MARTIN CRAMER'S PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000200790020-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: March 24, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional) Concurrent Resolution to Support Establishment
of a National Historical Intelligence Museum
TAT)^"
NO.
Acting Director
Office o
ER 83-1619 OEXA 83-0685
,
External Affairs
DATE
2 9 MAR 1983
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
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FORM 5~ O USE PREVIOUS
1-79 1 EDITIONS
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ROUTING AND RECORD -SST
IAI*A
NO.
ER 83-1619 OEXA 83-0685
Exte nal Affairs so YAR 03
Act n D rector, Office
TO: (Officer detigna~n, room number, and
building)
ExDir
3. ds
A/DCI
/D/O
Concurrent Resolution to Support Establ4.shment
of a National Historical Intelligence! Museum
8 0 ~I
,PR 1993
04 AP
4 APR
R 1983
1983'
OPNCERIS COMMENTS (Number! each cemmeM to show from whom
INITIALS to whom. Draw a 1I1w aaou column aitw each comment)
vc~cs~e>r
- wv-
I
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FOR
I-79M 610 tea
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OEXA 82-1129/1
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
STAT FROM:
uirector, ce o xternal Affairs
SUBJECT: Martin Cramer's Proposed Intelligence Museum
1. Action Requested: None; for information only.
2. Background: Martin Cramer, who you a ro ria ely referred to
STAT Geoffrey Jones,
STAT has promoted the development of an intelligence
museum for many years. He wrote you on 16 April 1982 asking for support
for his long sought intelligence museum. He specifically asked for help
in procuring a Federal site or facility, identifying CIA officers to assist
him, support of requests for exhibit materials, and advice on approaching
people and foundations for assistance.
The notion of an intelligence museum has been considered by succes-
sive DCI's since 1969 (see chronology). Cramer's proposal first came to
CIA in 1977. After careful study it was determined that it would be in-
appropriate for CIA officially to sanction and support such a venture. Cramer
was encouraged to solicit the help of the Association of Former Intelligence
Officers and/or Georgetown University's (Ray Cline's) Center for Strategic
and International Studies. AFIO was unwilling or unable to support it then
and remains unwilling today. Cline's group, however, formed the National
Intelligence Studies Center and named Cramer executive director, where he
continued to promote the museum project. I am informed he was recently
relieved of his duties and is no longer a member of the Board of NISC. His
interest in the museum obviously continues.
The reasons CIA should not sponsor this venture have not changed.
Although Federally-sponsored museums exist, there is no known Government
agency subsidization of a private museum such as Cramer proposes. The Agency
also found--during the Bicentennial and the 1977-78 Outreach program--that it
had little to offer in the way of meaningful exhibit materials that were
unclassified. More importantly, exhibiting intelligence materials in a
museum would send the wrong signal to our foreign friends who we are trying
to convince their secrets are safe with us. In addition, possible legal issues
notwithstanding, it remains that appropriated funds are not now available and,
if requested, would have to compete with other outyear priorities. Finally,
it is inevitable that-CIA support would forever be perceived as domestic
propaganda.
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3. The following have participated in looking again at this issue and
concur in this position:
STAT
STAT
Chief, History Staff
Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection
Director, Center for Studies of Intelligence
Chief, Public Affairs Division
Deputy General Counsel
Special Assistant to the Director
STAT
4. Recommendation: None.
OEXA/PAD/CEWilson/cdk/10 May 82~
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - D/OEXA w/backgr.2 - PAD
1 - DD/OEXA
1 - ER 82-4873/2 w/background
1 - OEXA Reg 82'1129/1 w/background
STAT 1
1
1
1
1 - John Bross
STAT
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Inc pinrctor of Central Intelligence
% hin ton D. C 20505
28 April 1982
Dear Mr. Cramer,
It is nice to hear from you and I am pleased to
learn you are retaining your interest in establishing
an intelligence museum. The trustees of the newly
formed William J. Donovan Foundation are interested
in this project, and I suggest you get in touch with--
Henry Hyde or Geoffrey Jones. Mr. -Hyde"-s, tel,epfione -"
number is (2i 2) 628-8480_-and Mr.--. Jones' number is
I have taken the liberty of sending a copy of
your letter along to Henry Hyde.
Mr. Martin G. Cramer
President, National Historical
Intelligence Museum
STAT
2-4
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k'- %f1 ~.1
STAT
APR 1932
April 16, 1982
The Honorable. William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Dear Mr. Casey:
I hope you will agree.with me that the time. has come to
revive one of the projects you and I discussed some years
back, the establishment of a National Historical Intelligence
Museum. Some of the changes in the intervening years are
obvious, such as a change in attitude in both the Executive
Branch and the Congress. Expanded educational efforts have
helped -- the establishment and nationwide activities of
AFIO, the projects of NISC, the Consortium for the Study of
Intelligence, the Welch Fund, along with expanded outreach
efforts of the Agency and some, at least, of the learned and
professional socities. Another, very important one ins an
outpouring of printed and audiovisual materials on which the
exhibits of the museum can be based.
We have established the National Historical Intelligence
Museum as a non-profit, educational., tax-exempt organization.
%Ye are reviewing possible sites in Washington, D.C., Virginia .
and Pennsylvania. We have a good working board and are be-
ginning to approach people about serving on a general advisory
board or specialized advisory panels (ie. history and in-
telligence). Our fundraising effort is beginning with app-
roaches to selected foundations and individuals. Hopefully,
approaches to corporations will follow before too long . We
have a proposed budget and reams of raw materials from which
museum content can be extracted.
The museum will describe, within approporiate security
considerations, significant intelligence achievements, de-
velopments and personalities, using a wide variety of visual
displays and audio presentations. A summary note on possible
content is enclosed for your review.
Such a collection would go far to increase public under-
standing of the intelligence community and its efforts. The
museum would parallel and complement what other museums at-
tempt in related areas - air and space, (Smithsonian and Cape
Kennedy) aviation development (Wright Patterson), nuclear
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Page Three
Mr. Casey
Our thanks for considering these proposals. I should
be pleased to forward any further information on proposed
content, or in response to any questions you might have.
I know from your historical writing, your continuing
interest in NISC and our talks of some years ago, you will
give this project a very interested hearing. I hope, working
together, we can develop a national intelligence museum,
combining private and public efforts, more interesting than
the traditional war museums and much more comprehensive than
any existing museums in the U.S. with content relating to
intelligence.
Sincerely,
?Martin G. Cramer, President
National Historical
Intelligence Museum
cc: Admiral Inman DD-CI
John A. Bross
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NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
A NOTE ON CONTENT
Making the museum a heavily historical one has many
advantages. It allows us:
1. To provoke thought while interesting (even enter-
taining) the viewers on some very important points
not well understood by many Americans. Dramatic
treatments of history' - historical novels, docu-
dramas, historical or period films - have huge
audiences, as do espionage novels; and nostalgia
underlies the appeal of much in continuing education,
entertainment and hobbies. All this points to a
.potentially very wide appeal for exhibits which
make general points on intelligence collection,
but focus around such dramatic subjects as espionage
and colorful secret agents in the American Revo-
lution, the Civil War and since; cryptographic
successes, such as the Black Chamber and the Naval
Treaty and ENIGMA and ULTRA, and failures (eg.
Russia in World War I), aerial and satellite re-
connaissance, such as in the U-2 story and the
Cuba Missile Crisis;, electronic listening as with
the Great Seal in the Moscow Embassy, and inter-
cepts, as with tapping the recently - developed
telegraph in the Civil War, the Berlin Tunnel and
the Zimmerman Telegram; types and variety of agents
(eg. Philby, Wennerstrom, Col. Abel, Sorge, Rado,
"Cicero") counterintelligence (eg. some of the
FBI's more famous older cases, and more recent
ones involving both military and civilian agencies
and KGB activities more generally).
2. To address such important matters as war and peace,
changes in non-democratic governments (succession
questions), the impact of some revolutions on US
interests, and thus to address general points about
early warning analysis, estimates, dissemination,
and briefings of top leaders, misconceptions and
misjudgements, or failures to disseminate adequately
and use available intelligence. Exhibits covering
such subjects might center on Pearl Harbor; the
beginnings of the Civil War; Arab-Israeli wars;
the extravagant expectation of all initial part-
icipants in World War I; the wishfulness of the
Japanese in World War II; the unwillingness to
listen to evidence of Stalin with regard to Hitler's
preparations for, a massive attack on the Soviet
Union, to cite a few arbitrarily chosen examples.
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Page Two
3. To make some very basic points about intelligence
which the knowledgeable take for granted, but are
not as well understood generally as they should
be. These include:
-That espionage is an ancient and virtually
universal activity.
-That we Americans owe much to intelligence
activities since the time of "George
Washington, Spymaster".
-That although virtually universal, Intelligence
is also a very "national" type of activity,
dictatorships (and before that, absolutist
monarchies) approaching it differently than
democracies and with even differences among
approaches to intelligence among the democracies
(eg. the longtime acceptance of a British
Official Secrets Act).
4. To address sometimes complex factors underlying
the challenge posed by the need to make decisions
which depend on an understanding of the probable
intentions and likely actions of adversaries,
potential adversaries and allies. These could
include stereotypical thinking,--adoption of
imfortant analogies - or failure to adopt them -
or even ?naivite and overconfidence.
5. To mare sometimes controversial matters (eg.
civil liberties vs. requirements of national
security; the role of the courts relative to
intelligence, the limits of Congressional over-
sight; media coverage of intelligence; possible
"political" use of intelligence data) clear in
a relatively noncontroversial way.
6. To avoid the truly sensitive (eg. in dealing with
technology and weaponry in terms of intelligence,
.or with cryptography).
Finally, in planning for relatively - recent content of
the museum we will have to grapple with the fact that even
highly - informed people sometimes tend to "define" in-
telligence differently. The museum's content, will require
further discussion and definition. It clearly would include
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence and should in our
view, include such historical and interesting related activities
as deception and forgeries, and escape anti evasion. I t might or
might not, however in dealing with relatively recent events, cover
to any extent a number of other subjects, such as counter-insurgency
and guerilla warfare, psychological warfare and propaganda and
covert political action, except insofar as such activities re-
quire good intelligence.
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STAT
Admiral Bobby Inman
Deputy Director of 'Central "Intelligence
Central Intelligence: Agency =. .
Washington, DC 20505.-_.
Dear Admiral Inman:
John'-Bross has. suggested: that. I send my revived proposal
:for a National Historical In.telligence'Museum to both Mr. Casey
and you. ' Having heard your recent presentation t.o the State
Department Open Forum Panel, I. am especially, encouraged to do
I was' impressed with. your-stress on intelligence as a .''!
government.-wide matter, and particularly''with the points you.
made on the need' f or-..sustained . popular. support for our 'in-
telligence activitiesand-'agencies. More .specifically,You hit a very responsive cord. in this listener: through comments
that. "intelligence has,, no con'stitbency' and. urgently needs
one" , and that we must avoid the..historical pattern of build-.
ing our intelligence capabilities for actual or threatened.'
hostilities and then dismantling them when a specific combat
or threat of conflict ends.
As you know, the Association. of ' Former intelligence Officers
..(AFIO), our. National Intelligen.ce Study Center;..and' the Consortium
for the Study of. Intelligence -have. all worked to expand popular
understanding. of intelligence., a'nd increase sustained public
support for it.'
Educating and convincing opinion leaders and a public
made skeptical in recent. years. its neither' an easy nor a short-
term task, however'.. It.require's institutionalization. One "??~.
way some- of us have. been attempting this is through encourage-
ment of both more and.more .balanced scholarly and 'popular
writing, and more and better coverage.in-'College courses. This
letter describes ' another.,complementary approach, establishment
of a National Historical Intelligence Museum in a ? location
visited by Americans 'in search of combination of recreation-:..
and their nation's historical 'heritage.'
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Page Two
Admiral Inman
We have set up a non-profit, tax-exempt organization and
established a working board. We are seeking members fora
blue-ribbon advisory board, a. site, funds and help from within
the Government.
We believe the museum should 'take a heavily historical.
approach, and have .enclosed some preliminary thoughts' on,
content for, your consideration.
We are asking Mr. Casey for his assistance with this
project and would 'be very pleased to 'have yours, as well
as any preliminary comments you might have for us.
'Sincerely,
? 'Martin G. Cramer, President
National Historical
Intelligence Museum
r
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CHRONOLOGY OF PROPOSED INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM
1969
1972
1976
1977
1979
1979
1982
1982
DCI Helms considered but finally dropped a suggestion to locate a
museum at the Smithsonian.
DCI Colby established an Intelligence Museum Commission of Agency officers
to establish a program for conserving and exhibiting materials. Commission
met once but no program developed.
DCI Bush considered a nonprofit, private museum and asked the Management
Committee to consider it. No record it ever did.
DCI Bush turned aside a request from Martin Cramer to serve on an Advisory
Board to a museum Cramer was promoting.
Martin Cramer, representing the National Intelligence Study Center, came to
CIA Public Affairs to solicit help in obtaining U.S. Government funds and
other assistance for the purpose of establishing a museum. Public Affairs
determined funds could not be made available and CIA cooperation on displays
encountered security problems. DCI Turner determined CIA should not be
part of project.
Martin Cramer sought AFIO assistance but was rebuffed.
Cramer, cut loose from NISC attachment, has contacted DCI and DDCI for support,
using John Bross as entre. His position has not changed. ;~ He wants Government
funds, space, and people.
AFIO reviewed again and has no interest.
27 April 1982
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