EX-DEFENSE CHIEFS URGE REVIEW OF ARMS TREATY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980082-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 82
• Publication Date: May 1, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980082-2
AF?T ICLE EARED
ON PAG:. '
THE WASHINGTON POST
1 May 1982
E
iiefs urge
eview of. Arms. 'lr'eatv
By Michael. Getler
f
ttWr
$
wanmStonvnase
Two former secretaries of defense
yesterday urged.. Congress and the
i Reagan adminrstraQnn to take an-
other look at reviving the never-ra-
tified ' SALT' II 'strategic .arms lim=
itation treaty with .Moscow, and.ex-
pressed doubts about President Rea=
gap's claim that the-So vieis had `a
"
over-
definite margin of superiority
i.. -James R. Schlesinger, who served
I under Presidents Nixon and Ford,
and Harold Brown, who was under
President Carter, advanced. these
i views during the second in a series of
i
ttee
'Senate- Foreign Relations Comm
hearings aimed at producing a res-
'olution on nuclear arms control pot
icy that can command strong nation-
al supper
marked wryly that.he was glad to
have- two witnesses _"who presided
ver that decade of- neglect" on mil-
o
itary spending that: the current del;
..V r
-tv
ger, says.is -thee cause of 'so much
Under- questioning by Chairman;
Charles H. Percy (R-11L),. Sehle
San
-
singer said "we..have lost-valuable
time and, more importantly, the.po-
among the US. population by taking'
Arms
hich are now called Strategic
A ReductionTalkI, W TARTh wvss
-
ti
..
souse ?auwq ? w >----? -?
sires to build up U.S. pucleer forces:
,.a~;
first.- "
.
But hesah those goals were over
taken.-by events"and that'this coun_
i
j
w
ll '.strafe
losing more
iid polittCally by.:
-y
8
otiate .hari it would by
- t
o neg
tire
:`going to the.negotiatingtablewith a?
the
i ;Perry-has- aaew'been'p~
-' White House bard for a U.S.-Soviet
:Schlesinger agreed that a meeting.
would be -.`.desirable, .adding: that .
;this. administration came to offic
believing that most'-Americans_ and
allies-.were. not sufficiently aware of
the Soviet menace and thus; feared
tlhaty ;Y-Y" :.meeting
would detract?from their. ability to
mobilize public-opinion.
:.Aithough. congressional aides say
a ainst' an re
chances' are strongly i Y
SALT II;'a growing number of law-
One is" San. John Glenn =(D=Ohio),
who -argued yesterda3r that'SALT TI,
which. is ~stlll officially in. the Senate
-although :dormant:- politically, is a..
quire-cuts of some 250 missiles in.
the Soviet arsenal and then lead to
the next round of START talks.
Schlesinger said he_Loped the ad
ministration "would review that-pos-
sibility of reviving SALT.II." Brown,
testifying later, "strongly ..urged this
committee to consider again the vir-
tues of the~treaty which. he helped
aeshgn. T.
,The Reagan admnustration velif
r mently opposes the Carter-era tree
ty; claiming that it puts no real lim'
'itations on the arms race and con
*firms Soviet superiority in certain
r.weapons. ;. _ ~.
- Under ' questioning by ;Percy
,Brown Said, "I- would- have to re
KspectfuUy disagree". with the
vment'` of . Reagan and' Weinbehge
tabout Soviet- superiority in overall
nuclear forces.
trt Both .;'Brown and' :Schlesinge
agreed that.. ~Moscow's?=,A,land-
'risissiles were now a threat to knot
tout U.S.`.land-based mimes. and
,that,the,Soviets do have. some ad
STAT
The So_viefs do not have, i my
judgment, anything ; 'like. strategic
superiority in the sense of'a mili~ari-
ly or politically useable advantage in
strategic nuclear for ces,".Brown said.
Furthermore..- perceptions of , the
strategic balance are crucially impoi
ttant because they. "affect* the: pout-
~hcal will and morale-of governments
and publics. Thus, it is important for.
'informed individuals, .`particularly
;:those with government responsbiP
' ity, .to-make every effort to express
their judgment' of that balance in
terms-'that are aoauate-neither
alarmist nor complacent," he said.
Schlesinger . did:s not directly'. re-
spond to the -president's='claim but
;said the - United StOes his signifi
'cant nuclear strengths that Moscow
-my or may not have. I would pre=
fer not to buy a pig is a: poke" he
-said when asked .if. he uld: switch
;forces with Moscow. .,., .:.;
Schlesinger said the'- c , -et space
program turned out to a fraud
, many
r
'.and stressed that there . e
unknowns about Soviet wee ns.
~Schlesintter,;_i former .C A
tor.- messed
and
about missUe a
technical failure on both sides' '(;Iv-'
en the spotty Soviet story. in deal:
ring with 'modem ;technologies, one1
' would hypothesize, that this m be'
h a constant worryof the Soviet lead
16-
ers.
.'. "We. ourselves know- a great deal'
more-'j about helicopter; operations'
:and' maintanance?than"We do about
actual missiles operatiops:Yet. if.. we-.
recall the abortive: rescue. operation.
In Iran in 1980,:even?.we,:.with a far.
.more impressive history'of-technical
success, - should bear in mind this
;salient element," he said '
~Vantl
a
ck -officials nt.- eh
' h
o
Staff, (;en.?David Jones,, day be-
wforer~stiessed,.American ` as
in; bombers and missile-firing sub-
arines, and agreed tl \Umt
;,summitmee Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980082-2