KENNETH ADELMAN ON SALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980060-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 60
• Publication Date: February 18, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980060-6
STAT
THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
DI; Fi G + 18 February 1983
Kenneth Adelman on SALT
On Aug. Y8, 1978, The Wall Street Jcur- To do so would be-as Dr. Johnson once I Many would justifiably lament the loss
!
nat published the following article by Ken- said about second marriages-a triumph of of a continual. high-level forum for the su-
neth Adelman, whose nomination by Presi- hope over experience. It is sad but true perpowers to discuss this critical topic.
dent Reagan to head the U.S. Arms Control that weapons technology Is outpacing the SALT would be missed as a means
and Disarmament Agency has been held capabilities of acceptable intelligence' whereby both sides admit strategic parity
up by the Senate Foreign Relations Com- means to monitor strategic systems. so that neither claims superiority. If
mittee. When the article appeared, Mr. Second, the type of weapons included in adroitly handled, SALT could have proven
Adelman was identified as a consultant to the negotiations must be expanded to en- marginally useful in enhancing crisis sta-
the Stanford Research Institute, having compass those based in or targeting West- bility, reducing the arms race and warm-
serued as assistant to the secretary of De- i ern Europe. SALT I and II covered inter- big relations a degree or two with Moscow.
fence from 1975 to 1976. He is currently continental systems. U.S.- and Soviet- The end of SALT would in fact sound the
U.S. deputy representative to the United based systems capable of striking the death knell of detente, 1972-style, because
Nations. other. SALT now stands as the sole remnant of a
Over the coming legislative season, the Again technology has rendered a verita- . once trumpeted network of relations bind.
Senate will assume center stage with its ble myriad 'of nuclear weapons with less big together the superpowers' fate and wel.
SALT II ratification debate. Some observ- than Intercontinental range. These "gray fare.
ers feel there's a good chance it Will ap- area" systems-wdefy the previously But the mourning period for SALT may
proach the drama and excitement of its valid black/white dichotomy of strategic/ be fleeting. The international atmosphere
1919.20 debate over the Versailles Treaty tactical systems-include Soviet weapons would be healthier, though decidedly not
and membership in the League of Na- aimed at Europe (e.g., the SS-20 mobile cheerier, without the sanctification of
tions. missile and the Backfire bomber) and Eu? SALT. A stable U.S.-Soviet truce based on
Regardless of the Senate's response be- rope-based systems targeting the U.S.S.R. mutual distrust is preferable to aberra-
fore the final curtain falls, SALT II is des- _ (e.g., air-launched cruise missiles, aircraft tions of friendship accompanied by nnsa I
tined to become the last act in the current carriers In the Mediterranean and nuclear- vory political and military Soviet con-
era of nuclear arms negotiations. The Car- armed missiles for European deployment duct.
ter administration may profess that ratifi- in the 1980s now under serious consider- The burial of SALT would resurrect
cation of SALT II is essential for the really ation within NATO). U.S. strategic programs as first and fore-
serious arms control measures anticipated Third, the number of actors on the . most a matter of national security and not
for SALT III. But it cannot stop the train of stage of nuclear arms negotiations must primarily one of arms control. It would
history, which precludes a SALT III per se. likewise be enlarged. Various provisions of awaken Americans from their torpor to the
Technological and political forces compel SALT U. have already caused unprece- stark fact that SALT, or any variant
a new generation of nuclear arms negotia- dented strains in NATO. The 'staggering thereof, is simply incapable of baiting the
tions, one quite distinct from SALT I and II impact of heedloss of
enting American strategic ratltd c Soviet strategic buildup. Indeed, since superiority in three key respects. . SALT I the Soviet Union has deployed four
First, the measurements of U.S.-Soviet is sinking into the political consciousness new ICBMs, two new SLBMs (submarine
strategic force must be altered. In SALT I of Europeans, making them increasingly launched ballistic missiles) with two more
and II, nuclear launch vehicles (i.e. inter- disgruntled at remaining mere spectators. upder development and a new bomber.
continental missiles, and later, bombers) Inclusion in any subsequent negotiations of The U.S. meanwhile has tested and can. .
represented the primary measure of stra- the "gray area" systems, which even more celed a new bomber, finished the deploy-
tegic strength. This was quite convenient directly affect their fate, would oblige on- ment of one new SLBM and begun the test..,
since satellite photography could verify a stage European participation. ing of another.
treaty based on this one element. In short, future nuclear arms negotia- This vastly unequal momentum of U.S. ?
Soviet Progress tions must be broadened in these three U.S.S.R. strategic programs will not van.
Strate 'c might, however, can no longer ways . Even SALT_II may have to undergo _ ish; the CIA now estimates Sovielstrategic
ifl alterati on along these lines before final spending at three times that of the U.S.
be comfortably equated with this single Senate ratification is possible. with no relief in sight.
measure. Due to technological break- Over the long haul, such expanded ne- The demise of SALT could prove most
recent hs and Soviet the dictates of SALT I itself, gotiations will prove vastly more confound- valuable in ending a series of egregious
recent progress has been most im big and intricate than even the tortuous American delusions on Soviet intentions.
pressive precisely In other areas of the SALT process to date. Pivotal negotiations The series dates back at least to the
strategic equation: in MIRVing their mis- on technically perplexing matters in such a sprin Secre-
McNamara when a beamed proud Defense Secre-
siles, augmenting civil defense, launching multilateral framework-one involving a tart' of 1965
killer satellites (which threaten our com- dozen nations on the Western side alone- tary during an inter
munications and control systems) and im- view that "the Soviets have lost the quanti-
1 will prove a staggering diplomatic task in- ' tative" strategic arms race and, better
proving ICBM accuracy (which enables deed. The long-dormant troop reduction yet, "are not seeking to engage us In that -
them to more than double the destructive contest." Lest the point be missed, he ..
talks' in Europe (MBFR) offer little
power of their already awesome heavy , grounds for optimism. -..added: "There is no indication that the So.
What The U.S. in turn has accelerated What if such expanded negotiations viets are seeking to develop a strategic nu- .
cruise missile technology. ! were to prove infeasible? What If the SALT clear force as large as ours." Now Mr. '
These areas have become essential in
process were flung on the dung heap of his-
appraising strategic strength. But they tory, McNamara s successor must reckon with
as the Soviet propaganda phrase
defy reliable verification via satellite, a Soviet strategic equality if not superiority.
goes? According to a compelling Defense Nu-
critical consideration since no administra- clear' Agency study, the U.S.S.R. today
tion or Senate would consent to a nonverifi- leads the U.S. in 33 of 41 categories of stra-
tegic power.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980060-6