U.S. TELLS SOVIET ANY ARMS PACTS MUST INCLUDE ON-SITE VERIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980098-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 22, 2010
• Sequence Number: 98
• Publication Date: September 2, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980098-5
ARTICLE APPEARED
ON PAGE
NEW YORK TIMES
2 SEPTEMBER 1981
Must Zr cii-de' On-Site _Verification I
By LESLIE H. GELS . `,.
the Russians indicated that they now
would be willing to ask questions about
American data on Soviet tones in Cen-
tral & Europe instead of insisting on
Soviet data. But American negotiators
consider this a ploy to get more Ameri.
iVASHIa iGI'ON, ~-~` -' _.. ;.. B ar. oessmer~wyan asaeumr. awsww,
Sept. 1 - The Rea.) k Itis more difficult.t'overify abilities according to the Administration offi-
ni
on uwa any ,inure arms=trol
r- ace
cords will haveto include on-site inspeo.
tion and otherdirect means of verifie.
Lion, acco for
rditrg Administration .oats.:
ctais.
This messagt wasf conveyed. is the
Soviet charge d'affairee inVashington,
:AleksandrA. Besstneitaykh,_bVEugene
V. Rostov, directorof the Arms Control
and DisarlnmenEAency. in a meeting.
onAug.2I:."?f ..,'zs, ti ...
~f..1_ 4.1.6. ,?. A'y~?+M'.~ .',FVi ".
bioscow'baa W. opposed
>suck.
demands. in the?past;an the gtouad that
they. constituted-Intrusion-_into..Sovi
societyandapretextferspying.,;:;,;
Awaiting
Soviet Reepsoeen
A h
ighranking oftclatsaid ths
.ministration. was now :waiting ..fo
reply to the' proposal'tQbegip-ittio
1 meetings immediately in Washington w.
1 elsewhemonthesubfectofvwineadorx:
Mr: Rostowwa~ also said m haYepro-
posed exchanges?.:on '??strategic"doc.
trine," which would d
uch sub.'
jects as plansior fighting nuclear wars
and firststrikeabilities_
Virtually all arms control agreements
are now policed by.what is called "n
tional technical means" a combination
of spy satellites,' with photographic and
radar ability, and, listening. post,.with
electronic and othersomrs.
These were- deemed- by.ntelligmce
experts to be- - sufffdent to monitor
agreements.that:simply limited-mm-
bets of weapons' The satellites can see
and count missile silos; submarine can
struction bays and bombers at airfields:
But tnteiligenceexperta do-not consider
these mesas good enough to monitor the
kinds of liatitatibtss bow being
~r.'thim tie ti
ow for`coming
negotiate rises on medium-range
t:tisslles it Eu rope re slated to begin
DecBmber,. Snd,hose-on strategic _ "
iclear missilsswand:1bombers.are?ex..
rla
-pectedtobe,l;tnnexEspuing: ~:'~~<
'Gauging Cbutsacl~ristics Dlificuli.y.
For these-negotiations.and: partt
larlythetalkson?strategicarms, the Ad.
ministration otfdb are considering
trying to limit witit.they call the "do;
structive powa!`oi iniesiles '
lifting power :: explosive power and -the
number Of r ~. ?::.ry i Js.
.than numbers of weapons..Also, as th aura problems. of.-verification were a
United States: and the-: Soviet Union 'Precondition for the startof the talks on,
begin to deploy. small- and mobile. sys- medium-range missiles in Europe and
ise
tl
..
a,++.as
, -eve n plied that they were not- he Soviet dip-
Sauntingnuimbers will bscorns.liivcadt. l
t th
k
d if:
h
c
eut as
oma
e
t
erots
ould-
;it,Ib deal with this, offd4sa Mr. re
lace in the context of the ne
oti
p
g
a-.
1A to"ld Mr. Bessune
rt3VM4+em bons-themselves rather than separate;
bassy's arms c orttrol e t thai there,1ly and Mr. Rostow responded, tbakthe;'
.These would be specific limitations d sides, or be held as part o&tbe regular
signed.sa,that they could ber.Periflaid negotiation. "
??Z".
jucl oast Mr. Rostov also pointed m as artlde;
.ilesi.measures 4t
f of August 18 from ?ass. the Soviet pressi
agency. by a- comEdatatar, Anatoly
dUttes and exchanges of information on Krasikov, who wrote: "One should real.
demands and a change otdata. so the ire that as new types and modifications.
two sides could agreewith confidenceat of weapons are coming into.being, it is
exactly whatwasbeinglimited. rr? 'z. becoming increasingly,.difficult to find I
..':Since Soviet=American arras =cantrvi common denominator for defining the=
sisted those demands, and negotiations arms limitation.
"~
recent years there have been signs,of quipped that Mr. Krasikov seemed to be
rue anreshold.. aeSi??.13an.,T7eaty
signed in 1974 but'itill' iunratified, lim-
ited-underground nuclear tests-,to the
for.the first time, Moscow and Washing.
[ tton .Clear ag to exchange data on their nu--
Po+. gas' and to limit
tesitag to spediYC places to assist `ven ,
fication.i` :.- .. .
- In the-relatedTieaty'on Peaceful Nu
clearEsploelons signed in 1978 and also
still unratifithe two parties agreed
.not only to information to en.
!,fiance confidence in gauging.the size of
an explosion but also to allow for observ-
"ere and for.access to the sites of the ex-
plosions.:I n::both-.treaties,_abere `were
'provisions. for mandatory consultations
`as questions of compliance arose: ;yi.'., f
Moreover, ? in- both the ' first' treaty
rlimiting strategic arm's signed in 1972,,
and the. , signed. in .1979 but un-.
ratified, the Russians provided Gonsid-
amble datuiontheir forres.;,,x .;
:Admitilstration ; ,offic ialsrs'alsa -dis?'
closed that about six weeks: alp In the
longstallad negotiations in-Vienna on
.mutual and-balanced force inductions,,.
STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/22 : CIA-RDP90-00806R000200980098-5