THEORY AND PRACTICE: A DIPLOMATS' DEBATE, IN THE SHADOW OF IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000100500027-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: January 10, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/09: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100500027-6
STAT_
0:1 PAG _ LG.
WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
10 JANUARY 1930
.t in the Shadow of Ir
By Boris Weintraub
Washington Star Staff writer
get the proper information you need . States and de Gaulle going back be-
without making it seem that you are fore World War II. That created a re-. !
encouraging the opposition to ex- sentment in the general's mind
pect U.S. support? ? .. which plagued us later."'
So when a covey of diplomatic Hughes harkened back to his days
practitioners who made up a very as deputy chief of mission in London
substantial segment of the U.S. during 1969 and 1970, when a flap de-
foreign-policy establishment for the. veloped over whether, the U.S.
last three decades, as well as at least should close its consulate in South.
half a dozen foreign envoys to Wash- ern Rhodesia to protest the refusal
ington, got together yesterday at of Rhodesian whites to share power
'Georgetown University in a sea of with blacks.
gray-flannel pinstripes to discuss the ? As he described it, the American
le at ambassador t
sim
d
t ver
Lo
- Walt
d
i
eign Service, which is intended to it the Conservatives. Meanwhile, the
raise questions like these, questions Conservative opposition of Edward
of diplomatic processes, diplomatic Heath, which was about to depose
mechanics, rather than those in the the Labor government, was estab-
policy area. But as the discussion I lishing its own secret contacts with
proceeded, the policy questions were Kissinger and his staff in the Nixon
unavo-idable. And, as it is almost- White House, which, in contrast to
everywhere these days, the Iranian the policy of the State Department,
spectre was present. was tilting in favor of the Ian Smith
The panelists discussing the issue regime and "practicing benign ne-
provide a fair index to the level of glect" toward black Africa.
participants in the symposium. They In that jumbled context, said
included former CIA Director Wit- Hughes, who was the opposition?
Liam Colby; ormer Ambassador MIS- I Over and over again, the panelists
worth Bunker; former Ambassador I and members of the audience, which
to the United Nations Charles Yost; I included a large number of former
Thomas L. Hughes, president of the I high-ranking ambassadors and State
Carnegie Endowment. and a former Department officials past and
diplomat, and John Wills Tuthill, present, complained that they knew
former ambassador to, among other of opposition to established regimes
places, Brazil. (Henry Kissinger that were gaining strength in their
spoke in. an afternoon session, but 1 countries and eventually took
put his appearance totally off the power. Again and again, they told of
record.) I reporting this to Washington, but
Almost everyone agreed that being ignored by policy-makers here
American diplomats abroad should for one frustrating reason or
maintain some sort of contact with another.
the opposition. But that was merely a "The problem may be that at
starting point.-Almost everyone pro- I home, at the highest levels, there is
vided horror stories of one sort of a predisposition to see the situation
another designed to show that this is in a certain way, and a reluctance to
easier said than done, and that, even move away from a particular
if good contacts are established, it policy," said Yost in quiet di-
It's one of those questions that
confront all diplomats at Some time,
a nuts-and-bolts question that none-
theless spills over into the policy
field - particularly at a time when
the shadow of Iran looms so large. ,
The question is this: When you are
a diplomat, do you maintain contact
with the opposition to the estab-
lished government in the country?
Simple, perhaps. But then the
questions start to multiply, and take
unusual twists and turns, and start
doubling back on each other, and
pretty soon, it becomes a very, very tion of American foreign policy. Certainly, the most fervent ar ti-
delicate matter. ? meets about contacts wit . the onpo- !
How do you decide what is legiti- When I was serving in France in
? sition were stirred up over the
mate opposition and what is a kooky the 1950s," said Yost, a career diplo- subje-ct'of Iran, where even former
fringe? At what level should any mat, "some of us saw the probability Ambassador-Ric and elms, a career
that the government would fall and
contact be made? What do you do if -inleIhgence o ,tcta , has conceded
you are serving in an authoritarian that Charles de Gaulle would come that the U.S. was the victim of an
country that considers such contacts to power. We did our best to culti- tit teIli ece failure.
round for grave displeasure? How rate those around him. But the prob- ----g-----
g 1-Ielms, in an article written for an,
do you make such contacts so. as to lem was a rift between the United
p
y
o
n
on,
er
no
t seeme
issue,
`a11. Annenberg, "spent most of his time
They were brought together refurbishing the embassy," which
under the auspices of the relatively meant- that dealing with the Labor
new Institute for the Study of Diplo- government of Harold Wilson,fell to
macv of C Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
ffONTI NUED