My humble opinion is, the NBC Staff, and for the President. The .very resolution that requires the committee to, purpose at the time the Government Opera- I am of the existence the specific stems '.'the select committee on or before tions reported this resolution, the feeling referring to is never officially acy March 15th of each year, the select com- was that they couldn't do, get a law passed, edged. First, because the fact of the existence mittee can submit to the committee on the by joint resolution, what they could do by of a given system could, when combined with other facts, expose United States foreign in- that committee have to make a report to Senate resolution. s not it going to came consider me telligence collection sources and methods- how on all the in detail But to that the House e H was no Because thereby enabling foreign powers to deny that how this can be handled in the authoriza- such, and.that they were just putting in the information us. tion, if you, amend that section that spells sense of the Senate as provided by that law, difficulty of proving validity of recognize the tthe he difficulty out the details of how the authorizations knowing full well that you can't legislate I the fully proposition in are to be made and so forth, you could ac- by simple resolution, emphasizing that these debate. It is not a matter which can complish whatever you wanted to accom- were the things that they wanted the de- public ebated 3n public w matter at the same plish if you wanted to change the present partments to know that the select commit- be d doing the very damage which the policy rules. tee would be concerned about. time ve is designed which prevent. Senator NUNN. What would be the main Mr. BRASWELL. Do you think they intended of nondisclosure the nondi l order sgthe validity prevent. arguments against this? That it would di- that they furnish everything that the com- the Therefore, , eit is r to absolutely necessary of minish the authority of the committee? mittee might ask for, anything? above informed judgment of c necessary Mr. RIDICK. Senator, I win tell you, I have Mr. RIDDICK. I would hate to interpret their rely dent and the point, inform ud full knowledge i-to whom been into about 20 conferences with these motives. these extremely expensive and sensitiv sys- people trying to reach compromises. And Senator THURMOND. This is a Senate reso- terra and programs has been entrustei - _ didn't do anything to go along with them to Mr. RmDICK. That is correct, a simple res- save intelligence budget, as would be reglYire try to get language that would be-acceptable. olution. by the separate budget formulation process Senator NIINN. I understand that. But Senator THURMOND. Is the effect of that a now being considered, would Inevitably bring -that would probably be the objection, that- concurrent resolution? these matters into much wider knowledge, in it would dilute the authority of the new Mr. RmDICx. No sir. This has no relation two ways: committee. with. the House, nor can it concur in the a. Such a budget could hardly he debated Mr. RIDDIcx. I think that is true, I think legality. without debating the particular parts that what they want to do is to make it Senator THURMOND. It is not legislation, thereof; and more public, make the information more and it is not law. Would the Defense Depart- b. The exposure of changes in the overall public, and 'at the same time try to protect ment be bound by it? intelligence budg- security. Mr. RmDICx. No more so than they would size of over a a comprehensive of years, years, would give Senator THURMOND. How can they do under any situation in the case of investigat- the a per analysts r would powers a that? - tag committee that had subpena power. e intelligence f foreign they Mr. RIDDICIt. It Is a difficult problem, Sen- - Senator THURMOND. I imagine they would combined substantially increualys s se of phbil ich when rs anges theh ator. I don't know how you can do it. As the contest this, if .they are not bound by it. cninformation information available to Secretary has indicated, if you' go a certain Because if the national security of the other intelligence begin tinf r the programs and way, like if you publish information to country Is jeopardized by some resolution them, t I have it mind, a h the capabilities whom you are giving contracts for defense of either body of the Congress, i presume thereof. The intelligence analysts of foreign purposes, that sets up a picture for the sthe executive branch would make a test of powers are not a dull and alyst oftso as intelligence of foreign countries to plant that in court, if necessary. overlook the shifting patterns of expend- spies in that plant and locate what they Mr. RIDDICK. I would say this, Senator, as a iture and programming which would be can. if you give them an indication that procedure to be binding on the Senate, It revealed. you are doing so and so, it gives them an endeavors to set up a procedure for the I think it is important to keep in mind idea where they can plant spies. I don't Senate to follow. It does not give any select that the very openness of our society already know how,you can do it. committee any legal authority to get infor- gives to the intelligence analysts of foreign Senator THURMOND. As I see it the more mation that it doesn't have already. powers a considerable advantage as they work information disclosed the more our security Senator THURMOND. It would be a resolu- to collect and understand information on our is subject to being jeopardized. I can't see tion that would be a guide and to the Senate capabilities and intentions, as well as our ad- it any other way. to get what information they could, but it is of . details To of give programs them ms the and s added ed ad- Mr. RIDDICx. I don't feel that f am en- not law, another branch of Government vulnerabilities. titled to express an opinion. I just say what would not necessarily have to be bound by which heretofore have been fully protected the problem is. ' it, would they? from their scrutiny would be quite unde- Senator THURMOND. Sure. We understand RIDDICx. The extent of the committee suable. Mr. your position. is its subpena power to get information. In reviewing some recent history, for exam- Mr. BRASWELL. Mr. Secretary, just to wrap The CHAIRMAN. Gentleman, do we have fur- this up, say that there are certain ele- T pie, it is interesting to note that overall na- ments of this bill, the proposed resolution, ther questions? If not, Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. tional intelligence funding showed a bulge that would be damaging to U.S. intelligence Riddick, thank you very much. from fiscal year 1969 to fiscal year 1972, then efforts. We will take a recess, gentlemen, subject to a slight decrease to fiscal year 1976, then a the call of the Chair. more marked decline. The initial bulgerre- We feel that the authoriz-Mr. ing for ELLSWORTH. appropriation provisions in sec-. [The attached letter from Secretary 'Ella- flected initial funding of the Glom been submitted for inclusion in plover; the slight decrease represent h t as h t the numbers wor tions-I don't remember wha are, 3 and 12 if my memory serves me cot- the record at this point; I conclusion of the initial production :; W se Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 7361 and the more marked decline coincided with the public disclosure of that operation and its abandonment. If that pattern had been available to the intelligence analysts of for- ble, when combining that pattern with bits and pieces of information avail- partment of Defense would still be required to maintain a budget formulation process for the House of Representatives which would continue to conform to an appropriation ac- count. The two separate processes which pose upon us the necessity to maintain double accounting for our intelligence pro- gramming and budgeting. It would also re- quire additional expenses,. additional staff, to yourself and to the Committee and to the Senate. ROBERT ELLSWORTH: Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Mc- CLURE). The clerk will call the roll. The assistant. legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. AMENDMENT NO. 1646 Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 1646. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. e assistant legislative clerk pro- d to read the amendment. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that further reading of the amendment be dispensed with. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The amendment is as follows: On page 6, line 12, delete paragraph (b) and substitute the following provision: (b) Any proposed legislation or other in- telligence matter considered by the select committee, except any legislation involving matters specified in clause (1) or (4) (A) of subsection (a), containing any matter other- wise within the jurisdiction of any standing committee shall be communicated to the chairman and ranking member, respectively, of such standing committee, and at the re- quest of the chairman of such standing com- mittee any proposed legislation shall be re- ferred to such standing committee for its consideration of such matter and be reported to the Senate by such standing committee within thirty days after" the day on which any proposed legislation is referred to such standing committee; and any proposed legis- lation reported by any committee, other than the select committee, which contains any matter within the jurisdiction of the select committee shall, at the request of the chair- man of the select committee, be referred to the select committee for its consideration of such matter and be reported to the. Senate by the select committee within thirty days after the day on which such proposed legis- lation is referred to such committee. In any case in which a committee fails to report any proposed legislation referred to it within the time limit prescribed herein, such tom- e shall be automatically discharged further consideration of such proposed ation on the thirtieth. day following thWciay on which such proposed legislation is referred to such committee unless the Senate provides otherwise. In computing any thirty-day period under this paragraph there shall be excluded from such computation any days on which the Senate is not in session. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, this amend- ment relates to section 3(b) of the pro- posed substitute, page 6 of that substi- tute, which sets up a procedure under which any proposed legislation reported by the select committee, except legisla- tion relating to authorizations and leg- islation relating to the Central Intelli- gence Agency, or the Director of Central Intelligence, containing any matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of any standing committee shall, at the request of the chairman of such standing com- mittee, be referred to such standing com- mittee for its consideration of such matter. Then it goes on to the procedural as- pects of how this is handled requiring the standing committee to act within a specified period of time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair inquires of the Senator if this is the amendment upon which 2 hours have been designated. Mr. TAFT. No; this is a 1-hour amendment.- The PRESIDING OFFICER. I thank the Senator. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, the question that occurred to us "in the hearings be- fore the Armed Services Committee with regard to this amendment was whether there was any way in which the chairman of the standing committee could possibly know what matters were before the intelligence committee so that he could ask for jurisdiction to be asserted under this particular clause. Let me read briefly from the tran- script of the committee hearings before the Armed Services Committee in this regard, page 9 of that transcript: Senator TAFT. I must say I share some of the serious doubts about this already ex- pressed by my colleagues, Senator Tower and Senator Thurmond, There are some practical things I would like to ask. Maybe Dr. Riddick or Mr. Ellsworth can comment on them. But the question I have is that under the procedures involved, as I read them, the Armed Services Committee would be entitled to ask for a referral of 'a particular matter to the Armed Services Committee for a period of time, is that correct? Mr. RIDDlcx. For 30 days. It goes two ways, it is sequential concurrent referral, except for CIA. Now, the CIA project does not come to any committee except to the select Committee. Senator TAFT. There is also in the bill a ban on the disclosure of information by any member of the committee to any other Sen- ator outside of the committee of the classified information. Mr. RIDDICK. There are two aspects in there. One is, until the committee has acted, you may not. After the committee has acted to divulge under certain circumstances, after this has been submitted to the Senate, they can pass it onto a committee or to a Senator. But the staffs are pretty well Senator TAFT. Only after the committee has acted and there has been an appeal to the President and so forth. Mr. RIDDICK. That is correct. Senator TAFT. The question that comes up to me, substantively, then is, how is the Armed Services Committee going to have enough jurisdiction? Mr. RIDDICK. The Armed Services Commit- tee also has a right to make investigations. The resolution specifically states that noth- ing given to the select committee shall pro- hibit any standing committee from making investigations within their respective juris- dictions that they already have. Senator. TAFT. But in order to find this out they are going to have to call in the various intelligence agencies, they can't go to the select committee and ask for it? Mr. RIDDlcx. This is a part of that compro- mise that Senator Hart was talking about there. Senator TAFT. How are they going to know, unless they have an independent investiga- tion? I do not know how they are going to know that they are going to get jurisdiction. Mr. RIDDlcx. That is what I was going to explain. Part of the reason that the commit- tee got so large is the fact that they wanted two representatives from each of these com- mittees. Senator TAFT. But the ban on disclosure of information that is presently in the bill as I read it would apply even to a disclosure of information by the ex officio Armed Services Committee member to the chairman of the' Armed Services Committee, if he is not a member. Senator HART. If the Senator will yield, I think a portion of the bill may* touch on that. Section 4(a) states: "The select committee, for the purposes of accountability to the Senate, shall make reg- ular and periodic reports to the Senate on the nature and extent of the intelligence ac- tivities of the various departments and agen- cies of the United States. Such committee shall promptly call to the attention of the Senate or to any other appropriate commit- tee or committees of the Senate any mat- ters deemed by the select committee to re- quire the immediate attention of the Senate or such other committee or committees." Senator TAFT. Would that apply to classi- fied information? Senator HART. That is what it does apply to. Senator TAFT. But the same question would remain, I think, because the judgment would then be made by the Armed Services Com- mittee unless the select committee decided to turn the matter over to the Armed Serv- ices Committee; the Armed Services Commit- tee would have no way to know whether or not there would be a referral. Senator HART. I think it is mandatory lan- guage. They don't have a choice. Senator TAFT. It says deem, and deem to me confers a choice. They have to make a judgment, the legislative committee make a judgment as to whether they think the Armed Services Committee ought to have this. If they decide that, then they have to defer it. Senator HART. It is not an arbitrary kind of power that they have to decide whether to turn something over to the Armed Services Committee or not. If it is a defense-related matter, they have to. That is the way I read this language. 11 Senator TAFT. I don't read it that way, Senator. I think that is something.that ought to be cleared up. ..1 am thinking about an amendment, is why I am asking these ques- tions along this line. Senator HART. And you do have two mem- bers of the Armed Services Committee on this 17-member committee. Senator TAFT. I understand that. I might comment that the 8 and 9 setup that you are advocating is that the 8 members in- volved are representing 61 Senators and with 9 Senators representing 39 Senators who aren't on the committee. The point that I would make is that there is no way under which the Armed Services Committee can know what is before the Select Committee on Intelli- gence unless the Select Committee on In- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001--5 S 7362 Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE . May 17, 1976 telligence itself makes a judgment that it wants to refer to the Armed Services Committee. If the select committee wants to leave the Armed Services Com- mittee in the dark, they can leave them in the dark because they would deem it was not within their jurisdiction or area of interest. So I think we have a real question here. I attempt, by this amendment, to clear it up by changing the language saying that any matter otherwise under the jurisdiction of any standing commit- tee shall be communicated to the chair- man and ranking minority member, respectively, outside the standing com- mittee. Then we would go ahead with the same language for concurrent juris- diction that is included in the substitute as it presently stands. Mr. President, with regard to that, the committee never really did resolve the question. I would be interested in hearing from the distinguished chairman of the committee and the ranking minority member as to what their understanding is in this regard and how mechanics of this can work. I reserve the remainder of my time. Mr. RIBICOFF. I would be pleased to respond. Senator TAFT's amendment re- quires the new committee under section 4(a) to communicate to the appropriate standing committee any . intelligence matter, as well as any legislation con- sidered. Section 4(a) already requires this new committee to promptly communicate with the appropriate standing commit- tee any matter deemed by the select committee to require the immediate at- tention of such committee. What worries me is that the mandatory nature of the proposed language, in conjunction with its vague reference to the words "any matter," could unduly hamper the new committee's operations. If it requires dis- closure of all the details of an intelli- gence activity, for example, it could be a burdensome requirement. The general language in 4(a) is preferable. Under section 3(d) on page 7 the other stand- ing committees will be able to obtain directly from the intelligence commit- tee the information they need. I read: (d) Nothing in this resolution shall be con- strued as amending, limiting, or otherwise changing the authority of any standing com- mittee of the Senate to obtain full and prompt access to the product of the intelli- gence activities of any department or agency of the Government relevant to a - matter otherwise within the jurisdiction of such committee. And on page 7 is 3 (c) : (c) Nothing in this resolution shall be construed as prohibiting or otherwise re- stricting the authority of any other commit- tee to study and review any intelligence ac- tivity to the extent that such activity directly affects a matter otherwise within the juris- diction of such committee. I would like to point out that last Thursday the distinguished Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON) introduced an amendment cutting down the size of the committee from 17 to 15. The pending substitute also mandates that two mem- bers on that committee be from Armed Services, two from Foreign Relations, two from Appropriations and two from the Judiciary. So the standing committees that have jurisdiction generally over the agencies that engage in intelligence will have the majority of the 15 members on that committee. Mr. TAFT. Will the Senator yield at that point? Mr. RIBICOFF. I would be pleased to yield. Mr. TAFT. What confused me is the fact that, as I understand the prohibition on communication of information by members of the Select Committee on In- telligence even though there are ex officio members on that committee from various other standing committees with concurrent jurisdictions, there would not be any authority on their part to even communicate to their own chairmen something before the Select Committee on Intelligence that they felt also would entitle the other standing committee with concurrent jurisdiction to receive it. Mr. RIBICOFF. May I point out they are not ex officio. They are actual, voting members of that 15-member committee. There is a provision that at the request of the so-called parent committee there is a sequential referral for a period of 3Q days. So the other committee can ask that it be referred on to them. If this is going to work at all, there has to be comity between the standing committees, the select committee, and the executive branch of our Government. If there is not this comity, it is not going to work. It is inconceivable to me that any intelligence matter would be kept back from the parent committee. Mr. TAFT. Will the Senator yield? Mr. RIBICOFF. I am pleased to yield. Mr. TAFT. Can the Senator answer specifically under the legislation as it is now proposed, without any amendment, whether the members of the Armed Serv- ices Committee, who also are Members of the Select Committee on Intelligence, have the right-never mind the duty- to communicate information that they get on the select committee to the chair- man I of the Armed Services Committee and the ranking minority member of the Armed Services Committee? Mr. RIBICOFF. It is my understand- ing that when it comes to communica- tions the communications will be in ac- cordance with rules and regulations established by the select committee. We did not try to write into the legislation how they were going to communicate with one another. But the select com- mittee, with eight members being from the four other committees, could sit down and make the rules and regulations of the select committee which could pro- vide under what circumstances there would be communication from the select committee to the other standing com- mittees. I am sure the eight members would see to it that they would be able to communicate to the so-called parent committee a matter that affects the standing committee and its operating functions. I wonder if my distinguished colleague from Illinois interprets the resolution the same way that I have. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, if the Senator will yield for just a comment, on line 22 on page 14, paragraph 2, the language says: regulations as the committee shall pr to protect the confidentiality of such paragraph (1) available to any other com- mittee or any other Member of the Senate. It certainly seems that by our pre- scribing that two Members shall come from each of the four committees, the intent and purpose is to be certain that those committees, each of which do deal with one aspect of intelligence, are fully' apprised, and that there shall be a mem- ber of both the majority and the minority. - Any time any member of that com- mittee feels that certain matters are be- ing discussed that the other cognizant committees should be aware of, there is adequate procedure for making certain that that information can be trans- mitted. The problem I have with the pending amendment is that it would require a tremendous amount of reporting by the intelligence committee of a broad range of matters not requiring legislation, simply by those words "or other intelli- gence matter considered by the select committee." The burden of responsibility would be tremendous, and much of that material might-be highly sensitive. That would seem to drastically reduce the in- dependence of the intelligence commit- tee, and place a burden ? upon it which hopefully the group working on the com itself, and that the four cognizant com- mittees are fully represented on that committee at all times. Mr. RIBICOFF. If I may add further, ,we were careful not to try to write all the rules and procedures in the legisla- tion. You have to read 8(c) (2) on page 14 with section 3 (c) and. (d) on page 7 and section 4(a) on page 7 together. I look at all those provisions to be taken together. These provisions show that it Is the intention of the resolution that the new committee keep informed all these other committees sharing responsibility. I do believe that we have, in 3 (c) and (d) and 4(a), combined with 8(c) (2) on page 14, the method by which to keep the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Ju- diciary, and Appropriations Committees completely, informed. I would be very -disappointed in the intelligence of the Senate as a whole and the select com- mittee if they were not able to prescribe rules to assure that the Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Judiciary, and Ap- propriations- Committees could exercise their-appropriate functions. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I yield my- self such time as I may consume. I appreciate the good intentions of the, distinguished Senator to discuss the fact that there would be good coordination under the regulations of the Select Com- mittee on Intelligence. But I still not received an answer to the basic tion as to whether there is any Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE right under the resolution as drafted for apparently it is an intended deficiency. a member of the Select Committee on Apparently the intention of the draftees Intelligence who is also a member of the of the substitute is that individual mem- Committee'on Armed Services to go to bers of the select committee who are tile irman of the Armed Services members of another standing committee Co tee, or the ranking minority which has concurrent jurisdiction may menr if he be a member of the minor- not communicate to the chairman or ity, and tell them about a matter that is the ranking minority member of that being heard by the Select Committee on committee information that they get Intelligence which comes also within the with regard to a matter properly within concurrent jurisdiction of the Armed the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Services Committee.- - Committee or the other standing com- I point out With regard to that the mittee. specific language included in section 8 This seems to me to put them in a di- (c) (1). We have been talking about ?rect conflict of interest position insofar section 8(c) (2), but I would call atten- as their position on the standing com- tion to section 8(c) (1), which is a flat mittee is concerned. The amendment is prohibition, saying that no information designed to correct that, and I do not in the possession of the select committee see what harm the amendment does in relating to the lawful intelligence activi- correcting it. It merely says they have ties and so forth, which has been classi- fied, can be disclosed to any other Mem- ber or anyone else. Mr. RIBICOFF. I would say it could not without action by a majority of the select committee. Mr. TAFT. So it would be up to the select committee to vote. Mr. RIBICOFF. To the select commit- tee, by a majority vote; and the select committee may have regulations requir- ing a written record of who was disclos- ing what to whom. Mr. TAFT. Then I go on to point out- I do not really agree with the Senator in that statement, because it seems to me the prohibition in (c) (1) is so clear it is not even amended by (c) (2). The Sen- ator says it is amended by (c) (2) ; I would take it this would be legislative hist r on that point: But it still does nove in the control of the member of SWRrmed Services Committee the de- cision as to whether he talks with the chairman of the Armed Services Com- mittee, which I think is an intolerable burden to put on the man, and he is in a conflict of interest position, basically. Mr. RIBICOFF. No, I would say that (c) (1) provides in line 21, "or as pro- vided in paragraph (2)." If you go now to (c) (2), it gives the select committee the authority to make regulations to communicate this matter to the other committees. I have complete confidence that the select committee will be able to make sure that they transfer from the select committee to the other committees the knowledge and information as provided under section 4(a) . I think we are making the legislative history right here today indicating how that would be-achieved. Mr. TAFT. I would just say with regard to that, I am afraid I cannot agree with the Senator on it. It seems to me that subsection (2) merely applies to the way the regulations of committees will oper- ate. It does not really say what the in- dividual member of the committee may or may not do with regard to his other standing committee. It gives me 'a good deal of pause about this. I do not see any way in which there is direct authority for a member of the select committee to refer a matter to the standing commit- teeA&lvhich he is a member. that authority. I am not attempting to take it one step farther than that. But if the matter also comes before the Select Committee on Intelligence, I think the member of the select commit- tee should be authorized to go before the chairman.of the committee. The matter might be solved if the only members of the select committee who are members of the standing committee were the chairman and the ranking minority member of the standing committee. That might resolve it, although then perhaps someone would even find within him- self a conflict as to whether he could take that information and move with his committee. Mr. RIBICOFF. I wonder if the Sen- ator would concur-and I would have to check also with the distinguished Sena- tor from Nevada and the distinguished Senator from Illinois-if, on page 8, on line 5, we deleted the words "deemed by," crossing out the select committee, and then having "requiring," so as to make it read "such committee shall promptly call to the attention of the Senate or to any other appropriate committee or com- mittees of the Senate any matters re- quiring the immediate attention of the Senate or such other committee or com- mittees." So anything of importance would immediately be sent over to the com- mittee having sequential jurisdiction, without requiring such committee to take all the minutia that comes to it, and give it to the other * committees, or all the details which would not concern the other committee. Does the Senator from Ohio think that would solve his problem? Mr. TAFT. It does solve my problem in some part anyway because it seems to me, 'to, go to matters requiring im- mediate attention. I do not know why it should be limited to those matters, but it is a step in the right direction certainly so if the matter does require immediate attention, of course, we have it all. What it would do practically is give the member of the Intelligence Committee, who is a member of the standing committee, a basis for raising the question and saying this is a matter requiring the immediate attention of the committee. Mr. RIBICOFF. I am even willing to we have a deficiency here, which take out the word "immediate" so then is a rather serious one insofar as there would be no problem what our i n- the committee referral is concerned, and tention is. It is definitely our intention S 7363 if there is any matter of importance in- volving any other committee that that matter should go to this other commit- tee for its attention. If we took out the word "imingdiate" that would-indicate that it is the intention of this resolution that when a matter of substance comes before they Intelligence Committee it then goes over to the Committees on Armed Services, Foreign Relations, Judiciary, or Appropriations. Mr. TAFT. I think with that change it meets substantially the objections I have been raising. Mr. RIBICOFF. I would suggest the absence of a quorum so I could consult with the Senator from Illinois and the Senator from Nevada. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The time is to be equally charged against both sides. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 minute on the bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Montana is recognized. PUBLIC WORKS EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1976 . Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, t on behalf of the Senator from West Virginia (Mr. RANDOLPH) I ask the Chair to lay before the Senate a message from the House of Representatives on S. 3201. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. MCCLURE) laid before the Senate a mes- sage from the House of Representatives insisting upon its amendments to the bill (S. 3201) to amend the Public Works and Economic Development Act of 1965, to increase the antirecessionary effective- ness of the program, and for other pur- poses, and requesting a conference with the Senate on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses thereon. Mr. MANSFIELD. I move that the Senate agree to the request of the House for a conference, and that the Chair be authorized. to appoint the conferees on the part of the Senate. The motion was agreed to; and the Presiding Officer appointed Mr. RAN- DOLPH, Mr. MUSKIE, Mr. MONTOYA, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. RiBrcoFF, Mr. GLENN, Mr. BAKER, Mr. MCCLURE, Mr. STAFFORD, and Mr. JAVrTS conferees on the part of the Senate. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk will call the roll. The time is to be charged equally to the proponents and opponents of the Taft amendment. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7364 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 17, 1976 Mr. TAFT. Mr.. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. , Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I -:asktla: modify my amendment. The- PRESIDING OFFICER. The modification will be stated. The legislative clerk read as follows: On page 8, line 5, delete the words "deemed by the" and substitute: the words, "requiring the". On page 8, line 6, strike the words, "select committee to require the immediate". Mr. TAFT. I appreciate the considera- tion this matter was given by the Sena- tor from Connecticut and the Senator from Illinois. I believe this largely does meet the problem that I have raised. I think, prac- tically, with this language as modified that the intention will be clear that the individual members of the Select Com- mittee on any matters affecting the other standing committee on which they serve will be in a position to ask the Select Committee to call the matter to the at- tention of the other standing committee for their possible assertion of concurrent jurisdiction. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the amendment, offered by the distinguished Senator from Ohio is acceptable to me. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, a point of clarification. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will state it, Mr. PERCY. Is the language substi- tuted for the language offered before by the distinguished Senator from Ohio? Mr. TAFT. Yes. That was the inten- tion of the Senator from Ohio. The language is. a substiute for the amend- ment previously offered. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Chair understand that-the Senator from Ohio states this Is a substitute for the entire language? Mr. TAFT. It is a substitute for the amendment. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified. - Mr. PERCY. Mr_ President, with that understanding and also taking into account the wording of the substitute, the objection the Senator from Illinois had before has now been fully taken satisfied. The concern that I had before was that it imposed a tremendous bur- den upon the committee to refer all other intelligence matters considered by the Select Committee to another committee whenever it involved their work. This clearly delineates the difference now be- tween all matters, which might include minor matters, and matters of consider- able importance. With that modification and substitution, it is acceptable. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the substitute amendment of the Senator from Ohio. The amendment was agreed to. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. . The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. COMMITTEE. DISCHARGED FROM FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF S. 1174, EARTHQUAKE HAZARD RE- DUCTION ACT Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, this request has been cleared on both sides of theraisle, with all concerned. S. 1174, the Earthquake Hazard Reduc- tion Act, originally called the Earthquake Disaster Medication Act of 1975, was in- troduced on March 13, 1975. It was re- ferred by unanimous consent to the Com- mittee on Commerce, with an additional referral to the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare for a period not to exceed 30 days, if and when it was reported by the Committee on Commerce. I now ask unanimous consent that the Committee on Labor and Public Welfare be discharged from further consideration of this bill as of the time it was reported by the Committee on Commerce, so that the bill will be placed directly on the cal- endar as of that time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum, in accord- ance with the previous request. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN- ATOR PROXMIRE ON WEDNESDAY Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on Wednesday next, after the joint leaders have been recognized, the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. PROXMIRE) be recognized for not to exceed 15 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE - ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a. Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is my understanding that the Senate has agreed to a 20-minute limitation on de- - batable motions or appeals under the unanimous-consent agreement. Is that correct? The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. Mr. MANSFIELD. It is my further One Taft amendment, which is"lfaw the pending business; a possible Taft amendment with a 2-hour limtiation, which will be offered tomorrow; one Allen amendment, and one Tower-Stennis- - Thurmond amendment which will take not to exceed 4 hours, plus the remainder of the 4 hours on the bill. ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, if - there is no further business to come be- fore the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 10 a.m. to- morrow. The motion was agreed to; and at 4:15 the Senate adjourned until tomorrow, Tuesday, May 18, 1976 at 10 a.m. . NOMINATIONS Executive nominations received by the Senate, May 17, 1976: FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION The following-named persons to be mem- bers of the Federal Election Commission for the terms indicated (new positions) : For terms expiring April 30, 1977: William L. Springer, of Illinois. Nell Staebler, of Michigan. For terms expiring April 30, 1979: Vernon W. Thomson, of Wisconsin. S Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. .Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. AMENDMENT - NO. 1645 Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I call up my amendment No. 1645. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment will be stated. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) proposes amendment numbered 1645. The amendment is as follows: On page 4, line 20, delete the word "not". Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, for the ad- vice of the Chair, this is a 1-hour amend- ment, not the 2-hour amendment in the unanimous-consent agreement. -I reserve the remainder of my time. 'The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. MANSFIELD. W. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time to be charged to the bill or to the amendment? Mr. MANSFIELD. To the bill. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold that, for a unani- mous-consent request? Mr. MANSFIELD. Yes. ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN- ATOR MANSFIELD TOMORROW Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that, on tomorrow, I be allotted not to exceed 15 ml, after the joint leaders have been nixed. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -=SENATE international model.'Although most analysts agree that the long term price elasticity of exports Is greater than one, it may be more d`thth whether the elasticity is as high as 5.4 B. Price passthrough the May 4, 1976 CRS report on the DISC export subsidy, CRS noted that the potential price passthrough could be calculated on the basis of recorded DISC profits, or on the assumption that firms would react to DISC by seeking to maintain the same after-tax profit margin. Using the latter method would lead to the possibility of a somewhat larger reduction in export prices. The second method for computing the potential price passthrough, however, was not used in an earlier CRS report on DISC that was also released to the public. Quoting the first rather than the second study, the Treasury quite rightly points out the implications of the second method. CRS, however, does not agree with the Treasury that a reasonable estimate of the maximum price passthrough is 3.3% DISC of export revenue, and consider it to be not very significant In any case. The 3.3 % effect estimate by Professor Horst in the Senate "Budget Committee's hearings cited by Treas- ury is based on the assumption that the effective corporate tax rate is the statutory sate. We believe that this assumption is not reasonable and suggest the use of 30% tax rate. The 30% rate is approximately the average effective domestic tax rate or man- ufacturers as relforted in the National In- come Accounts and is adjusted by various factors .5 While it is true that the marginal tax rate is equal to the statutory rate, it 1s 'not appropriate to use the marginal tax rate unless it is being applied to the marginal rate of return. In this instance, since the average rate of return can be calculated, and not the marginal rate of return, it is'more appropriate to use the average effective tax fact, use of a 30% tax rate may be too -since exported products tend into fall In industry categories relatively favored by U.S. tax law-agriculture, timber and paper and allied products, and "manufacturing. Using an effective tax rate of 30% to com- pute the price passthrough results in a maximum estimate of price passthrough to export revenues, when after tax returns are equated, of 2.4%. The "best case" estimate of increased export revenue would then be $1.9 billion. In the May 4 CRS report is is noted that such an estimate is somewhat above the $1.4 billion CRS estimate, but is substantially below the $4.6 billion Treasury estimate. In addition, if a comparison of the impact on revenue with the subsidy provided by the DISC provision is made, the tax revenue loss estimate resulting from DISC should be ad- justed to take Into account the changes in export prices and quantities. Rather than comparing the $1.9 billion estimate with a $756 million revenue loss, the estimate should be compared with a $1.06 billion reve- nuie loss, (2.4% of export value). This larger tax revenue loss takes into account the DISC-induced reduction in the taxable in- come: base as well as the rate change. 0. Export base Treasury also argues that optimistic as- sumptions about price passthrough and elasticity effects may be applied to the en- tire volume of U.S. exports-rather than merely those that are eligible for and use d It should be noted that a price elasticity of 5 implies that a 10 percent fall in the price of exports Would result in an increase in uantity demanded of 50 percent. Effective Corporate Tax Rate: Toward a e Precise Figure," by Emil M. Sunley, ax Notes, March 1, 1976, pp. 15-24. DISC privileges. Treasury argues: "If all U.S. exports of a certain product type are sold at the same price, it would then. be reasonable to assume that the 'passthrough' price re- duction would lead to an Increase in foreign demand for all U.S. exports." A logical extension of the argument could say: and if, as generally understood, do- mestic sales of U.S. products must compete with our export markets it is reasonable to assume that the price relief deriving from DISC on exports might soon filter down to entire trillion and a half dollar economy with a. diminished inflation, reviving sagging con- sumer demand and boosting job and otuput levels. This is undoubtedly true. However, it is unsound to assume that the passthrough -effect to the entire economy would remain at 3.3%. It is equally wrong to apply the -3.3% calculated for the DISC export market to the entire market. DISC, or other special tax privileges, cut the cost of doing a particular kind, of busi- ness for a particular kind of businessman (the taxfavored firm). The effects on increas- ing production depend on decreasing the ex- pense of operating at a particular level of output (or maintaining the same unit costs as output is pushed upward). Assuming that the full benefit of decreased costs flows through to purchasers, an- estiamte of de- mand elasticity can be applied to guage the likely market for the favored, now cheaper goods. But we cannot legitimately apply this same elasticity to all the product markets conceivably competitive with those of the privileged firms. To do so would presume that output would be expanded, and adds= .tional costs Incurred, by producers who are not only unfavored by tax preferences, but see their selling prices falling as, well. Con- sumers might well enjoy such an arrange- ment. But profit-making U.S. enterprise rare- ly operates in this fashion. In short, Treasury uses the price pass- through presented by Professor Horst, for DISC related exports only. Treasury, however, applies the DISC pasathrough to all exports, which obviously are much greater. If the DISC passthrough estimate is to be applied to all exports, then the passthrough must be calculated from a base that includes all exports. When this calculation is made the passthrough effect to all exports is found to be 2.4%, not 3.3%. When the more reasonable assumption of a 30 % effective tax rate is used, the 2.4% passthrough effect to all ex- ports is reduced to 1.5 %, and the "best case" effect on export revenue is $1.9 billion, the same result as using only the DISC export base. Aside from the questions of appropriate price elasticities, the fact that an estimate of 5 should be viewed as too high should be reemphasized. None of the discussed esti- mates take into account the secondary effects of flexible exchange rates which would act to reduce the initial export gains. Nor should calculations of the impact on export revenues and employment-obscure the 'central ques- tion of DISC-is it an appropriate policy In a world of flexible exchange rates? As the original CRS report suggests, there is no way to determine, given a specified level of fiscal stimulus, whether the effect on jobs is posi- tive or negative. The Treasury Department also argues that the price elasticity approach is inappropriate because DISC was never--intended to reduce price. The critique then goes on to point out that the function of DISC is to increase the quantity of exports through a higher rate of return to the manufacturer, and to draw attention to the export market. Unless there are severe barriers to entering the ex- port market, for each and every product exported, any increase in the rate of return from exporting must be short-lived. A rate of return to exports higher than the rate of return available elsewhere would attract new investment to the export sector and thereby S 7339 increase the quantity of exports. This In- creased supply, however, normally would re- sult in lower prices and a reduction in the rate of return back towards that available in the other markets. The net effect would be an increase in the U.S. export market at the expense of domestic markets. In effect DISC acts as a subsidy to foreign consumers of U.S. products. It would also seem reason- able that more cost effective methods of drawing attention to the export market exist. It is hard to imagine that over $700 million- Treasury's estimated cost of DISC for 1973- is a cost effective way to accomplish this purpose. CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there any further morning business? If not, morning business is closed. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, the Senate will now re- sume consideration of the unfinished business, Senate Resolution 400, which the clerk will state. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intel- ligence Activities, and for other purposes. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). Without objection, it is so ordered. FURTHER AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE COUNCIL ON ENVIRON- MENTAL QUALITY Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the pending business be laid aside temporarily and that the Senate turn to the consideration of Calendar No. 773. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title. . The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (H.R. 11619) to authorize further appropriations for the Council on Environ- mental Quality. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Montana? Without objection, the bill was con sidered, ordered to a third reading, read the third time, and passed. NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION AU- THORIZATIONS, 1977-CONFER- ' ENCE REPORT Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I submit a report of the committee of conference on H.R. 12453 and ask for its immediate consideration. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7340 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 17, 1976 The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). The report will be stated by title. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows : The committee of conference on the dis- agreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the-bill (H.R. 12453) to authorize 'appropriations to the National Aeronautics and Space Administra- tion for research and development, construc- tion of facilities, and research and program management, and for other purposes having met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses this report, signed by a majority of the conferees. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the Senate will proceed to the consideration of the conference report. (The conference report is printed in the House proceedings of the RECORD of today.) Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, the confer- ence agreement authorizes to the Na- tional Aeronautics and Space Adminis- tration for fiscal year 1977 $3,695,170,000. This is $1,830,000 below the NASA budget request for the fiscal year. This confer- ence report authorizes $2,761,425,000 for research and development; $120,290,000 for construction of facilities; and $813,- 455,000 for research and program man- agement. The actions of the conferees on the differences between the House. and Senate bills are recorded in the joint ex- planatory statement accompanying this conference report. Mr. President, I believe the conference report now before the Senate reflects a balanced program for the NASA for the forthcoming fiscal year. I believe that the conferees have exercised budgetary restraint and have agreed upon a pro- gram which makes the maximum use of the resources which are recommended herein for the Agency. It is forward look- ing. It is constructive and in addition to supporting sound ongoing activities it will provide a good base for future re- search and development activities in space and aeronautics. While there was some reduction in the NASA request and the amount approved by the Senate, I am pleased that the con- ferees agreed to provide $2.2 million to construct an addition to the lunar sam- ple curatorial facility at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center for the storage of, and more importantly, to provide the capability to process the 842 pounds of lunar samples returned to Earth by the highly successful Apollo program. This facility addition will provide the support necessary to conduct a program of sci- entific research on these materials, ac- quired at great cost to the Nation, with the objective of increasing our knowl- edge of the Earth's space environment. These materials represent hard evidence in the overall study of the processes tak- ing place in the space environment and they may well prove to be extremely im- portant to understanding the factors in that environment that impact the Earth on which we work and live. This facility requirement was examined carefully'by the Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences prior to its being recom- mended to the Senate. The committee, in its report on the fiscal year 1976 NASA. authorization bill, requested further study and a report on this requirement by NASA. The report was submitted on October 23, 1975. This study considered remote storage, use of alternate facilities at the Johnson Space Center, a facility at another location, and the facility project as originally proposed. Also, upon receipt of the fiscal year 1977 budget re- quest restating this facility item the committee asked the Comptroller Gen- eral to review the location of and the design plans for the facility. I think this facility project has been reviewed ade- quately -and responsibly. I think it is necessary, it is supported by the scien- tific community, and I believe the sup- port that the Senate has shown for this project is fully warranted. Mr. President, I move the adoption of the conference report. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the conference report. The conference report was agreed to. Mr. MOSS. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will please call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the consid- eration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a standing committee of the Senate on intelligence activities, and for other purposes. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, it is antici- pated that sometime tomorrow votes will be held on Senate Resolution 400. I am anticipating some of the concerns that Members of the Senate have expressed about the proposed compromise resolu- tion that will hopefully be voted upon. Some Members have expressed con- cern as to why the new committee on intelligence is embracing defense intelli- gence. I would like to comment briefly on this point, because it may be that there will not be too many Senators on the floor today. Possibly some might be interested in some of the deliberations that have occurred and the hearings that have been held over a period of many weeks under the chairmanship of the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIBIcoFF). They have brought out testimony which cer- tainly has caused the Senator from Illinois to conclude that it would be in the national interest and in the interests of senatorial oversight for the new pro- posed Committee on Intelligence to in- clude defense intelligence as well as all other aspects of the intelligence commu- nity. I shall be very brief, but I would like to make the following points: First, DOD does represent a huge por- tion of the overall intelligence budget. The Church report says: DOD controls nearly 90 percent of the Nation's spending on intelligence programs. These programs are clostly, and the fully draws in attempting to formulate judgments in many areas. The Senator from Illinois himself has found this in- formation valuable. ' But for the Senate of the United States, after extensive inquiry, the estab- lishment of select committees, the months of hearings, and voluminous re- ports, if we were to establish a commit- tee on oversight over the intelligence community and then to exclude from that committee 90 percent of its expendi- ture, I wonder if we would not be in a position' where we would be presuming to say to the country, "We have seen the nature of this problem; we intend now to exercise diligence in connection with our oversight responsibilities; and yet we are establishing a committee that would - have only 10 percent of the intelligence budget under its jurisdiction for authori- zation and oversight." So, for that rea- son alone, I should think we would want to include DOD. Also, if for any reason, in any amend- ment proposed, the Senate voted in favor of excluding the Department of Defense intelligence from oversight responsibil- ities of the overall committee, would- we not then go to the heart of breaking the compromise that has been reached wherein concurrent responsibility was assigned to The intelligence committee diciary for oversight over Defense, State. and FBI intelligence? So, once we invade this area and break the compromise that had been so pain- stakingly worked out, would we, not then establish a precedent to say, then, let us take everything else back into the other committees? Instead of having a focused responsibility in the hands of one com- mittee clearly by its own charter and by its name, with the implication that it is going to have that oversight responsi- bility as one of the major functions of that committeee, would we not in a sense even fractionalize further a Senate pro- cedure which has led us to the present point? The past procedure has really meant we had implied oversight, but with so much diversified responsibility that, we never really did have effective oversight. It was even up to the point where the Secretary of State testified before the Committee on-Government operations that he thought he knew what the in- telligence community was doing as it af- fected foreign policy, but he was shocked and surprised in the hearings and revela- tions of the Church committee to find that he did not know what he should have as Secretary of State. I wonder if any Member of the Senate who has exercised oversight responsibil- ity in the past could today say that, as a Member of the Senate assigned to that particular oversight responsibility, he not shocked and surprised to find m Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA7.RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE had it. Is it not better to focus oversight on one committee that has that overall picture and overall responsibility and then, just so that there is no chance that we would not exercise proper responsi- bility within a chosen field, have con- current oversight responsibility as is pro- vided for in the compromise? The second point that I mention is that the armed services are a major con- sumer of finished intelligence, and obvi- ously those framers of the compromise have determined for that reason the Committee on Armed Services should have concurrent jurisdiction. But the Senator from Illinois points out that those who worked out the com- promise, and from the inception of the construction of the bill in the Committee on Government Operations we always drew the distinction between exercising oversight over a particular activity and having the benefit of the end product of intelligence. We have tried to make it very clear in this legislation and this res- olution before us that any committee of the Senate that requires the end product of intelligence to carry out its responsi- bilities should have that end product. It Is not necessary for that committee to feel that it is only going to get that In- formation if it happens to set the budget. That is not necessary at all. In the number of years the Senator W Illinois has served in the Senate, r once has the Senator from Illinois e r been deprived of proper end product intelligence in formulating judgments and obtaining information from the CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, or whoever it may be, simply because the Senator from Illinois did not sit on a committee that happened to set the budget. I do not think we have to feel in that respect that that is the only way we can receive the end product of intelligence. The third point I make is that DOD In- telligence has been subjected to much criticism on managerial grounds. DIA was created - to provide a single intelli- gence voice for the Secretary of Defense. In point of fact, it has constituted an additional layer over the parochial in- terests of the individual service intelli- gence branches. DIA's defense attach6 program has been much criticized for in- competency and mismanagement. NSA is often accused of gathering too much information at too great a cost. I do not believe that this area is so sacrosanct that we should not oversee it, when the power of the purse has been so clearly given to Congress in the Consti- tution. Even through the area is sensitive we have the ability, the right, and the duty to go in and say how much Is it costing, how much duplication exists, and what is the end product that we are getting, is it cost effective? Someone must ask those questions in the frame- rk where the-whole picture is available ose who are asking the questions. ess Members of the Senate have that total picture they would be the first to say they are not truly competent to ask the right questions and to exercise the kind of oversight that can and must be made over every expenditure of the Government no matter how sensitive it may be, in order to see whether we have the overlapping and duplication that has been so apparent in the Church committee report. All of this goes back to the fact that 20 years ago the now majority leader of- the Senate had the wisdom and the foresight, as he so fre- quently has had, to say tha) we cannot exercise this responsibility that Congress must and should carry out unless we have a committee given the full respon- sibility and authority to carry out this function. Are we then, after all of these years, after the wisdom of that judg- ment at that time has now been so unmistakably proven, to once again fractionalize the intelligence oversight functions now to be asusmed and that the country is insisting that Congress as- sume? All we know is that in the past Men of goodwill, with- indefinite au- thority and fractionalized responsibility have not fulfilled and carried out the function the Nation throught they were, carrying out. And to the shock and amazement of the Senate itself, we had not organized ourselves in such a way to carry out the duty, function, and re- S 7341 sponsibilities -of NSA. Certainly, one of the purposes-of this committee would be to establish such a charter and, hope- fully, place it-in legislation: Recently, the Senate proposed, and Congress now has adopted, a charter for the Voice of America. It never was a legislated charter. It was always an Ex- ecutive order, subject, therefore, to in- terpretation by the executive branch only. The Senator from Illinois felt very strongly that VOA should have a charter that is in law. The Congress of the United States would have a duty and a responsibility then to see that that law was effectively carried out, not simply subject its executive branch charter. The Senator from Illinois felt the charter was being abused in such a way as to de- tract from the value of VOA. Having it in law now clearly enunciates what the rules should be. NSA likewise carries on a function so vital that a legislated charter should be undertaken. With respect to Army intelligence, un- der the guise of quelling civil disorders, Army intelligence gathering covered not only "subversion" and "dissident ele- ments"-and there was no further defini- tion of what "dissident elements" were- but also the civil rights movement, the anti-Vietnam-antidraft movement, and The fourth point I make is simply this: Many abuses have been committed by Defense Department agencies. We know, for instance, In NSA, in the question of cable traffic alone we have had abuses that are on the record for all of us to study. From 1947 until May 1975, NSA received from international cable com- panies millions of cables which had been sent by American citizens in the reason- able expectation that they would be kept private. Many questions could be raised about this practice: Was it necessary to protect the national interest? Was it necessary and was it cost effective? What end result came from all of that cable traffic that was reviewed? Talk about a make-work project. The PWA was small compared to the make- work that was created by this oversight operation scanning and reviewing, read- ing and looking at, passing around, making copies of millions of pieces of paper involving private transaction of business. Where is the proof that this has been a cost-effective operation? Another point I should like to raise is in connection with watch lists. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, various Fed- eral agencies gave NSA names which went into so-called watch lists, names of Americans whose communications were selected for monitoring, without a war- rant. Where is the protection to the civil rights of those individuals? I wonder whether it does not come right down to the fact that NSA op- erated without a charter. My point, therefore, is this: should not NSA operate with a charter? The Church report, under the section on defense, if I recall correctly, indicated that the Senate and Congress should set out in charter form the duties and re- nent persons" who were "friendly" with the "leaders of the disturbances" or "sympathetic with their plans." I wonder, Mr. President, whether that Is under the charter under which the 5th Army, in Chicago, had dossiers, files, and surveillance over some of our most prominent citizens. In a newspaper report--and- I say a newspaper report, only-I discovered, to my shock and horror, that a Member of the Senate, my distinguished colleague from Illinois, ADLAI STEVENSON III, was under the surveillance of the Fifth Army in Chicago. By what right does Army in- telligence place surveillance over civil- ians, particularly Members of Congress? Why? Because they might happen to dis- agree on a Vietnam war policy? Millions of Americans disagreed with that policy. The distinguished majority leader of the Senate disagreed with that policy. Does .that give the Army the right to place them under surveillance? It is almost as bad as the "plumbers" who wasted I do not know how much tax- payers' money, placing other people un- der surveillance. I understand, from testimony given to the Watergate Com- mittee, that the senior Senator- from Illi- nois- was placed under surveillance by an operator of the "plumbers" who testified that he did not know why he was placed outside my office. He was to record the name of everyone who went in and out, and he said, "I don't know why they picked me. I'm not from Illinois, and I knew virtually no one who went in or out, and I couldn't say it In my report, But I was there for 3 weeks, outside the Sen- ator from Illinois' office, recording, pre- sumably, who goes in and out." I do not know that their thought was In doing that. Was it their thought to de- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7342 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 17, 1976 termine the protesters going into the Senator from Illinois' office, to talk to the Senator, who might subvert his kind of thinking? Heaven knows what goes on in an in- telligence operation that is as big as 90 percent of our entire intelligence budget. It is a confidential figure, but it is not. in pennies, dollars, tens of thousands of dol- lars, hundreds of thousands of dollars, millions of dollars, or hundreds of mil= lions of dollars. It is in the billions of dollars, and we know that. So should there not be a concentrated oversight of this operation? Is it right and proper to exclude 90 percent of the entire intelligence budget and kid the people of this country into thinking that we are setting up an intelligence over- sight committee, and then exclude 90 percent of it? The fifth point I should like to make Is that it is not true that national- that is, strategic-intelligence cannot be separated from tactical` -intelligence, although there is much overlapping. I say this first because both DOD and the DCI and their budget procedures make the clear distinction themselves. So when we say that we cannot separate them, they belie it themselves by having separated it in their budget procedures. Further, the President, in his execu- tive order on intelligence, has given the DCI clear authority over all national intelligence, thus providing that it can in fact be' distinguished from tactical intelligence. In any case, the proposed new com- mittee merely would have shared juris- diction with the Committee on Armed Services. Thus, Armed Services will re- tain its input into all military intelli- gence legislation and authorization, both national and tactical. But the citizens of this country and the Congress of the United States will know that that shared jurisdiction in this particular area with the Armed Services Committee, in the case of the FBI, with the Committee on the Judici- ary, and with the Committee on Foreign Relations in State Department intelli- gence, will not mean that the intelligence oversight committee to be established has been relieved of oversight responsi- bility. It will have concurrent responsi- bility, and in one committee we can hold 15 members, 17 members-however many members we put on for the 8-year period In which it is now determined they will serve-fully and effectively responsible for oversight. The intelligence committee has re- sulted from a great deal of soul-search- ing, a great deal of earnest negotiation. We feel that an extraordinarily good job has been done. Not a single Member who engaged In those negotiations ever achieved everything he wanted or would have built into the resolution before the Senate. Everyone entered into the spirit of compromise, that everyone had to give up some of his own sacred cows. But in the-interest of reaching a broad- based agreement, we tried to arrive at a consensus, and this consensus was ar-, rived at: Certainly, many important issues were debated. Originally, it was conceived by some Members of the Senate that the intelligence committee should have prior knowledge of any covert activity car- ried on and, in a sense, should have the right to veto it. After a great deal of deliberation, after hearing many wit- nesses, the Committee on Government Operations wisely agreed, and the framers of the compromise retained, the provision that provided that information always should be available to the intelli- gence oversight committee, but that prior approval of activities would, in a sense, make the oversight committee part and parcel of the original decision. How can we exercise oversight if we are a part of the dction that has been taken? So it was determined that these activities should be committed to, writ- ing and should be signed by a high offi- cial. The options that went into the thought process should be committed to writing so that they always could be subsequently reviewed. The Senator from Illinois made the point in those hearings and in the delib- erations at markup that if something were committed to writing, a proposed activity, and someone at high levels had to sign it and authorize it, many, many times, the activity would not even be en- gaged in. Because, when you Put some- thing down in black and white and you analyze it and appraise it, some of these foolish activities that were carried on, that ended up to be on the wrong side of the national interest, would not be en- tered into in the first place. But . if the Senate, through the over- sigkt committee, actually approved these- operations in the first place, how could Congress subsequently have oversight over that activity in which it shared re- sponsibility? How could it then be in a position to criticize or find fault with it? For these and other reasons, Mr. Pres- ident, I hope that my distinguished col- leagues who are not on the floor today will have an opportunity to look over the RECORD in the morning and, when we vote tomorrow, I hope we can move for- ward with great dispatch. I trust that the spirit and the principle of the compro- mise can be achieved in our utimate vote, which I.hope will come at the earliest possible time. Mr. President, I ask unanimous coll- sent that an article dated May 17, 1916, from the New York Times entitled "Mil- itary Flouted Civilians' Rights, Senate Unit Says", written by John M. Crewd- son, be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the few York Times, Monday, May 17, 1976] MILITARY FLOUTED CIVILIANS' RIGHTS, SENATE UNIT SAYS-INTELLIGENCE AGENTS ACCUSED OF IGNORING LEGAL CURBS IN SPYING ON DISSENTERS (By John M. Crewdson) WASHINGTON, May 16.-Military intellig- ence agents have violated the rights of United States citizens in the agents' investigations of domestic political and protest groups, and in the process have threatened "to violate the traditional and legal restraints which govern the use of military forces in the ci- vilian community," the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities has concluded. said in a report released today, Defense De- partment agents, principally those of Army ganizations, intercepted those groups' communications and cooperated with ci law-enforcement agencies in monitoring the activities of private citizens. REPORTS CONFIRMED The Senate staff termed those activities "improper" and went on to confirm reports published yesterday in The- New York Times indicating that the Army has also conducted active surveillance of United States citizens living in West Germany and West Berlin whom it considered to be "threats" to its operations. Until 1968, according to the Senate staff's report, Army commanders in West Germany had unilateral authority to open mail to and from such individuals and to subject them to wiretaps. Since then, the West German Govern- ment has forbidden the Army to conduct such activities, but the 1968 restrictions do not apply to the American sector of West Berlin where "mail openings and wire- taps continued to be employed against Amer- icans and groups of Americans," according to the report. FILES ON ALL DISSENTERS Affidavits from Army Secretary Martin R. Hoffman recently filed in two civil court cases show that Army intelligence officers opened, mail in West Berlin as late as 1972, and the affidavits carried the strong impication that such practices were conti4nuing there. As' the Army was called upon with increas- ing frequency in the early 1960's to respond to civil disorders, the report said, it began what later became a "massive" intelligence collection effort that eventually produced files on "virtually every group engaged in dissent in the United States." The military's rationale for such su lance, the staff noted, was that, to enab forces to respond effectively to Presidential requests for assistance in times of civil dis- order, it was necessary to learn about the goals of dissident groups. Although there is no statute authorizing military surveillance of the political activi- ties of private citizens, the report said, the Constitution gives the Federal Government the responsibility of protecting each of the states "against domestic violence." 1971 INoUIRY CITED _ The committee staff noted, however, that the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, which conducted an extensive in- vestigation of military intelligence activities in 1971, had been "unwilling to imply the authority to conduct political surveillance of civilians from the role assigned by statute to the military in the event of civil disturb- ance." In all, the committee staff estimated, 100,- 000 indiivduals and a "similarly large" num- ber of domestic organizations were subjected to surveillance by Army intelligence agents "who were young and could easily mix with dissident young groups of all races." In addition to civil rights protests, such as the 1968 Poor Peoples' March on Washing- ton, and anti-Vietnam war organizations like the National Mobilization Committee, Army agents penetrated a coalition of church youth groups, classes at New York Univer- sity, a conference of priests convened to dis- cuss birth control and the late Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.'s Southern Christian Leader- ship Conference. - POSED AS NEWSMEN While the covert infiltration of such or nizations was a principal technique, th port said Army intelligence agents moni protest marches and rallies by posing+a? newsmen and by recruiting civilian inform. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE ers to work in the agents' behalf, before the defense department's nationwide intelli- gence collection effort was declared to have been ended in 1971. n an effort reminiscent of, but narrower scope than the "Cointelpro" domestic' nter-intelligence programs of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, military officers and enlisted men also set out to harass and dis- rupt attempts of some antiwar groups to organize public demonstrations, the report said. Among the individuals on whom the army maintained intelligence files, it added, were Dr. King; the late Whitney M. Young, head of the National Urban League; Julian Bond; the Georgia State legislator; Arlo Guthrie and Joan Baez, folksingers; Dr. Benjamin Spock, the child care specialist and antiwar activist; and Senator Adlai E. Stevenson 3d, democrat of Illinois. "WORST INTRUSION" The experience of the late 1960's which the committee staff termed "the most intrusion that military intelligence has ever made into the civilian community," resulted in the is- suance of new Defense Department directives that presumably eliminated some intelli- gence activities against United States citi- zens and sharply curtailed others. The Senate report pointed out, however, that the 1971 restrictions, while barring the collection of intelligence about individuals "unaffiliated" with the military, excepted from that prohibition individuals or groups that the Pentagon considered "threats" to its operations or security. Although the committee staff said it had found very few apparent violations of the 1971 directive, it pointed out that the direc- tive was an administrative one, and that "no matter how effective it may have been in the past, the directive can be rescinded or changed at the direction of the Secretary of Defense." r. RIBICOFF. Mr. },'resident, I sug- Wst the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. . Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ORDER TO VITIATE ORDER FOR VOTE ON CLOTURE PETITION TOMORROW Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for a vote on a petition of cloture to occur tomorrow be vitiated. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENTS- SENATE RESOLUTION 400 Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on the amend- ment to be offered by Senators TOWER, STENNIS, and THURMOND, there be a time limitation of not to exceed 4 hours, the time to be equally divided between the sponsor of the amendment and the manager of the bill; that on one of the Taft amendments, there be a time limita- ion of not to exceed 2 hours, the time to equally divided between the Senator In Ohio and the manager of the bill; t on all other amendments, there be a- period of not to exceed 1 hour, with the time to be equally divided between the sponsors of the amendment and the manager of the bill; and that on the res- olution itself, there be a time limitation of 4 hours under the usual rules of pro- cedure, the time to start immediately. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. FAN- NIN). Without objection, it is so ordered. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the vote on the cloture petition has been vitiated? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator is correct. Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Sena- tor from Illinois. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, as the majority leader knows, the entire Illi- nois delegation will be at Arlington Memorial Cemetery tomorrow for a pe- riod of about 2 hours. Will it be possible to have no vote scheduled during that period, and if debate has been finished, that votes be set aside until, say 4'clock tomorrow? Mr. MANSFIELD. We shall pile up the votes, if need be, in view of the sad cir- cumstance involved. Mr. RIBICOFF subsequently. said. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that under the previous consent agreement on S. 400, all motions, appeals, points of order, be limited to 20 minutes, equally divided. The.PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. . The text of the agreement is as fol- lows: - Ordered, That during the consideration of S. Res. 400 (Order No. 728), a resolution to establish a Standing Committee of the Sen- ate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes, debate on any amendment (ex- cept an amendment by senators Tower, Stennis,, and Thurmond, on which there shall be 4 hours debate, and an amend- ment by Senator Taft, on which there shall be 2 hours debate) shall be limited to 1 hour, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of such and the manager of the resolution, and that debate on any de- batable motion, appeal, or point of order which is submitted or on which the Chair entertains debate shall be limited to 20 min- utes, to be equally divided and controlled by the mover of such and the manager.of the resolution: Provided, That-in the event the manager of the resolution is in favor of any. such amendment, debatable motion, ap- peal, or point of order, the time in oppossi- tion thereto shall be controlled by the Minority Leader or his designee: Provided further, That no amendment that is not ger- mane to the provisions of the said resolu- tion shall be received. Ordered further, That on the question- of agreeing to the said resolution, debate shall be limited to 4. hours, to be equally divided and controlled, respectively, by the Majority and Minority Leaders, or their designees: Provided, That the Senators, or either of them, may, from the time under their con- trpl on agreeing to the said resolution, allot additional time to any Senator during the consideration of any amendment, debatable motion, appeal, or point of order. ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M: TOMORROW Mr. MANSFIELD. - Mr. President, on my own initiative, I ask unanimous con- sent that when the Senate completes its business today, it stand in adjournment until the hour of 10 o'clock tomorrow morning; and that no later than the hour of 11 o'clock tomorrow morning, the Senate will return to the pending business. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I wish to speak to the pending Stennis-Tower amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Will the Senator from Minnesota suspend? - Who yields time? Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, I ask the distinguished floor manager if he will yield to me such time as I may re- quire-15 minutes? Mr. RIBICOFF. I am pleased to yield 15 minutes to the Senator from Minne- sota. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes. Mr. MONDALE. Mr. President, the Stennis-Tower amendment would delete from the jurisdiction. of the oversight committee which-we seek to create ap- proximately 80 percent of the Nation's intelligence budget. The overwhelming proportion of the activities of this Na- tion in the intelligence field would be outside the jurisdiction of the new com- mittee. The amendment proposes to delete from the jurisdiction of the new committee all of the Defense intelli- gence activity. That would mean the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Na- tional Security Agency, and joint pro- grams with the CIA. It seems to me that the arguments for turning that amend- ment down and including these activi- ties within the jurisdiction of the new committee under the terms of the Can- non resolution are overwhelming. First of all, the abuses that we have uncovered in the 15 months of the work of our com- mittee have shown that there have been as many abuses committed by these agencies as by the agencies that would remain within the jurisdiction of the new committee, the CIA and the FBI. The DIA played a role in covert action. One of the classic examples of mis- guided, counterproductive, and, I think, inexcusable covert actions that we found was so-called Track 2 in Chile. Track 2 was the strategy ordered personally by the President, under instructions to go around the institutions that exist for intelligence decisions in this country, and the CIA going directly to the DIA operatives in Chile. The idea behind Track 2 was, stripped to its essentials,,to depose Mr. Allende, who was the duly elected President of Chile. One of the things that was decided in Track 2, was that a General Schneider, who was a constitutionalist and therefore refused to cooperate in the attempt to overthrow President Allende by a coup to be re- moved because he insisted on complying with the constitutional requirements of Approved For Release 2004/05/13 :.CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7344 meeting of OPEC. Tens of thousands of such tnem in riew fora, auu ~tau- ~? -.-~" u"~~" -- w- ?-- - - _ messages are intercepted daily around the were distributed to other Government shown itself capable of undermining? world and beamed to a complex at Fort bodies. Congress got wind of Shamrock, how- did the whole problem originate? the broad range of abuses interfering activity.dubbed the "watch list." Two Stanford University computer scien- with constitutional and legal rights of General Allen testified that, in the early tists have recently accused the N.S.A. of pro- the American people conducted for sev- 60's, domestic law-enforcement agencies ? rooting its own interests at the expense of eral years and with practically no limits asked the N.S.A. for information on Ameri- the public's in a standard cipher proposed whatsoever by the National Security can citizens traveling to Cuba. The assign- by the Government for computer networks. Agency. ment, he said, was reviewed by "competent At issue is the key that would afford secrecy external authority"-two Attorneys General between pairs of users. The scientists I ask unanimous consent that that and a Secretary of Defense. All approved it, cuse the N.S.A. of maneuvering to get article be printed at this point in the and the idea of using the N.S.A. for such dustry to accept a key that, while too co RECORD. purposes spread rapidly through the Gov- plex for rival businesses to try to solve would There being no objection, the article ernment. The drug bureau submitted the be susceptible of cracking by the N.S.L s su- was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, names of 450 Americans and 3,000 foreigners perior capabilities. That would permit the as follows: whose communications it wanted the N.S.A. agency to raid the'economic data flowing into to watch. The F.B.I. put in a list of more the computer network, and to penetrate [From The New York Times Magazine than 1,000 American and 1,700 foreign in- personal-daa files enciphered for security. May 16, 19761 dividuals and groups. The Central Intelli- In the whole area of economic intelligence, BIG EAR OR BIG SsoxaEat gence Agency, the Defense Department and N.S.A. interception has been developing rap- (NoTE -David Kahn, assistant professor of the Secrete Service also submitted watch idly. The House Intelligence Committee, in- journalism at New York University, is the lists. Altogether, General Allen said, some its report, expressed concern over the resul- author of "The Codebreakers.") 1,650 American names were on the lists, and tant `intrusion ... into the privacy of in- (By David Kahn) the N.S.A. issued about 3,900 reports on ternational communications of U.S. citizens them. 6510 at the State Department Is a and organizations." But all this is over, he said; he personally At the root of General Allen's appearance warren of windowless offices with a special abolished the "watch list" when he took before the Senate Intelligence Committee, cipher lock on the door. Scrambler teletype- over the agency in 1973. and of the entire Congressional investigation writers, shielded by special walls so that The general's assurance did little to over- of the N.S.A., lay the question: Who author- none s their radiation escape, d door tick out a stream of of material. . Another oor bars an come the committee's overall concern--and ized these abuses? What was there about the inner area to all but perhaps 5 percent of that of many other Americans. For both agency's legal basis that permitted it. to in- the officials at State. This Is the LDS room- prior to and since that hearing, disclosures vade privacy at the request of other Govern- long-distance Xerox. Here, the scourings of in Congress and elsewhere have indicated ment agencies-and with so little qualm? the globe's electronic environment flood in. a multifaceted practice of using the N.S.A. Was the final authority the President's- The environment is heavy with traffic- in ways that threaten American freedoms, and, in that case, was he not armed with For instance: powers to play Big Brother beyond the worst in ne code o or r In fa c c didahdidah lea of r, the Soviet Army buzzings of foreign The N.S.A. persuaded three major cable imaginings of the recent past? air-defense radars; the whines of high-speed companies to turn over to It much of their "[The N.S.A.'sl-capability to monitor any- radio-teletypewriter circuits carrying diplo- traffic overseas. It was partly through this thing . . . could be turned around on the matic dispatches; the bleeps of missile te- operation, code-named Shamrock, that the American people," said the committee's lemetry; the hums of the computer-data N.S.A. complied with the "watch list" assign- chairman, Senator Frank Church. "And no liks any plat language mt of tors na corporations; imessat se shment. ow uptb bone etween 5eA.M. and 6 A.M. pick up wouldc be no would p ace eto h de. If a (dictator the chiming ing-song of scrambled speech. the foreign message's sorted out for him by ever took charge in this country, the tech- Moving on these varied channels may be company employees (who were said to have nological capability that the intelligence Soviet orders to transfer a regiment from been paid $50 a week for their cooperation), community has given the Government could one post to another; Chinese Air Force pilots microfilm them and hand them back. When enable it to impose total tyranny." complaining during a practice flight about messages began to move on tape, the N.S.A. How essential to the nation's security is deficiencies In their equipment; Saudi got them in that form. The agency took some the National Security Agency? How can a ti.o+nroa? +ha 1Pe1tlmate Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 17, 1976 the government that he took an oath of Meade, Md., for decoding and relaying to ever, and a year ago, after 28 years and mil- office to uphold. the State Department and, simultaneously, lions of private telegrams, Secretary of De- Of course that effort, although we had to the White House, the Defense Depart- fense James R. Schlesinger had to terminate not intended it that way, led indirectly ment and the C.I.A. the operation. The tall, bespectacled Air Force general A previous N.S.A. director, co-signed t e to the assassination of General Schneider at down behind a table in the high, colon- notorious plan of White House aide T because, after being abducted, General naded Caucus Room of the Old Senate Office C. Huston to penetrate organizations c Schneider was assassinated. Building. Television focused its dazzling sidered security threats by the Nixon A That one example, it seems to me, lights upon him and recorded his gestures. ministration. The agency furnished Huston stands as a classic example of a miS- Two business-suited aides pulled up their with several suggestions; one of them seems guided, poorly conceived, immoral and chairs on either side of him. Before him sat to have been to let the N.S.A. eavesdrop tactic of the kind that the members of the Senate's Select Com- on domestic American communications. counterproductive mittee on Intelligence. A gavel banged, and Huston conceded that the plan would use not the hearing began. "clearly illegal" techniques. But the N.S.A. shames this in terms bountry our and is souind relationship that ductive In appearance, the event resembled the has acknowledged that it "didn't consider only with Chile, our responsibility indi- start of thousands of Congressional hearings. . . at the time" whether its proposal was rectly for the present repressive and ter- what distinguished this one, last Oct. 29, legal or not. The Huston plan was never im- rorist administration which runs Chile, was that, for the first time, the`head of the plemented, but, said the Senate Watergate but also has humiliated us in the eyes largest and most secretive of all American Committee, the "memorandum indicates of Latin America. Intelligence organs had emerged from ob- that the N.S.A. D.I.A. (Defense Intelligence Another agency that would be exempt scurity to describe some of his agency's work Agency), C.I.A. 'and the military services and respond to charges that it had invaded basically supported the Huston recommenda- under the proposed amendment is NSA, Americans' privacy. The big officer was Lieut. tions." the National Security Agency. There was Gen. Lew Allen Jr., current director of the Former President Nixon acknowledged in a separate report put out by our Commit- National Security Agency. N.S.A. is America's a recent deposition to the Senate Intelligence tee on the activities of NSA. It was this phantom ear. And sometimes it has eaves- Committee that he had used the N.S.A. to agency that had a watch list on 1,600 dropped on the wrong things. Intercept American nonvoice communica- innocent Americans, and established an In addition to sucking up and disgorging tions. He said he wanted to discover the operation called "Shamrock," which its daily load of intercepts from abroad, the source of leaks from the staffs of the Na- operation had improperly eavesdropped on the tional Security Council and the Joint Chiefs read all of the cable traffic out of the . conversations of many Americans, such as of Staff. city of New York, none of it Comply- the antiwar protesters Benjamin Spock and The agency is said to have passed reports ing with the requirement for" a court Jane Fonda and the Rev. Ralph Abernathy, on what prominent Americans were doing warrant. successor to Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., cur- and saying abroad directly to Presidents Mr. President, in addition to the report rent director of the National Bureau of Johnson, and Nixon. Once, for example, the put out by the committee, there was in Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs and other agency informed Johnson that a group of this Sunday's New York Times Magazine Government agencies, its vast technological Texas businessmen involved in private nego- this had invaded the domestic field, tiations in the Middle East had claimed a an article entitled "Big Ear or Big which they were never intended to do. The close relationship with him to improve their .Brother?" by David Kahn, spelling out committee wanted to know about an N.S.A. bargaining position. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD --SENATE Signals intelligence reaches back in Amer- ica to the' founding days of the Republic. But it matured only in World War I, with widespread use of radio. During World }hee II, it became the nation's most im- ant means of gathering secret informa- nt. When the Iron Curtain clanged down, the United States wanted to preserve these extraordinary capabilities. In 1952, President Truman issued a directive transforming the Armed Forces Security Agency, the inter- service arm for signal intelligence, into the National Security Agency, serving all branch- es of government. - Therein lay the first pitfall. Unlike the C.I.A., in which' all intelligence functions were centralized in 1947, the N.S.A. was not formed by act of Congress, with a legislative charter defining the limits of its mission. The cryptologic empire has only a Presiden- tial directive as its legal base. So shadowy has been the N.S.A.'s existence, however, that the text of the seven-page directive has never been made public. This obsession with secrecy is well reflect- ed by the agency's headquarters. At the edge of Fort Meade, just off the Washington-Bal- timore Parkway, it is ringed by a double chain-link fence topped by barbed wire with six strands of electrified wire between them. Marines guard the four gates. Inside lie a modern, three-story square-A-shaped struc- ture and, within its arms, a boxy nine-story bullding: From the latter, in particular, ema- nates a chill impersonality, quite different from the flashiness of C.I.A. headquarters in McLean, Va. Topped by a frieze of antennas, the only sign of life a plume of white steam rising from the roof, the afternoon sun gleaming off its glassy facade, it stares bleak- ly south, toward Washington, the White House, and the centers of national power. All around sprawl the vast macadam park- ing lots for the 20,000 employees who work there. They have passed some of the most orous security tests in the Government, they may be fired merely on a suspicion. ty are enjoined from talking even to their spouses about their work. And inside the building they are physically restricted as well. The colored badge each of them wears tells the patrollling Marine guards into which areas they may and may not go. Their work is of two kinds. Some of them protect American communications. They de- vise cryptosystems.They contract for cipher machines, sometimes imposing performance standards so high and tolerances so close that suppliers quit in despair. They promul- gate cryptologic doctrine to ensure that the procedures of, say, the State Department do not compromise the messages of Defense. But the main job is'SIGINT-signal intelli- gence-listening in. To do all its work, the N.S.A. alone spends about $1 billion a year. The agency also disposes of about 80,000 servicemen and civilians around the world, who serve in the cryptologic agencies of the Arn y, Navy and Air Force but stand under N.S.A. control, and if these agencies and other collateral costs are included, the total spent could well amount to $15 billion. The N.S.A.'s place on the organizational chart is ambiguous: It is "within but not a part of" the Defense Department. Th(Z Secretary of Defense merely serves as the "executive agent" of the President in carry- ing out the functions assigned to the agency. It is not subordinate to the C.I.A., but its director sits on the United Sates Intelligence Board, the intelligence community's steer- ing committee, whose chairman is the Direc- tor of Central Intelligence-the C.I.A. chief. The N.S.A. director is always a three-star general or admiral. (The deputy director must be a career cryptologist.) The Presi- dent appoints the director, rotating among e three services, which get 85 percent of output. The seven directors before Gen- Allen held the job for an average of three and a half years each. The agency's orders-Truman's 1952 direc- tive-are to "obtain foreign intelligence from foreign communications or foreign electronic signals," General Allen is said to have told the House Intelligence Committee. The agen- cy can be remarkably successful. . "Most collection agencies give us history. The N.S.A. is giving us the present," said Lieut. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, a former head of the Pentagon's Defense Intelligence Agency (D.I.A.). "Spies take too long to get information to you, [satellite] photographs as well. N.S.A. is intercepting things as they' happen, N.S.A. will tell you, "They're about to launch a missile. The missile is launched' We know in five minutes that a missile has been launched. This kind of in- telligence is critical to the warning busi- ness." During the Strategic Arms Limitation` Talks (SALT) of 1972, the N.S.A. reported on the precise Soviet negotiating position and on the Russian worries. "It was abso- lutely critical stuff," said one high intel- ligence officer. The information was passed back quickly to the American diplomats, who maneuvered with it so effectively that they came home with the agreement not to build an antiballistic missile defense system. "That's the sort of thing that pays N.S.A.'s k -.ges for a year," the officer said. In 1973, large antennas appeared in satel- lite photographs of Somalia, which lies east of Ethiopia on the Indian Ocean. They looked like Soviet models. But not until the N.S.A. had learned where the anten- nas' signals were going to and coming from was the Government certain that the Rus- sians, who had been kicked out of Egypt, had moved their military advisers into So- malia in force and were controlling their warships in the Indian Ocean from there. Examples like these made General Allen's task a little' easier when he appeared be- fore the Senate Intelligence Committee. Senator Walter F. Mondale, the Minnesota liberal, told the general, "The performance of your staff and yourself before the commit- tee is perhaps the most impressive presenta- tion that we have had. And I consider your agency and. your work to be possibly the single most important source of intelligence for this nation." Senator- Church concurred. "We have a romantic attachment to the days of Mats. Hari that dies very hard. The public has the impression- that spies are the most import- ant source of information, but that is defi- nitely not so. The more authoritarian the Government being penetrated, the less re- liable the information derived from secret agents. In the Soviet Union and other Com- munist countries, the penetrations are like- ly to be short-lived and the information lim- ited. But information obtainable through technical means constitutes the largest body of intelligence available to us, except by overt means." And, he might have added, the most reli- able. It is free of the suspicion that blights a spy's reports: Is he a double agent? Photo- graphs7from satellites also provide data as hard as can be, but, as Schlesinger once re- marked, "nobody has ever been able to photo- graph intentions." On the other hand, communications intel- ligence is far more easily jeopardized than other forms of information gathering. If a . Government merely suspects that its com- munications are compromised, it does not have to hunt down any spies or traitors- it can simply change codes. And this will cut off information not from just one man but from a whole network. That is why the Gov- ernment is so hypersensitive to any public mention of the N.S.A.'s work. When President Ford last September refused to send classi- fied material to the House Intelligence Com- mittee after it made public four apparently innocuous words-"and greater communica- tions security"-it was because of fears that S 7345 the words would reveal to the Egyptians, to whom they referred, that the United States had pierced deeply enough into their com- munications to detect Important changes. When last February he invoked executive privilege for private firms to keep them from furnishing information to a House commit- tee looking into Government interception of private telegraph and teletypewriter mes- sages, it was also for fear of compromising N.S.A. procedures. In doing its work, the agency doesn't just tune up its receivers and go out hunting for codes to break. It gets its assignments from other elements of the Government. They tell the United States Intelligence Board what information they need that the N.S.A. can probably provide. After board approval, the Director of Central Intelligence levies the requirements upon the N.S.A. Typical assign- ments might be to locate and keep track of all the divisions of the Chinese Army, to determine the range and trajectory of Soviet ICBM's, to ascertain the characteristics of radars around East Berlin. In all of these, the first step is to seek out the relevant foreign transmissions. Some of the intercepts come from N.S.A. teams in American embassies. The team in Moscow has been spectacularly successful- at least before the Russians began flooding the building with low-intensity microwave radiation. It had picked up the conversations between - Soviet leaders in their radiotele- phone-equipped automobiles and other offi- cials in the Kremlin. - More intercepts come from special satel- lites in space called "feerrets. " Swinging si- lently over the broad steppes and scattered cities of the Communist world, or floating permanently above the golden deserts and strategic gulfs of the Middle East, these giant squat cylinders tape-record -every electric whisper on their target frequencies. These they spew out upon command to American ground stations. Most 'radio intercepts come from manned intercept posts. Some of these are airborne. The Air Force patrols the edges of the Com- munist bloc with radio reconnaissance air- planes, such as the supersonic SR-71, the EC- 135, and the EC-121, which, carries a crew of 30 and six tons of electronic equipment. These planes concentrate not on communica- tions intelligence (COMINT) but on the sec- ond branch of signals intelligence- elec-tronics-intelligence, or ELINT. ELINT plays an important role in modern war. Suppose the Air Force were to send a bomber force against Moscow, Soviet radars would detect, the force and report its range, direction and speed, enabling their fighters to attack. To delay this, the Americans would have to jam the radars, or "spoof" them- i.e., emit counterfeit pulses that would in- dicate a false position and speed for the bombers. But to to do this, the Air Force would first have to know the frequency, pulse rate, wave form and other character. istics of the Russian radars. That explains why, in fiscal 1974, according to a report of the Center for National Security Studies in Washington, the Air Force flew at least 38,000 hours of ELINT flights--better than a hun- dred hours a day-dissecting radar signals with oscilloscopes and other electronic means. The game is not without its risks. No nation leaves all its radars turned on all the time. So the planes sometimes dart to- ward the country's territory. They hope the target will turn on its more secret radars. The danger, particularly at a time of inter- national tension, is that the target will take the tease for the real thing and start World War III. Other N.S.A.-directed posts lurk in the depths of the sea, aboard submarines in the Navy's Holystone program. This seeks, among other things, to "fingerprint" the acoustics of Soviet missile submarines. Aboard the Holystone submarine Gato, when it collided Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90: 00735R000200180001-5- S 7346 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 17, 1976 with a Russian sub in the Barents Sea in 1969, were eight sailors working for the Navy's N.S.A.-related security group. The Navy also used to have nine noncombatant surface ships collecting signal intelligence. But after the Liberty was strafed by Israeli forces during the Six-Day. War of 1967 and the Pueblo was captured by the North Ko- reans, it decommissioned this mode. The vast majority of the manned posts are fixed on the ground. They ring the Soviet Union and China-clusters of low huts huddling on a dusty plain or in the foothills of some remote Karakoram. In Turkey, they nestle close to the Russian underbelly. The post at the Black Sea port of Sinop-the an- cient Sinope, which centuries ago colonized the shores of the Euxine-strains to hear Soviet voices. At Okinawa, the antenna field cobwebs a mountainside. But much of the interception is done by servicemen. Earphones clamped to their heads, they hear the staccato of Russian Morse: One Soviet Army post reports the movement of half a dozen trucks to another. Other messages are in cipher. On a voice cir- cuit, soldiers can be heard talking on maneuvers. During moments of tension, the routine changes. Transmitters will vanish from their usual points on the dial. Station call signs will cease following their normal pattern of changes. Yet this is when information is most needed. The monitors hunch over their radio sets as they hunt up and down the frequency spectrum for their target trans- mitter. They can recognize him by peculiar- ities in sending or Hy the tone of his trans- mitter. One may sound like dowdy-dowdow, another like doodee-doodee. One may sound as if he's sending from inside a can; another may let his frequency slide up two or three kilohertz during a message. They type out their intercepts on four-ply carbon paper and pass them back to the analysts. These men graph message routing to deduce organizational relationships. They monitor traffic volume for an upsurge that might indicate unusual activity. They ex- tract from the message content indications of equipment capabilities, unit morale, names and characteristics of commanders. And they send the messages in cipher back to the cryptanalysts. These are the aces, the shamans, of the communications intelligence business. They are the descendants of the ruffed divines and mathematicians who broke codes in cur- tained, candle-lit black chambers to ;urther the grand designs of their absolute monarchs. The N.S.A.'s modern Merlins work in large open spaces filled with rows of gray steel desks. They pore over green-striped sheets, tap on computer terminals print letters with colored pencils in rows and columns on cross- ruled paper, sip coffee, confer. Their successes become the agency's most jealously guarded secrets. They succeed, however, mainly with the ciphers of third-world countries and with the lower-level ciphers of major powers. Under- developed nations have neither the money nor-the expertise to secure their messages from American-and Russian-exposure. Anyhow, they mainly want to keep things secret from their neighbors-Pakistan from India, Egypt from Israel, Argentina from Chile. So they buy commercially available cipher machines. But N.S.A. cryptanalysts, backed up by probably the largest concentra- tion of computers under one roof in the world, some of them perhaps a generation or two ahead of any others in existence, can often beat these. The major powers, on the other hand, use machines to generate ciphers so strong that, even given a cryptogram and its plaintext, and all the world's computers of this and the next generation, a cryptanalyst would need centuries to reconstruct the cryptosys- tern and use the reconstruction to read the next message. The N.S.A., in other words, can- overwhelming volume can stifle results. In not get the most desirable communications late September 1973, just before the start intelligence-the high-level. messages of the of the Yom Kippur War, "the National Se- Soviet Union and Communist China. (The curity Agency began picking up clear sign. SALT coup was partly the , result of a Soviet that Egypt and Syria were preparing for enciphering error.) Worse, the area in which major offensive," the House Intellige cryptanalysts may expect success is shrink- Committee reported. "N.S.A. information i ing. The main reason is the declining cost ?dicated that [a major foreign nation] had of computation. This is falling by 50 percent every five years; the most obvious example is the price of pocket calculators. For the same amount of money as it spent five years ago, a nation can buy a cipher machine to- day with double the coding capacity. But doubling the coding capacity squares the number of trials the cryptanalyst has to make. Very quickly this work rises beyond practical limits. So the N.S.A. asks for help. The F.B.I. bur- glarized embassies in Washington for it. The C.I.A. has subverted code clerks in foreign capitals: It once offered a Cuban in Mon- tevideo $20,000. In 1966, it bugged an Egyp- tian code room to pick up the vibrations of the embassy's cipher machine. The N.S.A., which could not cryptanalyze this machine, though it was commercially available, ana- lyzed the recordings, revealing the machine's settings-and hence the messages. The C.I,A: s most spectacular assist came in 1974, when it spent $350 million in an unsuccess- ful secret effort to raise a Soviet submarine from the depths of the Pacific, with missiles and cipher machines intact. In Room 6510 at the State Department, the intercepts come in on white sheets of paper bearing the heading "To Secretary of State from DIRNSA [Director, N.S.A.]." Several lines of gibberish indicating the dis- tribution are followed by the text of the in- tercept, unscrambled on the spot. R.C.I. offi- cers (for "research-communications intelli- gence"), one for each geographic area, insert the new material into fat loose-leaf binders and pull, out the old. Once a week or so, the country directors mosey on down to Room 6510 and leaf through the file to keep cur- rent with their areas. If something urgent comes in, the R.C.I. officer calls the country director, who comes right down. Daily, an R.C.I. officer conceals the more important in- tercepts under black covers (the C.I.A.'s col- or is red) and carries them in a briefcase to the several Assistant Secretaries of State. Dramatic intercepts are rare.' And when they come, they seldom have much impact. Once, an intercept arrived suggesting that a coup d'etat could take place in a certain country in a matter of hours. It was rushed to U. Alexis Johnson, then Under Secretary of State. He read it, nodded, said, "That's interesting," and handed it back to the R.C.I officer. There was simply nothing he could do about it. The vast majority of the intercepts are low-level routine. At State, they deal largely with the minutiae of embassy business, such as foreign messages dealing with Soviet visa requests to foreign governments, reports of foreign ambassadors about meetings with American officials, foreign businessmen's or- ders. At Defense, they may include foreign ship locations, a reorganization in a Soviet military district, the transfer of a flight( of Iranian jets from Teheran to Isfahan. Nearly all come from third-world countries. Usually they are of secondary interest, but some- times their importance flares: Korea, the Congo, Cuba, Chile. And since these coun- tries are spoken to by the major powers, their messages may carry good clues to the major powers' Intentions. (This was another of the sources for the SALT Intelligence.) The quantity is enormous. In part this reflects the soaring increase in communica-. tions throughout the world. In part it marks a shift to the more voluminous peripheral sources, such as observing message routings, to compensate for the growing difficulty of cryptanalysis in areas of central interest, sucti as Russia and China. Unfortunately this of war and concerned about their, citizens and dependents in Egypt. N.S.A.'s warnings escaped the serious attention of most intelli- gence analysts responsible for the Middle East." "The fault," the committee concluded, "may well lie in the system itself. N.S.A. intercepts of Egyptian-Syrian war prepara- tions in this period were so voluminous-an average of hundreds of reports each week- that few analysts had time to digest more than a small portion of them. Even fewer analysts were qualified by technical training to read raw N.S.A. traffic. Costly intercepts had scant impact on estimates." If N.S.A. failed in this major test, how does it do in its day-to-day operations? A'survey at the State Department showed that most desk officers felt that while the N.S.A. material was not especially helpful, they didn't want to give it up. It made -their job a little easier. A former top State Depart- ment official was always glad to see the man with the locked briefcase. "I got some good clues on how to deal with various countries," he said, "and I quickly learned which ambas- sadors I could trust and which not." At the Defense Department, most officials said they appreciated the help they got from the agency. "D.I.A. relies very heavily on N.S.A.," said General Graham, "because D.I.A. puts out a warning document to American units all over the world and to Washington, and whether the warning lights are green or amber or red comes mostly from the N.S.A." For policy makers, naturally, the more in- formation the better. But is this margin. advantage worth the billions it costs in nation that has so many other vital human needs unfulfilled? Put that way, the ques- tion poses a false dilemma. The money for health and housing and education can-and should-come from elsewhere. It is on the vastly larger arms . budget, on atomic over- kill and obsolescent nuclear aircraft carriers, that the nation overspends. Intelligence is far cheaper and usually saves more than it costs. In general, with its record of some fail- ures and some successes, and the incal- culable potential value of its sleepless watch around the world, the N.S.A. is worth the money the nation spends on it. The real question fora nation reappraising its intelligence community is not one of fi- nancial priority but of legal basis. There is no statute prohibiting the N.S.A. from activ- ities that encroach on Americans' constitu- tional rights. In response to criticism, Presi- dent Ford recently issued an executive order on intelligence that seems to forbid the N.S.A. from intercepting American commu- nications-but also seems to leave a loophole. Even with the best of intentions, however, that cannot be an adequate approach. For what one President can order another-or even the same-President can abrogate or amend. The final responsibility for all those im- proper activities by the N.S.A. was, in each case, the President's, even though it remains unclear whether all of them were reported to the Oval Office. That alone should illustrate the hazards of an arrangement under which the powers of an intelligence service derive not from Congress but from the White House. As a basic reform, Congress should replace Truman's 1952 directive with a legislative charter for the N.S.A. That, in fact, was the view that underl much of the questioning of General All before the Senate Intelligence Committ , and that is the substance of the recommen- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 17, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE dations on the N.S.A. contained in the com- would be no constitutional protections mittee s recent report on the intelligence at all, and once again another area of establishment as a whole. "The committee abuse, another area of major significance ds," said the report, "that there is a com- need for an N.S.A. charter to spell out that would be beyond reach of this over- ling tations which will protect individual sight committee if this amendment is stitutional rights without impairing adopted. , N.S.A.'s necessary foreign intelligence mis- The military clandestine intelligence sion." The committee also made specific rec- activities are supervised by the CIA. Only ommendations designed to prevent a repeti- half of what the CIA spends comes from Con of the known abuses of the past. t its own appropriations. The other half The House Intelligence Committee, in its -own report, came to the same basic conclu- comes out of defense appropriations sion. declaring that "the existence of the through transfers or advances, and thus National Security Agency should be recog- if you controlled only the CIA it would n3zed by specific legislation," which should be a simple matter to shift intelligence "define the role of N.S.A. with reference to- operations, covert operations, dirty the monitoring of communications of Ameri- tricks, into agencies not under the juris- caps." diction of this oversight committee. There-is no question that the National . Anything the CIA does or the FBI does Security Agency, in the words of the Senate the military can do and has done. You committee report, is "vital to American secu- rity." In fact, in this nuclear age, when either have to oversee all of them or, in danger-fraught situations can be best han- all likelihood, we will not have had re- dled with knowledge about the "other side," strained what we are seeking to restrain. and when many international agreements, Finally, let us look at the Huston re- such as SALT, are dependent on, say, Amer- port. The Huston report or the Huston ica's ability to verify Soviet compliance by plan is probably the most classic official its own technical means, N.S.A. intelligence, document of lawlessness ever prepared like all intelligence, can be a stabilizing fac- and signed off b for in the world. by high officers in the his- There is also no question that we need a tory of America. It was approved by the new statute. No law can guarantee preven- President, it was approved by repre- tion of abuses, especially if lawlessness is sentatives of every intelligence agency in condoned in the higher echelons of govern- 4%he Federal Government. On its face it ment, and the C.I.A.'s charter did not prevent sanctioned a broad range of illegal and that agency from overstepping its bounds. unconstitutional activities: reading mail But a gap in the law is an invitation to abuse. without a court's warrant, contrary, to An institutionalized mechanism to seek out violations and punish the guilty can best law; black bag jobs; breaking and enter- deter the sort of intrusion that so many ing the homes of American citizens, con- Americans fear-and that destroys the very trary to the fourth amendment; tax re- freedom the N.S.A. was created to protect. turns and a whole range of activities that Mr. MONDALE. Next, the Army count-* we have revealed and which were to be erintelligence, which would be another officially -sanctioned by Presidential pri- .ncy- exempt under this pending vate plan, the Huston,plan, and the rea- endment, was found spying on inno- son I raise this point is that a majority cent Americans, bugging, tapping, and of the participants in the committee, who illegally opening mail. That record is prepared that plan, were representatives also spelled out in the, reports of our of the military agencies, the DIA, the committee. Some of the early pioneering NSA, Army Intelligence, Navy Intelli- work in the area of intelligence abuse gence, Air Force Intelligence, and each came as a 'result of the hearings before had a representative on the committee Senator Ervin on the Constitutional that prepared the Huston plan. Rights Subcommittee relating to the . So if what we are trying to do here is abuses of the Army Intelligence Agency designed to try to prevent the recurrence against innocent Americans. Thus there of abuses that threaten American de-, is a very rich and broad record that dem- mocracy and threaten the accountability have seen here were not the contribution onstrates that abuse has occurred within for U.S, foreign policy to Congress and to of Mr. Hoover. the authority and under the jurisdic- our constitutional system, then the argu- Mr. Hoover had little or nothing to do tion of Army intelligence. ment is overwhelming that these agen- with the bomber raids in World War II: Next, the military has provided the ties must be included within the juris- What we have seen, if we look at the backbone for the major paramilitary ac- diction of this new oversight committee. history of secret intelligence agencies, is tivities. These are activities which have Moreover, the reason for the oversight that if we are not careful and if we do been carried on in Laos, the Bay of Pigs, committee is not simply to prevent not have oversight, we can expect, based in which an attempt is made to suggest abuses, as important as that is, but to on the record, that human nature is such that it is not direct U.S. military inter- assure that these agencies are acting ef- that those who wield this power will find vention but which, in fact, have been fectively to defend us. The record is re- it very hard to restrain themselves from under our control and direction, often plete with failures on the part of these ' abusing it. It is hard to refuse to play U.S.-trained military personnel who agencies to effectively defend our in- God when we have the right to do it have been, in the jargon of the business, terests. For years the CIA. and the FBI outside the law and protected by censor- "sheep-dipped." They have been clan- did not talk to each other at top levels, ship. destine in their outward marks, but they risking this Nation's defense because of That is why, above all, we need what are, in fact, U.S. military personnel in- the petty personal disputes. No one knew Madison once called auxiliary precau- volved in those activities, about it because there was. no oversight. tions. Those paramilitary activities occurred For years there had been private talks I do not think it is any insult to those outside the Constitution. If you read the within the Defense Department about the now running these agencies to say that Constitution and the declaration-of-war effectiveness of the DIA. on which we we need that oversight and that we can- powers contained therein you will find -spend millions and millions of dollars. not accept their argument that, "we are no exception in there permitting military The Murphy Commission recommended different people than those other people activities run and conducted by the that it be terminated; the House com- who did wrong, but we don't do wrong." United States except through a declara- mittee, after studying it; recommended I do not think that answers the ques- JEW war, and there is no exception in that it be terminated, and we understand tion. I do not think the experience and re for such activities if you call them there is a good deal of private talk in the history justifies it. amilitary. If you did, of course, there Defense Department toward that same I often like to quote Madison's Fed-?j S 7347 end, because it has not proven to be as effective and to serve the purpose it was supposed to serve in helping to protect this country. For many years there was a paranoid attitude in the CIA that viewed possible agents that we could work with or pos- sible leads as all plants presented by the Russians. Maybe and undoubtedly many of them were, but not all of them, and .very few, if any, were pursued. That shows, in my opinion, the need for oversight not only to prevent abuses but to make certain that these agencies are performing effectively to defend our country against real dangers. If we do not have oversight of the mili- tary agencies; I think we have largely failed-largely failed in our effort. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's 15 minutes have expired. Who yields time? Mr. MONDALE. May I have 5 more minutes? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator is recognized for 5 more minutes. Mr. MONDALE. It seems to me that there are three or four fundamental principles that justify and demand over- sight of all of these agencies. First of all, if there is one thing we have learned from this long study, it is that we must be very concerned about how human nature works when we clothe people with secret power, particularly with great secret power. If we are not careful, it will almost inevitably lead to abuse. Recently, the Director of the Bureau. Mr. Kelley, said, "Well, the real problem is that in Hoover's, twilight years he was acting foolishly," and I think. that is true. But I do not think the villain theory an- swers our question becailse many of these things occurred before Mr. Hoover's twi- light years. They were committed by many people in the Bureau and in these other agencies, other than Mr. Hoover. Mr. Hoover does not explain the CIA; he does not explain the DIA; he had nothing to do directly with assassina- tions, but many of the abuses that we Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S7348 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD = SENATE May 17, 1976 eralist Paper No. 51, which I think un- derscores the need for what he called "auxiliary precautions." He said this : If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next" place oblige it to control itself. and that he said Experience has taught mankind the neces- sity of auxiliary precautions. clearly defend itself within the law and within the Constitution from every threat to this country, terrorists, bomb- ers, foreign spies, rioters, civil unrest. We can do all that within the Constitu- tion and within the law. I want to know what right any of us have, those of us who have taken the oath to uphold the Constitution of the United States, to grant authority to any- one, the President. or anyone in his be- half, or ourselves, to take the law into his own hands and in secret and in that fact threaten 'the constitutional rights and the constitutional system of this Nation. It is not necessary and it is the most dangerous thing that this Nation can do. If our study has concluded anything, it is this, that those framers of our Con- stitution nearly 200 years ago came up with a document that was shrewd and profound interms of how human nature worked, but shrewd and profound in terms of giving us the full authority we needed. The power we needed to protect us from our dangers at home and abroad, plenty of power, and at the same time to restrain the hand of government, because we do not go beyond that line, beyond enforcing the law, and interfer' ing in the political rights and freedoms of the American people. It is the most sacred and important line drawn in the Constitution. I can- not think of anything better that we could do to celebrate this Bicentennial and more meaningful than to say that 200 years later we agreed that line is right and in the face of this record we are go- ing to insist these agencies observe the law and to make certain they obey it, they are going to'have to report their activities to this Congress, all of them. Mr. President, I yield the floor. able economic effect of trade conces- sions. Additional work in this area has representatives as negotiations intensify in fiscal- year 1977. The new escape clause criteria have -resulted in a total of 14 industry investigations in less than a year since the Trade Act's effective date, compared to a total of only 1 'such investigation initiated in the pre- vious 21 months. Intensive efforts are being devoted to completion of unfair import practice investigations under the new rules and time limits established by the Trade Act .of 1974. Mr. President, the Commission's pres- ent efforts, such as its recent advice to the President on the probable effect of tariff concessions and the generalized system of preferences, its reports on East-West trade, its studies of interna- tional commodity agreements and the United States-Canadian automotive agreement, and its series on the com- petitiveness of the United States and other major trading countries, have greatly impressed the members of the Committee on Finance. Further, as the multilateral trade negotiations proceed in Geneva the Commission will play an increasingly important role regarding the economic impact of proposed tradeoffs and the Commission must be adequately staffed to carry out this important task. I think that is what this record shows: experience has taught us that we need auxilitary precautions against abuse, particularly the abuse of power in the intelligence field which, ' by necessity, operates in secret. Secrecy, yes. Unaccountability, no. That is why we simply must have full jurisdiction in this oversight committee. It seems to me that, when we strip the arguments down to their essentials, what many people are really arguing in these agencies is that this Nation can- not defend itself unless it can do so with the protection of the censorship and un- less it can from time to time proceed illegally. In other words, in order to de- fend this country, it is necessary to do something that the framers of this coun- try found abhorrent, namely, to have censorship- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's time has expired. Mr. MONDALE. May I have 5 more minutes, please? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? Mr. RIBICOFF. Yes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. MONDALE. So that we can pro- ceed with secrecy and protect ourselves from the Congress, from the American people, and, second, to have the right to act illegally and in violation of the rights of the American people from time to time in order to defend this country from its real dangers. I say that is their essential argument; when we get down to it, and certainly the record will demonstrate that time and time again they said almost exactly that, because that would be the only rea- son for saying that they should have the right to operate in secret and beyond the reach of the Congress. Why do they want that right if they are operating legally and responsively? What is their fear? I think the fear is that it would deny them this broad freedom they have had to pursue whatever course they wanted, no matter how illegal or disruptive of constitutional rights it should be. What we found, if we found anything, is that this Nation can defend itself fully and effectively, as it has for 200 years, within the law. For some months we have looked through the.FBI files; we asked them which dangers they wanted to defend us from. We did not look at logic, we'did not look at theory, we looked at real life, and we found out that this Nation can munity and I strongly urge my col- leagues to support S. 3420. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill is open to amendment. If there be no amendment to be proposed, the ques- tion is on the engrossment and third reading of the bill. The bill was ordered to be engrossed for a third reading,-read the third time. and passed as follows: S. 3420 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That (a) there are authorized to be appropriated to the International Trade Commission?$11,789,- 000 to carry out its duties and functions dur- ing fiscal year 1977. (b) There are authorized to be appropri- ated to such Commission $12,036,000 to carry ,out its duties and functions during fiscal year 1978. (c) In addition to the amounts authorized under subsections (b) and (c), there are au- thorized to be appropriated to such Commis- sion such amounts as may be necessary for fiscal years 1977 and 1978 for increases re- quired by law during such fiscal years in salary, pay, retirement, and other employee benefits. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMIS- . SION AUTHORIZATIONS Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, in order to keep the calendar clear and to take only a few minutes of the Senate's time, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate turn to the consideration of Calendar No. 776, S. 3420. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill will be stated by title. The legislative clerk read as follows: A bill (S. 3420) to authorize appropriations to the International Trade Commission. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the present consideration of the bill? .There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to consider the bill. Mr. CURTIS. Mr. President, I fully support S. 3420 which provides budget authorization for the United States Trade Commission. The Finance Com- mittee has approved the amount re- quested by the Commission for fiscal year 1977 and 1978, and I would like to briefly explain the need for this level of funding. The Trade Act of 1974 has placed in- creased responsibilities on the Commis- sion. For example, in fiscal year 1975, about one-third of all Commission re- sources were devoted to the development of advice to the President on the prob- ORDER REFERRING S. 3091 TO COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS Mr. TALMADGE. Mr. President, I ask mittee on Agriculture and Forestry be Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved-For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 18, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE tinue to speak tough words about returning them home, even they allow refugee "camps" to become gee "villages" under controlled conditions. III. Refugee resettlemen i. the United States 21. In little more than ear, some 131,000 Indochina refugees move rom boats and crowded processing center to reception areas in the U.S., to sponsor d homes in local communities. By this Ju 30th, when the parole program comes to end, the 22. Despite the chaos of the a nation, and the lack of leadership and dir on in the early stages of the resettlement p ram, substantial progress has been achieved re- settling a majority of the refugees. Ho _ Pr, serious problems remain, contrary to timistic reports from the Task Force. agree that unemployment, underemploy- ment, welfare and other problems have gen- erally increased among the refugees-and increased very dramatically in some areas of the United States. 24. A clear indication of the adjustment and integration problems among the refugees can now be seen in their frequent movement from their initial resettlement areas of last year, to new areas. The movement is largely towards the so-called "sun-belt" from the northeast and midWest. The reasons for mov- ing are usually personal-climate, the pres- ence of family or friends elsewhere, better job opportunities, the lack of acceptance in a community, etc. ' - 25. For a significant number of refugees the optimism and hope of last year has faded into feelings of frustration,. failure, loneli- ness and general depression. There are un- doubtedly legitimate reasons for, this situa- tion, including the ptate of the nation's econ- omy, lack of resources of many refugees, poor job skills, lack of English language, etc. But these problems have also come from some "failings in the President's resettlement pro- gram: early pressures to-empty the camps at the expense of good resettlement; emphasis on the widest dispersion of refugees, leading to unrealistic resettlement situations; the limited scope of the program; the lack of federal programs available for job training, etc. 26: There are no quick remedies for these problems, and the refugess resettlement pro- gram is in a period of transition. So the refugees must try to cope, and officials are still trying to "catch up", even as they talk about phasing out the program. MISS LAURA JOHNSON Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, Miss Laura Johnson, who for many years was president of Hartford College for Women, recently retired. Her achievements were many in the fields of education and com- munity affairs. The Hartford Courant, in a recent editorial, commented on her accomplishments. I ask unanimous consent that the edi- torial be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: [From the Hartford (Conn.) Courant, May 14, 1976 ] Miss LAURA JOHNSON RETIRES When a college president retires, it is ex- pected that tributes will outline numerical gains: Acreage added to a campus, how many new buildings were erected and how much the student body grew. All these are evident achievements when reviewing the 33 years spent by Miss Laura Alice Johnson, first as dean, then as president of Hartford College for Women. But the main concern of Miss Johnson, who retires next month, always has been the broadening of student minds, not particu- larly their growth in numbers on the campus of- the two-year liberal arts college. Widened horizons and expectations for them as per- sons have been nurtured by Miss Johnson rather than focusing only on the narrower stereotyped role of women. Indeed, Miss Johnson herself epitomizes that philosophy. When she became the first woman to be named as a director of a Hart- ford-based insurance company-Phoenix Mutual in 1972-she described that unique honor as "nothing special; not a big thing." Rather she hoped her selection was based on her talent as an individual, not as a woman. She again became a "first woman who" when in 1974 The Courant asked her to be a member of its Board of Directors. The year before that she became a director of the couraged time to Laura Johnson's infi in its graduates, as will help to maintain Bard higher education College where Miss oe long will be felt, their places in the wor and potential. confidently take persons of talent SHIPBUILDING CLAIMM AGAINST THE NAVY: A M ACTURED CRISIS ' Mr. PROXMIRE. Mr. Pres t, Wil- liam P. Clements, Deputy S Lary of Defense, has formally notified gress that the Pentagon is invoking emergency powers under blic Law 85-804 to pay over half a billio 1- lars to two Navy contractors. The o lion worth of shipbuilding claims against the Navy. In addition, Mr. Clements says that about $300 million in claims is about to be filed by the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics. These claims have not yet been received by the Navy. THE CLAIMS HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY AUDITED Part of Mr. Clements' argument in support of emergency treatment of the claims, rather than the normal settle- ment procedures followed by the Navy, is that the claims represent long-standing disputes and therefore must be quickly resolved. The impression has been cre- ated that the claims are old and that they have been unresolved for a long period of time. The facts are that most of Newport News' claims were either filed for the first time or revised this year, and that the backup documentation for Litton's claims has still not been submitted to the Navy. S 7407 What this means is that the Navy has still not had a chance to fully audit or analyze the claims. For the Government to pay the claims wholly or in part with,-., out a full audit and analysis would with,--,-, like buying a pig in a poke. Such an action is objectionable as matter of principle. The taxpayer should not have to pay for unaudited, unan- alyzed claims. Paying these particular claims before they are fully audited is especially objectionable. A MANUFACTURED CRISIS After reviewing the facts and the se- quence of events in this matter, I am forced to conclude that the Pentagon is conspiring with the shipbuilders to manufacture a crisis designed to cover up cost overruns and possible false claims that could cost the taxpayer hundreds of millions of dollars. The facts surrounding the $1.4 billion in claims filed by Newport News and Lit- ton against the Navy show that they are based at least in part on vague estimates. - phony assertions and inflated figures. The facts also show that the timing of many of the claims coincide with pres- sures applied to get them quickly settled and that the Pentagon is now trying to exempt the contractors from audits of their claims and pay them under a na- tional emergency law. CLEMENTS PROPOSAL' IS FOR A BAILOUT The Pentagon's purpose seems to be to bail out two defense contractors who hove incurred huge cost overruns be- cause of-their own inefficiency and fail- ures to deliver on time. I am confident that if the claims wer thoroughly audited, they would be re~ vealed as largely a mixture of hocum and hot air. The squeeze play engineered by Clem- ents and the shipbuilders has already re- sulted in recent provisional payments of nearly $20 million to Litton based on an incomplete analysis of . partial infor- mation. Litton asserts that the Navy agreed in a March 1976 meeting to pay the com- pany $50 million in provisional pay- ments. I ain informed that Navy officials deny making any such agreements. Part of Litton's and Newport News' $894 months aft pleted, and in the Navy March. dumped most of them ap last February and of them had even February Clements to resolve the rt News in 30~ fa.iins had still days. Some of the largest c not been filed. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Crimson, that's newsworthy and it t be. Women who have a potention continuing pursuit. Johnson was honored at a S7408 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 18, 1976 INVCLEAR CARRIER CLAIM FILED FEBRUARY 1976 Newport News' largest single claim- $221 million for the aircraft carriers its, and Eisenhower-was filed on bruary 19, 1976, together with 16 thick flumes of documentation. On February 20, Diesel wrote to the Navy threatening to stop work on other Navy ships unless there was progress toward settlement of its claims. NUCLEAR SUBMARINE CLAIMS FILED MARCH 1978 Newport News' $92 million claim for the nuclear submarines SSN 686 and SSN 687 was not filed until March 1976. I am informed that Newport News com- pleted its price estimates for this claim in May 1975. Another curious fact about the SSN 687 and SSN 687 claims is that General Dynamics built four submarines of the same class, in the same time period, in accordance with the same designs. Yet General Dynamics has no significant claims. against the Navy for its sub- marines. NEWPORT NEWS CLAIMS FILLED WITH DISCLAIMERS Other disturbing facts about the New- port News claims are: First, the statements accompanying the claims are filled with disclaimers in- dicating the company would not be able to prove the Navy owes the amounts alleged. Second, with regard to its $160 million claim on the cruisers CON 38, 39, and 40, documentation "includes the team's anal- ysis of contemporary documents and working files which might be lost when e project goes tinto final completion ages." The contractor also admits "some W rors may have been made" in its esti- mates, and that the specific impact of what the Navy is alleged to have done "is difficult to identify." Third, Newport News also admits some errors may have been made" in its nuclear submarine claim, that its con- clusions cannot be proven with certainty, and that it may be evaluated differently by the Government. Fourth, Newport News refuses to cer- tify its claims although 'Navy regulations require that contractors certify that their claims are "current, complete and accur- ate" in a sworn affidavit. LITTON LHA CLAIM STILL NOT FULLY DOCUMENTED Litton's claim on the helicopter carrier program-LHA-was originally $270 mil- lion in 1972 and was revised upwards three times until it reached the total of $505 million in April 1975. The Navy rejected Litton's original claim in 1973 on the grounds that it had failed to substantiate its allegations with facts. The Navy did agree to pay Litton $109.7 million for cancellation costs when riving in March, enabling the Navy for the first time to begin analyzing the facts behind the claim. In the latter part of March, Secretary Clements pulled the rug out from beneath the Navy by de- ciding the Government should provide financial relief to Newport News and Lit- ton through its national emergency powers. EARLIER LITTON CLAIM UNDER INVESTIGATION BY JUSTICE DEPT. Among the disturbing facts about Lit- ton are the following: First, an earlier Litton claim on a sub- marine contract was referred by the Navy to the Justice Department for investiga- tion of possible fraud. That investigation is now taking place. Second, in 1972 Roy Ash, president of Litton, urged the Navy to ask Congress for $1 billion to $2 billion to solve LHA and other shipbuilding problems. Ash said he discussed such a program with a Mr. Conally, who was quoted as saying that it should be positively presented, "on a grand scale-make it bigger than the Congress.,, Third, only a fraction of the support- ing data to the LHA claim has been sub- mitted to the Navy. Fourth, Litton's shipyard facility has been proven to be inefficient and poorly managed by a number of Government'in- vestigations. This is the same company that ordered a ship cut in ,half so that when welded back together Litton could claim that it had been built according to modern, modular construction techni- ques. THE REAL ISSUE-WHO IS TO BLAME FOR DELAYS AND COST OVERRUNS? I believe Secretary Clements is a man of high integrity and that he is dedi- cated to the public interest. I also feel certain that the Navy must share some of the responsibility for the problems in the shipbuilding program. The real issue is, who is to blame for the schedule de- lays and the cost overruns? THE CLAIMS MUST BE }LILLY AUDITED AND ANALYZED There is no way to decide this issue until the claims are thoroughly audited and analyzed. The contractors should have nothing to fear from a Navy audit if the claims are legitimate. The 'taxpayer should not have to pay anything for unaudited, unanalyzed and unsubstantiated claims. Under the law the Senate and the House each have 60 days of continuous session to adopt a resolution disapprov= ing the Pentagon's proposal. Clearly, there is no national emergency justify- ing the wholesale bailout of the ship- building industry proposed by Mr. Clem- ents. It is also of interest that the ship- builders themselves have not asked for the LHA program was cut back from nine the kind ships to five ships. Litton appealed the of relief contemplated by the decision to the Armed Services Board of law that is being invoked. Contract Appeals instead of providing The senate should reject the Clements proposal. the Navy with supporting facts. In January 1976, the Navy and Litton agreed that the contractor would with- begin documenting the draw its appeal , "Na im, and resume negotiations er the Navy examined the backup The PRESIDING OFFICER. Morning PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ate will now resume consideration of the unfinished business, Senate Resolution 400, which will be stated by title. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a standing Committee of the Senate on In- telligence Activities, and for other purposes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who yields time? The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Ohio. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, we have be- fore its amendment No. 1645 to the sub- stitute. An aspect of Senate Resolution 400 that disturbs me greatly is the stipula- tion that the Select Committee on In- telligence be, in essence, a "B" committee with members limited to an 8-year term of service on the committee. In fact, as every Senator knows, "B" committees do not always receive the at- tention from their members which they might deserve. This is fully understand- able in terms of the severe constraint on time faced by every Member of the Sen- ate. In recognition of this fact, we usually designate as a "B" committee those com- mittees responsible for areas' which, while vital, are perhaps not as vital as certain other areas. Extending this logic, by designating the select committee as a "B" committee, we state that its area of concern is not as vital as a number of other areas, and that it is recognized that members may not be able to give its committee business as much attention as they would like to. Can we do this in regard to the area of national intelligence? I strongly suggest we cannot. It is clear to me that national intelligence is one of the most critical areas for which the Congress has some responsibility. In fact, is it not contradictory that the increasing awareness of the importance of ? the intelligence community has brought us to consider a bill, which im- plies strongly, by designating the pro- posed committee as a "B" committee, that the subject in question is compara- tively a less important one? I do not think this aspect of the proposed legislation can be considered at all satisfactory or acceptable. Mr. President, Members,. particularly those with the greatest abilities, may tend to seek to avoid such a committee assignment because it is an uncompen- sated add-on to their primary commit- tee responsibilities. Can we afford to have this committee regarded by the Mem- bership as one of the "dogs," so to speak as far as committee assignments are con- cerned? Given the tremendously impor- tant nature of the national intelligence function, I do not believe we can afford that. Merely doing the authorized house- keeping work annually, in itself, In my opinion, has to be a very considerable burden upon all Senators who serve on the committee, regardless of the con- tinuing oversight functions which that Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 18, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE committee would be called upon to exer- cise continually. Not at any particular point in the calendar year, I emphasize to the Senate, but throughout the entire year this intelligence committee Id have a responsibility 'for its over- t function. The experience we have .ndar had would indicate that that oversight should continue on a very active basis at all times. Mr. President, what about those dili- gent Senators who really become in- volved with the work of the select com- mittee, as we would hope and expect. Will we not have a situation where other sen- atorial committee assignments and other necessary work will suffer because of the time and effort devoted to the select com=mittee by such Senators? Mr. President, this situation is unfair to Senators who rightfully assume re- sponsibilities for work on the select com- mittee as well as to those Senators who must, by virtue of time limitations, pick up the slack created on regular commit- tee assignments. We want our very best people to serve on this committee, if such a committee is established; and we want them to be motivated to devote their full attention to it. We must provide for an accommo- dation between the current requirements imposed by section 6(a) of rule XXV, and the realities of our demanding work in the Senate in all areas. My amendment, No. 1645, would integrate the select com- mittee into the normal functional work structure of the Senate and thereby, rec- ognize the realities of providing for a realistic opportunity to do our very best in this most critical area. _ shall mention one other danger I see lved here. I see it involved in any but I think it is multiplied by the approach we are taking with respect to permitting this committee to be an add-on, select, or "B" committee, what- ever one wishes to call it. That is the propensity that already exists in. many of these areas of Senators to rely on their committee staffs very heavily. That is mittee for more than 8 years. At the likely to be magnified in this particular end of this period, he will have to start area. What we have here, very possibly, all over again on another "B" committee. Is the building up of a staff of so-called The. proposed amendment will affect intelligence experts in this area who, especially hard those Senators initially unless the Senators have the time, in appointed to the committee who must view of their other committee assign- get' off the committee after only 4 years, ments, to devote a great deal of attention in order to start the rotation process . , ecomes to the work of the committee, are going These Senators may have to give up all indifferent to the problems and an apolo- to become the actual, functional working -their seniority on another committee to gist for the intelligence communit Th t y. a committee. Instead of having one or more serve just 4 years on the new committee. was the rationale behind limiting the agencies in the executive branch with the It could very well be hard to find a Sen- term. final word in the intelligence field, I .ator willing to do that. I say respectfully to the Senator from think we are very likely to see it cen- The members of the present Select Ohio that I have a degree of sympathy tralized, as we have it in this committee, Committee on Intelligence were able to for his point of view. It is my feeling that' in .the staff of this committee-a power conduct their work on this committee this committee is going to, have a lot in itself within the Senate but not sub- as an add-on committee on top of all of hard work to do. It is my feeling that ject to as much oversight or control as other committee assignments. Members this committee is going to take a con- there should be and really becoming the of the new permanent committee could siderable amount of a member's time. dominant force in the intelligence activi- , do so also. We have before us a Senate resolution ties of the United States. It would seem to me that even without setting up a group of Senators to look For all these reasons, my feeling is that the proposed wording, the leadership over the entire committee structure. I It would be far wiser if we, at the very could certainly take into account the believe they have to report back in the outset, began by regarding this as a "B" overall problems of a Senator's other next session of Congress. At that time, committee or a select committee that obligations in trying to find Senators the whole alinement of "A" and "B" under rule XXV would have the same re- to serve on the new select committee. committee will be gone into. At such .quirements as to a limitation on mem- Consequently, and for these reasons, time, the select committee will be in bership as the other "B" and select and Mr. President, I oppose the amendment place. Jqj" committees of the Senate have offered by the distinguished Senator I say frankly, I do not seek a place on UNP the second sentence of rule XXV. from Ohio. this committee. If I were a member of S 7409 For that reason, I recommend the Mr. TAFT. I wonder if the distin- adoption of this amendment. guished Senator_ would yield for a I reserve the remainder of my time. moment for a question? Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, the Mr. RIBICOFF. I am pleased to yield. compromise substitute as presently writ- Mr. TAFT. I should like to know the ten allows a Senator to serve on the new rationale by which the committee ar- intelligence committee in addition to any rived at the decision or the framework other committee on which he already for the compromise which subsequently serves. arrived at the decision to have an 8-year The amendment offered by Senator limitation on the term. I have not offered TAFT would change this. It would bar a an amendment to strike that, but it does- member of the select committee from also seem to me it raises exactly the same serving on any other "B" committee. point. The Senator, indeed, has made Paragraph 6(a) of rule 25 places in the the same point himself. That is that category of "B" committees the following having a committee of this limited length committees: seems to me to militate against mem- District of Columbia, Post Office and bers choosing it as a committee on which Civil Service, Rules and Administration, Veterans' Affairs, any permanent select or special committee, any joint commit- tee of the Congress except the Joint Com- mittees on the Library and Printing. If the amendment offered by Senator TAFTwas adopted, any Member going on the new intelligence committee would have to give up his present membership on any of these "B" committees. The problem with the amendment of- fered by Senator TAFT is that it will make it more difficult to find a suitable cross- section of the Senate to serve on the committee. Only 23 Members of the Senate are not now members of a B committee. Of the 40 Senators from whom the 7 at-large Members must be drawn, only 7 are not already on a "B" committee. Thus, it is clear that to get a true cross-section of the Senate, and meet the other member- ship requirements of the resolution, the leadership will have to find Senators now on other "B" committees willing to give up their present committee assignments. - This may be difficult if the proposed wording were approved in light of the provision in the resolution for rotating membership. It will be difficult to get a Senator to "B" committee to go on the new com- When we started to think about the they want to serve and, thereby, down- grading the committee. If you know you are only going to be on it for 8 years, you cannot build up seniority on it as you might on another committee, and it seems to me you would think a long time before you would agree to go on this committee. Is the Senator firm and are the com- promisers firm in feeling that they want to keep the 8-year limitation of member- ship? Mr. RIBICOFF. The Committee on Government Operations at first sug- gested only a 6-year term. It was our feeling that we wanted to make sure that the Senators on this committee would not get a vested interest in the intelligence community and find them-, selves apologists for the intelligence apparatus instead of:doing their over- sight job. When we sat in Senator MANSFIELD'S office to try to work out a compromise between the ,proposals of the Committee on Rules and the Com- mittee on Government Operations, the point was raised by Senator CANNON that he felt that it should 'be a longer term of years in order to give the members of this committee the necessary special knowledge and insights. Consequently, it 9-year term, it became obvious that cer- tain members would have to get off in the middle of a term, and, consequently, an amendment was offered on the floor changing it to 8 years. I think there is a basic wisdom in making sure that no member stays on this committee too long, and- thereby loses his interest b Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIADP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7410 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 18, 1976 this committee, I would give up a "B" mittee ample time and attention. If he to me this might be a fair way, a work- committee on which I serve, because I finds that a Member wants to get on this manlike way, to go about resolving this uestion ned with b d d i . q ur s so over e do not think I could really give the committee an necessary time to the new committee other committee assignments that he Mr. RIBICOFF. Again, this will be a .~ _ the atten- permanent rotating rnmmittee and t ... t h i 0tt t , s com ee e k ao ++c c++~== ~~--- will taKe a naru loo mittee structure at the beginning of the Senator MANSFIELD could very well talk years resolves the basic difficulty of ap- next Congress, it was felt that, because to such a Member of the Senate and find plying your proposal to a committee with of all these reasons, at this time, we out if he would be willing to give it up. rotating membership. should not insist that any member serv- But I do not want to tie the hands of As I indicated, this provision was ing on the select committee would have either Senator MANSFIELD or Senator worked out in close cooperation between to give up another committee assign- SCOTT in the makeup of this 15-member the Rules Committee and the Govern- ment. committee. If it is going to work, it is . men Operations Committee..At this time and I do not feel I could depart in this in- t f th ' up e se s going to work because o Mr. TAFT. I appreciate the Senator comments, particularly with regard to the makeup of this first 15-man com- stance and change the basic compromise the ongoing review of the entire com= mittee. I should like to give the majority that was worked out between the Com- mittee structure in the Senate. I am and minority leaders the freedom to mittee on Rules and the Committee on extremely hopeful that something affir- make that choice without writing in re- Government Operations. mative will come out of that at the next strictions in this resolution. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, will the session. The experience of the House Mr. TAFT. I am not sure that the Sen- Senator yield? today; unfortunately, does not seem to ator understands my suggestion, because Mr. RIBICOFF. Yes, be too sanguine a one as to what is likely I do not think it relates to writing in re- Mr. PERCY. I think what the Senator to come out of it. I still feel that we strictions. I have no restrictions. I think from Ohio is attempting to accomplish is badly do need such a study and we badly the makeup of the committee at present comparable to the original thoughts that need some realinem t of legislative is probably as good as we can get, al- the Senator from Illinois had. I felt there responsibilities within 'The various legis- though I think, frankly, it ought only to should be some sacrifice. lative committees. That is one reason why come from the four committees involved As I interpret this'amendment, it would I, frankly, have trouble with the sub- and not be a legislative committee. But require a Member to decide between all stitute at this point. I thought that the in view of the direction that.the substi- of the select committees that he has- resolution of the matter, in view of that tute has already gone, I concur rather these permanent assignments they have pending study that the Committee on strongly with the drafters of the substi- on those committees-and he would have Rules came out with in setting up an tute to the effect that the selecion ought to give up those permanent assignments, oversight committee at this point, really to be made by the majority and minority all of them, for a temporary assignment deferring any question of transferring leaders, I think that is a move in the on this-committee. basic authority for legislative purposes right direction and one that I would not Taking into account the very difficult to such a committee until we got the re- want to upset if this legislation is going compromise position that we finally re- port of that study of committee juris- to become law. - solved and worked out, where every single ther was that we say Member receded in that compromise ti on ra diction overall, was a sound approach to My sugges the problem. . that, for the purposes of the second sen- group on some points, I finally receded on le V-V V this point. I think the Senator from JjLi- _ _ -% f what ru o of t not be lli e gence -_ haps some kind of resolution of the may,- Committee on in However, 'I do commend the Senator ter might not be arrived at better by at taken into account until a date occurring from Ohio for grappling with a problem least putting a 2-year limitation or a during the first session of the 96th Con- next-session limitation, a 21/2-year lim- gress, upon which the appointment of that we wrestled with ourselves in com- itation, upon the ability of anyone to the majority and minority members of mittee and in the conferences that we serve on the Select Committee on Intelli- the standing committee of the Senate had. It is not an open-and-shut case gence and not count it, under rule XXV, would be initially completed. - either way. as a select committee or a "B" commit- In other words, you would have a delay What I am impressed with is that the tee. until after the next Cdngress before the floor manager of the bill is attempting to I have given some thought to that limitation upon holding membership on provide as much leeway as possible, to consideration and perhaps should want this committee would be included under have as many Senators from whom we to consider modifying the amendment in the rules as they currently stand, and can draw as possible, and then leave it to that direction if the committee were dis- that is a consideration I would await, and their conscience and their own judgment posed to think along those lines. Is there I think it is particularly appropriate in as to whether they can handle the load. any feeling of the committee on that? view of one of the matters the Senator I am sure the leadership will impose Has that been discussed? has already mentioned, which is the fact the requirement that once this respon- Mr. RIBICOFF. I do not think that that we have an ongoing study of the sibility is accepted.that it be accepted as at this time, as manager of the resolu- lineup of our committee structure. a major responsibility. tion, that I could accept that modifica- But, it seems to me, if you do not do The old saying is that if you want a tion. that, in a way you sort of make a prom- job done, give it to a. busy man. Now, that I think it is important to have the ise which later I feel we are going to be would only be altered by saying to give it majority and minority leader, if the Sen- called upon to "grandfather" in of keep- to a busy person. We know the capacity ate agrees to Senate Resolution 400, set tag people on this committee for the full of some people to handle a tremendous up this committee as soon as possible. I 9-year period even though it is an add- workload, and certainly I think everyone have the utmost confidence in Senators on committee, and even though they may in the Senate will be impressed by the MANSFIELD and Scorr, to structure this already be on their full quota of com- fact that this is a heavy load. Members committee in a way that takes into ac- mittees insofar as paragraph 6 of rule. of the Select Intelligence Committee, the count the composition of the Senate and XXV is concerned. Church committee, recognized the the question of seniority, and makes sure So my proposal really was to put this amount that it took out of their lives and that this committee represents a cross limitation on so that anybody who goes , the time and the effort that they put in, section of the thinking of the U.S. Sen- on this committee knows that at the end and we have that as a guideline to go by. ate. I should like to give Senator MANS- 'of the 95th Congress he is going to have But I still would come down on the side FIELD and Senator SCOTT a free hand. to make a choice. of giving the leadership the maximum I cannot talk for Senator MANSFIELD, We have done this once before. There leeway, and standing by the compromise. but I have heard his testimony that he is an obvious precedent for it insofar as So I would regretfully oppose the amend- meet erned . . is going to make sure -that whoever he the Budget Committee was conc appoints will be able to give this com- We have -tried that before. It would seem Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 18, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE modify the amendment, and I send the modification to the desk. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The modification will be stated. The assistant legislative clerk read as f h ows: e Senator from Ohio (Mr. TAFT) modi- is amendment to read as follows: On page 4, line 18, strike lines 18-21 and substitute in lieu thereof: "(d) Paragraph 6 of rule XXV of the Standing Rules of the Senate is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subparagraph: (i) For purposes of the second sentence of subparagraph,(a) membership on the Select Committee on Intelligence shall not be taken into account until that date occurring dur- ing the first session of the Ninety-Sixth Congress, upon which the appointment of the majority and minority party members of the standing Committee of the Senate Is initially completed." The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I will have to oppose the modified amendment for the same reasons previously stated. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, it is my in- tention to call for the yeas and nays on the amendment, as modified, and I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask unani- mous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I ask for the yeas and nays on the amendment. The yeas and nays were ordered. Mr. TAFT. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my-time. Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield back the re- mainder of my time. The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time has been yielded back. The question is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from Ohio, as modified. The yeas and nays have been ordered and the clerk will call the roll. The assistant legislative clerk pro- ceeded to call the roll. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr President on this vote 1: have a pair with the distin- guished Senator from Iowa (Mr CUL- vER). If he were present and voting, he would vote "nay." If I were permitted to vote, I would vote "aye." Therefore, I withhold my vote. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will suspend. Let us have order In the Chamber; Will Senators please clear the well? Senators will please take their seats or return to the cloakroom. Mr. NELSON. Mr. President, there Is still not order in the Chamber. ' The PRESIDING OFFICER. The point of the Senator from Wisconsin is well made. The well is not clear. Will Senators please take their seats? Let us have order in the Chamber. The clerk will suspend until we have order. The assistant legislative' clerk resumed that the Senator from Virginia (Mr. HARRY F. BYRD, JR.), the Senator from Iowa (Mr. CULVER), the Senator from Michigan (Mr. HART), the Senator from Hawaii (Mr. INOUYE), the Senator from Wyoming (Mr. McGEE), and the Senator from California (Mr. TUNNEY) are nec- essarily absent. I also announce that the Senator from Indiana (Mr. BAYH) is absent because of illness. Mr. GRIFFIN. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. BAKER), the Senator from Massachusetts (Mr. BROOKE), the Senator from Arizona (Mr. GOLDWATER), and the Senator from North Carolina. (Mr. HELMS) are neces- sarily absent. I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from North Caro- lina (Mr. HELMS) would vote "yea." The result was announced-yeas 38, nays 50, as follows: [Rollcall Vote No. 178 Leg.] YEAS-38 Allen Haskell Randolph Bartlett Hruska Roth Beilmon Kennedy Schweiker Bentsen Laxalt Scott, Hugh Biden Leahy Scott, Brock McClure William L. Curtis Metcalf Stafford Dole Moss Stevens Eastland Nelson Stone Fannin Packwood Taft Garn Pastore Thurmond Griffin Pell Tower Hansen Proxmire Young NAYS-SO Abourezk Glenn McIntyre Beall Gravel Mondale Buckley Hart, Gary Montoya Bumpers Hartke Morgan Burdick Hatfield Muskie Byrd, Robert C. Hathaway Nunn Cannon Hollings Pearson Case Huddleston Percy Chiles Humphrey Ribicoff Church Jackson Sparkman Clark Javits Stennis Cranston Johnston Stevenson Domenici Long Symington Durkin Magnuson Talmadge Eagleton Mathias Weicker Fong McClellan Williams Ford McGovern PRESENT AND GIVING A LIVE PAIR, AS PREVIOUSLY RECORDED-1 Mansfield, for NOT VOTING-11 Baker Culver McGee Bayh Goldwater Tunney Brooke Hart, Philip A. Byrd. Helms Harry F., Jr. Inouye So Mr. TAFT'S amendment, as modified, was rejected. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was rejected. Mr. MANSFIELD. I move to lay that motion on the table. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LEAHY). The question is on agreeing to the motion of the Senator from Montana. The motion to lay on the table was agreed to. The PRESIDING OFFICER. May we have order in the Chamber so the Sen- ator from West Virginia may be heard? ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT TO 10 A.M. TOMORROW Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it S 7411 stand in adjournment, until the hour of 10 a.m. tomorrow. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. ORDER FOR RESUMPTION OF CON- SIDERATION OF SENATE RESOLU- TION 400 Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at the hour of 11 a.m. tomorrow the Senate re- sume consideration of the unfinished business, Senate Resolution 400. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. TIME LIMITATION AGREEMENT ON AMENDMENTS TO AND VOTE ON SENATE RESOLUTION 400 Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that at 11 a.m. tomorrow morning there be a time limit for debate on the amendment by Mr. STENNIS and Mr. TOWER, the time to be limited to 3 hours to be equally divided between Mr. RIEICOFF and Mr. STENNis, that a vote occur on the amendment by Mr. STENNIS and Mr. TOWER at the hour of 2 p.m. tomorrow afternoon, that im- mediately upon the disposition of that Vote the Senate proceed to vote on the Cannon substitute, as amended, if amended, and that upon the disposition of that vote the Senate proceed imme- diately to the vote on Senate Resolution 400, as amended if amended. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. The text of the unanimous-consent agreement is as follows: Ordered, That on Wednesday, May 19, 1976, at the hour of 11:00 a.m., the Senate proceed to consider. the amendment offered by the Senator from Texas (Mr: TowER) and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), with a time limitation thereon of 3 hours, to be equally divided and controlled by the pro- ponents of the amendment and the manager of the resolution. Ordered further, That at the hour of 2:00 p.m., the Senate proceed to vote on the Tower-Stennis amendment, and that imme- diately following that vote, there occur a vote on the substitute amendment of the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON). and that if adopted, the committee substitute amend- ment, as amended, be considered as having been adopted, and that in any case, the Senate immediately proceed to vote on S. Res. 400 as amended, if amended. ECIITIVE SESSION Mr. FANNIN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider nom- inations. There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of execu- tive business. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, on May 4, 1976, the Senate passed by a vote of 62 to 29 the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976 (S. 3065) pro- viding for the administration of the Fed- eral Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, by a Federal Election Com- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S7412 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 18, 1976 mission to be appointed by the Presi- dent, by and with the advice and con- sent of the Senate. S. 3065 had passed the House on May 3, 1976, by a vote of 291 to 81. On May 11, 1976, the President signed S. 3065 into law. Yesterday, May 17, the President sub- mitted to the Senate the nomination of six individuals as members of the Fed- eral Election Commission, five of whom were previously confirmed by the Sen- ate as members of the Commission prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Buck- ley against Valeo. The nominations have been made pursuant to section 101 of the Federal Election Campaign , Act Amendments of 1976. On March 14, 1975, the Subcommittee on Privileges and Elections of the Com- mittee on Rules and Administration held hearings on the nominations of Thomas A. Harris of Arkansas, Joan D. Aikens of Pennsylvania, Robert O. Tiernan of Rhode Island, Vernon W. Thomson of Wisconsin, and Neil Staebler of Michi- gan, to be Commissioners of the Federal Election Commission. These nomination were reported favorably by the Com- mittee on Rules and Administration on March 24, 1975, 'and approved by the Senate on April 10, 1975. The pending nominations of these five Individuals have been cleared by the members of the Committee on Rules and Administration for approval by the Sen- ate. In view of the Senate's recent ap- proval, after full hearings, of these five individuals, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate consider their nomina- tions as in executive session at this time without referral to that committee. Several Senators addressed the Chair. Mr. HATFIELD was recognized. Mr. HATFIELD. Mr. President, re- serving the right to object, I wonder if the Senator will yield for a question or two. Mr. CANNON. I yield. Mr. HATFIELD. I ask the chairman of the committee what his time schedule is on the sixth member who has been nominated by the President and whose name has been sent to the Senate along with the five names that are now before us at this time? I refer to former Con- gressman, Mr. Springer, who is also a former member of the ? Federal Power Commission. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, the Com- mittee on Commerce of which I am a member held hearings on the nomination of William L. Springer, a former Con- gressman from the State of Illinois and the sixth nominee to the Federal Elec- tion Commission on March 19 and 20, 1973, when he was nominated to the Federal Power Commission. His nomina- tion to the Federal Power Commission was approved by the Senate on May.21, 1973, by a rollcall vote of 65 to 12. Since Mr. Springer's present nomina- tion is to the Federal Election Commis- sion, it is necessary, however, to have the matter referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration, and I intend to call for a hearing on this nomination on Thursday or Friday of this week. Should the Senate confirm five of the pending Presidential appointments, being more than a majority of the mem- hers, it is hoped that the Federal Elec- tion Commission will then be able to perform its duties and carry out all of the vital functions delegated to it under the law, as recently amended by this Congress, pending Committee hearings and subsequent consideration by the Senate of the President's sixth appoint- ment to the Commission. I say, in further response to our col- league, that I said on Thursday or Fri- day for the reason that we have been holding hearings for a number of days. in the joint conference committee on the airport-airways bill. We did not conclude this morning and went. over until tomor- row morning. I am hopeful we will con- clude tomorrow. If we do, I will set the hearing on the Springer nomination.for Thursday. If we do not conclude tomor- row morning with the airport-airways bill, then I will set the hearings for Fri- day morning on Mr. Springer. Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator, and I am glad the Senator brought out the point that he, as the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administra- tion and also as a member of the Com- mittee on Commerce, has already sat in a hearing on Congressman Springer, which I am sure was a very intensive, compresensive, and complete hearing. Will the Senator not agree that in all likelihood this would be a relatively brief hearing in the Committee on Rules and Administration and then we could ex- pect the .nominee's name reported out, barring unforeseen circumstances, by Monday, at least to the Chamber? Mr. CANNON. I could not make a commitment as far as Monday is con- cerned, but based on my past knowledge of having heard this witness, the nomi- nee, before, I myself would be willing to report his nomination immediately at the conclusion of the hearings, assuming that nothing else comes up that was not brought out in our hearings before in the Committee on Commerce. So if the committee agrees with me on that and we do not receive any adverse comments on the nominee, I would hope that we could report him out forthwith. Mr. HATFIELD. That is precisely the point I wished to ask the senator. The Senator has agreed to a hearing on Thursday and Friday. But I was wonder- ing what the Senator felt about report- ing the nomination after the hearing, if there would be any delay that he could foresee at this time, not precluding, of course, any possible question raised in the hearing. Mr. CANNON. I do not see any need for delay or any reason for delay. So. far I have not had any requests from anyone to appear and testify in opposition to the nominee. ~ Mr. HATFIELD. I have one last ques- tion, if the Senator will yield further. Regardless of the time schedule we may have on Mr. Springer, is it not true that until the nominees are formally sworn in by the President none of the members whom we confirm can function as a com- mission? Mr. CANNON. The Senator is correct. After the notice of confirmation, it is my understanding that they-would have to be sworn In by the President, Mr. HATFIELD. If the White House decided they wanted to wait until all six were confirmed before swearing any of them in that would mean, then again, that the function of this Commission would still be nonexistent. Mr. CANNON. The Senator is corb as I understand the law. Mr. HATFIELD. I thank the Senator. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Several Senators addressed the Chair. Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, and I shall not ob- ject, I welcome the assurances that the chairman of the Committee on Rules and Administration has provided to the Sen- ate. I shall not object because I think it is important that the campaign funds which have been held up be released and made available as early as possible. It also is important that the Senate move to confirm the nomination of the sixth FEC Commissioner as quickly as possible. A new chairman of the Com- mission must be selected, and it will be difficult, . if not lawfully impossible, to choose a new chairman without all the members being on board. There also are legal questions that could arise about the powers of the Com- mission. I will not go through them at the present time. It may be that they are legal questions without substance. Yet questions could arise, it seems to me, if certain actions were attempted by the Commission without its full membership because the FEC is contemplated as a bipartisan Commission. I do welcome the assurances of the chairman. I hope that we will be able, by the early part of next week at the latest, to have the nomination ofw sixth member confirmed. Mr. CANNON. I thank the Senato . The PRESIDING OFFICER. If there is no objection, the nominations will be stated. The legislative clerk read the nomination of Neil Staebler, of Michi- gan; Veronon W. Thomson, of Wiscon- sin; Thomas E. Harris, of Virginia; Joan D. Aikens, of Pennsylvania; and Robert 0. Tiernan, of Rhode Island to be mem- bers of the Federal Election Commission. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nominations are confirmed. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the President be notified of the confirmation of the nominations. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. LEGISLATIVE SESSION Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, I move that the Senate resume the considera- tion of legislative business. The motion was agreed to, and the Senate resumed the consideration of legislative business. Mr. BUMPERS. Mr. President, on April 5 the Senate defeated a motion to table a motion to reconsider the vote- by which the amendment of the Senator from Oklahoma (Mr. BARTLETT) to - ate Concurrent Resolution 98, the a Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 18, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL Carta resolution, was agreed to. The roll- call, No. 118 legislative, appears at page S4957 of the RECORD for that day, and reflects that I voted "nay." The vote is rded'as 30 yeas, 43 nays, and.27 not r. President, I voted "yea" on this rollcall. I supported the Bartlett amend- ment when it was originally agreed to by the Senate, and I voted against the mo- tion to reconsider, believing that for rea- sons of economy it would be better to send nine members of Congress to Bri- tain to pick up the Magna Carta rather than 25. Mr. President, I ask.unanimous con- sent that when the permanent RECORD is printed I be shown as voting "yea" on rollcall vote No. 118 legislative. This change would not-alter the result of that vote. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without PRIVILEGE OF THE FLOOR- SENATE RESOLUTION 400 Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, on behalf of Mr. Leahy, I ask unanimous consent that Doug Racine and Herbert Jolovitz be permitted the privilege of the floor during the further consideration of Senate Resolution 400 and during all rollcall votes in relation thereto. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. GLENN. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that a member of my staff, Mr. Walker Nolan, be per- mitted the privilege of. the floor during the consideration of and voting on Sen- esolution 400. e PRESIDING OFFICER. Without o tion, it is so ordered. JOINT MEETING OF THE HOUSES- ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF FRANCE that at that time the- Senate stand in recess, pending the conclusion of the address to be delivered by the President mous consent that the Senate resume consideration of its business not later of the Senate, Francis R. Valeo; the Ser- geant at Arms,. F. Nordy Hoffman; the Vice President of the United States; and the President pro tempore (JAMES O. EA' LAND), proceeded to the hall of the RECORD - SENATE S 7413 (The address delivered by the Presi- dent of France to the joint meeting of the two Houses of Congress is printed in the proceedings of the House, of Rep- resentatives in today's-RECORD.) At 1:21 p.m., the Senate having re- turned to its Chamber, reassembled, and was called to order by the Presiding Of- ficer (Mr. HATHAWAY). ORDER FOR RECOGNITION OF SEN- ATOR GOLDWATER TOMORROW Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that on to- morrow, after Mr. PROXMIRE is recognized under the order previously entered, Mr. GOLDWATER be recognized for not to ex- ceed 15 minutes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a standing committee of the Senate on intelligence activities, and for other purposes. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that after the Senate votes tomorrow on the Cannon substitute for the committee substitute, if the amendment is agreed to, the com- mittee amendment as amended be con- sidered as adopted, since, in effect, the Senate would be voting on the same ques- tion again. The. PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without TINE MORNING BUSINESS TO- PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES. The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on Intelligence Activities, and for other purposes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The pending business is the amendment in the nature of a substitute by the Senator from Nevada (Mr. CANNON). Who yields time? Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I sug- gest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. . Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I have a matter that I have discussed with the Senator from Connecticut (Mr. RIDI= coFF) and the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), the ranking Republican mem- ber handling this bill, and now with Senator WEICR:ER. On page 12, in line 7, I suggest that where we are discussing information being made public- The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator from California discussing, a possible amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute of. the Sen- ator from Nevada? Mr. CRANSTON. Beg pardon? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the amendment to the amendment offered as a substitute by the Senator from Ne- vada? Is the Chair correct in that as- sumption? Mr. CRANSTON. No; I am just going to discuss with the floor manager adding three words, which could be done by their accepting those words, I believe, at this point. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair wishes to know whether or not it is to the amendment in the nature of a substitute. Mr. CRANSTON. Yes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Or to the original resolution. Mr. CRANSTON. It is to the amend- ment in the nature of a substitute. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The one offered by the Senator from Nevada? Mr. CRANSTON. Right. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator may proceed. Mr. CRANSTON. On line 7, where we are discussing information and the re- lease of that information, the present language is that the President- Certifies that the threat to the national in- terest of the United States posed by such dis- closure is vital and outweighs any public in- terest in the disclosure. - I suggest that the word "security" be inserted after the word "national" and before the word "interest" In line 7, just to stress that national security is in- volved. I understand that language is ac- ceptable to the Senators from Connect- RECESS UNTIL 2 P.M. Mt. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. Presi- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S7414 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 18, 1976 guage is satisfactory to the manager of the bill. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The ques- tion is on agreeing to the amendment of the Senator from California. Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. On whose time? Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I yield time for.the quorum call. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. EXECUTIVE SESSION Mr. HUGH SCOTT: Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate go into executive session to consider a nomination reported earlier today. There being no objection, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of execu- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The nom- ination will be stated. THE JUDICIARY The second assistant legislative clerk read the nomination of Maurice B. Co- hill, Jr., of Pennsylvania, to be U.S. dis- trict judge for the western district of Pennsylvania. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, the nomination is considered and confirmed. Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Presi- dent be notified of the confirmation of the nomination. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. LEGISLATIVE SESSION Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate return to the consideration of legislative business. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.. Mr. HUGH SCOTT. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Clerk will call the roll. The second assistant legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for- the quorum call be rescinded. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a standing committee of the Senate on intelligence activities, and for other purposes. Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I turn to another suggestion. On the same page of the Cannon substitute, line 5 on page 12 and line 10 on page 12, I suggest that after the word "President" the word "personally" be inserted in both places. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair informs the Senator that there is a pend- ing amendment earlier offered by the Senator from California which has not been acted upon. Mr. CRANSTON. I did not actually offer that as an amendment, so I am not discussing that. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator move to modify his amendment? Mr. CRANSTON. I move to modify that amendment to suggest that the word "personally" be inserted therein. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair suggests to the Senator that he withdraw his earlier amendment. Mr. CRANSTON. I withdraw my earlier amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is withdrawn. Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will the Senator yield? Mr. CRANSTON. I yield. OR15ER AUTHORIZING THE COM- MITTEE ON COMMERCE TO MEET THIS AFTERNOON Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Cgnnmittee on Commerce be allowed to" meet this afternoon while the Senate is in session. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The Senate continued with the con- sideration of the resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a standing committee of the Senate on intelligence activities. and for other purposes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Chair asks the Senator from California if he will repeat his current amendment. Mr. CRANSTON. Yes. This amendment has been discussed with the leadership on both sides of the aisle just now. The proposal is this: on line 5, after the word "President" the word "personally" be inserted, and on line 10, after the word "President" the word "personally" be inserted The purpose of the amendment Is to insure that this will in all cases be a Presidential notification and not done through delegation to some other official without the Presigient's knowledge of the request. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. CRANSTON. I yield. Mr. TOWER. It is my understanding that the Senator's intent here is simply to insure that this is a _ personal com- munication from the President, that it does not require that he appear person- ally. Mr. CRANSTON. Absolutely. Mr. TOWER. And that the notifica- tion come over his signature. Mr. CRANSTON. That is correct. Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, looking at the lan- guage on line 10. although the legislative history which has just been made would help, it seems to me that if we are going to insert the word "personally," we ought to add the words "in writing." Mr. CRANSTON. That is fine. Mr. GRIFFIN. "Notifies the 8 committee in writing of his objec Mr. CRANSTON. I so move to mo y the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The amendment is so modified. The Chair inquires: Is the modifica- tion to occur in both places? Mr. CRANSTON. Yes. The PRESIDING OFFICER. It is in both places. Is time yielded back? Mr. CRANSTON. Mr. President, I yield back any remaining time on the amendment. The PRESIDING OFFICER. All time is yielded back. The question is on agreeing, to the amendment, as modified, of the Senator from California. The amendment as modified was agreed to. Mr. CRANSTON. I thank all Senators involved. Mr. GRIFFIN. Mr. President, I call to the attention of the managers of the bill line 8 on page 12, specifically the words "is vital." The President here is required to cer- tify "that the threat to the national in- terest of the United States posed by such disclosure is vital and Outweighs any public interest in the disclosure." ? I frankly wonder about the use of the word "vital." It does not have a very precise meaning in this context, as far as I am concerned. We have just discussed and r d the insertion of the word "see#' recognizing that there might be eco- nomic or diplomatic information, not national security in character, which nevertheless should not be disclosed. By the same token it seems to me that there might be information, not perhaps "vital" to the survival of the Nation, which also should not be disclosed. Per- haps we should try to determine what the word "vital" means in this context since we are setting up a standard with this language. I would like to read the definition of the word "vital" from Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary: Akin to life, existing as a manifestation of life, concerned with or necessary to the maintenance of life, fundamentally con- cerned with or affecting life, tending to re- new or refresh the living, destructive to life. My question is: Is that what we really mean? Are we goilig to limit it to that kind of a situation, where the life of the Nation has to be involved? So what I am suggesting is that we strike the words "is vital" In line 8. . Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I shall respond to the distinguished minority whip. This language comes from the original Church committee bill. I wonder whether the Senator from Michigan. will be sat- isfied with these words: "is of such grav- ity that it outweighs any public est in disclosure." Mr. GRIFFIN. I think that is LL ch Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May .18, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE better. In other words, it is a very serious matter. I think that is what we are really talking about. Mr. RIBICOFF. That is acceptable to if it is satisfactory to the Senator Michigan. r. GRIFFIN. It would be. I think that is a very good suggestion. Mr. RIBICOFF. My suggestion is this: On line 8, strike out the words "vital and" and insert in lieu thereof the words "of such gravity that it outweighs any public interest in disclosure". The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is the Senator suggesting that in the form of a modification of the amendment? Mr. RIBICOFF. I think it should be done by the Senator, and I accept it.' Mr. GRIFFIN. I propose the modifica- tion. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator from Michigan so modifies the amendment. Mr. GRIFFIN. On page 12, line. 8, strike the words "vital and" and insert, as has been suggested, the words "of such gravity that it". The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is all time yielded back? Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I should like the distinguished Senator from Nevada to have an opportunity to look at the wording. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Does the Senator from Michigan or the Senator from Connecticut suggest the absence of a quorum? Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum, with the time to be charged against both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The clerk ii&aall the roll. second assistant legislative clerk p eeded to call the roll. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the order for the quorum call be rescinded. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered, Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield back the remainder of my time. Yr. GRIFFIN. I yield back the re- mainder of my time. - The PRESIDING OFFICER. The question is on agreeing to the amend- ment of the Senator from Michigan, as modified. The amendment, as modified, was agreed to. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, do we- know precisely how many amendments remain on Senate Resolution 400? Mr. -MANSFIELD. Yes. So far as we know, one. Mr. CANNON. That is the Tower- Stennis amendment? Mr. MANSFIELD. That is right. They have indicated that their time could be better spent tomorrow, rather than this afternoon. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, if the. Senator will yield, I believe that Senator NUNN would like an opportunity to en- gage in a colloquy with the distinguished Senator from Nevada and me. I have in- formed Senator NtNN that I am willing, and I am sure the Senator from Nevada will be willing to do so, at his conven- iel Mr. CANNON. Certainly. Mr. RIBICOFF. I imagine that we will use my time, not Senator STENNIS' time, to oblige the Senator from Georgia. Mr. STENNIS. We will still have an hour and a half? Mr. RIBICOFF. I will take it out of my time, not out of the time of the Senator from Mississippi. Mr. BAYH. Mr. President, throughout the 1970's we have been shocked by one revelation after another regarding im- proper activities of intelligence agencies. The piecemeal disclosure of abuses, led us to establish a Select Committee on In- telligence to give us a full and complete picture of problems within the intelli- gence community. The Rockefeller Com- mission was charged with a similar re- sponsibility. Now after a 15 month study by the select committee, we have more informa- tion regarding the operation of this country's intelligence apparatus than ever before. We have learned that while the intelligence community for the most part has carried out its duties well and performed a vital service, the occasions on which power was abused were more numerous and even more shocking than we had previously imagined. The ques- tion before us today is whether we will respond to what we learned and take the first step in gaining control of intelli- gence activities by establishing an effec- tive oversight committee. I sincerely hope that we will answer that question in the affirmative. Mr. President, I think all of us here recognize the importance of sound in- telligence to this Nation. No one wants to do anything ,o jeopardize our ability to collect intelligence information. We do have a responsibility, however, to in- sure that intelligence activities are car- ried out effectively and in a manner consistent with our foreign policy and the fundamental principles of individual rights on which this Nation was founded. This has not been the case in the past, and we cannot assume that it will be so in the future. When bureaucracies are capable of carrying out clandestine activities and are not properly restrained, there will always be the temptation to employ those capabilities in an improper fashion. I do not wish to imply that individuals in the intelligence community have evil mo- tives, Mr. President. To the contrary, their underlying intentions are usually most patriotic. But as Justice Brandeis said many years ago, Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when the gov- ernment's purposes are beneficient. Men born to freedom are naturally alert to repel in- vasion of their liberty by evil-minded rulers. The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in in- sidious encroachment by men of zeal, well meaning but without understanding. Mr. President, our recent experience includes Cointelpro operations to disrupt the activities of groups expressing politi- cal dissent, the CHAOS program to col- lect information on thousands of Ameri- cans who opposed the Vietnam war, FBI mail cover programs, attempts to dis- S 7415 credit Martin Luther King, Jr., CIA paramilitary operations in Chile and Laos, and assassination attempts against a number of foreign leaders. It is clear that we must be more alert and make it perfectly clear to the' intelligence com- munity that there are, indeed, limits to what it can do. I believe a permanent oversight com- mittee with legislative authority is an important first step in gaining control of intelligence activities. One committee with responsibility solely for intelligence oversight and legislation should serve us far better than maintaining the exclusive jurisdictions for intelligence matters in committees which have many other responsibilities. The new committee can serve as a watchdog to keep the intelligence agencies in check, and, equally as im- portant, wore- on legislation to insure protection of human rights and to make our intelligence efforts as effective as possible. Recent experience shows there is much to be done in this last area. Mr. President, nearly every person or group which has studied the intelligence agencies has called for an intelligence oversight committee, including the Sen- ate select committee, the Rockefeller Commission, President Ford, George Bush, William Colby, and the Murphy Commission. It is up to us now to act. Th3 compromise proposal introduced by the distinguished chairman of the Rules Committee will provide us with an effective oversight committee. While I do not believe it is perfect and there are many changes I would make, I believe it merits support and passage. The new committee will have a broad- ly drawn membership. It will have exclu- sive jurisdiction ever the CIA and will share jurisdiction with existing commit- tees on other intelligence matters. It will be involved in the critical budget process of the intelligence agencies. The com- promise also provides adequate protec- tion against unwarranted disclosure of sensitive information by resting the ulti- mate authority in these matters with the full Senate. Mr. President, if we fail to provide a mechanism to control the intelligence agencies now, we will set the worst pos- sible precedent. Our failure would be nothing more than a green light for the overzealous to repeat past abuses. We cannot turn our backs to the out- rageous actions which have been re- vealed. If we care anything about re- storing confidence in Government, we must act now to begin to set things right in the intelligence establishment. ORDER FOR H.R. 12527 TO BE HELD AT THE DESK Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that H.R. 12527, authorizing funds for the Federal Trade Commission, be held at the desk until further disposition. It has been cleared on both sides. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it will be so held, when re- ceived. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 57416 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD SENATE May 18, 1976 PROGRAM Mr. ROBERT C. BYRD. Mr. President, the Senate convenes tomorrow at 10 a.m. Mr. PROXMIRE will be recognized for 15 minutes. Thereafter Mr. GOLDWATER will be recognized for 15 minutes. Morn- ing business will follow until 11 a.m., with a limitation on statements therein of 5 minutes each. At 11 a.m. the Senate will resume con- sideration of Senate Resolution 400. The pending question at that time will be on adoption of the Stennis-Tower amend- ment. There is a limitation for debate thereon if 3 hours equally divided. At 2 p.m. the Senate will vote by roll- call on- the Stennis-Tower amendment. When that amendment is disposed of the vote will occur immediately, without intervening motion or debate, on amend- ment 1643, the Cannon et al. substitute amendment as amended. After the Senate votes on the Cannon substitute to the committee substitute, if the Cannon substitute is agreed to, the committee amendment, as amended, will be considered as adopted since, in effect, the Senate would be voting on the same question again. Without intervening motion, debate, or amendment the Senate will then pro- ceed to vote by rollcall on Senate Reso- lution 400. it is the intention of the leadership to call up the antitrust legislation upon disposition of Senate Resolution 400. Also coming up in the near future will be the military procurement and mili- tary construction authorization bills, but not necessarily in that order. S. 3439, foreign military sales, will be taken up in the near future. ADJOURNMENT UNTIL 10 A.M. TOMORROW Mr. MANSFIELD. Mt. President, If there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, in accordance with the previous order, that the Senate stand in adjournment until 10 a.m. to- morrow. The motion was agreed to; and at 2:36 p.m. the Senate adjourned until to- morrow, Wednesday, May 19, 1976, at 10 a.m. NOMINATIONS Executive nominations received by the Senate May 18, 1976: DEPARTMENT OF-DEFENSE John J. Martin, of Maryland, to be an Assistant Secretary of the Air Force, vice Walter B. LaBarge, resigned. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Joseph Z. Taylor, of Virginia, to be Inspector General, Foreign Assistance. John P. Constandy, resigned. TIC: JuDicrszr John P. Crowley, of Illinois, to' be U.S. dis- trict judge for the northern district of Illi- nois, vice Richard B. Austin, retired. CONFIRMATIONS Executive nominations confirmed by the Senate May 18, 1976: 1 FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION The following-named persons to be mem- bers of the Federal Election Commission for the terms indicated: For a term expiring April 30, 1977: Neil Staebler, of Michigan. For terms expiring April 30, 1979: Vernon W. Thomson, of Wisconsin. Thomas E. Harris, of Virginia. For terms expiring April 30, 1981: Joan D. Aiken, of Pennsylvania. Robert 0. Tiernan, of Rhode Island. THE JuDICIART Maurice B. Cohill, Jr., of Pennsylvania, to be U.S. district judge for the western district of. Pennsylvania. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 y..19, 1976 - CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE pensive end of the high-low mix of ships and aircraft. An "Efficiency" Defense Budget the same size of that currently requested, but de- signed with these principles in mind, would yield a far more potent and suitable U.S. de- fense force. OPTION 3: MATCHING DEFENSE FORCES TO FOREIGN POLICIES Adopting the EFFICENCY Defense Budget outlined in this study will not save money but will add additional defense muscle where it is needed most. Adopting the ECONOMY defense Budget outlined here would save $8,537.9 million and still provide an adequate and strong defense force. Adopting a different foreign policy gen- erates different kinds of defense forces to support it. We have examined the different kinds of TACAIR. seapower, and defense manpower forces needed for each of four foreign policy options: (1) A Pax Americana Foreign Policy (2) The Present Foreign Policy of the U.S. (3) A Pacific Pullback/Europe-First For- Policy How much should be spent on defense to implement each of these? What kind of forces are needed for each? PAX AMERICANA This foreign policy would require a very strong and larger defense force. The US. N would be built to a level of 650 shfps ls many as 25 aircraft carriers and ing escorts. The Navy would. swell to 80 people and the Marines to 250,000. N orces would be assigned in strength to y ocean in the world. A Pax Americana military force would also maintain 30 active Army divisions, 5 active Marine divisions, 45 tactical Air Force wings, 25 Navy carrier wings, and 5 Marine aircorps wings. U.S. strategic force levels need not be changed significantly to support a foreign policy of Pax Americana since a massive U.S. strategic force to deter aggression is already in place. A Pax America military force would cost as much as twice what the U.S. now allocates to the Defense budget, an estimated dollar cost of roughly $220 billion per year with nearly 4 million persons in uniform and 2 million defense civilians working full time for DOD. PRESENT POLICY: STATUS QUO Present U.S. foreign policy commitments could be supported by a budget similar in dollar size to the U.S. Defense budget sim- Korea and scaledowns- elsewhere over five years. Pacific-bases would be withdrawn from Korea and a naval scaledown in the Far East would occur. Once completed such a policy would save $720 million annually in man- power costs and $7,400 million in Navy-Ma- rine costs yearly. U.S. Naval forces would be centered around nine attack carriers at their core. Scaledowns in naval tactical airforces and tactical air units in the Western Pacific region would also allow annual cost savings of roughly $1,000 million per year once ac- complished. European forces under this policy would remain similar to the present deploy- ments. Overall this policy in fiscal terms would mean defense expenditures cuts of $9,120 million based on foreign policy changes alone. This, of course, could be combined with the "economy" cuts of $8,537.9 million described' under the present foreign policy to produce an annual total savings of $17,657 million dollars in defense expenditures. Con- versely, these resources could be diverted to building a stronger European force should that. be necessary to maintain. the military balance there under such a policy of "EIi- rope First." GENERAL RETRENCHMENT A policy of general retrenchment would involve a major pullback of U.S. forces from both Europe and the Western Pacific. This policy would require far fewer forces than Pax Americana, the Status Quo, or Pacific Pullback Policies and would also require less of a defense budget investment. Under a gen- eral retrenchment policy the U.S. Navy would still retain 400 ships, nine attack aircraft carriers, and 342,000 Navy people as well as 126,000 Marines. This would represent 82 fewer ships than we now maintain and 40% fewer people. The Navy budget would thus be in the neighborhood of $28.5 billion in current dollars, down $8,900 million from the current Navy budget. Tactical airforces could also be confined to the United States or in token deployments abroad with 20 of the 42 TACAIR wings withdrawn and demobilized for a savings estimated at $12 billion in cur- rent dollars each year after such action was taken. Such a general retrenhement policy would also permit a return and demobiliza- tion of 172,000 land-based troops from Eu- rope and Asia at a cost savings of at least $2.0 billion per year once the transition costs have been paid. Strategic forces would re- main at present levels for the purpose of deterrence of direct attacks on the United States. Changing to a foreign policy of general re- trenchment would thus require a significant- ly smaller defense establishment abroad. It would signal far less dependence on the mili- tary power and other advantages secured by tight alliances. The defense expenditures for such a policy would be $22.9 billion less than ply by adopting the administration program. policy-this based solely on foreign policy Or a somewhat smaller defense budget with changes. If the "economies" also identified the suggested cuts laid out would give an in the present defense budget were taken an economical but still impressive defense pro- additional $8,537.9 million might be saved. gram to the country. - Thus, a foreign policy of general retrench- Present policy could be supported by an ment might lead to savings in excess of 31 "economical" defense program costing $8,- billion. dollars in defense expenditures. 537.9 million less than the original FY 1977 SUMMARY Defense Department request. Still another legitimate defense posture used to support Overall, U.S. defense costs would vary in the present policy might be what would be the following ways depending upon the for- termed an "efficient", if not economical, de- eign policy option elected and whether one fense posture. In the efficient posture the adpoted an "Efficiency" or an "Economy" $8,537.9 million saved from the "soft" pro- budget for the Department of Defense.' grams would be plowed back into more rea- Fiscal clear 1977 defense expenditures sonable defense programs such as PGMs, Foreign policy adopted *,tank weaponry, improved TACAIR pro- 1. Present U.S. Policy. and greater readiness and malnte- 2. Pax American Policy. n1~Ce Uroxrams. ?? k .-^^^ st n^,: ., ac r PACIFIC PULLBACK/ EUROPE FIRST a dense establishment consisting of a 400 Efficiency budget ship Navy, an overseas force reduced in size 1. $116.4 Billion ($114.2 + 2.2B in payroll by 72,000 consisting of. withdrawals from added). S 7533 2. $220:0 Billion (rough estimate) (extra Bost: $104 Billion). 3. $107.3 Billion (foreign policy cuts alone) (savings: $9.1 Billion). 4. $93.5 Billion (foreign policy cuts alone) (savings : $22.9 Billion). Economy budget 1. $107.86 Billion ($8,537.9 million saved). 2. Not applicable (all kinds of forces pur- chased with hedges built into budget). 3. $98.8 Billion (foreign policy + economy cuts) (savings: $17.6 Billion). 4. $85.0 Billion (foreign policy ? economy cuts) (savings-, $31.4 Billion). In conclusion, we allow the reader to draw his own conclusion as to the correct foreign policy for the United States and whether to 'elect the economy or efficiency versions of the Defense budget. It is also our firm conclu- sion that there should be no rubberstamping of the FY 1977 defense budget or of any auto- mdtic cost-of-living raise in military and DOD civilian pay for FY 1977. We conclude that even if the current U.S, foreign policy is adopted, either $8,537.9 million should be reinvested in programs that make more sense such as those identified in option 2 or $8,537.9 million should be saved the taxpayer or invested in other more useful government programs. Both the economy and the effi- ciency budget options make more sense than the proposed FY 1977 budget now before the Congress. CONCLUSION OF MORNING BUSINESS The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Is there further morning business? If not, morn- ing business is closed. PROPOSED STANDING COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous unanimous-consent agree- ment, 11 a.m. having arrived, the Senate will now resume consideration of the un- finished business, Senate Resolution 400, which will be stated by title. The second assistant legislative clerk read as follows: A resolution (S. Res. 400) to establish a Standing Committee of the Senate on In- telligence Activities, and for other purposes. The Senate resumed the consideration of the resolution. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Under the previous order, the Senate will now proceed to the consideration of the amendment offered by the Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER) and the Senator from Mississippi (Mr. STENNIS), with a time limitation of 3 hours thereon, and with a vote thereon to occur at 2 p.m. The amendment will be stated. The assistant legislative clerk read as follows: The Senator from Texas (Mr. TOWER); for himself, Mr. STENNIS, Mr. GOLDWATER, and Mr. THURMOND, proposes an amendment numbered 1649. Mr. TOWER. Mr. President, a parlia- mentary inquiry. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator will state it. Mr. TOWER. Who has control of the time in favor of the amendment, and who has control of the time in opposition? The PRESIDENT pro tempore. Sen- ators RIBICOFF and STENNIS are in con- trol of the time. Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7534 The amendment is as follows: On page 5 strike out paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 3(a) of the amendment and insert in lieu thereof the following: "(2) Intelligence activities of all other de- partments and agencies of the Government except the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and other agen- cies and subdivisions of the Department of Defense. "(3) The organization or reorganization of any department or agency of the Govern- ment, other than the Department of Defense, to the extent that the organization or re- organization relates to a function or activity involving intelligence activities. Strike out clauses (B), (C), and (D) of paragraph (4) of section 3 (a) of the amend- ment and redesignate clauses (E) and (F) as clauses (B) and (C), respectively. Strike out clause (G) of paragraph (4) of section 3(a) of the amendment and insert in lieu thereof the following: "(D) Any department, agency, or, subdi- vision which is the successor to the agency named in clause (A) ; and the activities of any department, agency, or subdivision -which is the successor to any department or bureau named in clause (B) or (C), to the extent the activities of such successor de- partment, agency, or subdivision are de- scribed in clause (B) or (C).". Strike out the period in section 4(c) and insert in lieu thereof "as specified in section 3(Strike out clauses (2), (3), and (4) of section 12 and redesignate clauses (5) and (6) as clauses (2) and (3), respectively. Mr. TOWER.. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may have con- trol of the time, in the absence of Mr. Stennis. The PRESIDENT pro tempore. With- out objection, it is so ordered. . Mr. TOWER. I yield myself such time as I may require. Mr. President, as a result of the in- vestigation conducted by the Senate Se- lect Committee on Intelligence Activi- ties, there is one inescapable lesson that we in the Senate should have learned about the intelligence community-that is, that the entire community is a com- plex, fragile, and essential asset to the security of the United States. While the committee's investigation revealed many abuses that occurred over the years, it also showed that such abuses were the exception rather than the rule in our intelligence agencies, and that more often than not the abuses that did occur were initiated by politicians who had authority over the agencies rather than by the agencies themselves. While the results of the select committee's in- vestightion makes it clear that changes should be made in the manner-in which Congress monitors the activities of the intelligence agencies, I feel that creation of a select committee on intelligence with legislative and authorization authority is the wrong way to do this. Yesterday, my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Illinois (Mr. PERCY), stated that he felt that the Department of Defense and all of the 'Intelligence agencies should be subjected. to over- sight by one group of Senators who have the entire intelligence picture. While I do not totally agree that unified and cen- tralized oversight is essential, I am cer- tain that to give such an oversight com- mittee the legislative and authorization CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976 authority for appropriations would be a serious mistake. This is true, especially of the Department of Defense, where in- telligence and the defense, generally, is so inextricably bound together. Also, in the Department of Defense, tactical and national intelligence are im- possible of separation; for what, in peacetime, is apparently purely tactical information, may certainly, in times of crisis or high tension, be of great na- tional importance. In testimony before the select committee, as well as the Sen- ate Armed Services Committee, it was revealed that the DCI, who is responsible for the national intelligence budget, as well as Defense officials, found it almost impossible and inconceivable to separate these two areas. For,the Senate to attempt in haste to separate a major part of the Defense in- telligence budget from the committee with principal intelligence responsibility for the defense generally, will, in my opinion, create grave risk to the national 'security. This, position is supported by the recent testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence, Ellsworth, who, before the Armed Services Commit- tee, on Thursday last, stated: We operate our intelligence responsibility sin a somewhat different world from the CIA or the FBI. We operate in an extremely highly technological world, which with our facilities is very sensitive and very delicate. And that is the basis for our first concern- from the standpoint of maintaining the over- all confidentiality of our sensitive and ex- pensive military and defense intelligence sources and methods and-you know what I mean, particularly our most modern collec- tion systems. The visibility that is created by separate budget process would entail, as we see it, grave risk. That is our first con- cern about the creation of a committee with the authorization for appropriations Juris- diction over these matters. Mr. President, I think that few Mem- bers of the Senate realize that section 12 of Senate Resolution 400 would, in its present form, require a separate bill or joint resolution to authorize appropria- tions for the various agencies and de- partments involved in intelligence activ- ities. I am concerned that this section would create unworkable problems re- garding public disclosure of the intelli- gence budgets of the intelligence agen- cies and departments. For instance, the highly classified activities of the National Security Agency, if revealed in such fashion to enemy intelligence forces could be disastrous to one of our most important national intelligence assets. For these and other very important reasons, which will be discussed more fully by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on Armed Services and the distinguished ranking member of that committee, we urge the Senate to support this amendment. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parlia- mentary inquiry. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. CUL- VER). The Senator will state it. Mr. STENNIS. Who has control of time on the bill? The PRESIDING OFFICER. Under the previous order, 3 hours are allotted for debate, and the time is to be equally Mr. STENNIS. Three hours f so-called Tower-Stennis amendm The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct-equally divided, and the vote Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, if I am in control of the time, I yield 10 minutes Mr. YOUNG. Mr. President, I support this amendment, but I shall speak in gence organizations. My major reason for opposing tions, I have always felt there no possible way to prevent leaks of ti' ost sensitive and top secret inform if you have a large committee and big While our Appropriations Subcommit- tee does not have oversight responsibility, This Appropriations Subcommittee for years has been composed of only five every Senator who has served on this subcommittee felt that, because of the with, it should be a small committee. Most Members would be very reluctant or new committee, the staff would have ac- cess to the most sensitive information. Mr. President, human nature is such that when too many people have access it to an ambitious and inquisitive press. The press people who concentrate on the business of intelligence are uncanny in their ability to piece together bits of The Senate Select Intelligence ' m- mittee, which has been holding gs Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R0002001.80001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD,$ENATE Bred some things that need to be ed. I cannot help but feel, however, far too much information has been 'ized, especially as to how our in- te ence agencies such as the CIA oper- ate in foreign countries. These disclosures have very adversely affected the operation of our intelligence system. They have seriously damaged our intelligence agencies in foreign coun- tries. The best example is the disclosure that Richard Welch was our top CIA agent in Greece. Shortly after he was identified as a CIA agent, he was mur- dered. Examples such as this cannot help but demoralize the spirit and dedication of other CIA agents, especially those operat- ing. in hostile foreign countries. If the Soviet Union conducted similar Investigations into their KGB operations and made public all the inside operations of their spy agencies, such information would be most valuable to us. To acquire this kind of information, we would have to spend hundreds of millions of dollars. Mr. President, intelligence plays a tre- mendously important role not only in the security of this Nation, but it makes pos- sible a very large saving in military ex- penditures. The more we know about what the Soviet Union or any other potential enemy is doing militarily, especially in the development of new weapons, the better we are able to determine what e termeasures we should take. stant surveillance by our intelli- g _e satellites gives us accurate infor- movements and the deployment of mis- siles. The present Senate Select Intelligence Committee, during its year. and a half of operation, composed of 11 members, did its utmost to do a good job and try to prevent leaks of highly classified infor- mation. The very size of this committee, how- ever, along with its more than 70 staff members, made it just impossible to pre- vent very damaging leaks. Mr. President, let me give one exam- ple of how important it is to keep some sensitive information top secret. During World War II, when we devel- oped the atonic bomb-as far as I am able to ascertain-not more than five Members of Congress were aware of the nearly $4 billion we secretly diverted into the development of the atomic bomb. This was one of the best kept secrets in our history. Had Hitler's Germany known early what we were doing, they might well have produced an atomic bomb before we did. They had the know- how. Thus, world history, as we know it today, would have been changed. With a 15-member Intelligence Com- mittee and a staff of 60 or more having ss to our top secrets of Government, MMuch projects involving our national s ! ity, such as the development of the Mr. President, I would favor a joint Senate-House intelligence oversight com- mittee dealing with all intelligence matte ters, but I would want it to be a relatively small committee with a very limited staff. This Is the kind of legislation I would support. Mr. President, I cannot vote for this bill but I hope and pray that history will be wrong. ' Mr. WEICKER. Will the distinguished prove my concern and apprehensions to Senator from North Dakota yield for a question, and I shall be glad to have it on our time. Mr. STENNIS. Yes. Mr. YOUNG. Yes, I yield. Mr. WEICKER. I wonder if the dis- tinguished Senator would tell me and my colleagues who divulged the information on.. Richard Welch? I ask the question since this has become a focal point as to whether or not Congress can be trusted with this type of oversight function. I would like to have the question an- swered: Who divulged that information? Did anybody in the Congress or any con- gressional committee divulge it? Mr. YOUNG. I think it was directly associated with the investigation at that time. Mr. WEICKER. No, I am afraid I am not going to let that point go unan- swered, because it was used, as I say, as a focal point to turn around this whole investigation. It was not as the result of any information coming from the Con- gress of the United States. It was di- vulged by a foreign periodical. That is the very simple fact of the matter. Mr. YOUNG. That he was a member of the CIA was published at the time of the CIA hearing and I do not think the Senator would deny that through the in- vestigations, most people know how these - intelligence agencies ? operate now. Mr. MONDALE. Will the Senator yield just on that one point which the Sen- ator from Connecticut raises? Mr. WEICKER. Yes. Mr. MONDALE. We never had Mr. Welch's name because we never wanted it. We never asked for any names of any foreign operatives, because it was not necessary to our investigation and we did not want it. In fact, the record discloses, as we looked into it later, that the CIA had urged Welch not to move into that house, because it had been known in the community that that house had been the residence of the previous head of the CIA in Greece. So when we look into the record, our committee and the House committee had absolutely nothing to do with the tragedy concerning Mr. Welch. Mr. YOUNG. Did not the members of that committee and more than 70 staff members have access to all of this kind of information? Mr. MONDALE. No, because we were very careful never to ask that kind of information, because we had anticipated that kind of problem. For example, we often let CIA officials come in and testify under pseudonyms. We did not want to know their names. It was not important to our work. What we wanted to know were issues that went to the question of accountability and control. Mr. HUDDLESTON. Will the Senator yield at that point? S 7535 'Mr. YOUNG. I yield to the Senator from Mississippi first. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, a parlia- mentary inquiry, if the Senator will yield. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator will state it. Mr. STENNIS. I understand that this .comes on the time, now, of the other side? The PRESIDING OFFICER. That is correct. Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield some on our side. Mr. HUDDLESTON. As a Member of the Senate committee that investigated our intelligence operations, I want to confirm what the distinguished Senator from Minnesota and the Senator from' Connecticut have indicated regarding the tragic death of Richard Welch. I do this only because this matter has been brought up several times and has been used to try to denigrate the activity of the committee and the need for the over- sight committee. As Senator Mondale said, the investi- gating committee did not seek and did not have the identity of Mr. Welch. One further point that should be made is that It has never been established that the revelation of his identity had anything at all to do with that unfortunate oc- currence. I think this matter should be put in proper perspective and that Mem- bers of the Senate should realize that that unfortunate occurrence really had no relationship to what we are discussing here today. As a matter of fact, proper oversight may very well help to eliminate or at least diminish prospects that situ- ations similar to that of Richard Welch will occur again. Mr. YOUNG. I am pleased to know that the committee feels there was no such leak. But the point I am trying to make is that there is no possible way to have a large intelligence committee with a staff of 60 or 70 and not have very damaging leaks such as this. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, I yield myself 12 minutes. I agree to the alter- nating of speakers side to side, as far as that is concerned, but I do want to make these few remarks now. Mr. President, I `want to make clear that I have nothing except compliments for the select committee, the members of the special intelligence committee who have been investigating these- matters. I not only assume, but I believe they acted in good faith. There are no charges to be made, by inference or otherwise. Mr. President, we are dealing today with a problem that is not one of indi- viduals; we are dealing with a major part of our foreign policy. We can sim- plify all of this greatly by just with- drawing and surrendering our position in international affairs. But if we are go- ing to continue in the role of a world power, which I-do not think we can aban- don, we are going to have to have intel- ligence and we are going to have to adopt special rules and make concessions to handle it. That is what was done with the passage of the original CIA Act. It was put into operation by the re- spective congressional committees on a kind of general understanding. The Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13: CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S 7536 Senator from North Dakota has been a part of that for some years, as have the Chairman of the Committees on Appro- priations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations, and others. It has been a spe- cial setup. It was not perfect by any means. We cannot legislate an arrangement here today, or any day, that is perfect. But we did, by common consent, realize this had to be handled in a special way. Now, this amendment, Mr. President, which we propose does not touch the CIA. It does not change the Cannon resolu tion as to what you are going to do about the CIA. It does not undertake anything of that kind to limit the new committee in its investigative oversight power, in- cluding power with respect to what I should call strictly military intelligence. Having tried to state what it does not do, I want to refer now to what this amendment does do. But.-at the very threshold of this whole problem I want to say I do not think we can ever have a system that will work unles it jibes with and coordinates with the system of the House of Representatives. We are talk- ing about legislation, dealing with legis- latide affairs, authorizations, appropria- tions, debates and sessions, and reports and staff work. All of those things we cannot possibly operate independently of the other body. Somewhere along the line this plan, however well motivated,. will fail, I think, because it lacks that essential threshold requirement. I have said before that a joint com- mittee of the House and the Senate, a special joint committee, was, I thought, the route to go if we were going to have a special committee, and I believe we will have to come back to that. What does this amendment do? It passes up all these matters that I have mentioned and merely takes out of the Cannon resolution as written now the matter of legislation and funds for the DIA and the NSA and other groups in the Department of Defense and within the services. Those items, under this amendment, would not have to go through this budget process. They would not have to be authorized as we use that term in legislation. I am one who favors authorizations, gene?ally. But under this amendment funds for those strictly military operations would be excepted. They would not have to go through the process of authorization where the amount of money and the amount of manpower become involved. Now, these are the key points, gentlemen: An au- thorization, the amount of money, the amount of manpower, not only in total- ity but for some of these major divisions would have to be set forth and be bind-. ing on this body once the authorization process has been met as required by the resolution. It would be binding on this body in open or secret session, and then be binding on the Appropriations Com- mittee and binding on this body when the appropriations bill came back for passage. I am talking about the Department of Defense appropriation bill. The author- ization will not be binding on the House of Representatives, not binding on their CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-SENATE May 19, 1976 committees, not binding on their repre- sentatives at the conference that it has always had on the Defense appropria- tion bill. Now, that is the basic condi- tion that this resolution, whatever its virtues may be, does not solve. It cre- ates this additional fatal defect, I re- spectfully say, that will keep this sys- tem, as proposed, from working. Our amendment merely undertakes to take out of that process this authoriza- tion. Now, just a word on this. By and large over the years the real foreign intelli- gence has been highly valuable to our Nation. The military intelligence has been highly valuable, and in all the things the select committee found-and I am ashamed of a lot of those facts- there was not much, Mr. President, that was attributable to the military services. I do not come here to defend them. I just say'it is a fact that, according to your record a very small percent of the wrongdoing, the evil things that were uncovered, were attributable to the serv- ices. There you have that military chain of command, there you have the military discipline, and I pray God we will always have that discipline; there you have their pride of service and responsibility. Anyway, the part of this operation this amendment covers is limited solely to the armed services, and there are cer- tainly not a great deal, a great number of things evil, in all of this proof that can be-attributed to them. There are no dirty tricks that they pulled. They just were not in on these matters, except in a slight degree, and that was under some special orders more or less from the Presidents of the United States during unrest and turmoil and high uncertainty. If I may just relate this incident, talk- ing about uncertainty, I was on my way to Capitol Hill one morning, driving my own car. Down there, very near the White House I was literally stopped, bodily stopped, and these organized groups threw a blanket over my windshield so that it was impossible to move forward. Well, I had the presence of mind enough to knov) that I had better stay in the car rather than get out, but they had effectively stopped the operation of the Government so far as one, Member of this body was concerned, and that is what their purpose was. I think maybe it was some of that group, the then Presi- dent had had some of the military look- ing in on, trying to find out their motives. I know the group was successful, and this body could not have convened that day had all Senators suffered the fate that I had suffered. I was finally released. By whom? By one of their own, one of their own group, one of the group which was stopping the operations of the government, who came up there and pushed the others out of the way and said, "This is a damned shame." He pulled that blanket away and told me to drive forward. Well, I persuaded them to let me drive backward. But I got- out. That is just a little of the atmosphere prevailing here when some of these activ- ities might have been carried on where some part of the army got a little over the line. But of the evil about whi are also concerned, not much of it tributable to this group. If we have to make up a budgeWd any committee has to go through the process, the ordinary budget process, and bring an authorization in here and argue it, debate it, and then another commit- tee, Appropriations, has to take it and operate under, it and come back, and. then if the Appropriations Committee goes over the line items subject to a point of order, all the debate back and forth could be day after day and time formation will get out. I do not accuse anyone of intentionally leaking or telling anything, but it will get out. It is in- evitable. It has before and it will now. Then when we would go to the confer- ence on the proposed authorization bill the other side is not bound by it any- way. What kind of disclosure am I talking about? Our friend here has already mentioned the Manhattan project that brought us the atomic bomb. I was not here then. I refer to the U-2 which was the air- craft which became known as "the spy in the sky." I can say on my responsibility that the activities of that group saved us billions of dollars by giving us information that caused us not to make mistakes as to the kind of weaponry we would build I suggest that literally saved us bi of dollars. I pass on to another. Take the By the way, I do not want to be a mem- ber of any new committee, whatever form it will be. I have been through, I believe, my share of sleepless hours about these projects. For over 4 years we were on the verge there of getting from that sunken sub- rnarine a regular mine of information, to learn about codes and many,. many other things. If there had ever been suspicion- no one had to tell it to kill it, if there had ever been suspicion-that we were carrying on that activity, that would have been the end of it because they would, naturally, have come in, and we would have had to go away. It finally fell through for other rea- sons, as we know. These are not imaginations, these' are actual facts of life. I do not support the resolution as a whole because of the defect I described in the beginning. I beg, peg even, because it is so important, that Senators recon- sider the matter. Let us put in this amendment so as to have a special cate- gory. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. NUNN). The Senator's 3 minutes have .expired. Mr. STENNIS. One minute. Put in a special category on life that they cannot go through thi- nary process. We will find anothe wa,y to be effective, because the budget Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE 12 ss, the authorization, the debates, he point of order just cannot apply. President, how much time is there is amendment? e PRESIDING OFFICER. Fifty- r(ine minutes. Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Chair. Mr. President, I yield the floor. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield myself 10 minutes. Mr._ President, this amendment would deny the new committee any legislative, authorization, or oversight jurisdiction over the intelligence activities of the De- partment of Defense. It would fundamentally alter the com- promise language offered by Senator CANNON last Wednesday. I must strongly oppose this proposed amendmelt. The new committee must have con- current legislative and authorization jurisdiction over the national intelligence activities of the Department of Defense for the following reasons: The Department of Defense is the Na- tion's primary collector of intelligence information. It controls 80-90 percent of the Nation's spending on national intel- ligence programs, and most technical collection systems are developed, tar- geted, or operated by Department of De- fense personnel. The Department also supplies a great deal of information to nonmilitary intelligence agencies. It pro- vides critical information of national se- ty policymakers on a multitude of is- including strategic arms limitations peace in the Middle East. dingly, the executive branch the DOD intelligence activities as al ntegral part of the entire national intelligence community. For example, in February, the President charged a new committee on Foreign Intelligence, chaired by the Director of Central Intel- ligence, with responsibility for overseeing and coordinating the Government's en- tire national foreign intelligence pro- gram, including DOD's intelligence pro- gram. If the new committee did not have jurisdiction over the defense intelligence agencies, it would be denied jurisdiction over most of the intelligence community. It is very important to achieve the proper relationship between the civilian intelligence agencies and the military in- telligence agencies. The two different types of agencies must work closely to- gether to assure as accurate and unbiased intelligence as possible for use by all mili- tary and civilian decisionmakers. It would be difficult to achieve this goal if responsibility in Congress for the intelli- gence community was split up so that one committee was responsible for the civil- ian intelligence agencies and one the military intelligence agencies. The Department of Defense has an enormous technological capability that could be used to violate the rights of American citizens. Past disclosures of as the FBI, CIA, and other agencies. example, the select committee has curity Agency from 1947 to 1975 under a secret arrangement with three U.S. tele- graph companies. Second. An estimated 100,000 Ameri- cans were the subjects of U.S. Army in- telligence files created between the mid- 1960's and 1971. Third. Army intelligence maintained files on Congressmen because of their participation in peaceful political meet- ings under surveillance by army agents. Fourth. As part of their effort to col- lect information which related even re- motely to people or groups in communi- ties which had the potential for civil dis- order, army intelligence agencies took such steps as: sending agents to a Hal- loween party for elementary school chil- dren in Washington, D.C. because they suspected a local dissident might be pres- ent; monitoring protest of welfare moth- ers' organizations in Milwaukee; infil- trating a coalition of church youth groups in Colorado, and sending agents to a priests' conference in Washington, D.C. held to discuss birth control meas- ures. Fifth. Army intelligence officers opened the private mail of American civilians in West Berlin and West Germany. Sixth. The military joined other in- telligence agencies in drafting the so- called Huston plan in 1970, and later participated in the Intelligence Evalu- ation_ Committee, an interdepartmental comittee established by the Justice De- partment to analyze domestic intelligence information. Just this past weekend the select com- mittee released a 49-page report describ- ing in detail abuses by the Defense De- partment intelligence activities. It de- scribes how the DOD collected informa- tion about the political activities of pri- vate citizens and private organizations, monitored radio transmissions in the United States, investigated civilian groups considered threats to the military, and assisted law enforcement agencies in surveillance of private citizens and orga- nizations. The same expertise gained by the new committee through oversight of the CIA and FBI could and should be used to oversee the DOD's intelligence activities so that civil liberties are protected. A committee with the necessary re- sources must closely examine the DOD intelligence agencies to avoid duplication and inefficiency and assure the best in- telligence possible. The Defense Depart- ment spends billions on intelligence. Yet the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Mr. Ellsworth, testified before the Govern- ment Operations Committee in January- that- The problem that we have had with the Defense `Intelligence Agency, as I see, is the same problem that we have generally with all intelligence in this Nation. That is, there are weaknesses in the quality of analysis and estimates that our intelligence community provides to us. I do not think that there is anyone in the intelligence community that would take issue with that. Our objective is, as far as the DIA is con- cerned, to very substantially improve the quality of the analysis and estimates that the DIA produces for the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. S 7537 If we cannot achieve that objective, then we have got to think of some other; way of structuring defense intelligence activity so that we can improve the quality of the fin- ished intelligence product. Problems with DIA exist despite the fact that DIA's problems have been rec- ognized for a number of years. In 1970, the Fitzhugh report, containing the con- clusions of a blue ribbon defense panel organized by the executive branch, crit- icized DIA's performance, concluding that "the principal problems of the DIA can be summarized as too many jobs and too many masters." In order to avoid waste and duplica- tion, and improve the quality of intelli- gence generally, the intelligence commit- .tee must have an overview of all national intelligence activities. It must be able to make choices 'between programs within and outside of DOD and to make changes in the way all the agencies-operate and are organized. Without authority over DOD's national intelligence activities, the new intelligence committee's jurisdiction would be incomplete in a crucial respect. The pending substitute to Senate Res- olution 400 recognizes that, to be effec- tive, the new committee must have leg- islative and authorization authority over the intelligence activities of the Defense Department. At the same time, it is writ- ten in such a way to protect fully the interest of the Armed Services Commit- tee in intelligence matters. Under section 3 (b) the Armed Services Committee will share with the new com- mittee legislative and authorization au- thority over bills involving DOD intelli- gence. Any legislation, including authori- zations, reported by the new committee and involving DOD intelligence activities will be sequentially referred to the Armed Services Committee upon request of its chairman. Section 3(c) of the resolution assures the Armed Services Committee the right to continue to investigate the national intelligence functions of DOD in order to make sure that the intelligence agen- cies are providing DOD the intelligence it must have to operate effectively. Section 3(d) provides that the Armed Services Committee will continue to re- ceive directly from all intelligence agen- cies the intelligence it must have to con- tinue to carry out its other responsibili- ties. One of the responsibilities of the new committee will be in fact to make sure that the intelligence agencies are promptly providing the other committees of Congress the information they should have. Section 4(a) requires the new commit- tee to promptly call to the attention of other committees, such as the Armed Services committee, any matters deemed by the select committee to require the immediate attention of such other com- mittees. Section 8(c) provides the new select committee with the authority and responsibility to adopt regulations that will permit it to share sensitive infor- mation with other committees in a way that will protect the confidentiality of the information. To assure that there is close coopera- tion between the new committee and the Armed Services Committee, the substi- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R0,00200180001-5 S 7538 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE May 19, 1976 tute reserves two seats on the committee for members of the Armed Services Com- mittee. The substitute does not give the new committee any legislative, authorization, or oversight responsibility for tactical in- telligence. Responsibility for this type of intelligence will remain solely within the jurisdiction of the Armed Services Com- mittee. The new committee will only have jurisdiction over that portion of DOD's intelligence activities which provides na- tional intelligence that DOD, the State Department, the President; and others in the executive branch need to make broad national policy decisions. The definition of intelligence in section 14(a) of the substitute to Senate Resolution 400 spe- cifically excludes from-the- committee's jurisdiction tactical foreign military in- telligence. The new committee will not have jurisdiction over tactical intelli- gence which seeks to meet the more spe-, cific technical interests of the weapons developers and field commanders. As a practical matter, the national in- telligence portion of the DOD budget may be authorized by the new commit- tee, in conjunction with the Armed Services' Committee, apart from the rest of the DOD budget. The distinction between national and tactical intelligence is an accepted one in the executive branch. The Defense Department already pre- pares a consolidated defense intelligence program which includes expenditures for intelligence of the type covered by this resolution, but excludes "intelligence re- lated activities which belong in the com- bat ..force and other major programs which they are designed to support." The Director of Central Intelligence already prepares a national intelligence budget. Indeed, President Ford's recent executive order gives the executive branch's Com- mittee on Foreign Intelligence-CFI- headed by the Director of Central Intel- ligence, responsibility to control "budget preparation and resource allocation" for the national foreign intelligence pro- gram. The President's directive provides, however, that the Committee on Foreign Intelligence will not have responsibility for tactical intelligence. The final report-of the Church Com- mittee on Foreign Military Intelligence similarly indicates that it also was able to separate national from tactical intel- ligence and to arrive at separate figures for each. Distinction between the different types of intelligence are in fact already being made for Congress by the Department of Defense as part of the budgetary process. In September 1975 the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee wrote the Secretary of Defense as fol- lows: The committee is concerned about appar- ent attempts to lessen the visibility of in- telligence funding. Therefore, the committee directs that the 1977 budget presentations include manpower and dollar amounts for in- telligence, direct support, and intelligence- related activities. The committee insists that the total cost of intelligence be presented to the Congress, and by requiring submission of justifications for these programs the committee hopes to assure the accomplishment of this goal. Mr. Ellsworth testified before the Government Operations Committee con- cerning this letter that, The Defense Department and agencies are following this directive and are supplying to the committee a thorough justification of intelligence and intelligence-related activ- ities in the fiscal year 1977 budget. Mr. Ellsworth indicated that in the material being prepared for the House Appropriations Committee, the Defense Department was in fact attempting to distinguished between tactical and na- tional intelligence despite, his testimony that the distinctions were difficult to make precisely. In discussing Senate Resolution 400 before the Armed Services Committee last Thursday, Mr. Ellsworth did not argue that it was impossible to author- ize separately the type of national in- telligence activities covered by Senate Resolution 400. There may be gray areas where it is difficult to decide whether a particular activity belongs to tactical or national intelligence. It may take the -new com- mittee several years to finally settle, in consultation with other interested com- mittees and the executive branch, the precise dimensions of the budget. But these technical budgetary issues can be removed. The Comptroller Gen- eral wrote the House select committee November 10, that- Once the Congress has outlined the ac- tivities which it wants identified and re- ported in the intelligence budget, it will be possible to establish guidelines for the ex- ecutive branch to follow in developing and submitting the budget. The responsible committees of Con- gress have every right to know as exact- ly as possible how much DOD spends on intelligence. To the extent that this in- formation is riot available now, it should be one of the first jobs of the new com- mittee to work with the executive branch to make sure it is available in the future. The fact that it may take some study and work to settle all the questions is no reason to deny the new committee the crucial authorization power itmust have to exercise effective oversight. In summary, the proposed substitute to Senate Resolution 400 will assure the Armed Services the ability to have access to intelligence information, and the abil- ity to consider legislation; including au- thorization legislation, involving DOD intelligence. The resolution creates a new committee that can work with the Armed Services Committee in this area so that the time-consuming and diffi- cult work necessary to oversee the in- telligence committee will not have to fall on the Armed Services Committee alone. Mr. TOWER. Will the Senator yield for a question? Mr. RIBICOFF. I am pleased to yield. Mr. TOWER. I would like to suggest to. the Senator from Connecticut that the Stennis-Tower amendment does not touch the question of oversight, only the question of legislation. It is addressed only to the legislative section of the resolution and not on the question of oversight. It does not take away the authority for oversight on the part of the new select committee. Mr. TOWER. The power to s or what have you. Mr. RIBICOFF. But in order to job, and do it properly, we do beve that it is important that the new com- mittee share with the Armed Services Committee the legislative functions in- substitute that 8 members of this com- mittee will be taken frouti Armed Serv- ices, Foreign Relations, Appropriations, What we are doing is adding seven more members to the committee, four from the majority and three from the Senate, who have just as much of a stake, and whose integrity I havediMt I have high respect for tl`ici' and higher regard. I think the Sena- tor from Mississippi appreciates that from the past experiences we both have ator from Mississippi and the Senator from Texas should realize that there are body. Consequently, I think it is absolutely necessary, in order to have the complete support and complete confidence of the Senate in basic decisions that - will be made in the future, that the committee tions, and Armed Services. Mr. President, at this time, on my time, I would like to accord the distin- guished Senator from Georgia a colloquy on some problems that are bothering Committee. I think the colloquy will mittee do have. Senator from Illinois, on the. Govern- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 or all the diligent work which into this. questioning, but I will start with the question of whether or not there is any- thing in the pending substitute to Sen- ate Resolution 400 which would require public disclosure in any form of the amount spent on intelligence. Mr. RIBICOFF. No. Senate, Resolu- iton 400 creates a new committee and defines its jurisdiction. It does not try to decide the important issue whether the intelligence budget should be dis- closed publicly, and, if so, in what form. The new committee is encouraged by section 13(a) (8) to study this issue. I would expect the full Senate to give this difficult issue full consideration after the new committee submits any recom- mendations it may have on the matter no later than next July 1. Section 12 establishes a procedure which assures that, for the first time, the intelligence activities subject to the select committee's jurisdiction will be authorized on an annual basis. The sec- tion constitutes a commitment, on behalf of the Senate, that funds will not be appropriated for these agencies before such an authorization. Approval of an authorization, however, may be given in a way that keeps the figures secret, just as now the Senate appropriates f s for intelligence in a way that tains the secrecy of the figures: r. NUNN. I thank the Senator from . Acticut her question along that line: : hen the select committee reports an authorization bill for intelligence funds, how will the full Senate then consider the matter, assuming that the Senate has decided to continue to keep these figures secret? Mr. RIBICOFF. If the Senate decided to continue to keep the overall figures secret, the process could work this way : In the case of authorizations for de- fense-related intelligence activities, any bill reported by the new committee would be sequentially referred to the Armed Services Committee. As in the case of sequential referral of other legislation, there would be no need for full Senate debate prior to this sequential referral. The authorization figure would then be disguised in the DOD authorization bill approved by the Armed Services Com- mittee, as is the case now. In the case of an annual authorization for the CIA, after the. select committee approves an authorization, I would ex- pect that the figure would be disguised in some other authorization measure. Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator. I think that is extremely important, and clarifies a point that has been of con- siderable concern to the Senator from Georgia and I think many other Sena- tors. nother question along the same line: would the new committee bring a wAhjLpr involving the intelligence au- ction figure to the attention of the f Senate, assuming the figures are still secret? CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE Mr. RIBICOFF. In that event, the Senate could invoke the same procedure for a secret session now available to the Senate. Under rule XXXV, the Senate could go into closed session and debate the matter in secrecy, just as they could debate the intelligence budget now in secret session. Mr. UNN. A further question: Will the requirement in section 12 for an annual authorization of the intelligence budget interfere with the ability of the Appropriations Committee to appro- priate funds for intelligence in a timely fashion? Mr. RIBICOFF. The committee au- thorizing expenditures for intelligence activities would be subject, like other committees, to the requirements of the Budget Act. The committees will have until May 15 to complete action on au- thorizations for intelligence. At the same time, the Budget Act contemplates that the Senate will not act on approriation measures until after May 15. This would apply to appropriations for the intelli- gence community. Assuming that all the committees adhere to the Budget Act, the requirements in section 12 will not affect the schedule the Appropriations Committee would follow for the appro- priation of intelligence funds. Mr. NUNN. One clarifying question on that latter point: I understand the timetable and that we may have to re- vise that timetable as the budgeting process is reviewed; but suppose, for in- stance, in terms of the overall intelli- gence activities, that there is a sequen- tial referral of the annual authorization from the Intelligence Committee to the Armed Services Committee. I understand that under the provisions of Senate Res- oltuion 400, in the case of such a referral the Armed Services Committee would be allowed to have that bill for 30 days! Suppose the Intelligence Committee gives them the bill on, say, May 14. Then the Armed Service Committee would be right up against the May 15 deadline. I suppose the committees would just have to work together under those circum- stances. Mr. RIBICOFF. I would say so. I would assume that the Intelligence Committee would, on a basis of comity, adopt a schedule that would assure that the Armed Services Committee had'the full 30 days to do its job. It should be remembered that on the Intelligence Committee there will be two members of the Armed Services Commit- tee, and I personally would be very dis- appointed in the Intelligence Committee if they did not make sure that any com- mittee entitled sequentially to 30 days would have the full 30 days before May 15 to comply with the Budget Act. Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator. I have another line of questioning on this point: Under present law, the Committee on Armed Services has authorizing jurisdic- tion over all of the military personnel and all of the civilian personnel in the Department of Defense. The manpower requirements report indicates that there are 42,000 military personnel, 9,500 civil- ians, and 5,300 reservists in the overall manpower authorization for fiscal year S 7539 1976 for the intelligence and security category. My question is, With the new Intelli- gence Committee having authorizing jurisdiction over Defense Department in- telligence, how would the two commit- tees handle the manpower authorization which relates to Defense Department personnel in general, but also includes intelligence personnel? Mr. RIBICOFF. Let me respond to the distinguished Senator from Georgia and the distinguished Senators from Missis- sippi and North Dakota, who are so deep- ly involved in such matters: This is the type of situation where, in my opinion, it would first go to the Armed Services Committee and then, sequentially, to the Intelligence Committee. You would come first, in my opinion, where the bill is a general Defense Department manpower bill. The Armed Services Committee would continue to have exclusive jurisdiction over all aspects of the legislation except for the portion affecting national intel- ligence. The portion of the legislation af- fecting national intelligence would be re- viewed by both the Committee on Armed Services and the new committee, under section 3. It would be up to the new com- mittee and the Armed Services Commit- tee to work out the details on the pro- cedure for actual consideration by both committees of the intelligence portion of this bill. Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield to me and let me inter- vene on that same point? If the Senator will yield, I appreciate the suggestion of the Senator from Connecticut, but the bill, as I under- stand it, provides to the contrary, that it would go to the Intelligence Commit- tee first. Senators will understand that our hearings on manpower start in the fall of the year, before-the budget even comes in. Mr. RIBICOFF. Well, basically it is up to the Parliamentarian, in a sequen- tial referral, on the basis of what is in the bill. If it is basically armed services, it goes to the Committee on Armed Serv- ices first. If-it is basically intelligence, it goes to Intelligence first. It is my per- sonal interpretation that if it provided for overall manpower, covering the en- tire Department of Defense, common- sense would dictate-and, of course, the Parliamentarian is the final judge-that that would go to armed services first. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. ALLEN). The allotted time has expired. Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield myself 2 more minutes. It would go to Armed Services first, because intelligence would be only a part of the overall Department of Defense manpower authorization. Then out of that would be carved out only the intelligence portion, which would then be referred sequentially to the Intelligence Committee. May I say for the benefit of the Senate that it is my feeling that there are a lot of gray areas in this legislation. It is impossible to answer all the questions. We are going to have to work it out between all the committees and the In- Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 - S 7540 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200'180001-5 - - . CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976 telligence Committee. All the interested committees will have to exercise a great deal of commonsense. I would say much will depend upon the quality of that 15-member committee. Also, I think it should be pointed out that the reason why we have a resolu- tion, and the advantage of the resolu- tion, is that a resolution does not bind the executive branch. If this is to work, we will have to have comity between the executive branch and the Senate of the United States. I personally believe that the greatest problem America has today in the matter of foreign policy is not our problem with foreign governments or our prospective opponents, but the di- visions between the executive branch and the legislative branch. I think the greatest problem we suffer as a nation in the field of foreign policy is the conflict, we have gone through in the last few years between the executive and legis- lative branches of the Government in the whole field of foreign policy. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's additional time has expired. Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield myself 2 more minutes. Here is an opportunity for the Senate and the executive branch to work closely together with the Intelligence Commit- tee, to work out the problems of broad policy, for the executive branch to gain a sense of what the Senate is going to do, and what the sentiment of the Senate is. I can think of no greater blow to the executive branch in our foreign policy than to find our Nation - embarrassed over a matter like Angola: If the execu- tive branch had gone before a commit- tee like the Intelligence Committee and had obtained the sense of this 15-mem- b-er committee that it just would not fly, it would never have developed into such a matter of conflict, to the embarrass- ment of our Nation. I have confidence in the majority and minority leaders, that the men they will choose will make this committee work in a way that benefits the Senate and the United States. Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, may I ask one further, question on that manpower matter? Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield. Mr. NUNN. It is my interpretation, from what the Senator from Connecticut has said, that the overall manpower au- thorization, as it is now, would be sub- mitted to the Armed Services Commit- tee, the Armed Services Committee would act on that manpower request, just as it acts on other requests, and then the por- tion -of the manpower proposal dealing with intelligence would be referred to the intelligence committee for their re- view. Is that correct? Mr. RIBICOFF. That is the way I interpret it, Mr. NUNN. 'If there were a difference between, say, what the Committee on Armed Services authorized in terms of manpower and what the intelligence community authorized in terms of man- power how would that difference be brought to the Chamber? The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Sen- ator's time has expired. Mr. NUNN. I know the Senate would resolve it. But how would it be brought to the Chamber? Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield myself 1 additional minute. I suppose the Senate would have to resolve this as they resolve all other con- flicts. There is no difference. The Senate eventually is going to decide, and they will have to make that decision. But again, looking at the makeup of the committee, with eight members coming from basic committees and seven from the remainder, of the Senate, and the Committee on Armed Services being well represented by two members, personally I do not think we are going to have any problems. I do not think we are going to ble that jealous or that shortsighted in this body. Mr. NUNN. I thank the Senator from Connecticut. Several Senators addressed the Chair. Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield to the distin- guished Senator from Nevada, after which I yield to the Senator from Illinois. The PRESIDING OFFICER. How much time is yielded? Mr. CANNON. Will the Senator yield me 1 minute? Mr. RIBICOFF. I yield the Senator 1 minute. Mr. CANNON. Mr. President, on May 17, 1976, the hearings on Senate Resolution 400, having been concluded, the director of the National Legislative Commission of the American Legion, de- siring to express its attitude toward Sen- ate Resolution 400, sent me a letter set- ting forth a resolution adopted by the National Executive Committee of the American Legion-on reaffirming "the American Legion support for a viable intelligence community." In light of the colloquy, just preceded, between Senator NUNN and Senator RISICOFF, I think it appropriate at this point, and I, there- fore, ask unanimous -consent that the letter and resolution be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the letter and resolution were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: THE AMERICAN LEGION, Washington, D.C., May 17, 1976. Hon. HOWARD W. CANNON, Chairman, Senate Committee on Rules and Administration, Russell Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. ' DEAR CHAIRMAN CANNON: It is my under- standing that a floor vote to invoke cloture on S. Res. 400, to establish a Standing Com- mittee of the Senate Intelligence Activities, will occur later this week. The National Executive Committee-of The American Legion recently met in Indian- apolis, Irldiana and adopted the enclosed res- olution (Foreign Relations Res. No. 23) re- affirming our strong support for a viable in- telligence community. Mr. Chairman, the Legion hopes that you will keep our views and recommendations in mind when the measure is considered by the full Senate. Your attention to this request is ap- preciated. Sincerely, MYLIO S. KRAJA, Director, National Legislative Commission. Resolution No. 23. Committee: Foreign Relations. Subject: Reaffirm American Leglo are indispensible to any nation's security and deterrence; and Whereas, there is presently a massive and sustained attack on-- the 'American intelli- gence community which has the effect of dis- crediting all intelligence operations; and Whereas, these continuing attacks have already seriously impaired the functioning of the CIA, Hampering the collection of worth- while intelligence by the Central Intelligence Agency, and the CIA is- also experiencing great difficulty in gaining cooperation from some foreign intelligence agencies; and Whereas, without credible intelligence op- erations, the United States becomes a blinded warrior. incapable of insuring even its own survival; and Whereas, at a time when America's intelli- gence community has been seriously im- paired, the KGB has expanded to an esti- mated 300,000 agents, domestic and abroad, with close cooperation from intelligence serv- ices which it has trained in Romania, Hun- gary, -Cuba and other nations; and Whereas, leaks of legitimately classified information with profound impact on our national security have become commonplace; and Whereas, no Congressional oversight of the intelligence community will be effective in the absence of specific statutes concerning the leakage of classified Information which effects our national security; and Whereas, the British- Official Secrets Act of 1911, as amended by the Official Secrets Act of 1920, has effectively safeguarded classified information without infrinaiftnt Whereas, the U.S. Supreme Cour g- nized the need for safeguarding ed information in the New York Times pu lica- tion case when Justices Stewart and White concurred that "it is clear . . . that it is the constitutional duty of the executive-as a matter of sovereign prerogative and not as a matter of law as the courts know law- through the promulgation and enforcement of executive regulations to protect the con- fidentiality necessary to carry out its re- sponsibilities in the fields of international relations and national defense;" and Whereas, it is obvious that executive orders and regulations alone can no longer con- trol the unauthorized release of classified information; and Whereas, the U.S. Congress faced and re- sponded to similar situations, namely the enactment of 50 U.S.C. 783(b), 18 U.S.C. 798 and the Atomic Energy Act; and Whereas, in the Scarbeck case, the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia point- ed out that the Congress fully intended to permit a prosecution without violating the same national security that 50 U.S.C. 783(b) was designed to protect; now, therefore, be it Resolved, by the National Executive Com- mittee of The American Legion in regular meeting assembled in Indianapolis, Indiana, on May 5-6, 1976, that we reaffirm our sup- port for a viable intelligence community which adequately advises the U.S. Congress of its major activities and one which operates within the current statutes and safeguards; and, be it further Resolved, that we support enactme penalties for violation of its provisio be it further Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 Approved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R0002001800 May 19, 1976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE it further Resolved, that this legislation should clear- ly prohibit the classification of infromation which does not effect the national security, of the United States. Mr.,LEAHY. Mr. President, will the Senator yield for a unanimous-co sent- Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, I am-happy to yield. Mr. LEAHY. Mr. President, I ask unan- imous consent that Douglas Racine and Herbert Jolovitz of my office staff be ac- corded privilege of the floor during con- sideration and votes on Senate Resolu- tion 400. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered. Mr. PERCY. Mr. President, the Sen- ator from Connecticut wishes to have a 3-minute colloquy and ask a few ques- tions at this point. The Senator from Illinois wishes about 10 minutes some- time before 1 p.m. I think we have held the floor, and the proponents of the amendment may wish to have time now. I am happy to defer my comments until afterwards, depending on the wishes-of the Senator from Mississippi. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield 4 the distinguished 'ranking minority tuber as much time as he wishes. the Senator from Maine. Mr. MUSKIE. Mr. President, I have a more complete statement covering my support of the compromise resolution, but in light of the colloquy which has taken place between the distinguished Senator from Georgia (Mr. NUNN) and the distinguished floor manager of the bill, part of which related to the budget process, I shall. make some brief observa- tions on it from that point of view. Mr. President, I rise and support the establishment of a new Senate committee with legislative jurisdiction over the na- tional intelligence community. Senate Resolution 400, as favorably re- ported by the Committee on Government Operations, would have created such a permanent committee. The substitute re- ported by the Committee on Rules and 'Administration would' not have estab- lished the kind of committee that the times demand. The compromise amend- ment (No. 1643),, proposed by the two committees, would set up a new select committee with sufficient authority to exercise those responsible uses of power that are required. As the American people now know so well, Congress' 40-year informal method of overseeing the activities of the Cen- ral Intelligence Agency, the National curity Agency, the Federal Bureau of 'RKnvestigation, and other agencies in- 'ved in domestic and foreign intelli- ce has been careless and ineffective. err host of intelligence agency abuses, violations of the law, covert operations, and infringements on civil liberties- without the knowledge of Congress-has been revealed by the Rockefeller Com- mission and the Senate Select Commit- tee on Intelligence Activities. The Senate myst take the lead to start anew in fulfilling the constitutional role of controlling the Nation's purse strings and formulating national policy. Vigilant legislative oversight over the in- telligence activities of the United States is very much in order to assure that such activities are in conformity with the Con- stitution and the laws of the land. die Budget Committee's view- point, a new select committee with juris- diction jk*er the national intelligence budget annual basis fits right into the co ional process of analyzing and co ling the budget. The regate outlay of the various intellig&ri a agencies is significant. At this time, Senate committees deal with parts rather than the whole. Intelligence spending-is not looked at in terms of na- tional priorities or priorities within our foreign-defense policies. "Neither the Armed Services Committee nor any other committee has the time, because of its other duties, or the necessary overall jurisdiction to attend to the Nation's in- telligence system," Senator CHURCH tes- tified before the Committee on Rules and Administration. He added that- The executive budgets for, and organizes and directs the national intelligence effort in a way that draws together the various com- ponents, and unless the Congress establishes a committee that can do the same, it will continue to fail in its oversight responsibili- ties. Section 3 of Senate Resolution 400, as amended, would provide for periodic au- thorization of appropriations for the CIA and other intelligence agencies. Each March 15 that committee would submit a report on intelligence spending for the forthcoming fiscal year to the Senate Budget Committee. This is what every authorizing committee does now, in ac- cordance with section 301(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974. Sec- tion 4(c) of the compromise resolution reads: On or before March 15 of each year, the elect committee shall submit to the Com- mittee on the Budget the Senate views and stimates described in section 301(c) of the ongressional Budget Act of 1974 regarding matters within the jurisdiction of the select ommittee. Reports to the Committee on the Budg- t would be received and handled in a manner consistent with the protection of national security. It-seems to me that the colloquy be- tween Senator RISICOFF- and Senator uNN covers this point very well, from oint.of view. AnQther aspect of the legislative process involved here is helping to re- store Congress role as a coequal branch of Government. I agree with the "Minor- ity Views" statement set forth by Sena- tors PELL, WILLIAMS, CLARK, and HAT- FIELD in the Rules Committee report: In failing to adequately control the activ- ities of the intelligence agencies abroad, Con- gress, in effect, has appropriated funds with- out knowing how they would be spent by the.executive to carry out foreign policy ob- jectives. Without the knowledge or approval S 7541 of the full Congress, the CIA has received funds to carry out paramilitary operations in Chile and Laos and assassination attempts against a number of foreign leaders. At the same time, Congress has refrained from de- manding access to vital intelligence informa- tion concerning matters of foreign policy upon which it is called to act. By establishing an effective oversight mechanism, Congress can assert its right to essential information and begin to define the proper limits of secrecy in a democratic society. A Select Intelligence Committee in the Senate with authorizing powers is essen- tial. This committee must have primary authority to consider and act on the an- nual budgets for the intelligence agencies within its jurisdiction. By controlling the purse strings, the select committee and Congress will have restored its rightful role in directing America's future intel- ligence activities-and America'ss future. I thank my good friend from Connecti- cut for yielding me this time to support him in his' efforts and to compliment him on the effective way in which he has handled this issue and. the problems connected with it. The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. LEAHY). Who yields time? Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I have a question which I intend to direct to the amendment. Mr. RIBICOFF. Mr. President, I yield 2 minutes to the Senator from Connecti- cut. Mr. WEICKER. Mr. President, I ad- dress myself to the amendment of the distinguished Senators from -Texas and Mississippi. In the "Dear Colleague" letter they sent out, they said: The amendment would provide: 1. It would remove from the proposed new select committee legislative jurisdiction over Department of Defense intelligence. The ra- tionale is twofold. First, it would minimize the possible disclosure through the long and debated process of authorization of sensitive intelligence figures. Rather than being sep- arately "authorized by a bill or joint resolu- tion passed by the Senate", as required by the Substitute, Defense intelligence figures would continue to be included in various parts of the Military Authorization and Ap- propriation Acts. I cannot overstress the damage to defense intelligence that could flow from budget clues which would enable foreign powers to determine information and trends on our highly sophisticated electronic and satellite activities. The difference I have with the Sten- is absolutely unconstitutional. I bring to the attention of the dis- and that clause which reads: No money shall be drawn from the Treas- ury, but in consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement of Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time,, What seems rather unsettling to me is that as men sworn to uphold the Con- stitution of the United States apparently we have some system or some procedure that de facto supersedes the very specific requirements of the Constitution. It does not say in the Constitution an account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money except those allotted to Approved For Release 2004/05/13 CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 S7542 roved For Release 2004/05/13 : CIA-RDP90-00735R000200180001-5 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE May 19, 1976 Intelligence activities. It says all public money, all money. And as much as I appreciate the thrust of the comments in the Chamber, which is to try to keep these moneys from pub- lic view, it seems to me that, if that is what they desire to have accomplished, then I suggest a constitutional amend- ment. But to me the duty placed on us in this body, in the legislative branch, and the executive branch, is very clear, as mandated by the Constitution of the United States, regardless, of what the process has been in the past, and the process has been a direct violation of the Constitution of the United States. I ask either the Senator from Texas or the Senator from Mississippi as