REPORT BARES NATO FORCES' DEFICIENCIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000200710022-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 5, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: September 8, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05: CIA-R
ARTICLE
ON FAG WASHING-ON POST
8 September 1983
Report Bares
NAT 0 Forces'
Deficiencies
. There is more to the great missile
controversy, now under discussion in
Geneva, than has been reported.
The decision to deploy Pershing II
and cruise missiles in western Eu-
rope not only shook up the Kremlin,
which launched a massive propagan-
da campaign against it, but alarmed
many Europeans who see the de-
ployment as a dangerous escalation
in the terrifying game of showdown.
Why did NATO decide it had to
modernize its nuclear forces despite
the high risk of political backlash?
The explanations are found in clas-
sified documents, which my associ-
ate Dale Van Atta has reviewed. f
A top-secret State Department
report, for example, describes the
deficiencies of the NATO forces now
in place. Of the 72 Pershing lA mis-
sile launchers in Germany, the re-
port complains:
"The Pershing missile system has
been in the inventory for a long time
and is becoming increasingly diffi-
cult to maintain. The system is man-
power-intensive as presently config.
tired. The accuracy and yields of
available warheads make them un-
STAT
suitable for some l mited attacks.
The missile range is insufficient to
place targets in the Soviet. Union at
risk."
NATO wants to deploy .572 Per-
shing II and cruise missiles in west-
ern Europe to offset what is per-
ceived to be a Soviet advantage. Of
urgent concern to the West are ap-
proximately 250 SS20 mobile mis-
siles that the Soviets have trained on
Europe. Each of these awesome mis-
siles can fire three warheads.
The United States also has more
than 600 bombers in Europe. But
they face more than 900 Soviet Bad-
gers, 'Blinders and Backfires. Cau-
tions the top-secret report:
"While dual-capable aircraft %are a
valuable and versatile element of
NATO's forces, all the land-based
aircraft, except the F111, lack the
rangy to threaten credibly strategic
targets in the Soviet Union."
The report describes the subma-
rine-launched Poseidon and Polaris
missiles assigned to NATO as "the
most survivable systems available to
NATO." But the report warns that
they "are generally regarded as 'stra-
tegic' systems whose use prior to
General Nuclear Response might
convey an overly escalatory signal to
the Soviet Union."
There are also problems with
"yields and accuracy" that make the
submarine missiles "unsuitable for
many of the desired targets." In
other words. NATO has a choice be-
tween inadequate weapons that
would be an ineffective deterrent
and apocalyptic weapons that could
turn a "limited. nuclear war" in EM-
rope into a global holocaust. .
Footnote: Aworried Yuri V. An-
dropov suddenly offered to scrap
enough Soviet medium-range mis-
siles in Europe, including SS20s, tb
bring the total down to the number
of British and French missiles=if
the United States will change its
plan to deploy the Pershing II and f
cruise missiles.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/05: CIA-RDP90-00806R000200710022-7