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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2 Next AFIO Convention October 1-2; Bob Brown Is New Chairman AFIO's Board of Governors has decided that the date of the next AFIO national convention will be October 1-2, 1982 and will be held in the Washington, D.C. area. The San Diego chapter, which had requested that the convention be held in its area, has withdrawn its offer because of a number of difficulties they would encounter this year. Robert Brown has been selected as the new chair- man for the AFIO '82 Convention. Mr. Brown is a 30 year veteran of the Central Intelligence Agency (1950- 1980) where he held a variety of senior operational and staff positions in the DDO. (He was awarded the distin- guished Intelligence Medal for his work there.) Prior to his CIA employment, he served in the U.S. Navy (1944- 1946). Mr. Brown is in the process of selecting his committee and determining the best hotel sites in the Washington area for the next convention. AFIO mem- bers will be kept informed of his progress in the next edition of Periscope. Legislative Pots Bubbling in the Congress John S. Warner, AFIO's legal adviser, has written the following roundup of current Congressional activity concerning matters of intelligence concern: What hath Congress wrought? As far as the intelli- gence community is concerned, the answer is - not very much. The Intelligence Identities Protection Act (HR-4) was passed by the House by an overwhelming vote of 354-56 late in 1981. (The details of the floor debate are included in our AFIO News Commentary sent out to members on January 1, 1982.) (cont'd on page 5) Welch Memorial Fund Drive Opened To Clarify U.S. Intelligence Aims A drive has been opened by a number of former intelligence officers to solicit contributions for the Richard S. Welch Memorial Fund, at Harvard University's School of Government and Center for International Affairs. The prime purpose of this Memorial Fund will be to encourage the teaching and talking about intelligence at Harvard and across the country. The sponsors state that the topics to be addressed by the Fund will include the (cont'd on page 3) AFIO Spring Luncheon The spring luncheon of AFIO is tentatively scheduled for March 29 at the Fort Myer Officers' Club, Arlington, Virginia. The speaker will be Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Lawrence J. Brady, who will discuss the technology flow from the U.S. to the Soviet Union. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2 KGB Disinformation: A Senior Defector Speaks (Final Installment) (We conclude the re-printing of the highly interesting and revealing views of Ilya Dzhirkvelov, a 1980 KGB defector whose last cover assignment was that of Novosti editor. Mr. Dzhirkvelov was interviewed in En- gland in mid-1981 by the editor of the American Bar Association's Intelligence Report The first portion of the interview appeared in our last (Vol. Vl, No. 4) issue of Periscope.) Dzhirkvelov: Here is a fresh example of "pure" dis- information. On May 26, 1981, the Soviet newspaper Izvestia under the heading CIA Sabotage informed its readers that the paper Noticias de Beira of Mozambique published a series of articles (a series, not just one arti- cle) on the subversive activity of the CIA. The series ""revealed" that "from 1961 to 1976 the CIA organized nearly 900 operations against politicians and govern- ments in different countries." It is a remarkable analyti- cal work-especially if we recall that in 1961 the present Mozambique (and its apparently formidable intelligence service) simply did not exist. The source, therefore, is quite clearly distinguishable. I must, however, make it absolutely clear that in disinformation the KGB is only the arm, the tool, the performing force. The aims for disinformation are set, the targets are chosen and the plans made only by the ""apparatus" and the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee. Q. What can you tell us about the role of the KGB in manipulating front organizations and orches- trating internal campaigns like the recent campaigns against the neutron warhead and the modernization of theater nuclear weapons? What specifically does the KGB do to assist these campaigns? A. Every Soviet organization-be it a state office or a "society" of any kind-is studded with KGB officers and informers if this organization deals with foreigners. This is true also for Soviet delegations at any interna- tional congress or meeting, whether the host organiza- tion is a front one or a genuine one. But the KGB itself does not "supervise" front organizations; neither does it launch or conduct any campaigns. This is the preroga- tive of the Central Committee departments, acting on the sanction of the Secretaries. The actions of various kinds may indeed be performed by the KGB officers using some cover in the international organizations- but never on the decision of just the KGB. The KGB capabilities abroad, especially in the West, are certainly used to propagate the Central Committee line and ""mobilize" public opinion in campaigns against neutron warheads, etc. But no more than "used." Q. The author Claire Sterling in her recent book charges that the KGB has been heavily involved in supporting international terrorism. Is this a matter about which you have personal knowledge, and if you do, could you tell us what you know about the degree of this involvement, the geographic target areas, the principal surrogate organizations through which the KGB has worked, and its mode, or modes, of operation? A. Let us speak separately of two kinds of terror- ism. There are terrorist groups like the "Red Brigades" in Italy or the former Baader-Meinhof group in Germany and the like. I dare say that the KGB has nothing to do with those-even if they use Soviet made weapons. The KGB did "liquidate," or made attempts to "liquidate" some leaders of anti-Soviet organizations, of emigres like Bandera, Rebet, Konovalenko and others-among them former Soviet citizens who remained, or intended to remain, in the West. But that was done by the KGB itself, without relying on usually unstable terrorist groups, often hostile to the Soviet Union. There is, however, the other kind of international terrorism helped and sponsored by the KGB. I mean the "'national liberation" movements in African, Asian, Latin American and even European (Ireland) countries. Prom- inent in this category is, no doubt, the Palestinian Liber- ation Organization. It is certainly used as one of the main tools in the fight against Israel and even against the Western democracies. In the training of the "figh- ters" for the Palestinian and other "movements", active assistance is sought (and received) from Bulgarian, East German and Cuban special services. The urban guerril- las are trained on Soviet territory, in the three above mentioned "brotherly" countries, and now also on the territory of several African states-like Angola, Congo, Mozambique and possibly Libya. The supply routes for those "movements" may vary. In my time a lot of weapons and ammunition was sent through Tanzania. However, the goods-and espe- cially arms-for the Soviet sponsored terrorists do not always safely reach their destinations. I remember a case when a consignment of 30,000 automatic rifles and other military equipment was delivered from the USSR to Tanzania under some disguise-and then dis- appeared without a trace. Rumors persisted in Africa that a group of smart Tanzanian "businessmen" had sold the arms "on the side" for an astronomical amount of money and the Soviet Union thought it wise not to claim the loss. Q. There have been reports in the West that it is official Soviet policy to wage what has been called a '"resource war" by progressively denying the West access to vital raw materials. In your KGB experience, did you hear talk about the "resource war," and could you tell us what you know about the direct involve- ment of the KGB in this war? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2 Marine Corps Commandant, Gen. Barrow, Addresses AFIO Pearl Harbor Day Throng Speaking before a Pearl Harbor Day luncheon crowd of more than 450 AFIO members and guests at the Ft. Myer Officers' Club, Marine Corps Comman- dant Robert Barrow paid high tribute to U.S. intelli- gence and to the effectiveness of the intelligence community. Identifying himself as "a great friend of the intelligence community," he said, "Intelligence production often exceeds the capa- bility [by its customers] to use it." He delivered a rousing speech on the efforts of the U.S. Marine Corps to maintain and improve the quality of its personnel, avowing that he would rather see the size of the Corps shrink rather than see the quality of its personnel lowered. He commented that the current crop of junior Marine officers is the best in his memory. General Barrow was introduced to the sell-out throng by another old Marine, AFIO President John M. Maury. Following Barrow's address, the Hon. Clare Boothe Luce, member of AFIO's Board of Governors, also spoke informally to the luncheon crowd on her memories of World War I I as a member of the House of Representatives from Connecticut. Mrs. Luce has been recently re-nominated to membership on the Presi- dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB) and has moved from Hawaii to Washington D.C. AFIO Chapter Activities (A sampling of recent Chapter activity is reported below if you desire to have Periscope coverage of Chap- ter events, please write to us promptly and with full details.) Western Montana Chapter held its Fall meeting 4 December 1981 at the Missoula Country Club and re- elected Tom Nicholson, President; Terry Nobles, Vice- President; Norman Larum, Secretary-Treasurer; and Dick Grant, Chairman for Montana. Walt Sedoff, AFIO member, lectured on life in Soviet Russia to the student bodies of two western Montana high schools in January 1982. The Chapter has been expanding its membership and now plans to hold quarterly meetings - a real change when we consider the bitter winters around Missoula. Gulf Coast Chapter on November 6, 1981 held a luncheon meeting in Houston, Texas, with a former Soviet diplomat Dr. Vladimir Sakharov, and AFIO President Jack M. Maury as guest speakers. More than 80 people attended and the meeting was covered by the local ABC and CBS TV affiliates as well as the press. At the close of the meeting, Mr. Fred Rodell, Chapter President, presented to Dr. Sakharov and Mr. Maury, on behalf of the Governor of Texas, commissions of "Honorary Texas Citizenship." (cont'd on page 7) Welch Memorial Fund (cont'd from page 1) rationale, historical importance, and contribution of intelligence in creating an informed U.S. government foreign and national policy; and a better national under- standing and appreciation of the intelligence function. As most AFIO members are aware, Dick Welch, one of CIA's most promising officers, was assassinated at the entrance to his home in Athens, Greece, on December 23, 1975 by persons not yet apprehended by the Greek government. At the time of his death, he was serving as the CIA chief of station in Greece. The Memo- rial Fund has been created as a means of commemorat- ing Welch's love of his intelligence profession. Harvard was chosen because Welch was a graduate (1951) of that University. The immediate goal of the fund-raisers is $50,000. Among a long list of persons publicly supporting the Fund are former Directors of Central Intelligence, Richard M. Helms and William E. Colby; Ambassadors (ret) Taylor Belcher and Delmar R. Carlson; Dr. Ray S. Cline of Georgetown University; and a number of our own AFIO luminaries including past President David Atlee Phillips and our current President, Jack Maury. AFIO members desiring to contribute to this worthy cause, whose aims coincide with those listed in AFIO's own charter, may make checks payable to the Richard S. Welch Memorial Fund, and send them to Dean Bayley Mason, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 79 Boylston Street, Cambridge, Mass. 02138. All contribu- tions are tax-deductible and will be credited to the cur- rent Harvard Campaign. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2 KGB Disinformation: A Senior Defector Speaks (cont'd from page 3) A. The Soviet government has been paying much attention to the "resource war" since the mid-forties. It started with oil. As early as 1945 or 1946 a Soviet- Iranian oil company called Kivirhurian was formed. The Soviet director of the company was the KGB officer Artavazd Mangasarov, a trained oil specialist. The aim was to build a pipeline for getting cheap oil from both Iran and Bahrein and gradually to make the Soviet Union their only customer. These plans were thwarted by Mossadegh who, on seizing power in Iran, imme- diately nationalized all Soviet-Iranian companies. Very significant from the point of view of the resource war" was the turn in the long-range Soviet policy towards Arab countries and Israel. I remember how surprised we were in the KGB when it became clear that the Soviet Union froze her relations with Israel-initially very warm-and took the side of her Arab foes. Our opinion was that Israel, a predomi- nantly socialist country, well disposed to the Soviet Union, was a much more useful ally in the Middle East than any Arab country. Israel could have become an excellent vehicle for intelligence and other penetra- tion into the U.S.; indeed the saying was that whatever would happen in the U.S. tomorrow was already known in Israel today. Yet the Soviet leader-then Stalin- decided to support the Arabs against Israel, and the rea- son, we were told, was oil. The anti-Communist mood of the late Egyptian president Nasser was ignored; it was his pan-Arabic designs that tempted the USSR to gain control of oil deposits in the Middle East. This long-term policy has been carried on since. It is worth stressing that at that time the USSR had virtually unlimited oil resources and therefore the Soviet interest in Middle East oil was clearly political: to deny use of oil to the West.' In 1971, when I was the TASS correspondent in the Sudan, the Foreign Trade Minister of the USSR, Patolichev, visited that country. He spoke to Soviet per- sonnel in Khartoum on the aims and methods of Soviet foreign trade. He mentioned as an achievement the new treaty with Iran on supply of the natural gas which, according to Patolichev, the Soviet Union could re-sell to the West at a good profit. But he also stressed that, trade advantages aside, oil and gas had, first of all, great stra- tegic and political importance. "Stalin himself under- stood it well," said the Soviet Minister. As for the role of the KGB in the "resource war," it is serious enough. Both the KGB and the GRU are gath- ering intelligence world-wide on the availability of vari- ous resources-to enable the Soviet leadership to act precisely in the way which would hurt the Western countries most. Then, the KGB is ordered to concentrate its efforts on the countries important for their mineral resources-both to obtain more information and to 'Translator's note. As a Soviet journalist in 1956, the translator attended a briefing on the Middle East by the Central Committee lec- turer German M. Sverdlov, who said: "Nasser is a Fascist but he has his finger on the jugular vein of the West-and therefore we support him." influence the events in those countries. Stalin's goal of depriving the West of the mineral resources of the planet is still pursued. Q. How much control does the KGB have over intelligence operations conducted by Cuba and other Communist bloc countries, how does the KGB exer- cise that control, and how is the entire operation coordinated? A. It is a little misleading to speak of "control" by the KGB over the intelligence services of other "social- ist" countries. There is rather a very close partnership in subversion against the West and in supporting various anti-government organizations in the rest of the world. Naturally, the KGB is an undisputed "senior partner" but one should not diminish the initiative and activity of others-notably of the Bulgarian, East German and especially Cuban special services. A lot of support for "national liberation" forces in Latin America and Africa comes from those three countries. The major actions, big concerted operations, are discussed and agreed in advance with the Soviet side- but then not just with the KGB, often at the higher level (where the KGB is now, of course, represented by virtue of its Chairman Yuri Andropov being a full Politbureau member). Apart from that, in the intelligence services of most "socialist" countries there are, as a rule, the KGB "advisers" who coordinate (and possibly to a certain extent control) all joint operations. They may be, of course, just "keeping an eye" as well. Q. As you are aware, there has been a good deal of debate in the United States over the morality of covert operations. Does the Soviet Politbureau impose any restrictions on the kinds of covert opera- tions from sabotage and assassination to support for pro-Soviet parties and organizations in the West? Could you give us a few examples of KGB covert operations in each category? A. All major operations conducted by the KGB abroad are to be approved in advance by the top Central Committee leaders-one of whom is, of course, the KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov. But if such an "offer of an operation" is made to the Central Committee Secret- ariat, it very seldom is turned down, not only because Andropov is in the Politbureau, but also because serious operations are discussed by top KGB people beforehand with the Central Committee "apparatchiks" who are privy to such matters and who prepare the decisions finally made by the Politbureau or Secretariat. Here is an example from the past, but, to my best knowledge, the decision-making process in this respect has changed very little. When we planned covert operations in Iran-like abductions or "liquidations" of undesirable persons or "'evacuation" of our valuable agents from there-we had to obtain the go-ahead from Politbureau level (not necessarily the whole Politbureau; there were members (conci. on page 5) Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2 Notes From National Decals and Pins AFIO decals (circular, about 3 inches in diameter) and AFIO pins are available for purchase. The cost of each decal is $1.00 and that of each pin is $5.00. Cost of postage is included in the price but please enclose your check for the full amount with each order because AFIO national headquarters does not have the facilities to bill our members for such orders. Speakers' Kit As reported in our previous issue, we now have ample supplies of our Speakers' Kits for sale at AFIO headquarters. Cost of each Kit, which runs to over 150 pages, is $5.00 and checks must be sent with each order. Overseas members must pay $10.00 to cover additional postage costs. Soviet Disinformation (cont'd from page 4) of it who made decisions on behalf of that whole body). When, after the debacle of the KGB-staged uprising in Iranian Azerbaidjan, we made plans for rescuing the Central Committee members of the Tudeh party which was the driving force behind the uprising, those plans had to be approved by Stalin himself. I was then the participant in the planning and peforming of that opera- tion and I remember that Stalin rejected the idea of sending an aeroplane to Iran (incidentally, to the same plateau where much later a helicopter rescue operation by some other country proved to be not really success- ful). In any event, the Tudeh leaders were evacuated from Iran by various individual routes. I personally organized the border crossing by the Central Committee Secretary called Kombakhsha, dressed as a woman, from Iran to the Turkmenistan desert. Q. At the time you defected from the USSR, the post-Watergate campaign against the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies was still going on. What can you tell us about the KGB reaction to our self- mutilation of our intelligence capability? Do you have any knowledge of KGB involvement in the campaign against our intelligence communities? Legislative Pot Bubbles (cont'd from page 1) HR-4, as passed, is in accord with the Administra- tion's and the intelligence community's view. AFIO also supports this bill. S-391, as introduced by Senator Cha- fee, is substantially identical to HR-4. But the road was rocky in the Senate when the Senate Judiciary Commit- tee reported S-391 but amended it to resemble HR-4 before it was amended on the House floor to conform to S-391 as introduced. [Editor's note: This is sometimes the way things are. Bear with us.] Much of the support to amend S-391 in committee was generated by elements who simply wish to kill any legislation of this subject. In my opinion, supported by many Constitutional scholars, the assertions that the mere concept of this legislation is unconstitutional, is pure sham. Some of those same elements were shout- ing "unconstitutional - First Amendment Rights" in the two Marchetti cases and the Snepp case. They lost in the courts and the U.S. Supreme Court rejected their arguments. What they lost in the courts, they are now trying to win in the halls of Congress. The issue was not brought to a floor vote in the Senate in 1981 and it will be scheduled for action, we hope, early in this year's session, with strong efforts on the floor to amend S-391 as reported, to return it to form as originally introduced. I urge all AFIO members to write to your two Senators requesting them to support such action. This battle can be won and we have cau- tious optimism that it will be. FOIA and Other Legislative Amendments Other likely legislation will be amendments to the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). AFIO is monitoring this and, when the appropriate legislative vehicle is determined, you will be informed. The chances of serious consideration of statutory charters is most slim. Another legislative item of interest is the amend- ment to the Federal Tort Claims Act which would require individuals alleging violations of their constitu- tional rights, to sue the U.S. Government and not indi- vidual government employees. As you know, there have been hundreds of law suits of this nature, naming indi- vidual employees as defendants. This legislation is in good form and would be effective. Enactment appears likely. A. Denunciations and "exposure" of the CIA and other special services of the Western countries is, of course, one of the most favored lines of the Soviet pro- paganda machine. In this activity the help from the KGB is always sought; it advises on targets, names, etc., inside the USSR, for internal consumption, and con- ducts some "mobilization" of public opinion abroad. Naturally, the KGB was delighted that the U.S. Congress and the U.S. media were doing such a good job for them. Yet it must be emphasized that the KGB was not really taken in by the campaign. The KGB bosses never believed that the CIA was "demolished" or "utterly incapacitated." The KGB still retains a great deal of respect for the CIA as the most sophisticated service of its kind in the world. The American "self-mutilation" was, for many a KGB chief, simply some strange deca- dent propaganda. Two New Executive Orders In passing, I wish to mention two Executive Orders, both issued on December 4, 1981. E.O. 12334 estab- lishes the President's Intelligence Oversight Board to inform the President of intelligence activities which are believed to be in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, executive orders, or Presidential directives. The Chairman of this Board shall be desig- nated by the President from among the appointed mem- bership of the reconstituted President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). The other order, E.O. 12333, is a re-written direc- tive governing "United States Intelligence Activities." It replaces the over-restrictive executive order issued by President Carter but does not "unleash CIA." It provides a sensible and reasonable basis on which CIA and FBI can go about their tasks in a more effective fashion. 5 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/08: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100140058-2 On the Intelligence Bookshelf ... Current books of interest to intelligence buffs and watchers of the world scene. Blackford Oakes Strikes Again How It All Began ... DONOVAN AND THE CIA, by Thomas F. Troy, University Publi- cations of America (44 North Market St., Frederick, MD 21901), 1981, 589 pp., including illustration charts, bibliographic notes, appendices and index. $29.95 It is a pleasure to be asked to write a commentary on this book, not only because of the excellence of the product but also it is for me an exercise in nostalgia. Of the latter, more later. As to the book, it is meticulously researched. The author had unusual access to almost all the pertinent record material. Tom Troy, as I know, is an indefatigable pursuer of the facts both on paper and through personal interviews. He also has perspective and the ability to organize his material well. The result is a first rate historical item-far and away the best on intelligence on the American scene and well up with some of the recent excellent publications from the British. I happen to agree with Troy's argument in his preface to the First Edition that there is definite historical connection between Donovan and the creation of CIA, and later will support the argu- ment from my own memory. But first, some comments on Troy's unique contributions. One of the most useful is putting the role of Sir William S. Stephenson into proper context; not to down-grade him, as he played an important and useful part, but he was not quite the eminence grise others would have him. Another is Troy's locat- ing and describing all the documents which pertain to the growing pains of OSS and the later debate on the concept for post-war intel- ligence. The end product is pretty close to the definitive word on how CIA came to be. Having said that, I now come to the nostalgia and here Troy's account does not accord in all respects with my memory. I have to admit that whenever I took up a point with Troy on which we dif- fered, he could almost always bring up some record that supported his view, and I also am aware how treacherous one's memory can be after nearly forty years. However, I have certain very clear pic- tures in mind that vary somewhat from Troy's perception of some events. First, I would like to give credit for what I consider to be the strong and important contribution of General John Magruder. He was an unusual military man, coming from a distinguished military family. Early in World War II, when he was, I believe, the senior colonel on the Regular Army list, he was sent to the Far East by the Army to assess the contribution that China's millions could make to the land war against Japan. Contrary to the official assumption that this would be massive, Magruder came to the conclusion that we could expect no reliable or substantial military support from the Chi- nese. I suspect but cannot prove that this was why Magruder was assigned to OSS and remained there as a Brigadier General. He was an intellectual and he thought deeply about intelligence, and had become convinced that an independent and centralized intelligence organization was essential for post-war needs. In the debate on this subject, in the fall of 1945, Magruder was Acting Director of OSS and then SSU. (Donovan was at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials and played little part in this particular struggle.) As Acting Director, Magruder, with valuable aid from his staff, was responsible for some of the best papers arguing his and Donovan's points which I believe were persuasive to such key prsonages on the scene, such as Ferdi- nand Eberstadt (then a consultant to Secretary of the Navy Forrestal on matters of unification, including intelligence) and Assistant Secretary of War for Air, Robert Lovett, both of whom played major roles in what emerged as CIG. Troy does mention Magruder, and his importance is hard to document, but I offer it as a personal impression. I would also like to emphasize the contribution of (then) Major General Lauris Norstad to the CIA legislation. One of the main bones of contention was the relation of the Director to the President. Dono- van had insisted that the DCI report directly to the President, while most of the other participants wanted him to report to an interde- partmental board similar to the National Intelligence Authority for CIG. John Warner and I had drafted a bill in SSU starting in early MARCO POLO, IF YOU CAN, By William F. Buckley, Jr., 233 pp., New York, Doubleday, $13.95 Having spent some 40 years in various aspects of the second oldest profession, I find most spy books too contrived to be credi- ble or too involuted to be readable. Bill Buckley's accounts of the adventures of Blackford Oakes, though, are a shining exception. Buckley has done his homework. Thus, in the case of MARCO POLO, IF YOU CAN, it is difficult to comply with the unwritten law that book reviewers must find nits to pick. The best I can do in this regard is to note that Allen Dulles' official title was Director of Central Intelligence, not "of the Central Intelligence Agency;" that at no time within memory was his desk "immaculate" (it was invari- ably cluttered with papers, pipes and pipe ashes); and the camera compartment in the U-2 was in the center, not the tail section, of the aircraft. (Beyond this trivia, by the way, Buckley's description of the design and operation of the U-2 is authentic and, to the technically-minded, fascinating. As one of the masterpieces created by "Kelly" Johnson, the legendary design genius of Lock- heed's famed "Skunk Works," the U-2 is even to this day a marvel of ingenuity.) Buckley is equally authoritative in his portrayals of Allen Dulles, J. Edgar Hoover (and the strained relations between them), Dean Acheson, Eisenhower and Khrushchev. Inevitably the reader will identify Oakes with Gary Powers of the fateful U-2 mission of May 1, 1960, which has been blamed for wrecking the U.S.-Soviet summit meeting of that year. But the only similarity between Powers, the shoemaker's son from a Virginia coal mining village (who was later killed in a helicopter accident), and Oakes, an authentic Ivy Leaguer, is that one actually, and the other fictionally, did a hell of a job for his country (although a job which Powers, to our shame, never received the recognition he deserved). Beyond this, Buckley takes us on a wide-ranging tour of the spy business. He covers the intricate process of sorting out num- berless leads in a counter-intelligence case. He lets us in on FBI surveillance techniques. He describes a beautiful and privileged Vassar girl who turns out to be a sort of Kim Philby mole. He tells us what it's like in the pilot's seat of a U-2 flying over the Soviet Union at 70,000 feet. He suggests how a sophisticated and auda- cious deception operation might alter international relations on a massive scale. He treats us to a ringside seat at a shootout in an East Berlin loft, at occasional sexual encounters and at a tempes- tuous summit meeting, and provides profiles of assorted KGB operatives, including an "illegal" of the Rudolf Abel variety. In fact, Mr. Buckley conveys in 230 pages more of the flavor of the real world of espionage than can be gleaned from a dozen books by renegade former intelligence officers or investigative journalists. He does so with style and wit, and his narrative moves along at the exhilarating pace of a Porsche on the autobahn. Those who can pick up MARCO POLO, IF YOU CAN and put it down short of the last line are the people who'll turn off the TV tube during "sudden-death" overtime in the Superbowl. - John M. Maury 1946 which followed Donovan's concept. It was a long complicated bill containing both the functional role of CIA and the administrative authorities we thought would be needed. As Troy states, Norstad represented the War Department (Army and Air Corps) in the devel- opment of the National Security Act of 1947. I remember the White House meeting on 23 January 1947 which I (as General Counsel, CIG) and Walter Pforzheimer (as CIG's Legislative Counsel) attended with General Vandenburg, then DCI, at which Norstad suggested that we split our bill in two and put the functional part in the National Security Act, leaving the administra- tive aspects until later. This made good sense to us as it put the creation of CIA as an integral part of a major administration bill, and it had the DCI reporting to the National Security Council, chaired by the President. Since the Council was advisory only to the President, we felt that a proper relationship to the top was established. This is an oversimplification of a process that Troy describes at some length, but is is an example of what memory retains as important in contrast to the record as it now appears. 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