THE CHEATING ON THE PL5

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980043-5
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
July 22, 2010
Sequence Number: 
43
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 29, 1983
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980043-5 ARTICL AMU ON PAGE -.01 /!Z The Cheating ~ii the PL5 THE WASHTNGTON POST 29 June 1983 Rowland Evans and Robert Novak Just as President Reagan is trying to warm up relations with the Kremlin; he must decide what to do about the ': third Soviet test of a new long-range missile, secretly described by Central Intelligence Agency andAir Force ana- lysts' as more than twice the size al-.' '"lowed by the SALT II treaty. The CIA has sent its analysts back .to restudy-their data. before sending it "on .' to the' White House, putting a "hold" on one of today's most impor- tant government secrets. But there is little doubt ab out validity: Administra- :tion officials were shocked by the clear-, est evidence so far of Soviet missile cheating. Thus. Reagan must decide whether to publicly accuse the Soviets of SALT ii violations even though he may not consider the time ripe for con- frontation. That's because the president is trying to moderate his Cold War rheto- ric and shed the Genghis Khan cloak, bestowed on him by Democrats; in time for. the 1984 election. But Rea- gan's staunchest supporters. in Con-. gress, who have been dismayed by his past reluctance to confront Moscow on SALT I1 violations, will demand that he face tip to the damning evidence The Soviet missile, designated the' PL5, underwent its third test May :UI. This was the first test the United -States was able to scrutinize by special radar screens operated from an elec- tronic ship, well-known to the Rus- sians, stationed in the Bering; Sea off the coast of* Siberia. Normally, radar readings are not nearly so informative as telemetry readings from the missile during its flight, but the PI 5's telemetry was heavily encrypted. Radar scrutiny did reveal this central fact: the throw- weight (payload) of the PL5 appears slightly more than 200 percent of the throw-weight of the old SS 1:3. . The significance of that ratio derives from the fact that SALT 11; which Mos. cow and Washington have agreed to obey. even though it never was ratified, permits only one "new type" missile each for the two superixowers. The-Kremlin has con- ducted four tests on what the United States regards as the one permissible "new type" Soviet-missile, designated the 58X24. 't'hus, the P1,5 cannot be a legal new type" missile. But SAL'I' says the throw-weight of a rncxlernsed or "ti llt w-un' mi:isile cannot exceed the original by more than ::5 per. cent. Yet; the Soviets have informed the' United States that the PIA) is a "folloow- on" of the S813, not a "oew type" missile. ' Clearly, then, if Air Force and CIA ana- lysts are even close to being right in esti- mating a 200 percent increase in throw. weight, the PIA) is a "new type" missile .not a modernimd SS-1:1 Summed up; the radar ship caught the Kremlin cheat- ing red-handed. When the CIA and Air Force iiitetli- gence first received radar data from the M630 test, they sent it routinely to the Foreign Technology Division _of Air Force intelligence and to the govern- ment's Lincoln labs in Cambridge, Mass. Examination of the data in both labor- tories- produced substantial agreement . on throw-weight. These findings were re- turned to the CIA and the Air Force. Air force intelligence officers argued for immediately sending the alarming report on the PL5 to the White House, Stete_Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and Department of Energy. But CIA officials worried about implications of so wide a dis- semination. Despite months of White House hints about going to the Mat with the Russians on alleged SALT violations, Reagan always has decided that evidence of cheating has fallen short and pulled back at the last mo- ment from charging a violation. The CIA finally decided it did not want the heavy responsibility of sending :: the president what looked to he irrefuta= R ble evidence of cheating, boxing him in a corner. Once he received the evidence,. Reagan would have no exit from a major -confrontation with Yuri Andmpo v at a, these might not want it. _ Accordingly.. the"'CIA ordered -the data sent back to the-labs for 'more Cstudy. It also ordered major effhrts;to break the encryptioir code of the mis: site's telemetry-4h -it Af . e pmhshle violation of. SALT 11--so learn the PL5's secrets from its own reports, hack to Soviet stations. But that can only delay the decision for Ronald Reagan. Berth _ his political: advisers and the State Department. tak- ing different routes, have arrived at the same destination: agreement that now is the time for dome U.S.-Soviet reconcilia- tion, specifically a new arms ?controll agreement- Just at this point, ironically.i the president scam will have on his desk evidence of Soviet cheating A). blatant. -that it could produce ail* outcry menac- ing even U S. adherence tci SALT ll.. STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980043-5