SOVIET VIOLATIOSN BROADER THAN TOLD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980021-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: January 17, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980021-9
ARTICLE APEkR!D
ON PAGE
i By Teo Acres
WASHINGTON TIMES STAFF
WASHINGTON TIMES
17 January 1984
Soviet viOlations
broader than told
The Reagan administration's re-
port on Soviet arms control viola-
tions contains strong accusations,
.but the evidence presented is sub-
stantially weaker than that which
the administration has in hand, ac-
cording to sources familiar with the
report.
Mr. Reagan, in his speech on U.S.-
Soviet relations yesterday, devoted
only one paragraph to the violations
report. He cited "mounting evi-
dence" that the Soviets have vio-
lated existing agreements and trea-
ties.
A senior State Department
official who briefed reporters Fri-
day on the report, which is to be
sent to the Congress shortly, said
;'we are not seeking to make a pro-
paganda issue" of the violations.
But. he added, "We have to recog-
nize that this is not an issue that can
easily be swept under the rug."
The official, who spoke on condi-
tion he not be identified, outlined
seven areas of Soviet arms control
violations to be cited in the secret,
55-page report.
In 'many . cases, he would not
elaborate or deviate from the re-
port's carefully crafted language.
However, other secret and top-
secret reports obtained by The
Washington Times'reveal the fuller
extent of evidence on arms control
violations in the hands of U.S. mili-
tary and intelligence agencies.
? Regarding the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention and the
Geneva Protocol, the Soviets "have
repeatedly violated their obliga-
tions," the official said. He cited use
of Soviet chemical and toxin weap-
ons in Southeast Asia and Af-
ghanistan as specific examples of
the violations.
The full report, however, also is
expected to raise serious concerns
over Soviet development of biologi-
cal weapons. Special attention will
be drawn to an explosion at the
Sverdlovsk biological warfare in.
stitute in central Russia.
According to a secret report by
the Defense Intelligence Agency,
some 200 people died of anthrax
when a laboratory at a biological
production or storage site exploded
in 1979, releasing highly toxic an-
thrax spores into the air and,
through ventilator shafts, to nearby
factory buildings.
The DIA report concludes there
is "strong evidence" that Sverd-
lovsk contains "illegal production
or storage of biological agents and
weapons"
? Construction of "a large.
phased-array radar constructed
near Krasnoyarsk, in the central
U.S.S.R., is almost certainly a viola-
tion of a legal obligation" of the
1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty,
the official said.
The radar "is well deployed
within the interior" of the Soviet
Union and is facing inward - two
elements in violation of the ABM
Treaty. The concern here is that the
radar could be used as part of a
battle menagement system for a
large-scale ABM system, the offi-
cial added.
The DIA, however, warned in a
secret report on July 15, 1983, that
the giant radar is "ideally suited for
ballistic missile tracking and tar-
get acquisition"
"The radar would also have the
technological potential to provide
target tracking data should the So-
viets decide to deploy a national
ABM system," DIA warned.
The DIA said the radar is "al-
most identical" to large, oper-
ational arrays at Lyaki (near the
Caspian Sea) and Pechora (in the
northwest Soviet Union). Other ra-
dar facilities under construction at
Sary Shagan, Michelevka and near
Moscow are similar in design, the
DIA reported.
? On the testing of nuclear weap-
ons, the administration report will
cite "verification constraints" that
precluded reaching "a conclusive
judgment whether the Soviets are
violating the unratified Threshold
Test Ban Treaty" But, he added,
"We believe it likely that Soviet test-
ing violates their obligation not to
defeat the object and purpose of the
TTBT agreement"
The official pointed out that the
TTBT allows for underground
atomic testing of yields up to 150
kilotons, and that ambiguity re-
mains due to inadequate U.S. verifi.
cation techniques. He said there
have been 11 tests that exceeded
the 150-kiloton limit, one of which
may have been as high as 300 kilo-
tons.
A Defense Department analysis
of Soviet nuclear testing, which was
declassified but which officials
later attempted to reclassify,
presents a stronger picture.. It
shows 14 Soviet underground nu-
clear weapons tests since 1978 that
were above the 150-kiloton limit.
Of these, several were at 250 kilo-
tons or more, and at least five were
at or above the 300-kiloton level -
twice that allowed by TTBT.
? "In view of the available infor-
mation," the senior State Depart-
ment official said, "we cannot reach
a conclusive judgment whether
SS-16 ICBMs are deployed" There
are, however, "certain activities un-
der way" at the Plesetsk testing fa-
cility indicating that SS-16s "are
probably deployed there."
At issue here is whether the o-
viets violated SALT II by oper-
ationally deploying in a mobile
mode the SS-16 intercontinental
ballistic missile. While citjng ?real
concerns" over the SS-]6 at
Plesetsk. the official declined_1o
comment on what exactly has been
nbc.erved due to
methods" of intelligence gather-
A top-secret report of Soviet
SS-16 denlovment by Defense De-
artment analysts states "there is
converging evidence from mu ti e
intelligence sources" that t e o-
viet mobile SS 16 is"deployed oiler
ationallv at the Plesetsk test
range. ,
"DIA, military intelligence Agen-
cies, and NSA (National Security
Agency) all believe that about 180
to 200 SS-16 missiles" are deployed
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980021-9